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 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that tends to conflate Arab foreign 
fighters with Islamist terrorists, and ‘martyrdom operations’ with ‘suicide attacks.’ 
Overlaps notwithstanding, it aims to draw distinctions between Arab foreign fighters 
engaged in defensive jihad defending co-religionists against a military foe, and Islamist 
terrorists engaged in terrorism that indiscriminately targets civilians and non-
combatants. Critically, while disaggregating the two transnational cohorts, this thesis 
also illuminates the nexus between them. It draws on a thesis dataset of 3,010 Arab 
foreign fighters compiled using biographies, martyrdom eulogies, and postings on 
‘jihadi’ websites, in both English and Arabic. This dataset is then used to support three 
case studies involving the defensive jihads in 1980s Afghanistan, Iraq (post 2003), and 
Syria (post 2011). It leverages a theoretical framework based on the concept of 
radicalisation and the language of political Islam, whilst concurrently drawing on 
theories from psychology and historical military examples of combat, germane to 
defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism.  
 
The thesis concludes that Arab foreign fighters involved in defensive jihad employ 
martyrdom operations against military targets, through tactical necessity. Conversely, 
Islamist terrorists employ suicide attacks against civilians and non-combatants, through 
ideological necessity. The trajectory between the two transnational mobilisations 
appears to be broadly underpinned by facets of the Lucifer Effect – the situational 
factors encountered whilst participating in defensive jihad, including but not limited to, 
the experience of close combat in a war zone; being subjected to ideological 
indoctrination; and being exposed to charismatic authority and obedience to it. This 
suggests that subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism by some Arab foreign 
fighters is primarily forged in the crucible of defensive jihad. Such findings should 
result in the crafting of more individualised de-radicalisation and rehabilitation 
programmes for returning foreign fighters, in both the West and the Arab world.  
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 1 
Chapter 1: Setting the Scene 
 
Introduction 
 
Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya was born in 1984, in the town of Buraidah in central Saudi 
Arabia, known to be ‘a pietist community characterised by an extreme social conservatism’ 
and ‘the heartland of the Saudi Islamist landscape’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 89, 121). 1 
Educationally, he dropped out of school ‘where half the classes were in religious subjects’ 
(Ballen, 2011: 8), and domestically he endured an abusive father.2 After a short time in a 
gang in an area where ‘at least half of all men under twenty-five were unemployed’ (Ballen, 
2011: 19), al-Shaya and notably his cousin and close friend, Adil, both turned to religion 
and started attending their local mosque.  
 
Their increased religiosity3 happened to coincide with the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq, 
and a resultant environment in Saudi Arabia where ‘both local imams and some senior 
clerics were encouraging participation in the Iraqi resistance’ (Hegghammer, 2007: 16). 
The narrative was of defensive jihad - a ‘defensive struggle … against non-Muslim … 
enemies in uniform … over territory’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 7).4 A year later (April 2004) 
the Abu Ghraib prison abuses became public knowledge, and acted as a ‘triggering event’5 
for both al-Shaya and his cousin. In October 2004 during the Islamic fasting month of 
Ramadan,6 al-Shaya and Adil decided to travel to Iraq in order to engage in defensive jihad, 
as an Arab foreign fighter, ‘to fight the Americans on Noble Jihad’ (Ballen, 2011: 7). From 
a transcript of his interrogation (conducted later in Saudi Arabia), his ‘objective was to kill 
the Americans, policemen, national guards and the American collaborators’ (Komarow and 
al-Anbaki, 2005).  
                                                 
1 Also, according to Matthiesen (2013: 84) the city of Buraidah ‘lies in the historical heartland of … dissident 
Islamist movements, including al-Qaeda.’ 
2 Ken Ballen (2011) personally interviewed Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya in 2008, at a Ministry of Interior 
Prison Care Centre in Saudi Arabia. 
3 The term religiosity is understood to mean ‘the condition of being religious or excessively religious’ (The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995: 1161). 
4 Hegghammer (2010b: 6) uses the term ‘classical jihad’ to denote defensive jihad. 
5 A ‘triggering event’ is defined as a ‘significantly provocative event’ (Horgan, 2005: 84). 
6 The Holy Month of Ramadan, one of the five pillars of Islam, is a fasting period for all Muslims. 
Hegghammer (2007: 4) noted that the most common departure time to Iraq was during Ramadan.  
 2 
However, once he arrived in Iraq, there appeared to be a point of inflection involving 
‘sound bites’ of indoctrination, including references to Abu Ghraib prison, revenge, and the 
benefits of martyrdom. The leader of their group in Iraq demanded to know: ‘How many of 
you will die to avenge Abu Ghraib? Those most blessed among you in God’s eyes are 
noble shaheeds [martyrs] 7  ready to go to heaven on a martyrdom mission for Allah 
Almighty’ (Ballen, 2011: 27). Within less than two months of his arrival, on 24 December 
2004, al-Shaya carried out a vehicle-borne suicide attack outside the Jordanian Embassy in 
Baghdad, which killed 12 Iraqi civilians.8 He however survived (although badly burnt and 
missing fingers) and after a series of interrogations, he soon became the ‘poster boy’ of the 
Saudi rehabilitation programme (Beaumont, 2014), denouncing terrorism in all its forms. It 
wasn’t until 18 November 2013, that al-Shaya reappeared on an Arabic language Facebook 
account (Shaghor, 2013), announcing that he was ‘honoured to be a soldier’s soldier of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), having pledged allegiance to [its leader] Shaykh 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.’ 
 
The Conundrum 
 
The preceding narrative of Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya reflects a broad conundrum that 
requires headlining. Specifically, to what extent did his geographic origin affect his initial 
involvement in defensive jihad, considering thousands of other Saudis were exposed to the 
same conditions? Did kinship and friendship ties (his cousin, Adil) influence his decision to 
participate in a defensive jihad? To what extent did religiosity (his exposure to a more 
pietistic community) affect his initial involvement? Why were non-Iraqi Arabs motivated to 
participate in a defensive jihad in Iraq as foreign fighters, against the US led coalition? 
Linking the last two puzzles above – can political Islam9 help explain his transnational 
volunteerism? Was al-Shaya an Arab foreign fighter engaged in a defensive jihad or was he 
an Islamist terrorist? Are these two categories the one and the same or can boundaries be 
                                                 
7 Strictly speaking a shaheed is a martyr, while the plural (martyrs) is shuhaada. (Wehr, 1980: 489). 
8 Global Terrorism Database (GTD) ID:200412240004; Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) 
Attack ID: 1006327513. 
9 Political Islam refers to ‘a religious-cultural-political framework for engagement on issues that most concern 
politically engaged Muslims’ (Fuller, 2007: 193), and is covered in Chapter 3. 
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identified and drawn between them? Was al-Shaya’s decision go to Iraq due to him being 
radicalised,10 or did this process occur in Iraq? Despite him surviving his attack, did al-
Shaya conduct a martyrdom operation or a suicide attack? Is there a difference? Why did 
al-Shaya return to political violence (despite rehabilitation) by travelling to Syria and 
joining (as it was known then) the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham?  
 
This broad conundrum within the Arab world underpins a more general inquiry that 
informs the research question: how and why do some Arab foreign fighters cross a 
threshold to subsequently become involved in Islamist terrorist related activities? Although 
discussed in greater detail below, Arab foreign fighters are defined for this thesis as 
ethnically Arab, religiously Sunni Muslim combatants, who participate in defensive jihad, 
with no apparent link to the conflict other than religious affinity with the Sunni Muslim 
side.11 Examples of such conflicts include 1980s Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, 
Iraq (post 2003), and Syria (post 2011). The research question seeks to address the 
‘Western tendency to conflate foreign fighters and international terrorists’ (Hegghammer, 
2011a: 2). Hegghammer is not alone in this assertion: Gerges (2005: 161) recognised the 
tendency ‘to lump all jihadis together in one category and to overlook important subtleties, 
nuances, and differences between them,’ while Ranstorp (2010) implicitly differentiates 
between ‘terrorist and jihadist movements.’12  
 
Yet why does such apparent conflation matter? What does this taxonomic designation allow 
academics and policy makers to do?  What are the implications of branding an individual a 
foreign fighter or an Islamist terrorist? This conundrum and matter of distinctions are not 
about merely semantics or intended to be a pedantic typological debate about various 
transnational cohorts and mobilisations. The need to distinguish between Arab foreign 
                                                 
10 Radicalisation is defined as the ‘social and psychological process of incrementally experienced 
commitment to [an] extremist political or religious ideology’ (Horgan, 2009: 152), that may eventually cross a 
threshold that leads to violence, and is covered in Chapter 2. 
11 This thesis definition is adapted from Hegghammer (2010a: 53) to reflect the sectarian (Sunni-Shia) nature 
of the contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The roots of this sectarian divide, according to Gonzalez 
(2009), are that while ‘the Shia contend that the correct line of succession after the Prophet Muhammad’s 
death in AD 632 should have been familial’ (p. 6), the Sunni ‘accepted Abu Bakr, a close companion of the 
Prophet Muhammad, as their next political and religious leader’ (p. 4). 
12 The very title of Ranstorp’s (2010) book Understanding Violent Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist 
Movements in Europe, implies a distinction between terrorist and jihadist. 
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fighters and Islamist terrorists will facilitate, overlaps notwithstanding, a greater 
understanding of their respective mobilisations, and the situational factors that influence 
their respective decisions and actions. It does not appear correct to simply assume that an 
individual who mobilises to fight abroad in a defensive jihad against a foreign army of 
occupation, has the same motivation as an individual that conducts a self-sacrificial attack 
in a Baghdad market against civilians and non-combatants. In addition, by acknowledging 
those ‘important subtleties, nuances, and differences’ (Gerges, 2005: 161), individualised 
rehabilitation programmes can be established to better reflect them.   
 
However, perhaps this conflation is understandable given that some Arab foreign fighters 
do subsequently become involved in Islamist terrorist related activities.13 As Chapter 4 will 
demonstrate, there were veteran Arab foreign fighters involved in the 1993 World Trade 
Centre (WTC) attack, the 1995 Riyadh attacks, the 1998 East Africa bombings, the 2000 
USS Cole attack, and finally the 9/11 attacks where four of the hijackers had previously 
participated in a defensive jihad in either Bosnia or Chechnya.14 Moreover, this apparent 
conflation (between Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists) is not just an issue in 
academia, inasmuch as the United Nations Security Council (2014) passed Resolution 2178 
(in September 2014) that introduced another term – ‘foreign terrorist fighters.’15 In July 
2015 at a meeting in Madrid, a United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (UNSC CTC, 2015a) discussed the threat from ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ 
including, inter alia, those ‘who travelled to Afghanistan during the 1980s … and to Iraq 
… during the 2000s.’ Yet those who travelled to Afghanistan during the 1980s, were 
labelled by former President Ronald Reagan (1982) as ‘freedom fighters of Afghanistan’16 
In effect, President Reagan was encouraging ‘freedom fighters’ to go to Afghanistan, only 
to be rebranded subsequently as ‘foreign terrorist fighters,’ ‘foreign fighters,’ or terrorists. 
                                                 
13 Hegghammer (2013b: 10) found his data indicated ‘that no more than one in nine foreign fighters returned 
to perpetrate attacks in the West;’ while Ahmed, Comerford, and El-Badawy (2016: 6) found that 76 percent 
of their ‘prominent jihadi’ terrorists had been foreign fighters. 
14 The 9/11 Commission Report (2005) surmised that Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Saeed al-Ghamdi had fought in 
Bosnia (p. 233), while Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had fought in Chechnya (p. 155). 
15 ‘Foreign terrorist fighters’ were defined on 24 September 2014, in the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution (2178: 2) as ‘individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or 
nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or 
the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.’ 
16 Reagan (1982) issued Proclamation 4908 on Afghanistan Day, March 10, 1982. 
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The irony of such rebranding was also recognised by the actors themselves, as Speckhard 
and Shaikh (2014: 244) noted: 
 
“those who opposed the Soviets were supported and called ‘freedom fighters’ and 
many were encouraged to go and fight to throw the Soviets out. So for many, it was 
hypocritical to now call those who resisted the United States invasion of Iraq, 
terrorists - rather than freedom fighters.”17   
 
Finally, it is instructive that the passing of the United Nations Security Council (2014) 
Resolution 2178 (pertaining to ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ mentioned earlier), did not escape 
academic scrutiny. Schmid (2015: 5) suggested that “a distinction ought to be made 
between a ‘Foreign Fighter’ and a ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ but the Security Council 
chose not to do so;” while Malet (2015: 5) argued correctly that ‘the Security Council 
blurred all analytic distinctions.’  
 
The Argument 
 
The central contention of this study is that, overlaps notwithstanding, 18  the transition 
between participation in defensive jihad and subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorist 
related activities, is underpinned by situational factors experienced whilst participating in 
defensive jihad. The situational factors include, but are not limited to, the personal 
experience of close combat in a war zone; being subjected to ideological indoctrination (as 
part of group training and socialisation); and being exposed to charismatic authority and 
obedience to it – all underpinned by the notion of the Lucifer Effect.19 Implicit in this 
central argument, is that defensive jihad (involving Arab foreign fighters) is subtly distinct 
from Islamist terrorism (involving Islamist terrorists). These appear important factors when 
                                                 
17 The ‘freedom fighter versus terrorist’ labelling is one of the reasons why it is still impossible to arrive at a 
consensual definition of terrorism. Literature covering the debate includes Kennedy (1999) and Ganor (2002). 
18 Holtmann (2014: 140) recognised that ‘jihad can contain elements of terrorism – in terms of ideology, 
strategy and tactics.’ The most obvious overlap is where Arab foreign fighters employ terrorist tactics, such as 
in Iraq and Syria. This is addressed in the respective chapters. 
19 The Lucifer Effect is understood as ‘processes of transformation at work when good or ordinary people do 
bad or evil things [and] may be traced to factors outside the actor, to situational variables … unique to a given 
setting’ (Zimbardo, 2007: 5-8). 
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determining the outcome of involvement in defensive jihad, however these theoretical 
explanations do not necessarily remain constant throughout each defensive jihad, and as the 
individual case study chapters demonstrate, there are variations.20   
 
Moreover, there is a need to make a distinction between self-sacrificial attacks - martyrdom 
operations and suicide attacks. This need to predicated on the realisation that, particularly 
in Iraq (post 2003) and Syria (post 2011), there were/are different tactical imperatives and 
battlefield goals. For example, Crenshaw (cited in Hafez, 2007: ix) maintained that 
civilians in Iraq were ‘the target of choice’ for suicide attacks, while C. Winter (2017b: 1) 
found that in Syria ‘suicide attacks are now primarily … against military targets.’ By 
relying on the definition of civilians and non-combatants enshrined within the ICRC, it is 
argued that self-sacrificial attacks against enemy combatants (conducted by either 
transnational cohort) appear more generally akin to martyrdom (fee sabeel Allah - in the 
cause of God21), rather than suicide; whereas suicide attacks against civilians and non-
combatants (conducted by either cohort) are more generally analogous to terrorism. The 
ICRC definition of civilians and non-combatants, and the distinctions between martyrdom 
and suicide, are covered later in this chapter.  
 
Lastly, this study argues that most Arab foreign fighters appeared ordinary men – that they 
were not necessarily radical in the cognitive sense of being motivated by ‘extremist beliefs’ 
(Neumann, 2013: 873) - it was the situational circumstances of being involved in a 
defensive jihad that appeared to determine their subsequent behaviour. This argument 
chimes with Horgan (2015) who also found that: 
 
‘there are plenty of terrorists who don’t initially hold radical views but drift into 
terrorism regardless. In fact, more and more evidence suggests that quite a few 
terrorists acquire their radical views through ideological training only after they 
become involved with a recruiter or a group.’ 
                                                 
20 Although pertaining to ‘belonging to a terrorist group (before engaging in operations),’ Horgan (2009: 13) 
suggested similar situational factors - ‘a further set of issues … including the power of the group, the content 
and process of ideology, [and] the influence of a particular leader.’  
21 According to Wehr (1980: 396), fee sabeel Allah also means ‘on behalf of God and his religion.’ 
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From the perspective of Arab foreign fighters, this thesis will posit that there are plenty 
‘who don’t initially hold radical views but drift into defensive jihad,’ suggesting perhaps 
that they could be considered as mercenaries. Whilst mercenaries fight for a cause or for 
personal gain,22 Arab foreign fighters appear motivated by a multitude of factors enshrined 
within the notion of defensive jihad (that involves Sunni Muslim identity and the need to 
defend co-religionists). Whilst historical examples of mercenaries abound,23 contemporary 
examples would include Westerners fighting alongside the Kurds against the Islamic State 
(Sommerville, 2015), and European volunteers fighting in Eastern Ukraine against the 
Russians (Allen, 2015). Research for this thesis has not located any discussion or 
suggestion that these Western mercenaries are radical, or that they were radicalised before 
their involvement in war zones. This further suggests that ‘[q]uestioning the motivation, 
radicalization, and modus operandi of foreign jihadi fighters is central to understanding 
contemporary political violence and insurgency’ (Moore and Tumelty, 2008: 412). 
 
The Approach 
 
The approach taken to address the research question relies on analysis of a thesis dataset of 
3,010 Arab foreign fighters, 24  who were involved in one or more of three case study 
defensive jihads: 1980s Afghanistan, Iraq (post 2003), and Syria (post 2011). These 
defensive jihads were selected as they attracted the greatest number of Arab (and other) 
foreign fighters (compared to other defensive jihads25) thereby offering the largest amount 
of data for analysis. Whilst the research explores their initial motivational circumstances 
leading them to participate in a defensive jihad, the main focus is on those who 
subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities, as a result of the 
                                                 
22 A ‘mercenary’ is broadly defined as a combatant who is hired to fight in a foreign army. It is acknowledged 
that many (but not all) Arab foreign fighters had no prior military experience. 
23 Historical examples of paid mercenaries include but are not limited to, the German battalion in the French 
Foreign Legion in the French-Indochina war (Elford, 1971); former British officers who fought in the Dhofar 
war (Akehurst, 1982); and former British and South African officers who fought in the Rhodesian war 
(Rogers, 1998). Arguably, Nepalese Gurkhas in the British Army could also be considered mercenaries. 
24 Other scholars’ datasets include ‘172 participants of jihad’ (Sageman, 2004); ‘539 Saudi militants’ 
(Hegghammer, 2010b); and ‘1,175 fighters’ (Perlinger and Milton, 2016).  
25 According to Malet (2015: 10) the ‘foreign contingent’ in 1980s Afghanistan was 500-2,000 Afghan Arabs; 
in Iraq the ‘foreign contingent’ was 3,000-5,000 (in various jihadi groups); and in Syria the ‘foreign 
contingent’ was 10,000-16,000 (in various jihadi groups). Schmid (2015: 3) estimated that Chechnya attracted 
200 – 700 foreign fighters.   
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situational circumstances they experienced during defensive jihad. To support the analysis, 
the study leverages a theoretical framework undergirded by the notion of radicalisation, but 
augmented by the psychological theories of Hannah Arendt, Stanley Milgram, Ervin Staub, 
and Philip Zimbardo (covered in Chapter 2); the philosophical underpinnings within 
political Islam26 (covered in Chapter 3); and by the judicious use of historical military 
examples, in order to provide a richer contextualised account.  
 
This study is bounded and focussed on Arab foreign fighters (with no known prior terrorist 
links) who initially participated in a defensive jihad, but who subsequently became 
involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. It does not attempt to make comparisons 
with those who became directly involved in Islamist terrorism – in effect the ‘fast track’ 
route. Similarly, the study does not attempt to draw any conceptual comparisons (between 
self-sacrificial attacks, defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism) concerning the Palestinian 
armed resistance to the Israeli occupation of disputed Palestinian land. Such a protracted 
conflict is so deeply contested, contentious, and complex, as to make it sui generis, and 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Finally, the approach of this thesis attempts to explore the other broad outcomes as a result 
of involvement in defensive jihad. Labelled ‘post-return behaviour’ by Hafez (2012b), in 
addition to involvement in Islamist terrorist related activities, these outcomes include 
remaining involved in defensive jihad (possibly in another country, for example Chechnya), 
or reintegrating back into Arab world society (Hafez, 2012b). As Mendelsohn (2011: 194-
195) argued, only ‘a comprehensive account based on breaking down the foreign fighters’ 
experience will allow us to understand the phenomenon’s real significance.’  
 
Key Terms and Concepts 
 
The example of Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya (introduced at the start of the chapter) highlights 
a lot of the key concepts that are central to helping answer the research question. The eight 
                                                 
26 The philosophical underpinnings of political Islam include defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism; 
martyrdom and suicide attacks; takfir against Sunni and Shia Muslims; and finally Sharia law and the notion 
of an Islamic state. 
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key terms and concepts that are consistently referred to in this thesis exist under four 
groupings: civilians and non-combatants; defensive jihad and foreign fighters; terrorism 
and Islamist terrorists; and martyrdom and suicide attacks. It is acknowledged that they are 
not static categories, but evolve over time and are continue to be contested. Their 
interpretation varies depending on who is using the term(s) and for what purpose. Whilst 
definitions of key terms and concepts will be offered below, the ‘overarching Islamic 
philosophy’ and the actors’ (Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists) own interpretation 
of these terms, will be discussed and developed throughout the case study chapters.     
 
Civilians and Non-Combatants 
 
As part of the argument, by leveraging the targeting patterns of Arab foreign fighters and 
Islamist terrorists, and by defining civilians and non-combatants, it is suggested that 
distinctions may be drawn between the two transnational cohorts. First, this thesis is 
anchored by the ‘revised academic consensus definition of terrorism’ promoted by Alex 
Schmid (2013a: 86), that includes: 
 
‘direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and 
non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on 
various audiences and conflict parties.’ 
 
This definition is a cornerstone of this study, and is further validated by the US Department 
of State (2005) definition27 and by Boaz Ganor (2010).28 It is however recognised that this 
reliance on drawing distinctions between targeting patterns of the two transnational cohorts 
is not unproblematic, in that defining civilians and non-combatants is challenging. For 
example, are Iraqi men waiting outside army recruiting centres considered combatants, 
non-combatants, or civilians, and in whose eyes?  
                                                 
27 US Department of State (2005: 9) defines terrorism as ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.’ 
28 Ganor (2010) identified ‘three important elements’ for a definition of terrorism: ‘the essence of the activity 
- the use of, or threat to use, violence; the aim of the activity is always political; and the targets of terrorism 
are civilians.’   
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Unfortunately even under International Law, defining civilians is fraught with difficulty 
particularly in non-international conflicts.29 According to the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC, 2015a), in international armed conflicts, civilians are defined ‘as 
persons who are not members of the armed forces’, however in ‘non-international armed 
conflicts … the terms civilians and civilian population are used without defining them.’ 
There is broad agreement however that ‘civilians who do not take a direct part in 
hostilities are included in the category of non-combatants’ (ICRC, 2015b). What is 
striking is that the US Department of State (2015: 388) also uses the label non-combatant 
to mean, ‘in addition to civilians, military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who 
are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting.’ Thus, whilst these definitions are the 
preserve of national and international bodies, they do suggest correctly, that aspiring Iraqi 
volunteers outside military recruitment centres are civilians (as they are not yet members of 
the armed forces); and that the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden was terrorism - 
propaganda by the deed - as the sailors were non-combatants in a non-war zone. Whilst 
contentious, making a targeting distinction explicit is not contrived. Schmid (2013a: 55, 67) 
noted that many scholars (including Boaz Ganor, Joshua Sinai, Mohammed Hafez, and 
Ekaterina Stepanova) also highlighted the need to distinguish between ‘civilians / non-
combatants’ and combatants from a nation’s standing army. The current scholarly literature 
on targeting is reviewed in Chapter 2, while such conceptualisations and arguments are 
developed and tested throughout the three case study chapters. 
 
Defensive Jihad and Arab Foreign Fighters 
 
As noted earlier, the notion of jihad is contested and dynamic in nature, changing in order 
to remain ‘relevant to new circumstances’ (Cook, 2005: 93). It is important to recognise 
that there are non-violent as well as violent manifestations of jihad. Non-violent jihad is 
often considered the greater jihad, while violent jihad is considered the lesser jihad (Bonner, 
2008: 13; Cook, 2005: 32). The non-violent jihad is internal and spiritual in nature, 
possessing great theological depth within Islam. It is instructive that in September 2014, the 
                                                 
29 According to Schmid (2013a: 67), the term ‘non-combatants’ would apply “to terrorism in the context of 
armed conflict and ‘civilians’ to war – and peacetime terrorism.”  
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Grand Mufti of Egypt (Shaykh Shawqi Allam) and 125 notable Islamic scholars declared in 
an open letter to the leader of the Islamic State (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), that they were all 
in agreement about the precedence of the ‘greater jihad’ (non-violent) over the ‘lesser 
jihad’ (Allam, 2014).  
 
Violent jihad - sometimes labelled ‘jihad by the sword’ (Amjad-Ali, 2009: 245), may be 
offensive and defensive. According to Wiktorowicz (2005a: 83) ‘offensive jihad functions 
to promote the spread of Islam,’ whereas:  
 
‘defensive jihad … is a widely accepted concept that is analogous to international 
norms of self-defense and Judeo-Christian just war theory. 30 According to most 
Islamic scholars, when an outside force invades Muslim territory it is incumbent on 
all Muslims to wage jihad to protect the faith and the faithful … At the root of 
defensive jihad is a theological emphasis on justness … defending the faith-based 
community against external aggression is considered a just cause par excellence.’31 
 
By way of example, in the case of Iraq (post 2003), Hegghammer (2007: 4) posited that 
‘the US invasion and occupation of Iraq represented a textbook case of defensive jihad and 
required the participation of all Muslims.’ This notion of a defensive jihad was however 
exploited by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who declared in June 2005, that ‘our jihad in Iraq is 
the same as in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Bosnia – an honorable jihad’ (Hafez, 
2009: 79). This confirms the view that Islamist terrorists often hijack the concept of 
defensive jihad (Stern, 2001), thus contributing to the conflation of the two activities. It is 
worthy of inclusion that some scholars (Hegghammer, 2010b: 7; Brown, 2013: 88; Kuehn, 
Farrall, and Strick van Linschoten, 2014: 14) adopt the label ‘classical jihad’ to denote 
defensive jihad. As the Arab and wider Muslim world use the term ‘defensive jihad’ (jihad 
al-difaa), that term is used throughout this thesis.  
 
                                                 
30 For more on just war theory and jihad see Amjad-Ali (2009) and Kelsay (2009). 
31 Other definitions of jihad include an ‘intense struggle or effort ... [a] defence against an armed conflict in 
consequence of foreign aggression’ (Zaidi, 2009: 21), and ‘a Divine institution of warfare to defend Islam 
from danger or extend Islam into non-Islamic territories’ (Glasse, 2008: 271). 
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The key to understanding defensive jihad is that it may be conceptualised as a religiously 
sanctioned defensive response to foreign (or regime) aggression, that can only be 
‘authorized by a legitimate representative of the Muslim community’ (Cook, 2005: 3). 
Although the notion of a legitimate representative maybe contested (Kelsay, 2009: 155), 
Abdullah Azzam, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the perceived 
legitimate representatives (of most Arab foreign fighters) for the defensive jihads in 1980s 
Afghanistan, Iraq (post 2003), and Syria (post 2011), respectively. 32  The necessity for 
involvement in a defensive jihad is enshrined within the notion of fard, which is:  
 
‘a Divinely instituted obligation ... there is fard al-ayn, or essential obligation which 
is incumbent upon on all Muslims,33 and fard al-kifayah, an obligation which is 
acquitted in the name of all, as long as it is performed by some’ (Glasse, 2008: 151).  
 
Muslims who participate in a defensive jihad are considered to be mujahhideen (in Arabic), 
and hence Arab foreign fighters could also be considered foreign Arab mujahhideen.34 
Generic foreign fighters are normally defined as ‘non-indigenous, non-territorialized 
combatants who, motivated by religion, kinship, and/or ideology enter a conflict zone to 
participate in hostilities’ (Moore and Tumelty, 2008: 412).35 As noted earlier, Arab foreign 
fighters are defined for this thesis as ‘ethnically Arab, religiously Sunni Muslim combatants, 
who participate in a defensive jihad, with no apparent link to the conflict other than 
religious affinity with the Sunni Muslim side.’ They are essentially Sunni Muslim 
combatants who are ethnically Arab, who originate from (in the sense of being born in) one 
of the seventeen countries in the Arab world,36 and who participate in defensive jihad in a 
foreign space. The sense that they are ‘foreign’ is based on the ‘Western concept of the 
                                                 
32 Whilst true for most Arab foreign fighters, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (IS) and Abu Muhammad al-Golani 
(Jabhat al-Nusrah) both compete(d) for Arab foreign fighters arriving in Syria. 
33 Perhaps this religious obligation could be conceptualised as similar to the secular NATO Article 5 
collective defence, where an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all. 
34 The singular of mujahhideen is mujahhid, defined as a ‘fighter or warrior’ (Hans Wehr, 1980: 143). 
35 Malet (2013: 10) defines foreign fighters as ‘noncitizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during 
civil conflicts.’ 
36 The seventeen Arab countries are the Sultanate of Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and 
Egypt.  
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state and of citizenship’ (Schmid, 2015: 3), rather than Islamic concepts of the umma.37  
 
Terrorism and Islamist Terrorists  
 
As noted earlier, as an academic anchor, this thesis employs the ‘revised academic 
consensus definition of terrorism’ advocated by Schmid (2013a: 86). The term ‘terrorist’ 
could therefore be defined as an individual who is involved in terrorist related activities as 
defined by Schmid (2013a), however such a definition is perhaps too simplistic and fails to 
acknowledge ‘that involvement and engagement in terrorism is best thought of as a process’ 
(Horgan, 2005: 80; Silke, 2009: 29). Therefore drawing on Horgan (2005), Silke (2009), 
and Schmid (2013a), the term terrorist used in this thesis refers to an individual that is 
moving through a process of ‘initially becoming engaged and/or involved in doing 
terrorism’ (Horgan, 2005: 81), to ‘the point of engaging in terrorist events’ (Horgan, 2005: 
137), or terrorist related activities, that include providing material support.38 Although a 
terrorist may subscribe to any religion (or be an atheist), this thesis examines Sunni Islamist 
terrorists from the Arab world, who had had prior involvement in a defensive jihad. The 
key conceptual point from Schmid’s definition is the modus operandi of ‘targeting mainly 
civilians and non-combatants,’ and it is argued that it is this reoccurring theme that helps to 
distinguish Arab foreign fighters from Islamist terrorists, and is discussed in detail in the 
literature review. 
 
The collective term ‘Islamist terrorist’ deserves a greater explanation. ‘Islamist’ is used in 
this thesis in the sense of ‘advocating Islam as a political as well as a religious system’ 
(Aboul-Enein, 2010: 2).39 Although there are different shades of Islamist (Wiktorowicz, 
2006: 207; Wagemakers, 2012: 57), they broadly promote the need for Sharia law, and a 
greater adherence to Islamic principles. The label ‘Islamist’ is adopted, fully mindful that 
                                                 
37 According to Glasse (2008: 538) the umma are a “people, a community; or a nation, in particular the ‘nation’ 
of Islam which transcends ethnic or political definition.”  
38 According to the US PATRIOT Act Section 2339B, material support is defined as “attempting to provide, 
conspiring to provide, or actually providing material support or resources, to a foreign terrorist organization, 
knowing that the organization, has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or engages, or has 
engaged, in ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist activity.” 
39 Wilkinson (2006: 32-33) uses a variety of labels to denote radical Islamist terrorists, including ‘militant 
Islamists’, ‘Islamic fanatics’ and ‘extreme Islamic fundamentalists.’  
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‘Islamist terrorist movements are a small minority compared to the overwhelming majority 
of Islamist movements which are non-violent’ (Dalacoura, 2006: 510).  
 
Finally, the typology of Islamist terrorist related activities also needs explaining, and 
includes at least three variants. First, there is ‘transnational’ Islamist terrorism conducted by 
global terrorists (for example al-Qaeda) who promote ‘military confrontation with the 
United States and her allies, to avenge and deter non-Muslim oppression of Muslims’ 
(Hegghammer, 2009b: 28). Second, there is ‘religious nationalist’ terrorism (Gerges, 2005: 
151) conducted by ‘socio-revolutionaries’ (for example the Egyptian Islamic Group) 
against ‘a Muslim regime perceived as illegitimate’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 6).40 Lastly, the 
Islamist terrorism perpetrated by Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliated groups against 
civilians in both Iraq and Syria, is arguably more ideologically hybrid and could be 
perceived as ‘religious nationalist’ terrorism, but with a wider global targeting agenda 
(against civilians in Western, Asian, or African countries). This may be conceptualised as 
‘the mixing of ideal rationales for violence and the attendant blending of their associated 
enemy hierarchies’ (Hegghammer, 2009b: 32). 
 
The Islamic Notion of Martyrdom and Suicide Attacks 
 
According to Crenshaw (2007a: 162) the tactic of employing suicide attacks ‘is usually 
treated as though it were a single unified method of violence,’ and as a result ‘suffers from 
a lack of nuance’ (C. Winter, 2017b: 4). Consequently, it is argued that there is a need to 
distinguish between the Islamic notion of martyrdom whilst participating in a defensive 
jihad against military targets, and the practice of suicide attacks targeting civilians and non-
combatants. This perceived lack of nuance may be due to Islamic scholars tending to 
“avoid the question of discrimination on the part of the ‘martyr’ with regard to the 
difference between soldiers and civilians” (Cook, 2004: 136). The scholarly literature on 
martyrdom and suicide attacks (covered in Chapter 2) also tends to avoid making targeting 
distinctions, suggesting perhaps a tendency ‘towards state-centrism’ (Jackson, Gunning, 
                                                 
40 Hegghammer (2010b: 6) uses the label ‘socio-revolutionary,’ while Gerges (2005: 151) uses the label 
‘religious nationalist.’ 
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and Smith, 2007: 7). However leveraging such distinctions is one of the central features of 
this study and is drawn upon to assist in distinguishing between Arab foreign fighters and 
Islamist terrorists. Conflating the two tactics could lead to a general misunderstanding of 
the situational circumstances involving those who prosecute martyrdom operations and 
those who conduct suicide attacks. The notion of martyrdom in this thesis is defined as the 
value attributed to ‘those who die in a genuine jihad [and] as such, have special merit, and 
enter paradise directly’ (Glasse, 2008: 272). It is instructive that before martyrdom and/or 
suicide attacks became so contextually contested and mired in controversy, over seventy 
years ago, Rosenthal (1946: 256) maintained that “death as the result of ‘suicidal’ 
missions … are no suicides in the proper sense of the term.” The broad distinction argued 
in this thesis is that whilst martyrdom is part of Islamic philosophy, suicide attacks (against 
civilians and non-combatants) are acts of terrorism (although arguably the label ‘suicide’ 
trivialises the phenomenon).   
 
It is important to recognise that Islamist terrorist groups “involved in suicide attacks do not 
use the phrase ‘suicide bombers’ but instead refer to shuhada (martyrs)” (Sookhdeo, 2007: 
326), and frame such attacks as ‘martyrdom operations’ (amaleeyaat al-istishhaadeeya). 
Conceptually this is not supported in the Quran. Without getting into the theological debate, 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis, the Quran encourages the notion of martyrdom, 
whilst prohibiting suicide. Examples in the Quran that gives scriptural support to 
martyrdom include Al-‘Imran (3:3), Al-‘Imran (3:157), Al-‘Imran (3:169-170), Muhammad 
(47: 4-6), and Al-Baqarah (2: 154). Examples in the Quran that forbid suicide include, but 
are not limited to, An-Nisaa' (4:29) and Al-Baqarah (2:195). The theological content of 
these Quranic verses is presented in Appendix A.  
 
The key point to establish is that the practice of martyrdom (fee sabeel Allah) and suicide, 
whilst being contested concepts, feature as distinct and separate behavioural acts in the 
Quran. For example, Syrian ideologue and veteran Afghan Arab, Shaykh Abu Basir al-
Tartusi, published a fatwa 41  that implied a distinction between suicide attacks and 
                                                 
41 Also known as Abdul Mun'im Mustafa Halima. His fatwa - Suspicions of Sin in Martyrdom or Suicide 
Attacks – was issued on November 11, 2005. 
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martyrdom. Al-Tartusi (2005) argued that suicide ‘attacks are closer to suicide [intihaar] 
than to martyrdom [istishhaad] and they are forbidden because of sins they may potentially 
entail … which sow discord between Muslims and their 'ulama.’ Pakistani Islamic scholar, 
Shaykh al-Qudri (2010) also declared that suicide bombers cannot claim their suicide 
attacks to be acts of martyrdom or defensive jihad, as Islam does not support suicide attacks 
and attacks which harm civilians. The academic view on this distinction is covered in the 
literature review (in Chapter 2), and is discussed in context in each of the three case study 
chapters.  
 
Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is broken down into eight chapters, with Chapter 1 having set the scene and 
covered the research question, argument, and key terms/concepts. Chapter 2 covers the 
literature review, theoretical framework, methodology, and illuminates the thesis dataset. 
Chapter 3 explores the religious and political context of the Arab world through the lens of 
political Islam, aware that ‘Islam and politics commingle in almost infinite variety across a 
vast range of settings, issues, actors, and levels of analysis’ (Mandaville, 2007: 332).  
Specifically, it illuminates the concepts of defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism; 
martyrdom and suicide attacks; takfir42 against Sunni and Shia Muslims; and finally Sharia 
law and the notion of an Islamic state. Chapters 4 to 6 constitute the three case study 
chapters that examine the trajectories between initial involvement in defensive jihad and 
subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism, by leveraging 1980s Afghanistan, Iraq (post 
2003), and Syria (post 2011). Finally, Chapter 7 analyses the case study results and findings, 
while Chapter 8 provides a conclusion and recommendations.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis is concerned with explaining why and how some Arab foreign fighters 
subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. It builds on previous 
studies in the field, which have thus far tended to conflate the two transnational cohorts. It 
                                                 
42 Takfir is ‘the practice of declaring someone an unbeliever’ (Glasse, 2008: 510). 
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argues that, overlaps notwithstanding, the transition between participation in defensive 
jihad and subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorist related activities, is underpinned by 
situational factors experienced whilst participating in defensive jihad. These situational 
factors include, but are not limited to, the personal experience of close combat in a war 
zone; being subjected to ideological indoctrination (as part of group training and 
socialisation); and being exposed to charismatic authority and obedience to it – all facets of 
the Lucifer Effect. The thesis has the potential to make an original and important 
contribution to the study of terrorism, inasmuch that ‘Muslim foreign fighters … fuel 
international terrorism [and whilst] not all foreign fighters become al-Qaida operatives … 
most al-Qaida operatives start as foreign fighters’ (Hegghammer, 2011a).  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a review of the academic literature on Arab foreign fighters, the 
theoretical framework employed for the study, and the methodology adopted to leverage 
the thesis dataset. The literature review highlights the current debates pertinent to this 
study, including the tensions and synergies amongst scholars. The theoretical framework, 
derived from the notion of radicalisation, is a bespoke framework that was considered most 
suitable in order to explain the trajectory between Arab foreign fighters and Islamist 
terrorists – assuming that the latter cohort is more radicalised than the former. Finally, the 
methodology section explains the adoption of ‘content analysis’ and the composition of the 
thesis dataset. 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
Scholars who have attempted to examine the explicit presence of a trajectory between Arab 
foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists are few, resulting in a paucity of literature. Most 
scholars attempt to explain the motivations behind direct involvement in terrorism; 43 
Western foreign fighters (Hegghammer, 2010a, 2011a, 2013b; Byman and Shapiro, 2014; 
Perliger and Milton, 2016); or the circumstances behind Arab foreign fighter involvement 
in defensive jihad (for example in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq and Syria).44 There 
are other scholars who studied Islamist terrorists, however like Sageman (2004), chose to 
‘not include Muslims fighting for … straightforward jihads, like the former Afghan and 
Bosnia jihads’ (p. 62). This is noteworthy in that, whilst it acknowledged the distinction 
                                                 
43 The principal academics are listed in Schmid (2013a: 11-12). 
44 While Malet (2010 and 2013) examined foreign fighters from a general historical perspective, Hegghammer 
(2010a) focussed specifically on Muslim foreign fighters. Scholars who researched Arab foreign fighters in 
1980s Afghanistan include Al-Zayyat (2004), Gerges (2005), Rana and Bukhari (2007), Hafez (2009), Tawil 
(2010), Hegghammer (2010b), Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn (2012), and Hamid and Farrall (2015). 
Bosnia: Kepel (2008), Kohlmann (2004 and 2006), Schindler (2007), and Hegghammer (2010b). Iraq (post 
2003): Cordesman (2005), Krueger (2006), Hegghammer (2007), Hafez, (2007b), Fishman, Bergen, Felter, 
Brown and Shapiro (2008), and Hewitt and Kelley-Moore (2009). Syria (post 2011): Zelin, Kohlmann and al-
Khouri (2013), Zelin (2014a, b, c). Dodwell et al. (2016a); and C. Winter (2017b). 
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between the two cohorts, it ignored the possibility of a trajectory between them – it is 
exactly this nexus between veteran Arab foreign fighters and their later involvement in 
Islamist terrorism that is at the hub of this thesis. Whilst there is no known study that has 
attempted to explain the trajectory between those who participated in a defensive jihad and 
those who subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities, there are 
researchers who have examined discreetly, Arab foreign fighters and/or Islamist terrorists. 
Such scholars include, but are not limited to, Gerges (2005), Wiktorowicz (2006), Hafez 
(2007b), Hegghammer (2007), Horgan (2009), Ranstorp (2010), Denoeux (2011), and 
Mendelsohn (2011).45 These studies may be divided into at least three general themes: the 
conflation of defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism; rationales behind targeting and self-
sacrificial attacks; and the existence of radicalisation. 
 
The Conflation of Defensive Jihad with Islamist Terrorism 
 
Scholars who appear to conflate the two transnational cohorts suggest that the term ‘foreign 
fighters … refers to violent extremists who leave their … states to train or take up arms 
against non-Muslim factions in jihadi conflict zones’ (Cilluffo, Cozzens and Ranstorp, 
2010: 3); or that foreign fighters ‘travel great distances to kill innocent people they have 
never met’ (Venhaus, 2010: 2-3). More opaque but still arguably confusing is the term 
‘terrorist rebel groups’ as used by Fortna (2015). All these caricatures exhibit tensions. 
First, the term ‘violent extremists’ is deeply subjective and implies the existence of extreme 
radicalisation, which does not enjoy overwhelming empirical support (and is covered later 
in the chapter). In the second example, ‘to kill innocent people’ is posited without offering 
any evidence or a definition of what constitutes ‘innocent people;’ and in the third example, 
there is conflation of the terms terrorist and rebel, despite any overlaps in their respective 
tactics.  
 
Such conflation though, may not necessarily demonstrate a lack of academic rigour, rather 
it may be representative of the more general overlaps between terrorism, guerrilla warfare, 
                                                 
45 Hegghammer (2013b: 2) also noted that ‘[s]ome conceptual work has … been done to distinguish foreign 
fighter activism from terrorism and other forms of militancy’ pointing out the work of Malet (2010), Noonan 
(2010), Hegghammer (2011a), and Mendelsohn (2011). 
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civil war, and insurgency. These overlaps are particularly pertinent to the two later case 
studies, Iraq (post 2003) and Syria (post 2011), as they all co-exist(ed) on the ground. In 
both these conflicts, the idea that they are going through a civil war is predicated on the 
definition of civil war as ‘any armed conflict that involves: (1) military action internal to 
the metropole; (2) the active participation of the national government; and (3) effective 
resistance by both sides’ (Small and Singer, 1982: 210). A further criterion often used is 
‘the requirement that state violence should be sustained and reciprocated and that the war 
exceeds a certain threshold of deaths (typically more than 1,000)’ (Sambanis, 2004: 816). 
Since Iraq (post 2003) and now with groups such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah 
operating in Syria (post 2011), the linkage between civil war and terrorism has become 
increasingly acknowledged in the literature (Kalyvas, 2004: 97; Findley and Young, 2012: 
285; Jenkins, 2013; Moghadam, 2014; Fortna, 2015).  
 
According to Findley and Young (2012: 285), there is a ‘substantial overlap between 
terrorism and civil war generally … most incidents of terrorism take place in the 
geographic regions where civil war is occurring and during the on-going war.’ Kalyvas 
(2004: 97) also argued that ‘extensive empirical evidence suggests that indiscriminate 
violence in civil war is informed by the logic of terrorism.’ In the case of Syria, Moghadam 
(2014) argued further to suggest that in additional to the overlaps identified between 
terrorism and civil war, there is also a connectivity with insurgency – in effect a tripartite 
relationship. Moghadam (2014) argued that ‘terrorist groups use … terrorism in 
conjunction with other tactics, notably guerrilla warfare … [and] occurs in the context of a 
broader armed conflict, typically an insurgency and/or a civil war.’ This concurs with 
Jenkins (2013: 4), who identified both the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah as ‘behaving 
a lot like classic guerrillas.’ Examined from the top down, perhaps a civil war is a higher-
level manifestation of political violence that could also incorporate lower-level 
manifestations such as defensive jihad, terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare.  
 
Despite the above noted overlaps, there are various academics,46 Islamic scholars,47 and 
                                                 
46 Other academics who make an implicit (although not explicit) distinction are Sageman (2004: 62), Li 
(2011), and Duyvesteyn and Peters (2015). 
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other bespoke groups,48 who do recognise the distinction between (defensive) jihad and 
terrorism, and their perpetrators. They claim correctly that: (1) ‘violent jihad, regardless of 
its type, level and exact motivations, is by no means a synonym for terrorism’ (Stepanova, 
2008: 86); (2) that the definition of foreign fighters ‘excludes terrorists’ (Malet, 2015: 3); (3) 
that ‘foreign fighters are not necessarily terrorists’ (Byman, 2015: 584); and (4) that ‘not all 
foreign fighters are terrorists, and not all terrorists are foreign fighters’ (Van Ginkel and 
Entenmann, 2016: 57). As a case in point, whilst some scholars explicitly recognised the 
trajectory between veteran Arab foreign fighters of the Soviet Afghan war and the 
subsequent creation of al-Qaeda (Hegghammer, 2010b: 53; Piazza, 2009: 74; Richardson, 
2007: 65; Gerges, 2005: 80; Kuehn et al., 2014: 4), in ‘the literature on jihadism … foreign 
fighters have long been conflated with al-Qaeda’ (Hegghammer, 2011a: 2). 
 
In order to better contextualise these tensions (labelled ‘fault lines’ by Brown, 2013), 
Hegghammer (2010b: 7) makes the critical distinction between the doctrines of classical 
(defensive) and global jihadism, in effect trying to disaggregate the tactics and practices of 
those participating in a defensive jihad (including foreign and indigenous fighters), and 
global Islamist terrorists. He suggested (as noted in Chapter 1) that defensive jihad is a 
‘defensive struggle … against non-Muslim … enemies in uniform … over territory.’ This 
definition is consistent and in harmony with the conflicts in Afghanistan (1980s and post 
2001), Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq (post 2003), and arguably Syria (where Shia and Alawite 
Muslims are often - although not entirely - considered by many Sunni Muslims to be non-
Muslims).49 Conversely, he posits that global jihadism50 (terrorism conducted globally by 
Islamist terrorists) ‘was developed by Osama bin Ladin in the mid-1990s [and] called for 
indiscriminate mass-casualty out-of-area attacks’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 7). The distinction 
between (classical) defensive and global jihadists therefore appears to be underpinned by 
                                                                                                                                                     
47 According to the Muslim World League (2002), terrorism is defined as ‘any unjustified attack by 
individuals, groups or states against a human being … religion, life, property and honour.’ Jihad was defined 
as a struggle ‘against occupiers and colonial settlers who drive people from their land and against those who 
help them … [but] prohibits the killing of non-combatants and innocent women, children and elderly men.’ 
48 As noted in Chapter 1, in a September 2014 open letter to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 126 senior Islamic 
scholars declared that ‘jihad in Islam is defensive war’ and ‘it is forbidden in Islam to kill the innocent’ 
(Allam, 2014). 
49 For example, the Islamic State Dabiq Magazine 7th Issue (pp. 61-62) encourages readers ‘to wage jihad 
against the … Nusayriyyah [Alawites].’  
50 The notion of ‘global jihad’ was first coined by Sageman (2004), and subsequently by Brooke (2013). 
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concepts including a targeting rationale (‘enemies in uniform’ versus ‘indiscriminate mass-
casualties’), a strategic rationale (defensive versus offensive), and the operational area 
(Muslim territory versus ‘out-of-area’). However, despite the conceptual clarity offered by 
Hegghammer (2010b), Hafez (2009: 85) in his monograph Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from 
the Afghan Arabs, uses the term ‘global jihadists’ (instead of classical or defensive jihadists) 
to denote those aiding ‘fellow co-religionists in their own struggles,’ citing examples of 
Bosnia and Chechnya. This point perhaps highlights a lack of academic consistency 
concerning terminology and concepts within Terrorism Studies. 
 
Yet with the contemporary conflict in Syria, and the rise of groups such as Jabhat al-Nusrah 
and the Islamic State, perhaps the ideological concepts of ‘global jihadism’ and ‘global 
jihadist’ are perhaps less relevant today. As noted earlier, both these proscribed terrorist 
groups (United Nations, 2014) 51  are engaged in violence, including terrorism, against 
fellow Muslims (generally Shia) on Muslim land, whilst also providing inspiration and 
encouragement to attack ‘out-of-area’ targets in the West52 and the wider Middle East.53 
Such a situation appears to represent (as introduced in Chapter 1) the ‘the blending of 
associate enemy hierarchies’ (Hegghammer, 2009b: 32). This has become more apparent 
where the ‘enemy hierarchies’ for Islamist terrorist related violence, has widened to include 
both fellow Muslims and Westerners - indeed anyone who does not share their worldview. 
This thesis maintains however, overlaps notwithstanding, that Arab foreign fighters 
participating in a defensive jihad supporting ‘fellow co-religionists in their struggles,’ target 
more generally combatants in uniform, in stark contrast to the Islamist terrorist cohort that 
primarily targets civilians and non-combatants.  
 
                                                 
51 Under the AQ Sanctions List (1267/1989), Jabhat al-Nusrah was proscribed as a terrorist organisation on 14 
May 2014. The Islamic State (as its name changed) was proscribed 30 May 2013, 14 May 2014, and 2 June 
2014. 
52 The Islamic State Dabiq Magazine 6th Issue praised the attacks in Sydney (p. 3); the 7th Issue praised the 
Paris (Charlie Hebdo) attacks (p. 50); the 8th Issue called for attacks against the West (p. 62); and the 12th 
Issue praised the bombing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai desert, and the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks 
(pp. 2-4).   
53 The Islamic State has inspired attacks in the Sinai Peninsula against civilians and the Egyptian army, in 
Tunisia (against tourists), and in Libya (Harris and Youssef, 2015). 
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Rationales behind Targeting and Self-Sacrificial Attacks 
 
The recurring theme of targeting appears in the literature, but is not comprehensive despite 
its inclusion in many international treaties (for example International Humanitarian Law), 
and in most, but not all, definitions of terrorism.54 The literature tends to focus more on 
terrorist targeting (in contrast to foreign fighter targeting) and is often either conceptual 
(Drake, 1998; Cronin, 2003) or in non-Muslim majority contexts (Libicki, Chalk, and 
Sisson, 2007; Hegghammer, 2009b; Ramsey and Marsden, 2015; Harris-Hogan, 2015; 
Perlinger and Milton, 2016). While much of the literature on terrorist targeting focuses on 
civilians and non-combatants, others including Cronin (2003: 33) muddy the waters by 
arguing that ‘terrorism deliberately targets the innocent’ - without defining innocent -
similar to Venhaus (2010: 2-3) highlighted earlier in this chapter. Drake (1998: 56) makes 
an important point regarding ideology and ‘legitimate targets’ when he maintained that: 
 
“the ideology of a terrorist group identifies the ‘enemies’ of the group by providing 
a measure against which to assess the ‘innocence’ or ‘guilt’ of people and 
institutions. This gives rise to the idea that certain people or things are somehow 
'legitimate targets.’” 
 
This was corroborated by Ramsey and Marsden (2015: 582), who recognised that ‘jihadist 
[terrorist] ideology has been notoriously consistent in calling for and seeking to legitimate 
indiscriminate targeting.’ One scholar, Fortna (2015: 522), offers a compelling account on 
the effectiveness of terrorism, by leveraging the concept of targeting to distinguish between 
‘terrorist rebel groups’ who ‘indiscriminately’ target civilians, and those who attack 
‘military targets.’ She identified correctly that ‘terrorism by definition, does not target 
military forces’ (p. 526), but ‘that it deliberately attacks civilians’ (p. 522).55  This position 
has academic ballast, inasmuch as the ‘critical principle of intentional targeting of civilians 
and non-combatants’ by terrorists, and is emphasised by many scholars including Boaz 
Ganor, Joshua Sinai, Mohammed Hafez, and Ekaterina Stepanova (Schmid, 2013a: 67), as 
                                                 
54 Hoffman (2006: 40) does not identify the physical target of terrorism. 
55 Fortna (2015: 519) argued that ‘terrorists undermine rather than enhance their military effectiveness by 
attacking civilians indiscriminately.’ 
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highlighted in Chapter 1. In summary, ‘attacks are ordinarily labelled terrorist attacks only 
when they are aimed at non-combatants’ Moghadam (2008: 5); ‘against non-military 
targets’ (Asal, Rethmeyer, Anderson, Stein, Rizo, and Rozea, 2009: 262); or ‘against 
primarily civilian targets’ (Eppright, 1997: 334). 
 
Somewhat controversially however, but consistent with the thesis argument, Moghadam 
(2008: 5) also suggested that an attack ‘from a non-state actor … should not be labelled a 
terrorist attack if it is targeted against members of an army.’ The label ‘members of an 
army’ is considered to be the same as enemy combatants, and may be conceptualised in a 
number of ways. They may be viewed as invaders (for example the Soviets in 1980s 
Afghanistan); possibly as occupiers (for example the US led coalition in Iraq); or as 
subjugators (for example the Serbian Army in the Bosnian conflict, or the Syrian Arab 
Army in the Syrian conflict). This conceptualisation could perhaps be expanded to include 
the employment of unconventional attacks against military targets, such as self-sacrificial 
attacks.  
 
According to Hafez (2007b: 6), suicide attacks ‘usually target civilians, but they could 
accompany conventional battlefield attacks against soldiers.’ Because of the explicit war 
zone setting (in Iraq), this suggestion should not go unchallenged as although it recognises 
the targeting distinction, it draws no comparative distinction between martyrdom and 
suicide. As introduced in Chapter 1, this form of attack against soldiers in a war zone that 
leads to the attacker’s death, could be conceptualised as more akin to martyrdom. It is 
likely to be within the context of a ‘defensive struggle … against enemies in uniform … 
over territory’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 7). Whilst ‘suicide attacks’ against ‘enemies in 
uniform’ may be considered ‘an especially effective weapon of the weak’ (Hoffman, 2006: 
155), the ‘place of ideology in the selection process is crucial’ (Drake, 1998: 54), when 
deciding to target soldiers, and not civilians and non-combatants. Hafez’s ‘battlefield attack 
against soldiers’ has more to do with defensive jihad. For instance, in the 1980s defensive 
jihad in Afghanistan, Saudi veteran Afghan Arab and now academic, Musa al-Qarni, 
recounted that there were no ‘suicide operations at the time … [although] the young men 
used to attack tanks and fighter aircraft only with their personal weapons’ (Al-Qarni, 
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2006a). The key point here is that dying in a defensive jihad against a foreign military force 
could be conceptualised as more akin to martyrdom, than suicide. Whether Afghan Arabs 
were fighting ‘tanks only with their personal weapons’ or had attacked them with explosive 
vests, the likely result in both cases would be achieving martyrdom. Academics have also 
noted that despite the emphasis on martyrdom, there was no support for suicide attacks 
within ‘the 1980s Sunni jihad literature concerning Afghanistan’ (Cook, 2002: 8). 
 
Whilst differentiating between combatant and civilian/non-combatant targets may be a 
crude measure – it does allow for a nuanced understanding of the different intentions and 
motivations, at both the group and individual level (Pedahzur, 2005: 125, Moghadam, 
2011: 27). The measure allows for comparisons to be made between Arab foreign fighters 
and Islamist terrorists and the trajectory between them, and also assists with differentiating 
between self-sacrificial attacks: martyrdom attacks against enemy combatants on the 
battlefield, and suicide attacks against civilians and non-combatants.  
 
Whilst there is broad prohibition of suicide and suicide attacks in the Arab world,56 the 
literature is replete with examples of a desire amongst Arab foreign fighters for martyrdom. 
Former Egyptian veteran Afghan Arab, Mustafa Hamid (as cited in Hamid and Farrall, 
2015), remembered that Afghan Arabs ‘came to join to be martyrs’ (p. 151) and ‘were 
eager to fight, to be martyred and go to paradise quickly’ (p. 37). By his own admission, 
Mustafa Hamid inspired Afghan Arabs with the message that ‘the happiest fellows among 
us are the martyrs. If we are killed, we are happy’ (Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 191). Later, 
during the defensive jihad defending Bosnian Muslims during the Bosnian civil war, the 
commander of Arab foreign fighters in Bosnia, Abdul Rahman al-Dosari (Abu Abdul Aziz 
Barbaros), also admitted that their ‘desire’ was to be ‘killed in the way of Jihad’ (Kohlmann, 
2004: 17).   
 
Such eagerness for martyrdom is exploited by radical ideologues and used to support 
suicide attacks against civilians / non-combatants, arguably resulting in the perpetrators 
                                                 
56 In a poll conducted by Pew Research Centre (2013a: 29), ‘roughly three-quarters or more Muslims reject 
suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilians … in most countries, the prevailing view is that 
such acts are never justified as a means of defending Islam from its enemies.’ 
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believing that their actions are in keeping with their religion and that they (too) will be 
martyred. However as noted in Chapter 1, martyrs are considered ‘those who die in a 
genuine jihad … and enter paradise directly’ (Glasse, 2008: 272); while suicide bombers 
‘carry or deliver explosives to attack, kill, or maim’ civilians and non-combatants (Hafez, 
2007b: 6). Moghadam (2011: 231) stressed in The Globalization of Martyrdom, that ‘the 
willingness to die’ is present in ‘ordinary fighters’ and is ‘not limited to the suicide 
bomber’ – and it is this willingness to die as a martyr that appears to be exploited by radical 
ideologues. The martyrdom of ‘ordinary fighters’ could include frontal attacks with only 
hand-held weapons, or as a self-sacrificial act driving a bomb-laden truck into a military 
complex. As Bonner (2008: 78) argued correctly, ‘a self-sacrificing charge made by an 
individual fighter or small group against a powerful enemy force on the battlefield was not 
identified [by Islamic jurists] with suicide.’  
 
The targeting distinction is important, because as noted earlier, it continues to be central in 
helping to distinguish between Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists, allowing for 
analysis of the trajectory between the two cohorts. Such distinctions in the literature on 
martyrdom and suicide attacks are not always explicit. For example, Merari (2010: 9-10) 
defines a suicide bomber as one who ‘intentionally kills himself (or herself) for the purpose 
of killing others, in the service of a political or ideological goal.’ The term ‘others’ in his 
definition is very broad and would include civilians, non-combatants, and military targets. 
Whilst very clear, it says little about the philosophy, justification, or context for such acts. 
As noted earlier, there is no Quranic justification for killing fellow humans (except for just 
cause) or for committing suicide (see Appendix A), and the protection of civilians is 
enshrined under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC, 2015d) and the Law of Armed 
Conflict.57 Indeed there is no national or international justification for killing civilians and 
non-combatants, and when it occurs, it is labelled collateral damage by nation states.  
 
There appears to be only a handful of academics that note the distinction between 
martyrdom and suicide operations. Beit-Hallahmi (2003: 25) argued in The Return of 
                                                 
57 According to the UK Ministry of Defence (2004) The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 
‘the principle of humanity confirms the basic immunity of civilian populations and civilian objects from 
attack because civilians and civilian objects make no contribution to military action’ (p. 23).   
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Martyrdom: Honour, Death and Immortality, that in the light of suicide bombings 
‘martyrdom has lost his honour.’ This point is well made in that it recognises the implicit 
distinction between a genuine desire for martyrdom (istishhaad) by Arab foreign fighters 
whilst participating in defensive jihad against enemy combatants in a war zone; and the 
‘martyrdom’ gained through a suicide (intihaar) attack against non-combatants and 
civilians.  The two tactics appear discreetly separate, although it is acknowledged that those 
who conduct suicide attacks label their attacks istishhaad and never intihaar, which may 
again explain the apparent conflation. Second, other academics have also recognised the 
tension between suicide attacks and martyrdom operations: Cook (2002: 35) consciously 
labelled suicide attacks as ‘martyrdom operations’ - in quotation marks - because he was 
unwilling ‘to take a stand on the question of whether people who die during the course of 
these actions are actually martyrs or not;’ and Fierke (2014: 207) used the term 
‘suicide/martyrdom’ – in order ‘to highlight the tension in the relationship between the two 
concepts.’ The position taken throughout this thesis is that self-sacrificial attacks conducted 
within a defensive jihad against combatants are more akin to martyrdom operations; whilst 
self-sacrificial attacks conducted against civilians and non-combatants in whatever context, 
are more akin to terrorist suicide attacks.  
 
Radicalisation 
 
Radicalisation was defined in Chapter 1 as the ‘social and psychological process of 
incrementally experienced commitment to [an] extremist political or religious ideology’ 
(Horgan, 2009: 152), that may eventually cross a threshold that leads to violence. However, 
radicalisation ‘is a contentious term, vulnerable to subjective and retroactive application, 
which has come to describe highly variable situations of (usually Islamist) violence around 
the world’ (Beevor, 2016: 3), and is ‘a matter of continued debate among scholars and 
practitioners’ (Neumann and Kleinmann, 2013: 365). First, much (but not all) of the 
academic literature on radicalisation is focussed on domestic radicalisation and terrorism in 
the West (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Bakker, 2006; Nesser, 2008 and 2014; Ranstorp, 2010; 
Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Borum, 2011a; McAllister and Schmid, 2013: 217; 
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Schmid, 2013b), and generally not on individuals from the Arab world, less for Sageman 
(2004 and 2008); Hutson, Long and Page (2009); and Hegghammer (2010b).  
 
Second, from the perspective of Arab foreign fighters (and indeed Islamist terrorists) 
themselves, the label of radicalisation (in Arabic at-tatarruf) is not representative of their 
own interpretation of their engagement in a defensive jihad (nor indeed Islamist terrorism 
involving suicide attacks). What Arab foreign fighters consider defensive jihad being a 
doctrinally prescribed duty (fard), is often considered in the West as ‘violent radicalism,’ 
whilst the notion of what is radical is debated between Islamist ideologues themselves.58 
According to Horgan (2009: 155), the distinction between radicalisation and violent 
radicalisation is that ‘‘the vast majority of those who identify themselves as ‘radical’ do not 
engage in violent activity.’’  
 
Despite the large body of literature covering the radicalisation of Arab foreign fighters 
(more often labelled as Islamist terrorists), there is still tension as to when this 
radicalisation takes place – before, during, or after participating in a defensive jihad (and/or 
before involvement in terrorist related activities). Cilluffo, Cozzens and Ranstorp (2010: 
32) argue that ‘radicalization is a key part of the foreign fighter recruitment cycle’ 
suggesting that they arrive already radicalised in the country of defensive jihad (for 
example 1980s Afghanistan). This would indicate that later involvement in Islamist terrorist 
related activities does not necessarily involve a transition, however the problem with this 
argument is that, like much of the literature involving radicalisation, it appears to be 
“dominated by ‘conventional wisdom’ rather than systematic scientific and empirically 
based research” (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010: 889).  
 
There is nevertheless, a growing body of scholars who now argue that radicalisation may 
occur after having joined a group (albeit a terrorist group). For example, Ranstorp (2010: 7) 
argued that ‘in some cases recruitment precedes radicalization and not the other way 
                                                 
58 An example of such an ideological debate would be the correspondence concerning takfiri violence in Iraq 
against Iraqi Shia civilians in 2005. Ayman al-Zawahiri (2005) questioned Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (leader of 
AQI) about the ‘attacks on the ordinary Shia;’ while Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Jordanian ideologue) ‘felt 
it was wrong to do so [as it] hurts the image of Islam’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 47). 
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around;’ while Horgan (2015) argued ‘more and more evidence suggests that quite a few 
terrorists acquire their radical views through ideological training only after they become 
involved with a recruiter or a group.’ This supports the view that Arab foreign fighters may 
not necessarily be initially radicalised despite their transnational volunteerism. This 
conceptualisation of radicalisation lends credence to Horgan’s (2005) ‘process model’ that 
has an incremental quality about it, and may be visualised best as a trajectory. On one end 
of this trajectory would be the ‘thousands of young Muslims … [who] had no previous 
links to militants’ yet participated in a defensive jihad (Gerges, 2005: 60), and on the other 
end, Islamist terrorists. The ends are distinct and consistent with the opinion of former 
British justice minister Shahid Malik (2014) who argued that ‘we should not jump to 
conclusions that the young people who want to fight [in Syria] are extremists.’ Whilst 
acknowledging the definitional challenges including overlaps vis-à-vis radicals, extremists, 
and terrorists, the research undertaken for this thesis explores the validity of whether Arab 
foreign fighters were already radicalised (prior to their involvement in a defensive jihad); or 
were radicalised as a consequence of their involvement in a defensive jihad; or perhaps 
elements of both over time.   
 
There is further academic consensus (Sageman, 2004; Gerges, 2005; Cilluffo, Cozzens, and 
Ranstorp, 2010; Mendelsohn, 2011) about radicalisation as a result of the situational 
circumstances of participating in a defensive jihad, which may have contributed to some 
Arab foreign fighters later becoming Islamist terrorists. As Mendelsohn (2011: 194) noted, 
this ‘experience is often a constitutive event that shapes who they are and what they do.’  
The nature of the experience appears to have included the fact that the Arab foreign fighters 
had ‘abandoned their bonds to the outside world’ (Sageman, 2004: 149), and were now 
exposed to an ‘evolution of ideas and action over time and space’ (Gerges, 2005: 119). 
Their experience would appear to incorporate the ‘social and psychological process of 
incrementally experienced commitment to [an] extremist political or religious ideology’ 
(Horgan, 2009: 152) – the definition of radicalisation. Again, the notion of a trajectory is 
apparent, with Silke (2009: 94) also arguing that terrorist ‘involvement in political violence 
is a result of a series of understandable factors which combined result in a process of 
deepening involvement in violent extremism.’ 
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Gaps in the Literature 
 
On a general level, Schmid (2013a: 27-28) identified many ‘conceptual questions on 
terrorism [that are] not yet adequately solved’ - in effect highlighting gaps in the current 
literature. There was broad academic consensus that these conceptual questions included 
‘the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare;’ the differentiation between 
‘insurgency and terrorism;’ the identification of ‘legitimate targets during resistance against 
foreign occupation;’ and “the distinction between ‘terrorist groups’ and groups that employ 
terrorism as one of many insurgent and political strategies.” The research question of how 
and why some Arab foreign fighters cross a threshold to subsequently become involved in 
Islamist terrorist related activities, attempts to address some of the above broad conceptual 
gaps, and thus contribute to the scholarly debate.  
 
On the more specific level relevant to the research question, no single study was identified 
(for this thesis) that explicitly examined the nexus between Arab foreign fighters engaged 
in defensive jihad, and their subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorist related activities. 
This may be due to a variety of reasons. First, the apparent conflation of Arab foreign 
fighters and Islamist terrorists lends credence to Hegghammer (2013b: 2), who noted that 
few academics ‘have distinguished analytically between different types of violent activism, 
and even fewer have asked why jihadists fight in different places.’ Second, there appears to 
be a need to examine the targeting patterns of both Arab foreign fighters and Islamist 
terrorists in a contemporary environment, particularly involving Iraq (post 2003) and Syria 
(post 2011). A nuanced examination of the targeting patterns is called for, in order to better 
understand the motivations and situational circumstances behind them. Third, the contested 
notion of radicalisation needs to be tested within a contemporary environment, and 
particularly in relation to trying to explain the trajectory between Arab foreign fighters and 
Islamist terrorists. Finally, at ‘the heart of the current academic debate is the threat posed 
by returnees to Western countries’ (Moore, 2015: 1; Cilluffo, Cozzens and Ranstorp, 2010), 
but should be expanded to include returnees to the Arab world, as there is a ‘need to better 
understand the process of radicalization and recruitment of individuals joining ISIS from 
within the Middle East’ (Kilinc and Zeiger, 2014: 2). The thesis focus on the Arab world is 
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important as ‘the field of militant Islam is dominated by the Middle East’ (Vertigans, 2009: 
3), and the fact that the ‘overwhelming majority of foreign fighters who have gone abroad 
to join the fight in Syria and Iraq have come from the Arab world’ (Byman and Shipiro, 
2014: 2). By focussing this study on fighters from the Arab world, it offers a springboard 
for later post-thesis comparative studies of individuals from South East Asia and the West. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
According to Schwartz, Dunkel and Waterman (2009: 538) ‘‘no one theoretical perspective 
can provide an all-encompassing ‘explanation’ of terrorism, [however] it is important to 
advance theories that can explain some aspects or forms of terrorism.’’ This is echoed by 
McAllister and Schmid (2013: 202) who proposed that ‘[t]heories of terrorism should, on 
the one hand, be general enough to address the range of terrorisms, broadly conceived, and 
narrow enough to usefully analyse a specific aspect of the subject’ – in this case analysing 
the trajectory between Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists. Specific to the thesis 
research, Byman and Shipiro (2014: 5) recognised correctly that ‘no single model exists to 
explain why foreign fighters turn into terrorists.’ However, aware as a result of the 
literature review that the situational circumstances of participating in defensive jihad 
appeared to have a radicalising effect on some Arab foreign fighters, adopting a theoretical 
perspective that is based broadly (but not exclusively) on the concept of radicalisation, 
appears entirely appropriate.  
 
Foundation 
 
Despite it being a contested concept, the theoretical framework locates its foundation 
within the concept of radicalisation, as it acknowledges the possible existence of a 
progression whereby an individual may move from point a (involvement in defensive jihad), 
and subsequently arrive at point b (involvement in Islamist terrorism). The theoretical 
framework draws on the radicalisation models adopted by Sageman (2004 and 2008), and 
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Silke (2008). First, Sageman (2004: 69) leveraged ‘sets of variables … explaining why 
individuals become involved in global terrorism’ within the Arab world. Specifically, he 
explored various variables (factors) including their geographical origin, age, and friendship 
and kinship ties. It is instructive that these variables also consistent with those identified by 
United Nations Security Council, including: 
 
‘environmental and personal factors that may play a role in the incitement and 
recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, with particular attention being paid to 
geographical, age-related and gender-related vulnerabilities of community 
members’ (UNSC CTC, 2015b). 
 
Beyond the individual data, perhaps the other most significant contribution of Sageman is 
his concept of a ‘middle-range approach to analysis.’ Enshrined within this approach is the 
requirement to ‘examine terrorists themselves, fully embedded in their environment’ 
(Sageman, 2008: 23) – for this thesis that translates as being ‘fully embedded’ in a 
defensive jihad. Specifically, he recommended that:  
 
‘analysis should focus precisely on how the terrorists act on the ground: how they 
evolve into terrorists; how they interact with others; how they become motivated to 
commit their atrocities; how they are influenced by ideas; and how they follow 
orders from far-away leaders’ (p. 23).  
 
Second, Silke (2008) presented ‘an account of the psychology and motivations … that 
facilitate and develop violent radicalization.’ He identified factors that combined with ‘the 
culture and the social context … pushes and pulls someone into becoming a terrorist.’ He 
proposed many factors including: (1) age and gender; (2) education, career and marriage; 
(3) social identity (the role of religion and group loyalties); (4) marginalization and 
discrimination; and (5) catalyst events.  
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Thesis Theoretical Framework 
 
Drawing on Sageman (2004 and 2008) and Silke (2008), the thesis theoretical framework 
leverages data on Arab foreign fighters’ geographical origin, age, friendship and kinship 
ties, and the influence of political Islam. Researching geographic origin within the Arab 
world allows this study to exam the social, political and economic landscape therein, and 
helps explain in the light of these variables, why for example, certain countries may be 
overrepresented in a particular defensive jihad, or underrepresented when analysing suicide 
bombers. As Hutson, Long, and Page (2009: 19) observed, radicalisation ‘varies according 
to geography’ – an observation also supported by Tankel (2016).59 It provides a broad 
conceptual tapestry that may be used to partially explain, the contextual issues behind 
initial Arab foreign fighter involvement in a defensive jihad, but more importantly why 
some subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. Researching age 
is a very rudimentary variable, yet it may help explain for instance, the ‘biographical 
availability’60 of an individual, or suggest vulnerabilities to a radical narrative. For example, 
is a teenager more likely to accept being a suicide bomber, or is it because he is the 
youngest of five brothers who are already foreign fighters and/or Islamist terrorists? The 
inclusion of age whilst basic, adds a certain richness to the overall explanation, and as 
noted earlier, is a variable considered worthy of research by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC CTC, 2015b).   
 
Next, by drawing upon the precepts of political Islam, it permits analysis of the religious 
and political ideology involving defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism; martyrdom and 
suicide attacks; takfir against Sunni and Shia Muslims; and finally Sharia law and the 
notion of an Islamic state. In addition, it includes the influence of Islamic ideologues, 
                                                 
59 According to Tankel (2016: 2), a ‘jihadist group’s relationship to its country of origin and domicile … helps 
to explain that organization’s ideological preferences and alliance behavior.’ 
60 ‘Biographical availability’ is about whether individuals have ‘other commitments’ for example 
responsibility for a family, which may discourage high-risk activism (Wiktorowicz, 2005b: 15), or the 
‘absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-
time employment, marriage, and family responsibilities’ (McAdam, 1986: 70). 
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charismatic authority, 61  and of the annual Islamic festivals (for example the Hajj 
pilgrimage). As noted earlier, this thesis develops and builds on Sageman’s model, as many 
of these situational circumstances exist outside his theory.  
 
One key individual level ‘push’ factor62 that has much currency in the literature is the 
existence of ‘triggering events’ (Horgan, 2005: 84), occurring during the period of ‘initially 
becoming engaged’ (Horgan, 2005: 81). This ‘significantly provocative event’ is 
interpreted by different scholars to include a ‘sense of moral outrage’ (Sageman, 2008: 75); 
‘catalyst events’ (Silke, 2008: 114); ‘cognitive openings’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005b); ‘direct 
precipitators of terrorist acts’ (Testas, 2004: 260); or according to Crenshaw (2003: 93) 
‘precipitants,’ defined as ‘specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of 
terrorism.’ The inclusion of triggering events is based on the fact that arguably, they are 
possibly more germane to Arab foreign fighters (due to their activities in a defensive jihad), 
rather than perhaps ordinary Arab citizens who will be less exposed to such events, living 
in a broadly peacetime environment in their country of residence.  
 
At the group level, and in accordance with the intent of Sageman’s ‘middle-range analysis,’ 
the research also includes ‘information on people and their relationships with other 
terrorists, ideas, and the social, political, economic, cultural, and technological context’ 
(Sageman, 2008: 25). In effect the research attempts to contextualise the situational 
circumstances within the three defensive jihad case studies, aware of the ‘enormous 
distortions and misrepresentations that would result from … ignoring the context’ 
(Neumann, 2013: 884). Relating to group ideology and ideas, the thesis framework will 
help explain the nexus between the two transnational cohorts by drawing upon the notion of 
‘culturing’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005b: 27), 63  and how individuals ‘are influenced by ideas’ 
(Sageman, 2008).  
                                                 
61 The influence of charismatic authority, first illuminated by Max Weber, [1919] (2009), is worthy of 
inclusion in that Hofmann and Dawson (2014) leveraged the relationship between radicalisation and 
charismatic authority in their research. 
62 ‘Push’ factors include grievances and adverse sociopolitical conditions, whilst ‘pull’ factors include ‘lures,’ 
real and imagined rewards for aligning with a group (Borum, 2011b: 56). 
63 Wiktorowicz (2005b: 27) adopts the notion of ‘culturing’ to portray the transmission of ‘information to 
persuade audiences to change attitudes, preferences, and values.’ 
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It is important to note that as the research progressed and data were collected, particularly 
concerning the Arab foreign fighters in Iraq (post 2003) and Syria (post 2011), the original 
thesis theoretical framework appeared to struggle to explain the trajectory of those who 
subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. This was largely due to 
the need to study fighters in the context of operating in a war zone (and the leveraging of 
historical military examples), and not in a peacetime environment in their country of 
residence (as noted earlier). Consequently, in addition to drawing on historical military 
contexts, the thesis also began to draw inductively on psychological theories and analyses 
of Arendt (1994), Milgram (1963), Zimbardo (1971), and Staub (1989). Briefly, but 
expanded upon throughout the case study chapters, Hannah Arendt (1994), using Adolf 
Eichmann as a case study, found a connection between normal people and ‘the banality of 
evil.’ Stanley Milgram (1963) conducted an infamous experiment and concluded that 
‘obedience to authority’ could over-rule personal scruples leading an individual to perform 
acts of extreme violence. Philip Zimbardo (1971) conducted the Stanford Prison 
Experiment and later concluded that situational rather than dispositional factors could lead 
to a Lucifer Effect - ‘when good or ordinary people do bad or evil things’ (Zimbardo, 2007: 
5). These situational factors included obedience to authority, de-individuation, 
dehumanization, and moral disengagement. Finally, Ervin Staub (1989) found that the roots 
of evil are often found in factors that include devaluation, the role of authority, moral 
exclusion, and ideologies. These psychological theories proved, albeit somewhat belatedly, 
to be invaluable in explaining the nexus between Arab foreign fighters and Islamist 
terrorists, and in reflecting the situational factors in the crucible of defensive jihad, and the 
trends and tensions within the Arab world, including the Arab Spring and the rise of the 
Islamic State.   
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Research Methodology 
 
Research Population 
 
The research methodology used for this thesis is grounded within a flexible design 64 
adopting content analysis of 3,010 biographies and accounts of Arab foreign fighters, who 
were involved in one or more of the three defensive jihad case studies. As noted earlier, 
Arab foreign fighters are not indigenous fighters, thus for example, Iraqis participating in 
defensive jihad in Iraq were not included in the dataset (involving the defensive jihad in 
Iraq, post 2003). The Arab foreign fighter breakdown comprises of 369 who travelled to 
1980s Afghanistan; 711 who travelled to Iraq (post 2003); and 1,930 who travelled to Syria 
(post 2011), thus defining the chronological parameters from 1979 to 2016, and allowing 
for longitudinal analysis. It is also acknowledged that some Arab foreign fighters had 
previous ‘socio-revolutionary’ experience (Hegghammer, 2010b) in terrorist related 
activities, particularly the Egyptian Afghan Arabs, for example Ayman al-Zawahiri. As 
these individuals did not start their activism as Arab foreign fighters, but as terrorists,65 
they fell below the bar for inclusion, however their often significant influence on Arab 
foreign fighters is uncovered. 
 
Aware that ‘good data on jihadism are notoriously difficult to obtain’ (Hegghammer, 2013b: 
13), these three defensive jihads were selected (as mentioned in Chapter 1) as they attracted 
the greatest number of Arab foreign fighters (based on the figures provided by Malet, 2015: 
10; Schmid, 2015: 3), thereby offering the largest amount of data for analysis. As Robson 
(2002: 161) noted correctly, ‘the more accurate you want your estimates from your study to 
be, the larger a sample is needed.’ Also by dealing with such a large quantity of data, it 
attempts to address the challenge identified by Hegghammer (2010b: 239) whereby there 
are often ‘too many missing values to allow for meaningful analysis.’ The ethical 
challenges of assessing such data - be it Arab foreign fighters or Islamist terrorists – were 
addressed by only using readily available open sources, and by not entering into 
                                                 
64 Flexible design research is defined by Robson (2002: 547), as a ‘research strategy where the research 
design develops during the process of data collection and analysis.’   
65 A point noted by Sageman (2004: 71).  
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conversations with any non-state actors (for example on Twitter with Abdullah al-Shaya), 
or accessing non-state actors’ websites that required registration and passwords. This was 
in stark contrast to an Oxford academic researcher (Aymenn al-Tamimi) who became 
‘discomfortingly close with some of his sources in the jihadist world’ (A. Rosen, 2014). 
 
The primary sources analysed in this thesis included, but were not limited to: ‘Martyrs in a 
time of alienation’ (shuhada’ fi zaman al-ghurba);66  the Sinjar Records; 67  Arabic and 
English social media (Twitter and Facebook for Syria); the Violations Documentation 
Centre (for Syria); the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) Suicide Attack 
Database; Guantanamo Bay Detainee Assessments; Dabiq (IS magazine pre-August 2016); 
Rumiyah (IS magazine post-August 2016); Inspire (AQ magazine); and the Abu Zubaydah 
diaries.68 It should be recognised that the above sources collected data on individuals on the 
basis of their involvement in both foreign fighting and/or Islamist terrorism, and 
subsequently any links between their involvement in the two activities were examined. 
Secondary sources (many but not all peer reviewed) included the 9/11 Commission Report 
(2005), and studies of contemporary defensive jihads by scholars including Cordesman 
(2005), Rana and Bukhari (2007), Felter and Fishman (2007), Kepel (2008), Hafez (2009), 
Hewitt and Kelley-Moore (2009), Hegghammer (2010b), Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 
(2012), Hamid and Farrall (2015), and Warren (2015).   
 
Within the flexible design research, content analysis was chosen as it offered the most 
suitable method involving a large quantity of data. Other academic works, for example 
involving foreign fighter Internet forums, have also been successfully processed and 
analysed using content analysis (Hegghammer, 2014). This methodological approach also 
has the blessing of Robson (2002: 353), who suggested that content analysis ‘in the context 
of a flexible design ... is an entirely appropriate strategy … it is unobtrusive ... and the 
data ... can be subject to re-analysis, allowing reliability checks and replication studies.’ 
                                                 
66 Biographies of foreign fighters killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2002 and 2006, involving 15 
veteran Arab foreign fighters from 1980s Afghanistan. 
67 The ‘Sinjar records’ were captured by US forces in October 2007 near Sinjar, along the Iraq-Syrian border, 
and comprised of 707 foreign fighters, including 555 Arabs. 
68 According to McDermott (2013), the Abu Zubaydah diaries ‘contain the most detailed portrait of the 
interior life of a dedicated jihadi that we have ever seen, and that we might ever see.’ 
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The disadvantage of content analysis includes the fact that ‘documents have been written 
for some purpose other than for ... research’ (Robson, 2002: 358). For example, martyrdom 
biographies tend to be slightly hollow sounding accounts of glorious warriors, resulting in 
the detail and depth of the data being somewhat thin. This can be partially addressed in a 
number of ways. First, by acknowledging the existence of such a challenge allowed the 
researcher to be more circumspect during analysis. Second, data may be triangulated with 
other sources and the analysis conducted by applying good judgement (albeit subjectively 
and open to challenge). Finally, any findings based on such data are suitably qualified.  
 
Data Collection 
 
The data collection plan was based primarily on those individuals from the Arab world who 
had participated in one or more of the three defensive jihad case studies (1980s Afghanistan, 
Iraq - post 2003, and Syria - post 2011). The data collected were often based on 
availability, and consequently may have created a selection bias that is addressed below. 
The data collected from the biographies of Arab foreign fighters were broken down into 
codes 69  for analysis, and are presented in Appendix B. Macro data included (1) their 
personal biographical data; (2) the tenets of political Islam and their effect on Arab foreign 
fighters; and (3) the situational circumstances that may have influenced their subsequent 
involvement in Islamist terrorism. The micro variables corresponding to the macro data 
above, included (1) their age, education, migrant status, country of origin, and previous 
defensive jihad experience; (2) involvement in martyrdom and suicide attacks, and the 
influence of takfir, Sharia law and the notion of an Islamic state; and (3) the influence of 
certain situational factors underpinning Zimbardo’s Lucifer Effect - including indoctrination, 
identification of charismatic authority, and the pledging of allegiance (baya) and obedience 
to it. On the Lucifer Effect, there was clearly a need to make an assessment of how 
‘ordinary’ (un-radicalised) an individual appeared. Whilst difficult to collect primary data 
to support such an assessment, subjective normative judgements were employed, and 
signposted in the thesis, where relevant.  
                                                 
69 ‘‘Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information 
compiled during a study. Codes are usually attached to ‘chunks’ of varying size – words, phrases, sentences, 
or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting’’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 56). 
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Other variables included information on the content of the narrative of fatwas supporting 
Islamist terrorism, and the targeting choices in the execution of self-sacrificial attacks. The 
codes broadly reflected those themes most appropriate to the thesis focus and 
commensurate with their availability in the individual biographies, eulogies, and primary 
and secondary literature. As the coding process developed, more themes were identified as 
they became apparent during the research. For example, ‘targeting choices’ only arose 
while collecting biographies on Arab foreign fighters in Iraq, some of whom conducted 
martyrdom attacks against the coalition forces, whilst others conducted suicide attacks 
against civilians and non-combatants. By using this data, the thesis sought to address both 
E. T. Hall’s (1976: 213) argument that ‘a way to experience another group is to 
understand … the way their minds work,’ and Horgan’s (2005: 85) more recent observation 
‘that too little [attention] is paid to terrorists’ own account of their activities as a means of 
constructing a sense of their involvement in terrorism.’ Once the data were collected and 
entered into Excel spreadsheets (using the coding process), content analysis was conducted 
electronically by interrogating the spreadsheets to establish patterns of behaviour. Although 
the coding process produced over 40 categories (presented in Appendix B) that populated 
the thesis spreadsheet databases, only representative examples of short biographies of 
specific Arab foreign fighters, extracted from the spreadsheets, are presented in Appendix 
C, D, and E. 
 
Limitations of the Data 
 
The main limitations of the primary data included the potential propagandistic nature of 
some of it, missing or incomplete variables, and whether there was any selection bias. First, 
the use for research of individual biographies, including martyrs’ biographies posted on the 
Internet (primarily Facebook and Twitter), does present some limitations on the thesis. This 
challenge was highlighted by Hegghammer (2007: 7) in his paper on Saudi militants in Iraq, 
whereby: 
 
‘[a]uthors are most often anonymous, and the information cannot always be verified. 
There are obvious incentives for jihadist propagandists to embellish stories and 
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inflate numbers of martyrs … [however] this does not justify the complete dismissal 
of such biographies as fabrications.’  
 
This thesis, similar to Hegghammer (2007), has attempted to corroborate reports from other 
sources, particularly where the expansion of the World Wide Web has facilitated greater 
access to multiple media outlets, jihadi websites and blogs, offering greater opportunities 
for triangulation. Second, the issue of missing or incomplete variables has been addressed 
in part due to the research net being cast as wide as possible, and often in two languages. 
Therefore, although in percentage terms (of the whole) some data may appear incomplete, 
in numerical (n=) terms, they are sufficient in granularity to allow for meaningful analysis 
and explanation. By the very nature of terrorism research, data collection is a challenge, but 
the existence of under-represented data does not prevent ‘systematic scientific and 
empirically based research’ (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010: 889).  
 
The third limitation of the primary data is selection bias, driven more by availability (open 
source), than by design. This limitation is well founded, and reflects the reality in terrorism 
research of accessing reliable data on an activity that is inherently covert by its very nature. 
Any selection bias in this thesis was partially reduced by using multiple sources including 
for example, Western sources (GTMO detainee assessments, the Violations Documentation 
Centre, and the UN 1267 Committee Al-Qaeda List); and Arabic language sources (Arab 
foreign fighter websites, In the Hearts of Green Birds, Caravan of Martyrs, and the Sinjar 
records). This use of multiple sources, in effect triangulation, reduced the effect of, but not 
entirely eradicated, selection bias.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the academic literature, and presented the theoretical framework 
and methodology employed in this study. The literature review highlighted that no single 
study had been identified (for this thesis) that explicitly and systemically examined the 
nexus between Arab foreign fighters engaged in defensive jihad, and their subsequent 
involvement in Islamist terrorist related. Other gaps included challenging the trend of 
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conflating Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists; the need to examine and draw 
distinctions between the targeting patterns of Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists; 
and testing the notion of radicalisation within a contemporary Arab world setting. The 
theoretical framework, derived from the notion of radicalisation, whilst drawing on 
Sageman (2004 and 2008) and Silke (2008), is augmented by the psychological theories 
and analyses of Arendt (1994), Milgram (1963), Zimbardo (1971), and Staub (1989). 
Finally, the methodology section explained the adoption of content analysis and the coding 
of the thesis dataset of 3,010 Arab foreign fighters. 
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Chapter 3: The Context – Political Islam in the Arab World 
   
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the research question by illuminating the Arab 
world through the prism of political Islam. A Western conceptualisation (there is no Arabic 
synonym), political Islam is considered to be ‘a religious-cultural-political framework for 
engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims’ (Fuller, 2007: 193). 
Put another way, it is ‘a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and 
organizations that pursue political objectives’ (Ayoob, 2008: 2), and is generally viewed as 
synonymous with Islamism (O. Roy, 2007: ix; Ayoob, 2008: 2; Dalacoura, 2011: 16; Volpi, 
2011: 1). Accepting that involvement in defensive jihad and/or Islamist terrorism (at the 
individual and organisational level) are religio-political activities, viewing them through the 
prism of political Islam helps explain ‘the context from which the individual comes’ 
(Taylor and Horgan, 2006: 592). Also, the use of political Islam to contextualise Arab 
foreign fighter involvement in defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism is entirely appropriate, 
as ‘nowhere is the presence of political Islam more apparent than in the Arab world’ 
(Dekmejian, 1995: 211).    
 
The chapter is broken down into three constituent parts. First a short overview of political 
Islam in the Arab world is presented, followed by how the key ideological tenets of 
political Islam evolved through the influence and charisma of its principal ideologues. The 
key ideological tenets of political Islam include defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism; 
martyrdom and suicide attacks; takfir against Sunni and Shia Muslims;70 and finally Sharia 
law and the notion of an Islamic state. These tenets cover the four main areas of contention 
identified by Wiktorowicz (2005a)71 between radical and mainstream Islamists. Among the 
principal ideologues identified are Ibn Taymiyya, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, 
Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr 
                                                 
70 As defined in Chapter 1, takfir is ‘the practice of declaring someone an unbeliever’ (Glasse, 2008: 510). 
71 The four areas of contention identified by Wiktorowicz (2005a: 75-76) are whether to label Arab leaders 
apostates (takfir); the nature of defensive and global jihad; the targeting of civilians; and the legitimacy of 
martyrdom operations. 
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al-Baghdadi. Thus, rather than study the tenets of political Islam in isolation in a sterile way, 
examining the ideological relationships between the ideologues, the evolution of their key 
tenets, and how their charisma influenced Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists, 
offers a more nuanced and contextualised understanding. The key ideological tenets of 
political Islam support the theoretical (radicalisation) framework at the ‘middle-range 
approach to analysis’ in that they include ‘ideas, and the social, political … context’ 
(Sageman, 2008: 25). Lastly, to enrich the discussion, the view ‘amongst the common folk’ 
(al-Zawahiri, 2005) of the ideological tenets of contemporary political Islam is also 
revealed, by harnessing the results of polls and surveys undertaken in the Arab world, such 
as Gallup, Pew, and Al Jazeera - in effect offering a contemporaneous indigenous view of 
political Islam. 
 
Overview of Political Islam in the Arab World 
 
Political Islam, the merging of politics and the religion of Islam, appears broadly focussed 
on gaining political power domestically within the Arab world, and globally within the 
international arena. Domestically in the Arab world where ruling regimes are widely 
considered ‘corrupt elites’ (Jansen, 1986: 169; Tayekh and Gvosdev 2004: 14; Gerges, 
2005: 36; Wiktorowicz, 2006: 223; Hegghammer, 2009b: 29; Soage, 2012), there is a broad 
feeling of societal marginalisation. According to Esposito (2003: 142) ‘the most glaring 
difference between the Muslim world and the West today is the contrast between 
authoritarian72 and democratically elected governments.’ This is supported by Gurr and 
Marshall (2005: 9) who found that, out of the 16 Arab countries examined (Palestine not 
included), ten of the countries were ‘full autocratic regimes’ whilst the remaining six were 
‘anocracies (countries with governments in the mixed or transitional zone between 
autocracy and democracy).’  
 
The immediate question arises as to whether ‘political Islam is manifest in the permanence 
of autocratic regimes’ (O. Roy, 2007: x). There appears to be two conflicting arguments. 
                                                 
72 Authoritarianism is defined as the ‘ruthless policing of boundaries of acceptable political practice’ 
(Heydemann, 2007: 2). 
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Dalacoura (2011: 11) in her influential book on Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the 
Middle East, argued that ‘there is no necessary causal link between authoritarianism in the 
Middle East and terrorism.’ Other studies (Eubank and Weinberg, 2001: 161; Piazza, 2007: 
536) have drawn similar conclusions. There is however a counter-argument; research by 
Gurr (1979) and Rummel (1995) found that ‘autocracies, since they choke off alternative 
means of political expression, are far more likely to experience civil wars and other types of 
political violence’ (as cited in Eubank and Weinberg 2001: 156). Esposito (2003: 142) also 
argued ‘that militant jihad movements and terrorism … are products … of political 
conditions.’ Finally, Hafez (2003: 21-22) in his seminal book Why Muslims Rebel, claimed 
‘that Muslims rebel of an ill-fated combination of institutional exclusion and … reactive 
and indiscriminate repression that threatens the organizational resources and personal lives 
of Islamists.’  
 
Thus, whilst both arguments have their merits, the narrative of political Islam in the Arab 
world appears in part to be a response to the authoritarianism, rather than authoritarianism 
being a necessary cause of terrorism. In effect, the frame of political Islam ‘provides 
political responses to today’s societal challenges’ (Ayoob, 2008: 2); whilst also having ‘the 
capability to mobilize the disaffected’ (Tayekh and Gvosdev, 2004: 16). Therefore, 
although Dalacoura’s argument may be true (for her case studies on Iran, Turkey, Palestine, 
Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia), regime authoritarianism in the wider Arab world does (at 
least) appear to contribute to the space that promotes political Islam as ‘an ideology of 
protest against ruling elites’ (Dekmejian, 1995: 37).  
 
Political Islam in a global context appears most visible as a reaction to, and support for, 
persecuted co-religionists (for example Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria) while at the same time 
a feeling of anger due to Western duplicity in their ‘support for hated regimes’ (Lewis, 
1990: 52). These feelings of frustration and anger are exploited by Islamists, whereupon 
political Islam is operationalised through the use of a religio-political narrative,73 in order to 
                                                 
73 According to Wilkinson (n.d.), the ‘agenda is political though it is dressed up in language of Islamic holy 
war.’ 
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support mobilisation to an Islamist cause. As noted succinctly by Denoeux (2011: 62), this 
religio-political narrative ‘is to a large extent a political discourse in religious garb.’  
 
It is also important to note that Islam is viewed by many Arabs (and Muslims in general) as 
‘an inclusive order that pertains to all aspects of life’ (O. Roy, 2007: 41), and does not 
differentiate between politics and religion per se (Mandaville, 2007: 332). Many scholars 
acknowledge that ‘Islam has had a political dimension from the beginning’ (A. R. Taylor, 
1988: 20), particularly in regard to the succession of the Prophet Muhammad, that 
eventually led to the two sects within Islam, Sunni and the Shia.74 This has led other 
scholars to be more specific claiming that in ‘Islam … religion and politics are inseparable’ 
(Husain, 1995: 27).  
 
With this in mind, many of the aims of Islamists (violent and non-violent) such as 
implementing Sharia law within an Islamic country, are not at face value necessarily 
radical goals. For example, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in 1992 stressed that ‘the particular 
Islamic nature of his country … provided the legal and constitutional system appropriate to 
it’ (Halliday, 2003: 138). A distinction however needs to be drawn between an Islamic 
country, and an Islamic caliphate (khilaafah) such as that established in 2014 within Iraq 
and Syria. Whilst many religious nationalist Islamists do seek an Islamic country, there has 
not until recently been a concerted desire to resurrect earlier caliphates such as ‘the era of 
the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, who ruled immediately after Muhammad’s death in the 
seventh century … or the Abbasid caliphate, which existed … from the ninth to the 
thirteenth centuries’ (Danforth, 2015).75  
 
With the effects of globalisation and increased connectivity, there has been increased 
political awareness within the Arab world (Gray, 2003; Lia, 2005; March, 2015), often 
within an Israeli-Palestinian context, but also an awareness of the plight of Muslims 
                                                 
74 Noted in Chapter 1, according to Gonzalez (2009), the roots of the Sunni-Shia divide are anchored on ‘the 
correct line of succession after the Prophet Muhammad’s death in AD 632’ … the Shia contend it should have 
been familial (p. 6), while the Sunni accepted a close companion of the Prophet Muhammad (p. 4). 
75 There is less reference to the Ottoman Caliphate under Turkey, which is often considered ‘a myth’ 
(Danforth, 2015).  
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elsewhere, including 1980s Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq (due to UN 
sanctions),76 Iraq (post 2003), and Syria (post 2011). The response to the majority of these 
conflicts, albeit by a Muslim minority, was to participate in defensive jihad, in order to 
defend co-religionists. This increased global awareness, coupled with a growing frustration 
directed towards non-elected autocratic Arab regimes (Jansen: 1986: 169), appears to have 
produced a profound sense of grievance that has helped fuel political Islam.  
 
This however is not a view necessarily shared by acclaimed academics O. Roy (2007) and 
Kepel (2008), who both predicted ‘the decline’ of political Islam, starting with the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990; a prediction that now seems increasingly unlikely, with respect 
to the Arab Spring, the Syrian Revolution, and the establishment of the Islamic State. 
Although O. Roy and Kepel made these predictions originally in 1994 and 2000 
respectively, when re-examined in 2017, political Islam is likely to remain an influential 
factor in International Relations during much of the early 21st century.   
 
The Key Ideologues and their Influence on the Tenets of Political Islam 
 
There have been numerous ideologues within the wider Muslim world that have shaped 
Islamist thinking, however the individuals covered in this chapter were selected as they 
represent those most influential concerning defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. They are 
Ibn Taymiyya, a ‘medieval scholar-activist [who] has had more influence on radical 
Islamist ideology than’ any other scholar (Esposito, 2003: 45); Hassan al-Banna, who ‘is 
frequently characterised as the father of contemporary Islamism’ (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 
49); Sayyid Qutb, ‘often seen as the godfather of revolutionary Sunni Islam’ (Wiktorowicz, 
2005a: 78); Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj, ‘the most influential disciple of Sayyid Qutb’ 
(Sageman, 2004: 14); Abdullah Azzam who ‘inspired a new generation of radical Islamists’ 
(McGregor, 2003: 92); Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was ‘the master of the cutting-edge, 
hard core version of jihad’ (Kazimi, 2005: 59); and finally Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the 
                                                 
76 According to United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (2002), UN sanctions in Iraq caused the death of 
an estimated 500,000 Iraqi children. It is noteworthy, that Osama bin Laden specifically noted ‘the great 
devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people’ in his 1998 fatwa ‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders - World Islamic 
Front Statement’ (23 February 1998). 
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current leader of the Islamic State and a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ (as of 
October 4, 2011). 
 
Whilst they are all widely cited ideologues within political Islam, they are not all 
necessarily scholars (or thinkers) in the academic sense, but this was offset by their 
apparent influence and perceived authority. According to McCants, Brachman, and Felter 
(2006a and 2006b), authors of the Militant Ideology Atlas that identified ‘the most 
influential thinkers in the Jihadi Movement,’ Ibn Taymiyya was identified as ‘the most 
influential Medieval Scholar’ (2006a: 7), and Sayyid Qutb as the ‘most influential Jihadi 
Theorist’ (2006a: 8) who ‘Jihadis cite more than any other modern author’ (2006a: 10). 
Hassan al-Banna and Abdullah Azzam were both also identified as ‘most cited modern 
authors’ (2006a: 13), with Azzam judged to be ‘a role model for the younger generation of 
Muslims’ (2006b: 287). It is recognised that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi are absent from the Militant Ideology Atlas due to the timing of the research 
undertaken by McCants et al. (2006a and 2006b). 
 
Ibn Taymiyya 
 
The first ideologue, Ibn Taymiyya (1263 - 1328) was an Islamic scholar during the time of 
the Mongols, and is arguably the most cited ideologue concerning (1) the permissibility of 
killing Muslim civilians; (2) waging jihad against fellow Muslims who did not apply Sharia 
law (in effect takfir); (3) the permissibility of violence against Shia Muslims (again in 
effect takfir); and (4) the individual religious obligation (fard ayn) of defensive jihad in 
defence of Muslims. First, the permissibility of killing Muslim civilians (within the context 
of collateral damage) was sanctioned by Ibn Taymiyya in his Majmua al Fatawa 28/537 in 
which he declared:  
 
‘The Islamic scholars have unanimously agreed that when the kaffir [unbeliever] 
takes Muslims as human shields, and the Muslims fear defeat if they do not attack, 
then it becomes permissible to fire, but we aim at the kaffir.’ (Wiktorowicz and 
Kaltner, 2003: 90). 
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The setting of his fatwa was clearly concerned with using Muslim civilians as human 
shields, however it has since been removed from its original context, often to support the 
arbitrary killing of Muslim civilians and non-combatants. Contemporary Islamist terrorists 
also draw upon Ibn Taymiyya vis-à-vis attacking non-Muslim civilians in response to the 
killing of Muslim civilians by the West,77 arguing ‘that when the infidel kills Muslim 
civilians it becomes permissible to attack their civilians in kind’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 89). 
This position has some Quranic justification: ‘And the one who attacks you, attack him in 
like manner as he attacked you’ (Quran 2:194). 
 
Second, Ibn Taymiyya was a proponent of takfir – ‘one of the most potent weapons in the 
arsenal of Islamism’ (Lynch, 2013: 170). His permissibility of waging jihad against fellow 
Muslims (takfir) was based on the logic that:  
 
‘since the Mongols (who had previously converted to Islam) continued to follow 
the ... code of Genghis Khan instead of Sharia law, they were not real Muslims, but 
apostates who should be punished with death according to the Sharia. It was the 
right, indeed the duty, of Muslims to wage jihad against them’ (Sageman, 2004:9). 
 
Accordingly, as noted by Sivan (1990: 99), Ibn Taymiyya advocated that any ‘ruler who 
neglects or transgresses Islamic law is ipso facto an … apostate, hence the object of jihad.’  
 
From a sectarian perspective, Ibn Taymiyya also took issue with Shia Muslims and whilst 
reluctant to condone takfir against them, he would prescribe it as a last resort (Dekmejian, 
1995: 39). In his Majmua al Fatawa 3/157 (al-Hashimi, n.d.), Ibn Taymiyya wrote that 
Sunni Muslims: 
 
                                                 
77 This would include, but is not limited to, Western bombings, drone strikes, and post 1991 UN Sanctions 
against Iraq. 
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‘love the people of the household of the Messenger of Allah … [but] they reject the 
way of the raafidi78 [Shia] who hate the sahabah79 and slander them, and they reject 
the way of the naseebis80 [Shia] who insult ahl al-bayt81 in words and deed.’ 
 
What is particularly striking is that the terminology used by Ibn Taymiyya over seven 
hundred years ago, has resurfaced in Islamist circles and has been adopted by radical Sunni 
Islamists to refer to the Shia in Iraq and the Alawites in Syria - it appears to have a timeless 
quality. For example, in Dialogue with Shaykh Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, al-Zarqawi (2006) 
refers to the Iraqi Shia as raafidi more than seventy times, whilst IS leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi (2012) refers to Shia Muslims as ‘malicious raafidi.’ This consistency in 
terminology appears to create a linkage between medieval and contemporary Islamist 
narratives, and consequently by drawing on Ibn Taymiyya, it generates a greater degree 
authenticity and resonance. It is also instructive that this sectarian terminology was not in 
general use prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, not even by al-Qaeda.82 
 
Regarding defensive jihad, Ibn Taymiyya is widely quoted by modern day Arab foreign 
fighters. Translated in 1966, Ibn Taymiyya (1966: 138) declared that ‘jihad is the best of all 
voluntary actions ... it is better than the grand pilgrimage (Hajj) ... prayer (salat) ... [and] 
fasting (Ramadan).’ Concerning the religious obligation/duty to participate in defensive 
jihad, Ibn Taymiyya (1966: 146-147) declared: 
 
‘if ... the enemy decided to attack the Muslims, then to repulse that enemy would be 
a personal duty on all, both those against whom the attack was made and those not 
                                                 
78 The Arabic term raafidi is ‘abusive in tone, given by the Sunni Muslims to the Shia Muslims.’ Literally 
means ‘repudiators’ because the Shia repudiate the validity of the Caliphs (causing the Sunni/Shia divide 
(Glasse, 2008: 431). It also has the meaning of ‘apostate’ (Wehr, 1980: 349). 
79 The Arabic term sahaba is a Sunni Muslim term given to ‘those followers of the Prophet Muhammad who 
were closest to him in his lifetime’ (Glasse, 2005: 117). 
80 Historically the Arabic term naseebis is a Sunni Muslim derogatory term used to refer to those who 
expressed enmity towards the House of the Prophet. More recently, the term is also used by Shia polemicists 
as a derogatory term for Sunni Muslims. 
81 The Arabic term ahl al-bayt is normally used by Sunni Muslims to refer to ‘descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad … referring to the Quraysh tribe’ (Glasse, 2005: 31).  
82 Noted in Chapter 2, Al-Qaeda’s deputy al-Zawahiri (2005) wrote to al-Zarqawi discouraging his use of 
takfir against Shia Muslims, asking ‘why kill ordinary Shia … what loss will befall us if we did not attack the 
Shia?’  
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directly affected by it ... a war to defend the Religion [is] obligatory fighting (fard 
al-ayn)’.   
 
Ibn Taymiyya’s declaration challenged the broad understanding at that time among Islamic 
scholars, in that participation in a defensive jihad (within Sharia law) was not an individual 
religious obligation (fard ayn) upon all Muslims, but rather a collective obligation (fard 
kifayya)83 upon only those directly affected by it (Gerges, 2005: 81; Musallam, 2005: 180; 
Hegghammer, 2010b: 28), in order to defend Muslim land and the religion of Islam. To 
include defensive jihad as an obligation for ‘those not directly affected by’ an attack, 
challenged the mainstream position of Islamic scholars. This apparent contradiction is 
explained by Wiktorowicz (2005a: 83), who noted that Ibn Taymiyya’s contribution ‘to the 
ideology of jihad has more to do with the religious and moral elements of jihad rather than 
legalistic issues.’ Thus, while not getting into the theological or jurisprudential debate 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis, Ibn Taymiyya’s ‘religious and moral’ argument 
remained fairly dormant until after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in the early 1920s. 
Shortly afterwards in 1928, contemporary political Islam (re)surfaced by the founding of 
the Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) in Egypt, by Hassan al-Banna 
(Soage, 2008: 21; March, 2015: 104). 
 
Hassan al-Banna 
 
The ideological founder of Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, an Egyptian named Hassan al-Banna 
(1906 – 1949), was motivated to establish the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) due to the 
‘political circumstances’ and ‘the humiliation of foreign domination’ in Egypt (Euben and 
Zaman, 2009: 49-51). Al-Banna is probably best known for his ‘epistles’ (al-rasaa’il) the 
content of which provided the ‘well-known components of the Islamist lexicon’ for future 
generations (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 52). According to Soage (2008), these components 
included (1) reversing ‘the abandonment of Jihad’ (p. 30); (2) ‘the importance of religious 
identity’ (p. 23); (3) the implementation of Sharia law; (4) the establishment of an Islamic 
state (both within Egypt and the wider Muslim world), and (5) the rejection of takfir. 
                                                 
83 Wehr (1980: 706).  
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Regarding defensive jihad, in his Epistle 4 (Peace in Islam), al-Banna (1948a) explained 
that defensive jihad ‘is for the sake of stopping an aggressor, self-defence, achieving 
justice, and helping the wronged among the believers.’ In his Epistle 10 (al-Jihad), al-
Banna (1948b) explained that ‘if the enemy invades one of our territories, its population is 
obliged to repel them with all their force’ - in line with the notion of fard kifayya (collective 
obligation) – and consistent with broad scholarly opinion, as noted earlier during the time 
of Ibn Taymiyya. In Epistle 4 (Peace in Islam), al-Banna (1948a) stressed the nobility of 
participating in defensive jihad: 
 
“One will not find in any Islamic text the word fighting or jihad (struggle) not 
accompanied by the phrase ‘in the cause of Allah’ [fee sabeel Allah]. This is 
because Allah has declared the prohibition of all forms of fighting that have an 
ignoble motive behind them.” 
 
It was a powerful narrative, offering religious legitimacy to the concept of defensive jihad 
(fee sabeel Allah), while also affording dignity to those who participated in it.  
 
Next, the ‘importance of religious identity’ was articulated by al-Banna (in 1943) by 
stressing the centrality of Islam encompassing all worldly affairs:  
 
‘Islam is a comprehensive system, concerned with all aspects of life. It is country 
and nation, government and umma. It is ethics and power, mercy and justice. It is 
culture and law, science and judiciary’ (Soage, 2008: 26).  
 
It is clear that al-Banna was an advocate of deen wa dawla (religion and country) seeing no 
advantage of living as a Muslim in a secular country (that was not under Sharia law). The 
context to this politicization of Islam was due in part to the fact that Egypt was ‘still under 
British occupation and whose parliamentary system was completely discredited due to 
palace interference, party corruption and an increasing resort to violence’ (Soage, 2008: 
26). In effect, al-Banna’s ‘ikhwanism’ was a response to the prevailing circumstances at 
that time of ‘Egyptian political paralysis’ (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 134) – circumstances 
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that could be conceptualised as preconditions ‘that set the stage for terrorism over the long 
run’ (Crenshaw, 2003: 93).  
 
Next, in his further Epistle 7 (Between Yesterday and Today), al-Banna (1948c) discussed 
the notion of an Islamic caliphate (khilaafah), defining it as a: 
 
‘complete social and political unity … from making the Qur’anic order and its’ 
language universal, beneath the flag of the khilaafah … all act[ing] according to a 
single creed and a unified and comprehensive control.’ 
 
Al-Banna (1948c) mourned the demise of the khilaafah (particularly after the First World 
War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire), noting that as many Arab states gained 
independence from their colonial masters, they still focussed on ‘localised nationalism … 
and purposely ignored the idea of unity’ as a khilaafah. Al-Banna (1948c) identified ‘two 
fundamental goals: freeing the Islamic homeland from all foreign authority, [and] the 
establishment of an Islamic state within this homeland.’ It is important to recognize 
therefore, that whilst al-Banna’s Islamic focus was ‘within’ Egypt, his wider and longer 
term intention was more geo-political – the re-establishment of a global Islamic khilaafah.  
 
Finally, despite al-Banna targeting enemy ‘apostates’ (in addition to ‘unbelievers’), 
Kraemer (2009: 103) argued that ‘he explicitly rejected takfir.’ This appears to be a grey 
area, for as noted earlier, al-Banna rejected the Egyptian ‘parliamentary system’ – a 
rejection that may have contributed to the 1948 assassination of Egypt’s Prime Minster84 by 
Muslim Brotherhood members. Al-Banna himself was eventually killed in 1949, ostensibly 
by the Egyptian government in retaliation for the assassination of their Prime Minster. 
Despite al-Banna’s death, he left a legacy ‘that Islam is a comprehensive way of life’ and 
the need for an ‘armed fight against unbelievers’ (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 52). 
 
 
                                                 
84 Mahmood al-Nuqraashi Basha. 
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Sayyid Qutb 
 
The next ideologue, another Egyptian, was Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1966) considered ‘the 
main ideologue of modern Muslim Sunni fundamentalism’ (Jansen, 1997: 49), who had 
‘stepped into a political arena that had already been reshaped by al-Banna’ (Euben and 
Zaman, 2009: 134). He continued the philosophy of al-Banna and ‘ikhwanism’ (he was also 
in the Muslim Brotherhood) but was more specific, and breaking with Islamic tradition, 
Qutb insisted ‘that jihad is an [fard ayn] individual obligation’ (Musallam, 2005: 180) 
against the Egyptian regime. Although Qutb advocated jihad to establish an Islamic state in 
Egypt (Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 79; Musallam, 2005: 155), he explicitly used ‘the concept of 
takfir to condemn the rulers of [Egypt] … on religious grounds’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 61).85 
In particular Qutb ‘argued that the regime of Gamal Abdul Nassir, since it had tortured and 
imprisoned pious Muslims, was not a Muslim state but a regime of pre-Islamic ignorance 
(jahiliyya)’ (Beinin and Stork, 1997: 6). It is instructive that ‘according to Yusuf al-
Qaradawi86 the takfir theory took its present shape during the cruel persecutions that the 
Muslim Brothers suffered at the hands of the Nassir government’ (Jansen, 1986: 153). In 
effect it was again a response to the brutality of President Abdul Nassir’s regime (1956 - 
1970). Thus while in Qutb’s narrative ‘jihad was a central theme’ (Musallam, 2005:155), it 
was aimed at co-religionists - the ‘near enemy’ - a term not yet in circulation in his time. 
Such discourse however, particularly in his infamous 1964 book, Milestones on the Road,87 
broke with Islamic tradition due to the increased likelihood of fitna (sedition).88 Although 
not universal, Islamic tradition broadly holds that ‘criticism of rulers or any other issue in 
Muslim society should not be expressed in the form of political action or violence [as] it 
will only bring more evil and lead to fitna’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 76-77).  
 
Although Sayyid Qutb was an advocate of takfir (against the Egyptian regime), he 
introduced a contradiction in that he never ‘argued that civilians could be targeted during 
                                                 
85 According to Wiktorowicz (2005a: 79), Sayyid Qutb’s book, In the Shade of the Quran, ‘provides the 
cornerstone for declaring rulers apostates and waging jihad.’ 
86 Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926 -) is a ‘leading Islamist scholar’ (Baroudi, 2014: 2).  
87 According to Musallam (2005:155), Milestones on the Road ‘is the founding text for the jihadist Islam.’ 
88 The definition of fitna includes ‘sedition, riot, discord, dissension, civil strife (Wehr, 1980: 696). 
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combat and war, and there was little discussion about the subject until the 1990s’ 
(Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 87) – thus implicitly he rejected terrorism per se - predicated on the 
revised academic consensus definition of terrorism (Schmid, 2013a: 86). It is interesting 
that the 9/11 Commission Report (2005: 51) found that Osama bin Laden ‘relie[d] heavily 
on the Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb … permitting him and his followers to rationalize even 
unprovoked mass murder’ – a finding that is not entirely persuasive,89 based on his written 
work. Despite being sentenced to death in August 1966, his legacy is firmly rooted in an 
indigenous religious nationalist setting involving jihad and takfir against a jahiliyya Arab 
regime - an agenda that never advocated attacks outside the Arab world, or against 
civilians.  
 
Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj 
 
The next key ideologue, Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj (1954 – 1982) was greatly 
influenced by Sayyid Qutb (Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 80). Faraj like Qutb was also an Egyptian 
and an advocate of ‘jihad against apostate governments’ (Cook, 2007: 142). In his well-
known pamphlet, The Absent Religious Obligation (al-fareeda al-ghaa’iba) - also widely 
translated as The Neglected Duty - Faraj argued that ‘the rulers of Egypt in the 1970s … 
should be condemned as apostates and infidels and fought by means of jihad’ (Wagemakers, 
2012: 62). This ideology still has currency, particularly in Syria (post 2011) where ‘the 
absent obligation of jihad’ has been stressed by ISIS in their magazine Dabiq Issue 1 (p. 35). 
According to Wiktorowicz (2005a: 79), ‘Faraj drew on Ibn Taymiyya90 to argue for the 
centrality of jihad in faith,’ and that it was ‘an individual duty of every Muslim’ (Jensen, 
1986: 200). This support for takfir was based on ‘Qutb’s argument that rulers who do not 
implement Islamic law are unbelievers and must be removed from power’ (Wiktorowicz, 
2005a: 79). Faraj labelled ‘apostate Muslim regimes’ as the ‘near enemy,’ and (implicitly) 
Israel as the ‘far enemy’ (Jansen, 1986: 192), based on a desire to liberate Jerusalem. What 
                                                 
89 Zimmerman (2004: 242) also argued that ‘we can be certain that [the 9/11 hijackers] were immersed in the 
ideas of Sayyid Qutb.’ Perhaps this is based on Ayman al-Zawahiri, who in his Knights under the Prophet’s 
Banner, called Sayyid Qutb ‘the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements’ (Wiktorowicz, 
2005a: 80). 
90 In Faraj’s The Absent Religious Obligation, he cites Ibn Taymiyya 27 times. 
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is also important about Faraj is his support for martyrdom, in the theological sense, fighting 
fee sabeel Allah. As Cook (2007: 142) observed correctly, Faraj ‘realizes that fighting will 
create martyrs [however] it is crucial for the martyr to die for the right cause … of raising 
the word of God to the highest … against apostate governments [in order to] establish a 
Muslim state.’ It is illuminating that the notion of martyrdom conceptualised by Faraj, did 
not involve suicide attacks against civilians and non-combatants. 
 
Of equal importance in the work of Faraj is that he addressed the issue of targeting civilians 
and non-combatants. Relying on religious texts to buttress his argument, he argued against 
killing non-combatants (in daytime) however at night, so long as non-combatants were not 
specifically targeted, there was no objection (Jansen, 1986: 217). This narrative echoes with 
Ibn Taymiyya’s ‘human shields’ ruling, and offered a degree of legitimacy to more radical 
Islamists who wanted to target Muslim, and later non-Muslim civilians and non-combatants. 
Faraj was executed by the Egyptian regime in 1982, for his alleged involvement in the 1981 
assassination of Egyptian President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat.  
 
Abdullah Azzam 
 
At about the same time as Faraj’s execution, a Palestinian ideologue named Abdullah 
Yusuf Azzam (1941 - 1989) was becoming ‘the single most important individual behind the 
mobilisation of Arab volunteers in Afghanistan’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 39), to fight the 
Soviet occupation. His motivational significance is echoed by Wiktorowicz (2005a: 84), 
who identified him as ‘the most important figure to resurrect active participation in 
classical defensive jihad’ against the Soviets. Academic consensus on his role is not 
universal, with distinguished scholars like Gerges (2005: 135) claiming that ‘Azzam was 
not an ideologue,’ and yet his writings 91  and ideological guidance operationalised ‘the 
abstract promises of Qutb and Banna, to fight an unequivocal battle for Islam’ (McDermott, 
2005: 94). More generally, Azzam was widely viewed as ‘the father of the Afghan 
Arabs … and a preeminent theoretician’ (Kepel and Milelli, 2008: 97). Arguably more 
                                                 
91 Abdullah Azzam authored many ideological books including his Defence of Muslim Land (1983), Join the 
Caravan (1987), and The Lofty Mountain (1989). 
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important than his ideological credentials, was his largely undisputed charismatic authority 
amongst the Afghan Arabs (Bergen, 2002: 54; McGregor, 2003; Gerges, 2005: 134; Ingram, 
2013: 152), which is covered in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Perhaps the most influential publication of Abdullah Azzam was his 1983 Defence of 
Muslim Lands, where he argued that ‘one of the most important lost obligations is the 
forgotten obligation of fighting … [it] is the most important of the compulsory duties and 
arises [when] the kuffar92 enter a land of the Muslims’93 (A.Y. Azzam, 1983). The notion of 
a ‘forgotten obligation’ demonstrates the ideological cohesion between Azzam and Faraj, a 
point recognised by McGregor (2003: 97), who noted that Azzam was ‘well acquainted 
with The Neglected Duty.’ Azzam also had ideological solidarity with Ibn Taymiyya, whom 
he referenced 12 times, to support his argument that ‘if a piece of Muslim land the size of a 
hand span is infringed upon, then jihad becomes fard ayn on every Muslim’ (A.Y. Azzam, 
1983), and not just the Afghans.  
 
Azzam’s interpretation of defensive jihad being an individual religious obligation for all 
Muslims (fard ayn) appeared (like that of Ibn Taymiyya) to challenge the accepted Islamic 
mores, although interestingly scholarship is divided on this matter. First, according to 
Wagemakers (2012: 57), ‘Azzam’s importance with regard to jihad … lies not in any new 
ideas but in his ability to use his writings … to mobilise Arabs for the Afghan cause, based 
on a version of jihad that had existed long before.’ Yet Hegghammer (2010b: 41) argued 
that ‘the mainstream position of religious scholars at the time was that jihad was only an 
individual duty for the Afghans, not for all Muslims.’ Therefore, with the local Afghan 
mujahhideen fully engaged in defensive jihad against the Soviets (O. Roy, 1990), any 
outside help, for example from the Arab world, was the lesser fard kifayya. This broadly 
agrees with the analysis of Gerges (2005: 81) who argued that ‘a consensus then existed 
among Muslim clerics and scholars that doing jihad against the Russian invaders was 
                                                 
92 Kuffar refers to the plural of ‘an atheist’ (Glasse, 2008: 305). 
93 It seems that Abdullah Azzam was echoing Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj’s concept of ‘the neglected 
duty’ of jihad, but in the context of evicting ‘the kuffar’ from Muslim lands (as opposed to the prevailing 
‘jihadi current’ of the early 1980s which was focussed on religious-nationalist causes, against local Arab 
regimes). The term ‘jihadi current’ is a term widely employed by Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi’ (Hegghammer, 2009a: 253). 
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legitimate and could be considered a collective duty’ (fard kifayya). The truth is probably 
somewhere in between, as Abdullah Azzam had by his own admission, changed the 
‘mainstream position among Muslim clerics, and had actually gained the support of Shaykh 
Abdul Aziz bin Bazz,94 Shaykh Muhammad bin Salah bin Uthaymin,95 and ‘more than one 
hundred scholars from the entire Islamic world’ (A.Y. Azzam, 1983). Thus, perhaps what is 
arguably more accurate is that the defensive jihad in Afghanistan being an individual 
religious obligation for all Muslims (fard ayn) was a point of inflection, unravelling nearly 
fourteen hundred years of Islamic understanding of defensive jihad being a collective 
religious obligation (fard kifayya), and once unravelled, appeared to become accepted 
doctrine among many contemporary Islamists. 
 
According to McGregor (2003: 92), Abdullah Azzam’s ‘militant interpretation of the 
Islamic doctrine of jihad contributed to the success of the Afghan mujahidin’ for it 
resonated within the Arab world, as one later Saudi foreign fighter recounted: Azzam’s 
‘basic motive in jihad was to defend Muslim lands’ (al-Bahri, 2005a). This is the same 
broad doctrinal message that resonated again in the Arab and wider Muslim world for the 
defence of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan (post 2001), Iraq (post 2003), and 
Syria – although the last two conflicts have become more nuanced and sectarian in nature.  
 
Whilst he supported defensive jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam 
strongly ‘opposed the waging of takfir … arguing it would lead to permanent infighting 
among Arabs just at a time when Arab unity was needed above all else’ (Moghadam, 2011: 
65). Indeed, he felt so strongly on the issue, that he ‘was known to have ridiculed the 
revolutionary jihadis’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 91), who were predominantly Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad members. It is instructive to note that within the Afghan Arab cohort, the ‘Egyptians 
brought with them radical ideologies and a penchant for proselytizing [and] in particular, 
were at the forefront of introducing the takfiri ideology’ (Hafez, 2009: 77). In effect the 
                                                 
94 Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Bazz (1910 - 1999) was the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and the highest religious 
authority in the country. He proclaimed that ‘jihad in Afghanistan an individual duty on every Muslim’ 
(Trofimov, 2007: 244).  
95 Shaykh Muhammad bin Salah bin Uthaymin was one ‘of Saudi Arabia’s most famous scholars’ (Lia, 2009: 
284). 
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Egyptian influence in Afghanistan, possibly relying on the takfiri ideology championed by 
Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj, appeared to be another point of inflection 
in the evolution of a more radical political Islam – one that appeared more akin to Islamist 
terrorism rather than to defensive jihad. In his own words in fee Dhilal Surat at-Tawbah (In 
the Shade of the Quranic Chapter ‘The Repentance’), Abdullah Azzam (n.d.) believed the 
concept of takfir held by more radical individuals to be the result of ‘their lack of 
knowledge, they are simply youth with much zeal, and the hearts of these youth were made 
to follow their desires’ (p. 104). However, in contradiction to his own discourse, Abdullah 
Azzam (1987) actually viewed Arab regimes as tawagheet (tyrants). Whilst the label 
tawagheet is a Quranic term,96 in jihadist literature it is understood to signify ‘the near 
enemy, meaning oppressive regimes in Muslim countries’ (Kepel and Milelli, 2008: 302). 
Thus, although Azzam may not have supported takfir (during the defensive jihad in 
Afghanistan), his view that Arab regimes were tawagheet does offer some indication had he 
lived, of his possible future intentions. Olivier Roy (1995: 37) argued correctly that the lack 
of agreement over the employability of concept of takfir ‘is the watershed between 
moderate and radical Islamism’ where the latter ideology approves the killing of ‘a ruler 
who claims to be a Muslim but does not rule according to Islam.’97   
 
Perhaps however an even greater watershed between moderate and radical Islamism is the 
interpretation of the notion of martyrdom. Abdullah Azzam authored several missives on 
martyrdom including Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations, 98 where he argued that:  
 
‘History does not write its lines except with blood. Glory does not build its loft 
edifice except with skulls; honour and respect cannot be established except on a 
foundation of cripples and corpses. Empires, distinguished peoples, states and 
societies cannot be established except with examples. Indeed those who think that 
they can change reality, or change societies, without blood, sacrifices and invalids, 
                                                 
96 The dictionary definition of tawagheet (singular taghoot) signifies ‘a tyrant, oppressor, despot, or an idol’ 
(Wehr, 1980: 561). 
97 Lynch (2013: 170) also argues that takfir … ‘is a key ideological line of division in contemporary 
Islamism … a stark line of doctrinal distinction between’ moderate and radical Islamism.  
98 Another example was Virtues of Martyrdom in the Path of Allah, both missives are undated. 
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without pure, innocent souls, then they do not understand the essence of this deen 
[religion]’ (A.Y. Azzam, n.d.) 
 
Moghadam (2008: 59) argued succinctly that  
 
“Azzam understood martyrdom not as involving suicide missions per se, but as the 
death of any ‘true’ Muslim waging jihad. Such martyrdom would wash away the 
jihadi’s sins and bestow glory upon him.” 
 
Cognisant that Azzam’s view of waging defensive jihad was predicated on the ‘defence of 
Muslim lands,’ indicates that the act of dying whilst defending Muslim lands was viewed as 
martyrdom (fee sabeel Allah), and entirely consistent with the views of ‘scholars from all 
ideological persuasions’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 93). The other interpretation of martyrdom, 
involving suicide attacks by Islamist terrorists, pays little attention ‘to constructing a 
theological argument justifying such attacks’ and only focusses ‘on extolling the virtues of 
martyrdom’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 92). Despite Abdullah Azzam being assassinated in 
1989, according to McGregor (2003: 92), he had already ‘inspired a new generation of 
radical Islamists, including Osama bin Laden.’ 
 
Osama bin Laden 
 
Despite the burgeoning literature on Osama bin Laden, his inclusion is pivotal in that he 
became the leader and ideologue of the al-Qaeda organisation that was built on the ashes of 
the Afghan Arabs. Although Bin Laden was considered a charismatic leader and ideologue 
(Reeve, 1999; Bergen, 2002 and 2006; Bodansky, 2001; Landau, 2002), one of his former 
bodyguards Nassir al-Bahri (2013: 74), was perhaps more nuanced: ‘Bin Laden wasn't 
particularly charismatic, but his historical legitimacy assured him of everyone's respect. He 
was simple. He ate with us. He chatted with us.’ In effect he had great credibility, 
particularly after his involvement in the 1987 battle of Jaji in Afghanistan (Bergen, 2006: 
56; Tawil, 2010: 18-20). After the assassination of Abdullah Azzam, Bin Laden took over 
as de facto leader of the Afghan Arabs, and was considered by the Jordanian cleric Abu 
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Muhammad al-Maqdisi, as ‘the imam of the mujahidun in this age’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 
74).  
 
Ideologically, it appears that Bin Laden did not support the notion of takfir. According to 
Gerges (2005: 257), ‘Bin Laden reportedly was not in favor of civil strife between Shiites 
and Sunnis lest it detract from the focal confrontation against the Americans.’ The idea of 
attacking the Americans (and the West in general) was a new ideological conceptualisation 
that moved away from the near enemy to that of the far enemy. By judicious use of 
religious rhetoric (Ranstorp, 1998: 324; Wilkinson, 2003: 124; Hoffman, 2006: 93), he was 
able to call ‘for indiscriminate mass-casualty out-of-area attacks’ (Hegghammer, 2010a: 7). 
In his 1998 fatwa, Bin Laden relied heavily on the work of Ibn Taymiyyah and deliberately 
used the term fard ‘ayn: ‘the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and 
military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is 
possible to do it.’ Through the prism of political Islam, although Bin Laden adopted the 
label ‘jihad’ in his 1996 and 1998 fatwas, Kuehn et al. (2014: 4) argue strongly that ‘jihad 
is not synonymous with the goals, strategies or objectives of al-Qaeda.’  
 
Finally, it is important to include the swearing of allegiance (baya) to Bin Laden. Although 
generally offered to ‘only 10 to 30 percent of … trainees’ (Sageman, 2004: 121), it was a 
binding verbal agreement that once made, arguably demanded blind obedience to him. 
According to Nassir al-Bahri (2013: 124), who himself swore baya to Bin Laden, he 
declared:   
 
‘I swear before God to help and support you, putting aside my personal concerns 
and ideas, for better or for worse, and putting my own well-being behind me, I 
promise not to question your command.’  
 
The swearing of allegiance to Bin Laden has some interesting corollaries. It is instructive, 
that research in psychology has suggested that ‘the disappearance of a sense of 
responsibility is the most far-reaching consequence of submission to authority … once they 
are locked into a subordinate position’ (Milgram, 1974: 8). The role of ‘submission to 
 61 
authority’ may partly explain the subsequent trajectory of some veteran Afghan Arabs to 
participate in Islamist terrorist related activities, and is expanded upon later in the thesis. 
Bin Laden was killed by the US in May 2011, in a raid on his compound in Abbottabad, 
Pakistan. 
 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (1966 - 2006) arrived in Afghanistan in 1989, and is generally 
remembered as ‘the leading ideologue of jihad,’ who sanctioned the ‘unselective targeting 
of Shia civilians’ (Kazimi, 2005: 60) in Iraq between 2004 and 2006 - perhaps creating a 
further watershed in political Islam. It appeared more than just a break with Islamic 
tradition; it was according to Hafez (2013: 32), a ‘most extreme position.’ In a 2004 letter99 
al-Zarqawi (2004a) explicitly singled out Iraqi Shia Muslims as ‘the insurmountable 
obstacle, the lurking snake, and the crafty and malicious scorpion.’ He warned that ‘the 
danger from the Shia is greater than the Americans … and fighting against the Shia is the 
way to drag the ummah into the battle.’ It appears that al-Zarqawi’s targeting policy was 
specifically sectarian in nature, and focussed on Iraqi Shia Muslims in general, that 
included civilians, non-combatants, police and the military. Iraqi civilians and non-
combatants were particularly badly hit, perhaps due to them being ‘soft targets’ lacking any 
degree of physical protection (armour and blast walls). Al-Zarqawi’s selective targeting is 
important in that it permitted the indiscriminate use of terrorism, often involving suicide 
attacks, against any Shia Muslim - regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, or whether he/she 
worked for the (predominantly Shia dominated) Iraqi government.   
 
On 18 May 2005, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi issued a fatwa that aimed to ‘clarify the position 
of the Shari'a regarding such incidents in which Muslims are killed incidentally.’ 
According to al-Zarqawi (2005):   
  
                                                 
99 The letter was seized by US forces in Iraq on January 23, 2004, and after translation, was released by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in February 2004.  
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‘The legitimacy of … killing a number of Muslims even if it is known that they are 
likely to be there at the time … is justified under the principle of daroorah100 due to 
the fact that it is impossible to avoid them and to distinguish between them and 
those infidels against whom war is being waged … it is permissible to commit this 
evil – indeed, it is even required – in order to ward off a greater evil, namely, the 
evil of suspending jihad.’101 
 
This ideology that killing fellow Muslims was more important than ‘suspending jihad’ 
suggests that al-Zarqawi’s violence was rationale, from his perspective. However, the 
terrorist violence in Iraq against Shia civilians and non-combatants cannot be labelled a 
defensive jihad – it fails the criteria of being a ‘defensive struggle … against non-
Muslim … enemies in uniform … over territory’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 7). What appears 
more accurate is that the tactic of terrorist violence, although part of the defensive jihad, 
was more representative of a civil war and is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. It is 
instructive that despite the ideology being logical and rationale to al-Zarqawi, Ayman al-
Zawahiri (al-Qaeda’s deputy leader in 2005) wrote to him in July 2005, concerned that: 
 
“many of your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about 
your attacks on the Shia’ and ask ‘why kill ordinary Shia considering that they are 
forgiven because of their ignorance?’ And what loss will befall us if we did not 
attack the Shia?” (al-Zawahiri, 2005). 
 
It wasn’t only Ayman al- Zawahiri who was concerned, indeed al-Zarqawi’s former mentor 
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, also expressed his concerns about al-Zarqawi’s ‘widespread 
use of suicide bombings, indiscriminate violence and takfir of entire groups of people 
because it is wrong to do so and hurts the image of Islam’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 47). 
 
However, al-Zarqawi issued a rebuttal in June 2005 declaring ‘our jihad in Iraq is the same 
as in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Bosnia – an honorable jihad’ (Hafez, 2009: 79). 
                                                 
100 The Arabic word daroorah means ‘necessity’ (Wehr, 1980: 538).  
101 Al-Zarqawi (2005). The Return of Ibn Al-'Alqami's Grandchildren.  
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He was inferring that the violence in Iraq was a defensive jihad against occupying foreign 
forces – except that by 2005 it had morphed from defensive jihad to Islamist terrorism, and 
the targeting was largely against fellow Muslims, generally Shia, and predominantly 
civilians. Al-Zarqawi (2004a) also issued a statement blurring the distinction between 
martyrdom and suicide, when he declared:  
 
‘the [Islamic] nation cannot live without the aroma of martyrdom and the perfume 
of fragrant blood spilled on behalf of God, and that people cannot awaken from 
their stupor unless talk of martyrdom and martyrs fills their days and nights.’ 
 
Perhaps this conceptual merging of martyrdom (fee sabeel Allah) and suicide, however 
convoluted, also contributes to the dialectic between defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. 
Despite the lack of theological support for both Islamist terrorism and suicide attacks, the 
rhetoric of al-Zarqawi found fertile ground in the Arab world (and beyond), leading to 
thousands of Arab foreign fighters going to Iraq (Schmid, 2015: 3; Malet, 2015: 10). It is 
instructive that this fertile ground appeared to be sown with al-Zarqawi’s largely 
undisputed charismatic authority amongst the Arab foreign fighters in Iraq (Brisard and 
Martinez, 2005: 36; Gerges, 2011: 112; Bunzel, 2015: 13; Weiss and Hassan, 2015: 8).  
 
Lastly, al-Zarqawi was a proponent for establishing an Islamic state within Iraq, with 
longer term ambitions to expand beyond Iraq’s borders (Bunzel, 2015: 15). The 
establishment of an Islamic state was also an aspiration of al-Qaeda’s leadership, thus from 
October 2004 (the forming of al-Qaeda in Iraq - AQI), there was a convergence of 
ideology. It appears that political Islam in Iraq went through a series of inflection points, 
and situated itself on the threshold of ‘new’ ideological concepts: the ‘acceptability’ of 
suicide bombings (against Muslim civilians and non-combatants), the specific targeting of 
Shia Muslims, and the establishment of an Islamic state within Iraq. The notion of takfir 
within political Islam, as understood by Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Faraj against 
domestic Arab Sunni regimes, was now imported into Iraq and operationalised by al-
Zarqawi within a specific sectarian context. However al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006, 
being succeeded by Abu Ayoob al-Misri (for three months), followed by Abu Omar al-
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Baghdadi, who renamed AQI (in October 2006) the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). He too was 
subsequently killed in 2010, and was succeeded by a man called Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
(b.1971), an individual known to be influential and a charismatic leader (Gerges, 2016: 
136; Beevor, 2016: 17).  
 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
 
A year after taking over the ISI, and once the US withdrawal from Iraq was complete in 
December 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed: 
 
‘I direct my call to all the Muslim youth and men all over the world, and call them 
to make hijrah [migration] to us to consolidate the pillars of the State of Islam and 
perform jihad against the raafidi – the Shia’ (al-Baghdadi, 2012). 
 
Intent on reinvigorating Arab foreign fighter participation in a so called defensive jihad in 
Iraq (and later in Syria), his core tenets were (1) the permissibility of takfir against an 
identifiable enemy – both Shia and Sunni Muslims; (2) the need to (re)establish an Islamic 
state where Sharia law would be dominant; and (3) the individual religious obligation (fard 
ayn) to participate in defensive jihad.  
 
First, the permissibility of takfir against an identifiable enemy was situated at both the 
micro and macro levels. At the micro level (in Iraq), al-Baghdadi (2012) specifically 
identified the plight of Muslim prisoners, and called for the ‘liquidation of their butchers 
from the judges and interrogators, to their henchmen and their guards’ and that these 
individuals be ‘at the head of the targeting list’ (al-Baghdadi, 2012). As these individuals 
were Iraqi government employees, they were most likely to be Shia Muslims, 
demonstrating his sectarian hatred and also acceptance of takfir. Targeting at the global 
macro level, al-Baghdadi (2014b) also turned his attention to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and 
Egypt. For Saudi Arabia, his suggested targeting priorities included: ‘deal with the raafidi 
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(Shia) first … then al-Salool102 (Saudi regime) and their soldiers, before the Crusaders and 
their bases.’ For Yemen, he advised his supporters to ‘be harsh on the Houthi raafidi for 
they are kuffar apostates. Fight them and overcome them.’ For Egypt, he reminded his 
audience of ‘the obligation of jihad against the tawagheet of Egypt.’ Finally, he called on 
his global followers to ‘erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere. Light the earth with fire upon 
on the tawagheet, their soldiers and their supporters’ (al-Baghdadi, 2014b). Although much 
of al-Baghdadi’s targeting is aimed at Shia Muslims, more globally, his ‘need for fratricidal 
warfare – or fitna between and among Sunni Muslims – remain[s] a hallmark of al-
Baghdadi’s leadership’ (Weiss and Hassan, 2015: 119-120). 
 
Second, al-Baghdadi’s resurrection of a khilaafah (caliphate) that would impose Sharia law, 
whilst in line with al-Banna (1948c), differed from that sought by Qutb and Faraj, who had 
only imagined an Egyptian Islamic nation. In June 2014 during the fasting month of 
Ramadan, al-Baghdadi appeared in a mosque in Mosul to announce the establishment of the 
khilaafah, and declared himself to be the khaleefah (caliph). In his khutbah (sermon) he 
preached about the ‘duty to establish an Islamic State’ and the need for defensive jihad to 
fight ‘the enemies of Allah’ (al-Baghdadi, 2014a). Al-Baghdadi saw the fasting month of 
Ramadan as the appropriate time to establish the khilaafah in that he considered it the 
‘month wherein the marketplace of jihad is set up [to attain] reward, dignity, loftiness and 
honour’ (al-Baghdadi, 2014a).  
 
The establishment of a khilaafah is not however without controversy. First, renowned 
Islamic scholar Muhammad Nassir al-Albani explained in a lecture in 1977 that all 
‘Muslims agree on the need to establish an Islamic state, but they differ on the method to be 
employed to attain that goal’ (Lacroix, 2009: 69) – violent or non-violent. Second, there is a 
view that ‘neither the Book of God (the Qur'an) nor the Hadith (Traditions of the Prophet) 
unequivocally refers to the concept of the Caliphate’ (Haddad, 1993: 26). Although not 
                                                 
102 The term al-Salool is an interesting theological label, referring to the time of the Prophet Muhammad, 
when Abdullah bin Ubayy bin Salool, a chief from the tribes in Medina, converted to Islam. He was never 
fully accepted as a Muslim due to his continual disagreements with the Prophet Muhammad, and was thus 
considered a polytheist (mushrikoon). The term al-Salool used to represent the Saudi regime, is thus 
derogatory in nature believing them to be polytheists. 
 66 
getting into the theological debate, research shows there are actually 47 references to a 
‘caliphate’ in Hadith Bukhari. Finally, as noted in Chapter 1, it is instructive that the Grand 
Mufti of Egypt (Allam, 2014) and 125 notable Islamic scholars declared in an open letter to 
the leader of the Islamic State (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi), that he had ‘misinterpreted Islam 
into a religion of harshness, brutality, torture and murder.’ These scholars also alluded to 
the fact that he is creating fitna 103  within the Arab world – the opposite of an all-
encompassing Islamic caliphate. 
 
Al-Baghdadi’s third core tenet is the individual religious obligation (fard ayn) to participate 
in defensive jihad. In November 2014, al-Baghdadi (2014b) declared that jihad was ‘the 
best of deeds and the peak of Islam’ and that is ‘obligatory upon each individual’ (fard ayn). 
Whilst this declaration appears to chime with that of Abdullah Azzam, in fact the contexts 
are entirely different: fighting a non-Muslim (Soviet) invasion of Muslim land 
(Afghanistan), compared to fighting the elected (broadly defined) Arab regimes of Iraq and 
Syria. Perhaps the context defines the method of resistance, defensive jihad or Islamist 
terrorism, however he appeared vague in his support for suicide attacks, and whilst 
appearing to conflate the two, he declared in the imperative: ‘love martyrdom for the sake 
of Allah and wish for it, but you have to work for and seek victory, and not specifically 
martyrdom’ (al-Baghdadi, 2012). This rather vague declaration differs greatly from al-
Zarqawi, and as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, the majority of ISIS attacks that 
result(ed) in the death of the attacker(s), were/are not aimed at civilians, but at Syrian 
regime forces or other armed groups.   
 
The View of Political Islam in the Arab World 
 
The Sunni Arab world view of the key ideological tenets of political Islam is possibly best 
captured by gauging the view ‘amongst the common folk’ (al-Zawahiri, 2005), in order to 
gauge whether involvement in defensive jihad or Islamist terrorism has grassroots support 
in Sunni Muslim-majority countries in the Arab world. After all, it was ‘the common folk’ 
in the Arab world who were ‘wondering about [the] attacks on the Shia’ in Iraq (al-
                                                 
103 As noted earlier, fitna includes ‘sedition, riot, discord, dissension, civil strife (Wehr, 1980: 696). 
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Zawahiri, 2005). Also, as Horgan (2005: 33) noted, one ‘can never separate terrorism from 
society because it is embedded in it.’ Therefore, based on available data, the Sunni Arab 
attitudes towards defensive jihad, suicide bombing, Sharia law (within an Islamic state), 
and the so called Islamic State, are examined using polls and surveys.  
 
Support for defensive jihad against the al-Assad regime in Syria was strong across the Arab 
world. An Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development (2011) poll104 found that 86 
percent of Arabs supported ‘the rebels seeking government change’ in Syria. This is 
arguably not a surprise, defensive jihad against foreign or domestic oppressors appears to 
resonate widely across the Arab world, although supporting the notion of activism (in this 
case defensive jihad) may not necessarily translate to actual involvement.   
 
According to the Pew Research Center, support for terrorism in the Arab world, in 
particular suicide bombings, varied between countries. In their first survey, Pew (2013a: 70) 
found that 40 percent of Palestinians, 29 percent of Egyptians, 15 percent of Jordanians, 12 
percent of Tunisians, and seven percent of Iraqis say that ‘attacks against civilians in 
defence of Islam can often/sometimes be justified.’ In their second survey, Pew (2013b: 3) 
confirmed their earlier results and also found that 26 percent of Lebanese Sunni Muslims 
believed that ‘suicide bombings can often/sometimes be justified.’ Of particular interest is 
the contradiction of Tunisia, where Pew (2013b) found that 77 percent of Tunisians 
believed ‘that suicide bombing and other acts of violence that target civilians can never be 
justified in the name of Islam.’ However, the data obtained for this thesis finds that 
Tunisians are second only to Saudis in prosecuting suicide attacks in Syria against civilians, 
and secondary sources also show that ‘around 40 percent of foreign jihadists in Syria hold 
Tunisian nationality’ (Hamedi, 2013). This apparent discrepancy is explained by Horgan 
(2009: 148) who suggested that while “an individual community that is ‘represented’ by a 
terrorist movement may condemn and reject an atrocity that is conducted in its name, 
members of that community may still remain broadly supportive of the terrorist group.” 
 
                                                 
104 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey conducted under the University of Maryland. It involved 3000 Arabs 
from Egypt, the UAE, Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon. 
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Support for the ‘strict application of Sharia law in every Islamic country’ appeared also to 
resonate strongly among certain Arab countries. A World Public Opinion (2009: 29) report 
found that 81 percent of Egyptians and 76 percent of Moroccans desired a ‘strict 
application of Sharia law.’ In a later poll, Pew (2013a: 15) found 91 percent of Iraqis, 89 
percent of Palestinians, 83 percent of Moroccans, 71 percent of Jordanians, 56 percent of 
Tunisians, and 29 percent of Lebanese, supported ‘making Sharia the official law in their 
country.’ The reasons behind these strong showings are beyond the scope of the thesis, but 
they do demonstrate that many countries in the Arab world support one of the key tenets of 
political Islam – the implementation of Sharia law.  
 
As the implementation of Sharia law underpins much of the ideology of the Islamic State, a 
poll examining support for the organisation would be instructive. One particular example 
was an Al-Jazeera (2015a) poll conducted in May 2015. The results showed that 81 percent 
of 56,881 Arab respondents ‘considered the progress of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
good for the region/area.’ This result contrasted greatly with the Arab Center for Research 
and Policy Studies (2015) that found that ‘a clear majority of 85 percent of the Arab 
public105 expressed an overall negative attitude towards ISIL’ (p. 19), while only 11 percent 
of Arabs have a positive view’ (p. 22). In another survey, David Pollack (2015) found that 
“around 95 percent - of key Arab publics106 have a negative view of ISIS. A mere 2 percent 
to 4 percent of people in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Kuwait had even a ‘fairly positive’ 
view of that organization today.” Again this indicates a potential contradiction within the 
Arab world, in that many surveyed Arab populations demonstrated broad support for 
Sharia law (a key Islamic State platform), yet near universal rejection of the Islamic State 
(as a group). Although Sharia law and the Islamic State are not one and the same, it still 
perhaps represents a disconnect or lack of synergy within the Arab world. This potential 
contradiction was also acknowledged by D. Pollack (2015), who whilst noting that 95 
percent of key Arab publics have a negative view of ISIS, he also found that 80 percent of 
                                                 
105 According to the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2015: 19), this ‘majority was visible in the 
results from all of the surveyed countries and population groups, and followed this order of precedence: 
Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, amongst Syrian refugees, Jordan and Palestine (in that order).’ 
Each country had 600 respondents. 
106 Each country had 1000 respondents. 
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the same respondents thought it would not (author’s emphasis) be ‘a good idea to interpret 
Islam in a more moderate, tolerant, or modern way.’ Chapter 7 returns to this contradiction, 
in an effort to understand the Islamist philosophies of both Arab foreign fighters and 
Islamist terrorists.  
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has attempted to contextualise the research question by illuminating the Arab 
world through the prism of political Islam. By examining the evolution of the key 
ideological tenets of political Islam, it provides a deeper conceptual understanding of Arab 
foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists. The key ideological tenets provide support to the 
theoretical (radicalisation) framework at the ‘middle-range approach to analysis’ by the 
way of ideas, and the political and religious context. The chapter identified the evolution of 
four critical ideological points of inflection within political Islam: the involvement in 
defensive jihad becoming an individual religious obligation for all Muslims (fard ayn); the 
permissibility of terrorist suicide bombings (against civilians and non-combatants); 
embracing the widespread tactic of takfir against Sunni and Shia Muslims; and the 
resurrection of a khilaafah (caliphate). It may be that analysis of the trajectory of these four 
points of inflection offers explanatory value as to why some Arab foreign fighters 
subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities.   
 
The chapter also found a degree of universal normality towards the notion of defensive 
jihad and martyrdom (fee sabeel Allah) within the Arab world, whilst involvement in 
Islamist terrorism that includes suicide attacks had less support. It also identified an 
apparent disconnect within Arab world opinion – vis-à-vis the reality in Syria (for example, 
Tunisian suicide bombers), and also concerning support for a less moderate interpretation 
of Islam (yet rejection of the Islamic State’s interpretation). It perhaps begs the question 
whether Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists do actually represent Arab society. 
These conundrums are all teased out during analysis of the three case study defensive jihads. 
The next chapter attempts to explain why some veteran Arab foreign fighters from 1980s 
Afghanistan, subsequently became involved (physically or ideologically) in Islamist 
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terrorism, including the 1993 WTC attack, 1995 Riyadh attack, the 1998 East Africa attacks, 
the 2000 USS Cole attack, and the 9/11 attacks.   
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Chapter 4: Veteran Afghan Arabs and their Involvement in Islamist Terrorism 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is the first of three case studies examining why and how some Arab foreign 
fighters subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. It examines 
those who participated in the defensive jihad in 1980s Afghanistan by leveraging a dataset 
of 369 Afghan Arabs (representing as a minimum, 18 percent of the total Afghan Arab 
cohort), 107  the radicalisation framework presented in Chapter 2, and the language of 
political Islam outlined in Chapter 3. Using these tools, the chapter intends to demonstrate 
how situational circumstances at both the individual and group level were central to the 
veteran Afghan Arabs’ post-jihad behaviour.108 The label ‘Afghan Arabs’ (also known as 
‘Arab-Afghans’) 109  is defined in this thesis in time and space as an Arab male, 
predominantly from the Arab world, 110 who became involved in the defensive jihad in 
Afghanistan starting from December 1979 (the Soviet invasion) until April 1992, when ‘the 
first Afghan jihad really came to a close’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 46). 111  This chapter 
situates itself within the defensive jihad in 1980s Afghanistan and the subsequent Islamist 
terrorist attacks, including the 1993 WTC attack, 1995 Riyadh attack, the 1998 East Africa 
attacks, the 2000 USS Cole attack, and the 9/11 attacks. It is the nexus between veteran 
Afghan Arabs and their subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism that constitutes the 
hub of this chapter.  
 
The key finding in the chapter is that the vast majority of Afghan Arabs (who had no 
known pre-existing terrorist links) identified in the thesis dataset, were not radicalised prior 
                                                 
107 Based on the figures of Malet (2015: 10) of between 500 - 2,000 Afghan Arabs (1979-1989). 
108 This thesis uses the label ‘post-jihad behaviour’ in preference to ‘post-return behaviour’ (Hafez, 2012a), to 
recognise that many surviving veteran Afghan Arabs could not return due to dictatorial Arab regime 
restrictions. This issue of reintegration is covered in detail later in the chapter. 
109 Scholars who use the label ‘Arab-Afghans’ include Lia (2008b) and Hamid and Farrall (2015). 
110 Although the majority of the Afghan Arabs came from the Arab world, the thesis dataset includes 17 
percent (62) who were Arab expatriates living in a country other than their country of birth.   
111 This also conforms to the definition of Afghan Arabs used by Muhammad Hafez (2009: 74) in that it 
‘refers to Arabs who volunteered to aid the struggle of the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan (1979–1989) and the subsequent toppling of the communist regime of Muhammad Najibullah 
(1989–1992).’ 
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to participating in defensive jihad in Afghanistan, yet many eventually became involved in 
Islamist terrorist related activities, including the six Islamist terrorist attacks mentioned 
earlier.112 The primary finding suggests that subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorist 
related activities were underpinned by situational factors experienced by the Afghan Arabs 
during the defensive jihad, including real and perceived grievances (against the near and far 
enemy); terrorist training and indoctrination; the influence of those with pre-existing 
terrorist links; and finally comradeship ties developed in the mountains of Afghanistan, and 
in the markets of Peshawar (Pakistan).  
 
The chapter is broken down into two sections. The first analyses the broad ‘setting events’ 
(Taylor and Horgan, 2006: 592)113 - education, age, and geographic origin - by using the 
thesis data on 369 Afghan Arabs, in order to demonstrate their ordinariness and 
contextualise their initial involvement in defensive jihad. The second part, and core of the 
chapter, examines the situational circumstances that led some veteran Afghan Arabs to 
become involved in Islamist terrorist related activities, while others remained involved in a 
defensive jihad (for example in Bosnia) or reintegrated back into Arab world society. This 
allows for some form of comparative analysis, particularly in trying to explain why some 
chose not to subsequently engage in Islamist terrorism, despite being exposed to the same 
situational circumstances.  
 
Analysis of the Data 
 
Overview 
 
The 1980s defensive jihad in Afghanistan has been covered by many scholars including but 
not limited to al-Zayyat (2004), Gerges (2005), Rana and Bukhari (2007), Hafez (2009), 
Tawil (2010), Hegghammer (2010b), Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn (2012), and Hamid 
                                                 
112 It is instructive that Ahmed, Comerford, and El-Badaway (2016: 15) also found ‘that the in-
ternationalisation of Afghanistan’s conflict in the 1980s was the single most important event in shaping global 
jihadism up until the rise of ISIS.’ 
113 According to Taylor and Horgan (2006: 592) whilst setting events ‘‘cannot be said in any meaningful way 
to ‘cause’ or result in choices of a particular set of actions ... they clearly contribute to the behavioural choices 
of an individual, and may provide important direction and motivation.’’ 
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and Farrall (2015). Broadly speaking, the Afghan Arabs travelled to Peshawar (in Pakistan 
on the border with Afghanistan) and became involved in the defensive jihad either as 
combatants having crossed the border (Hamid and Farrall, 2015) into Afghanistan, or in a 
humanitarian capacity (Lia, 2008b: 78; Hafez, 2009: 75) in Pakistan or Afghanistan. From 
the thesis dataset, they were well represented educationally and career wise: 52 (14 percent) 
of the 369 Afghan Arabs had a university education; there were nine medical doctors and 
six engineers, with ten of them having gained their degrees in the US – a finding that 
echoes with previous studies.114 Some Afghan Arabs were married; many had religious 
credentials; some joined with family members and/or friends; while many lived as 
expatriates (and discussed later). Age wise, based on the available data of 102 Afghan 
Arabs, they varied between 11 and 65 years of age,115 with 51 percent of them under 22-
years-old. The average age was 23 and the median was 24-years-old. This finding chimes 
well with the scholarly literature particularly as it ‘is already well established in other 
spheres that young males are associated with a multitude of dangerous and high-risk 
activities’ (Silke, 2008: 105); and broadly matches the finding by Sageman (2004: 92) 
whose ‘Core Arab cluster’116 average age was 23.75 years.  
 
The overview presented suggests that those Afghan Arabs (with no known prior terrorist 
links) were ordinary Arab men, in the sense of being ‘regular, normal, customary, usual’117 
individuals, lacking the notions of radicalisation or extremism. They appeared to be broadly 
representative of their societies, of mixed social economic and educational levels, and a 
spectrum of ages. In the context of the Arab world, Bayat (2010: ix) defines ‘ordinary 
people’ as ‘the globalizing youth and other urban grass roots.’ The label ‘ordinary’ when 
referring to ‘ordinary people’ and ‘ordinary men’ has academic ballast, being used 
effectively by scholars such as F. E. Katz (1993) and Browning (1998), respectively. This 
                                                 
114 According to Li (2011: 15), the ‘Arabs travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to work as engineers, doctors, 
journalists, teachers, preachers, and fighters.’ 
115 Algerian national Adil Hadi al-Jaziri Hamlili was involved from the age of 11, going to Afghanistan in 
1986 with his father, brother and second cousin (JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment. Adil Hadi al-Jaziri 
Hamlili. 8 July 2008). The oldest Afghan Arab was an Egyptian national Shaykh Abdul Aziz Ali (aka Abu 
Osama al-Misri) ‘who went to Afghanistan during the late 1980s, even though by then he was sixty-five’ (Lia, 
2008b: 42). 
116 The Core Arab cluster consists of individuals from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen and Kuwait (Sageman, 
2004: 70). 
117 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995: 960). 
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picture of ordinariness (the lack of radicalisation and/or extremism) of the Afghan Arab on 
mobilisation is important, due to the fact that subsequently, some became involved in 
Islamist terrorist acts, and confirms the suggestion that ‘plain folk … ordinary people … 
have contributed to extraordinary evil’ (F. E. Katz, 1993: 1-10). 
 
The Afghan Arab mobilisation118 was not an instantaneous reaction to the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. Drawing on the accounts of 148 Afghan Arabs on whom data are available, 
mobilisation was a gradual process that only really accelerated in the late-1980s, as 
represented in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Afghan Arab Years of Mobilisation (n=148) 
 
Figure 4.1 supports the ‘historical evidence … which strongly suggests [that] only a few 
tens of fighters made it to Afghanistan before 1984 … and did not go to Afghanistan in 
significant numbers until the mid-late 1980s’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 38); and that ‘the 
number of Arab militants decreased after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan’ (Rana 
and Bukhari, 2007: 11). In effect Figure 4.1 resonates with history and the scholarly 
literature, thus adding an additional degree of validity to the Afghan Arab dataset compiled 
for this thesis.   
                                                 
118 The term ‘mobilisation’ is used in the context of ‘organising for service or action (especially troops in time 
of war)’ (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995: 874). The term is used by scholars including Gerges (2005), 
Sageman (2008: 23), Hegghammer (2009c, 2010b), and Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn (2012). 
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Geographic Origin 
 
The breakdown of the geographic origin (in the sense of being born in) of the 369 Afghan 
Arabs from the dataset is presented in Figure 4.2.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Afghan Arab Geographic Origin (n=369) 
 
The dataset confirms the major contribution of countries like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and 
Egypt. A brief analysis of these geographic origins offers an insight into the contextual 
societal level (or structural) circumstances that may have promoted involvement (or not) in 
the defensive jihad in Afghanistan. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the greatest driver for the 
mobilisation was regime and religious support. Former Arab foreign fighter and later 
Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard, Nassir al-Bahri, remembered that during the Afghan war 
‘all Saudi clerics and shaykhs were urging jihad and collecting contributions for jihad’ (al-
Bahri, 2005c: 3). Additionally, allegedly on one occasion, ‘Saudi Prince Salman bin Abdul 
Aziz paid seventy percent of Ali Hamza al-Bahlul’s travel expenses to Afghanistan.’119 The 
case of Yemen is less obvious. During the 1980s they were split as a country, one half 
being the communist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), and the other the 
Yemen Arab Republic (aka North Yemen). From the limited data available, it appears the 
                                                 
119 JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment. Ali Hamza al-Bahlul. 15 November 2007, pp. 2-3. 
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majority of Yemeni Afghan Arabs came from the Yemen Arab Republic (Ibb, Marib, 
Sanaa, Khirash, and Hudaydah), which had a sectarian complication, in that the ‘Sunni 
Shafi'is of southern North Yemen … resented the rule of the Shia Zaidis to the north’ (M. 
N. Katz, 1986: 8). The data suggest that the majority originated from within the ‘Sunni 
Shafi’is of southern North Yemen.’ Finally, 21 percent (12) of the Yemeni Afghan Arab 
cohort (58) were actually expatriates, the majority living and working in Saudi Arabia, 
which being away from family roots and living in a country that was promoting the 
narrative of defensive jihad in Afghanistan, may have contributed to their mobilisation.    
 
Finally, the substantial involvement of Egyptian Afghan Arabs can be broadly explained by 
two push factors120 orchestrated by the Egyptian regime. First, after the 1981 assassination 
of President Muhammad Anwar as-Sadat, the Egyptian regime crackdown on Islamist 
groups led many individuals to flee to Afghanistan (Sageman, 2004: 32; Kepel 2008: 148). 
Second, many Egyptian Islamists were ‘encouraged by the regime to join the Afghan jihad’ 
(Kepel, 2008: 279), as ‘a convenient way of disposing of their home-grown jihadis’ (Strick 
van Linschoten and Kuehn, 2012: 51), in order to ‘divert jihad outside their own bloody 
borders’ (Gerges, 2005: 62). As will be demonstrated later, the Egyptian Afghan Arabs 
with known pre-existing terrorist links, particularly to Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the 
Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), greatly influenced those Afghan Arabs who had no such 
prior affiliations.   
 
Afghan Arab Motivations and Circumstances 
 
Introduction 
 
According to Hafez (2009: 75), the motivations for involvement in defensive jihad of the 
Afghan Arabs were ‘seeking religious fulfilment, employment opportunities, adventure, 
safe haven, and military training.’ Using the thesis dataset, the three main documented 
situational circumstances identified were a religious (Islamic) influence (98), expatriate 
                                                 
120 As noted in Chapter 2, ‘push’ factors include grievances and adverse socio-political conditions (Borum, 
2011b: 56). 
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status (65), and prior terrorist links (51). It must be noted that some individuals were 
influenced by more than one motivation and/or circumstance. Diagrammatically this is 
represented in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Afghan Arab Situational Circumstances (n=138) 
 
It is reassuring to note some corroboration between the thesis findings and those identified 
by Hafez (2009). For example, ‘Islamic influences’ speaks to Hafez’s ‘seeking religious 
fulfilment,’ and ‘prior terrorist links’ speak to Hafez’s ‘safe haven’ (having been ‘pushed’ 
by a regime’s security apparatus for alleged involvement in Islamist activism). The three 
circumstances identified by this study that appeared to shape the Afghan Arab cohort’s 
initial involvement in defensive jihad in 1980s Afghanistan are briefly discussed below 
with an eye on their wider influence and applicability vis-à-vis their subsequent 
involvement in Islamist terrorism. 
Islamic Influences   
 
Perhaps the greatest influence that motivated the mobilisation of the Afghan Arabs was the 
notion of piety and the need to assist oppressed fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. The data 
are compelling: 71 percent (98) of the 138 Arab foreign fighters on whom information was 
documented, had been influenced by a combination of an ideologue, a religious fatwa, 
attendance at a mosque, or piety as a result of a formal Islamic education. As Hegghammer 
(2007: 4) observed, ‘clerics inspired many recruits.’ The Yemeni Arab foreign fighter and 
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later Bin Laden’s bodyguard, Nassir al-Bahri (2005a), admitted to being ‘influenced by the 
sermons delivered by some speakers in the mosques in Jeddah about jihad in Afghanistan,’ 
adding that ‘the call to jihad in the Friday sermons, the tape cassettes, the magazines, and 
other media … influenced him greatly.’ According to Hegghammer (2010b: 39), the ‘single 
most important individual behind the mobilisation of Arab volunteers for Afghanistan’ was 
Abdullah Azzam. Again, al-Bahri (2013: 18) recalled:    
 
‘I carried Abdullah Azzam’s books and cassettes around with me. In them he talked 
about Paradise, the glory of jihad and what lies beyond death. His talks described 
the mysterious powers of the mujahid, who feels no pain as he dies a martyr from 
his injuries.’ 
 
Abdullah Azzam’s interpretation of defensive jihad under the rubric of political Islam was 
covered in Chapter 3. What was central to his narrative was that he promoted both 
defensive jihad and martyrdom ‘in the cause of God’ (fee sabeel Allah), but at no time did 
he support a global or religious nationalist terrorist agenda (Gerges, 2005: 135; 
Hegghammer 2010b: 69; Lia, 2008b: 91; Stenersen, 2011: 184; Hamid and Farrall, 2015). 
His narrative, as discussed in Chapter 3, was that ‘if a piece of Muslim land the size of a 
hand span is infringed upon, then jihad becomes obligatory (fard ayn) on every Muslim’ 
(A.Y. Azzam, 1983). Additionally, he highlighted the injustices being inflicted upon 
Afghan co-religionists, in particular that ‘Afghan children are being slaughtered, women 
are being raped, the innocent are killed and their corpses scattered’ (A.Y. Azzam, 1983). 
Azzam’s narrative raises three points. First, the injustices inflicted upon the Afghan people 
were ‘important drivers of individual decisions to become involved in militant activism’ 
(Silke, 2008: 114). Second, from a similar angle, the notion of ‘identifying with co-
religionists’ is widely considered ‘a risk factor’ (Horgan, 2009: 12) for involvement in 
militant activism (including Islamist terrorism or defensive jihad). Third, as noted in 
Chapter 3, Azzam’s narrative resonated with aspiring Afghan Arabs due to his undisputed 
charismatic authority at that time (Bergen, 2002: 54; McGregor, 2003; Gerges, 2005: 134; 
Ingram, 2013: 152). 
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Expatriate Status 
 
Being an Arab expatriate living, studying, or working in a country away from their home, 
family, friends, and culture, appears in some cases to have influenced their decision to 
become Afghan Arabs. Out of the 369 biographies nearly 18 percent (65) had been Arab 
expatriates. Their biographies demonstrate the context of the 1980s: many Palestinians had 
immigrated to Jordan (due to the Palestinian Israeli conflict); many Algerians and 
Egyptians had resettled in the West (claiming political asylum); many Yemenis had 
resettled in Saudi Arabia (to seek employment as noted earlier); and finally, 15 had been 
studying in Western academic institutions. Examples of these circumstances include 
Algerian national Khalid Mustafa (Rana and Bukhari, 2007: 119), and Syrian national Abu 
Anas (Rana and Bukhari, 2007: 43) who both had lived in the West but felt isolated and 
were drawn to the defensive jihad in Afghanistan.  
 
The thesis dataset shows that many were largely ‘deracinated Arab youth, cut off from their 
families, feeling the sting of discrimination, and looking for some colourful purpose to 
orient their drifting lives’ (Dalacoura, 2011: 56). This is confirmed by Silke (2008: 112), 
who noted that: 
 
‘Research has shown that most members … joined the jihad while they were living 
in a foreign country or when they were otherwise isolated from older friends and 
family. Often these individuals were expatriates – students, workers, refugees – 
living away from home and family.’  
 
Finally, although pertaining to Islamist terrorists, Sageman (2004: 92) also identified in his 
study that ‘70 percent joined in a country where they had not grown up. They were 
expatriates … away from home and family.’ The impact on the individual of such an 
existence can lead to feelings of ‘social isolation’ and ‘relative deprivation’ which, 
according to Sageman (2004: 95), ‘is probably a necessary condition’ for involvement in 
Islamist terrorism. Perhaps a more nuanced account would suggest that expatriate status 
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may contribute to expatriate involvement in Islamist activities, violent and non-violent, 
where violent activities would include both defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. 
 
Known Prior Terrorist Links 
 
The presence of Afghan Arabs with known prior terrorist links in the Afghan jihad exposes 
the dichotomy between defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. Although in percentage 
terms (drawn from the thesis dataset) the number was small (14 percent), ideologically 
those Afghan Arabs with pre-existing terrorist links were more focussed on religious 
nationalist terrorism than on defensive jihad, and this is well established in the literature 
(Gerges, 2005: 57; Kepel, 2008: 148; Hafez, 2009: 78). As noted earlier, many Egyptian 
Afghan Arabs had been ‘pushed’ from Egypt, in effect ‘deflecting the problem onto others’ 
(Orton, 2016). The notion of Afghan Arabs with pre-existing terrorist links implicitly 
assumes that they had already been radicalised in their home countries, prior to their arrival 
in Afghanistan. They had already experienced the process of ‘initially becoming engaged 
and/or involved in doing terrorism’ (Horgan, 2005: 81), potentially to ‘the point of 
engaging in terrorist events’ (Horgan, 2005: 137). Although Sageman (2004: 71) argued 
that Egyptian Afghan Arabs ‘were already dedicated terrorists before coming to 
Afghanistan,’ a more empirically based finding reveals that actually less than half (42 
percent) of Egyptian Afghan Arabs (extracted from the thesis dataset) were either in EIJ (28 
percent) or EIG (14 percent). What is instructive, and will be demonstrated later, is that 
Afghan Arabs with pre-existing terrorist links, despite their modest size, were to have a 
disproportionate influence over those Afghan Arabs without such links. 
 
The Defensive Jihad in 1980s Afghanistan 
 
Introduction 
 
Although there is no definitive pattern (outside those exhibited in Figure 4.3) as to why 
certain individuals became involved in the 1980s Afghan jihad, having become involved, it 
is clear that their futures included, but were not limited to, later involvement in Islamist 
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terrorism; continued involvement in defensive jihad; reintegration back into society; or 
death (or some combination therein). The situational circumstances of the 1980s Afghan 
jihad need illuminating in order to understand the Afghan Arabs’ subsequent post-jihad 
behaviour. Were the Afghan Arabs already radicalised prior to arriving in Afghanistan? 
Was the Afghan jihad actually Islamist terrorism where civilians and non-combatants were 
targeted? Was martyrdom in the Afghan jihad actually a synonym for suicide attacks? If the 
answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then it would broadly undermine the 
research question – however the evidence suggests otherwise. It is instructive therefore to 
briefly examine the defensive jihad in 1980s Afghanistan, through the eyes of those who 
were actually there, in order to answer the above questions.  
 
To do this, the narratives of six particular Afghan Arabs are used: Abdullah Anas is an 
Algerian who ‘was one of the most high-ranking Arab fighters in Afghanistan’ (Lia 2008: 
70); Mustafa Hamid121 is an Egyptian, who ‘was among the first Arabs to join the jihad 
against the Soviets’ (Hamid and Farrall, 2015); Musa al-Qarni is a Saudi intellectual and 
former Afghan Arab ‘who once led the incitement to jihad in Saudi Arabia and travelled to 
Afghanistan in the early days of jihad against the Russians’ (al-Hayat, 2006); Tameem al-
Adnani was a Palestinian and the Director of the Afghan Mujahhideen Services Office;122 
and Noman Benotman123 is a Libyan veteran of the Afghan jihad and former member of the 
Shura Committee of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) (Abedin, 2005). Finally, 
Abu Zubaydah was a Palestinian expatriate living in Saudi Arabia who maintained a 
personal diary of his experience as an Afghan Arab124 - an account that does not suffer from 
post-hoc rationalisation. They were selected due to open source availability, the senior 
positions they held during the Afghan jihad, and the content of their narrative that appears 
broadly devoid of rhetoric. Whilst not necessarily being representative of the rank and file 
of the Afghan Arab cohort, their narratives are illuminating and instructive. 
  
                                                 
121 Mustafa Hamid is also known as Abu Walid al-Misri. 
122 Tamim al-Adnani was Palestinian Afghan Arab who died in London in 1989, who was considered the 
‘second in command’ to Abdullah Azzam (Hegghammer, 2008a: 95). 
123 Noman is a Muslim name meaning ‘blood’ (Rahman, 2010: 64), and Benotman is an unusual phonetic 
pronunciation of Ben Uthman, as shown in his Twitter account (@nbenotmen). 
124 Al Jazeera America released the diaries on 7 November 2013. See Zubaydah (1991 and 1992). 
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Defensive Jihad and Terrorism in 1980s Afghanistan 
 
The ‘most pronounced reason’ for participating in defensive jihad in Afghanistan was that 
it ‘was a formally and religiously sanctioned war to defend the country and the land’ (Strick 
van Linschoten and Kuehn, 2012: 58). It was enshrined within the rhetoric of political 
Islam first espoused by Ibn Taymiyya, and reinforced by Abdullah Azzam (although not by 
Egyptians al-Banna and Faraj, who were focussed on fighting the Egyptian regime). 
According to Mustafa Hamid the majority ‘of those who fought in Afghanistan were youths 
who went thinking they were fighting for a fair and just cause’ (Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 
313), indicating that they were not radicalised in the sense of being committed to an 
‘extremist political or religious ideology’ (Horgan, 2009: 152). This may help explain why 
the Afghan Arabs (without known pre-existing terrorist links) eschewed terrorist related 
activities. Certainly, Tameem al-Adnani (1989) stressed that ‘hijacking planes … killing 
innocent people, women, and civilians … is not jihad.’ He argued that in 1980s 
Afghanistan, ‘jihad was fighting for the sake of Allah ... fighting those who fight you … the 
men … the Russians.’ This was echoed by two further Afghan Arabs: Abdullah Anas (2014) 
argued that the Afghan Arabs were ‘not bloodthirsty people, the jihad was focused, and the 
philosophy of hatred and bloodshed did not exist;’ while Musa al-Qarni (2006a) noted that 
‘many Arab young men who had joined the Afghan jihad … had only come to fight’ the 
Soviet invaders.  
 
This suggestion that the majority (though not all) of Afghan Arabs were neither radicalised 
nor terrorists prior to their involvement in defensive jihad, is broadly (but not entirely) 
supported in the scholarly literature. According to O. Roy (1990: 233), the Afghan Arabs 
‘did not come from the more radical milieu,’ whilst Rana and Bukhari (2007: 21) argued 
that they ‘came to Afghanistan just to fight jihad in support of their Afghan brethren.’ 
Despite this finding, academics such as Dalacoura (2011: 42) still paint the Afghan Arabs 
as ‘Islamic radicals fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.’ Whilst perhaps misleading  
and unrepresentative, such labelling is consistent with the wider political and academic 
trend of ‘associating the noble religious concept of jihad with illegitimate violence’ 
(Hegghammer, 2009a: 246).  
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There is however some evidence (Kepel, 2008; Williams, 2011), possibly anecdotally, that 
atrocities (akin to terrorism by non-state actors) did take place during the 1980s Afghan 
jihad. Maybe these atrocities were conducted by more extreme Afghan Arabs with pre-
existing terrorist links, however in 1989 a group of Afghan Arabs did massacre some 
Afghan Communist troop prisoners near Jalalabad (Kepel, 2008: 148; Williams, 2011: 220). 
Perhaps therefore it was no coincidence that ‘it was after Jalalabad that the western media 
started to call [the Afghan Arabs] terrorists’ in Afghanistan (Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 168). 
Finally, veteran Afghan Arab Abdullah Anas (2015) while comparing the 1980s Afghan 
jihad with the atrocities perpetrated in the Syrian conflict, also argued that ‘the word jihad 
has been stolen, hijacked … jihad will continue until the hereafter, but the challenge is, in 
what context, what circumstances, who declared the jihad, with who, when?’   
 
In order to gain a first-hand account of one Afghan Arab’s journey, it is instructive to draw 
upon the diary of Abu Zubaydah. A week after his arrival in Afghanistan (19 January 1991) 
he remarked that the ‘spiritual atmosphere here is good; youth and elderly have given their 
souls to Almighty God, they traded off life and everything in it for jihad … the idea of 
settling here is enticing me’ (Zubaydah, 1991: 36). Less than three months later (2 April 
1991) his diary entry revealed: ‘I feel settled down due to being mentally determined to be 
engaged in jihad. Jihad is the future and my future is jihad’ (Zubaydah, 1991: 46). Finally, 
in the week 18-25 April 1991, he noted the conceptual development of defensive jihad 
within himself: ‘the idea of jihad for Allah’s cause in its meaning and perception is 
revealing itself to me and becoming more refined [and] now is an individual duty’ 
(Zubaydah, 1991: 55-56). It is perhaps instructive that Zubaydah’s ‘idea of jihad for Allah’s 
cause’ is more akin to the notion of martyrdom within the setting of a defensive jihad, 
rather than suicide attacks as part of an Islamist terrorist campaign.  
 
Martyrdom and Suicide in 1980s Afghanistan  
 
BBC reporter Saira Shah visited Afghanistan in 1986 and reported that ‘the Arab volunteers 
in Afghanistan … don’t mind strapping explosives to themselves to become martyrs’ (Shah 
as cited in Williams, 2011: 220); whilst Dalacoura (2011: 51) suggests that ‘not all Arab 
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Afghans … were suicidal’ - implying that some were. These caricatures maybe compelling 
but are not persuasive, and appear to misunderstand the nature of martyrdom in 1980s 
Afghanistan. As noted in Chapter 3, whilst the post 9/11 political landscape tends to 
perceive the Islamic concept of martyrdom as synonymous with suicide attacks, it is 
instructive that ‘Afghan Arabs did not engage in suicide attacks per se’ (Hafez, 2012a) – a 
suggestion that is supported by the biographies in the thesis dataset. These biographies 
indicate that the status of shaheed (martyr) was revered and achieved by dying fighting the 
Soviets (in the path of God) – as advocated by Abdullah Azzam (1983), and consistent with 
the prevailing current of political Islam in the 1980s.  
 
In the obituary of Saudi Afghan Arab Yahya Senyor al-Jaddawi125 - considered the first 
'martyr' from the Arabian Gulf to have been killed in action against the Soviets in 
Afghanistan in 1985, it refers to the Quranic view of martyrdom: ‘Think not of those who 
are killed in the Way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are alive, with their Lord, and they have 
provision’ (Quran 3:169). Many Afghan Arabs sought martyrdom, such as Saudi national 
Abu Zubair al-Madani126 who ‘always used to speak and think about one thing, which was 
martyrdom.’ He survived Afghanistan but had his wish fulfilled in 1992, defending 
Muslims near Sarajevo in Bosnia. Another case was Yemeni Afghan Arab Abu Uthman 
who participated in the defensive jihad in Afghanistan, because he ‘wanted to be a Muslim 
martyr.’ His wish was fulfilled at Shakardara, Afghanistan (Rana and Bukhari, 2007: 150). 
These personal accounts of martyrdom (and not suicide) are also supported in the literature. 
According to O. Roy (1990: 218), the Arab foreign fighters ‘were generally courageous, 
even fanatical fighters,’ and as noted in Chapter 2, Al-Qarni (2006a) recalled that ‘there 
were no suicide operations at the time. The young men used to attack tanks and fighter 
aircraft with their personal weapons.’ This zeal and fanaticism displayed by the Afghan 
Arabs should not be confused with that of contemporary suicide bombers, for whilst the 
Afghan Arabs developed a culture for martyrdom (Hafez, 2009: 77; Hamid as cited in 
Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 315), based on the evidence from the thesis dataset, they only 
sought martyrdom fee sabeel Allah fighting the Soviets in a conventional sense. That is not 
                                                 
125 Caravan of Martyrs (Afghanistan 1985): Yahya Senyor al-Jeddawi.  
126 Caravan of Martyrs (Bosnia 1992): Abu Zubair al-Madani. 
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to say that as a result of the situational circumstances experienced in the defensive jihad in 
Afghanistan, that some veteran Afghan Arabs did not subsequently adopt ‘suicide attacks’ 
– indeed the data suggest that many did, and being central to the research question, is 
addressed later in the chapter. 
 
Abu Zubaydah’s View of Martyrdom 
 
Interestingly, less than three months after his arrival in Afghanistan (8 April 1991), Abu 
Zubaydah’s desire for martyrdom becomes apparent, and is quoted in full:   
 
‘Martyrdom for Allah’s cause. I become dreaming of it because of all I hear about 
its virtue and standing by Almighty God ... sometimes I wish for a bullet or a swift 
shell to take me to meet my Lord as a martyr … I cannot wait: I want to be a martyr 
for Allah’s cause quickly’ (Zubaydah, 1991: 46).  
 
The two key points concerning martyrdom emanating from his diary are the religious 
(Islamic) basis or underpinning of such a desire, and the explicit lack of a suicidal 
interpretation. It is clear from his diary that Abu Zubaydah and many of his cohort of 
Afghan Arabs were seeking martyrdom through defensive jihad, unequivocally in the cause 
of Allah. He also expressed no desire to commit suicide, in the sense of becoming a suicide 
bomber, which conforms to the interpretation of martyrdom championed by Abdullah 
Azzam (Moghadam, 2008: 59), as noted in Chapter 3.  
 
To establish a baseline for the remainder of the chapter, it must be reinforced that based on 
research undertaken for this study, Afghan Arabs eschewed terrorism and suicide attacks: 
there is no evidence of a single suicide attack (targeting civilians or non-combatants), or an 
expression to commit one, during the Afghan jihad. This suggests that those Afghan Arabs 
(with no known prior terrorist links) were neither radicalised nor terrorists. However, 
having participated in the defensive jihad, their circumstances were very different from the 
general public in the Arab world – their start point for later involvement in Islamist 
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terrorism was in Afghanistan, as Afghan Arabs, not as ordinary citizens in their home 
countries in the Arab world.   
 
The Radicalisation of Afghan Arabs: How and Why? 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite the Afghan Arabs eschewing terrorism and suicide attacks during the defensive 
jihad in 1980s Afghanistan, some (who had no known prior terrorist links) did eventually 
become involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. These activities included global 
Islamist terrorism (including those presented in Figure 4.4) 127  and religious nationalist 
terrorism (such as involvement with the GIA in Algeria).  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Veteran Afghan Arab Involvement in Global Islamist Terrorist Attacks (n=18). 
 
By way of definitional reinforcement and clarity, global Islamist terrorists fight the far 
enemy - ‘the West by all means and in all places’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 6), whilst religious 
                                                 
127 Piazza (2009: 74) noted that ‘many of the key figures in the al-Qaeda groups ... are veterans of the Soviet 
Afghan war of the1980s;’ and Rabasa et al. (2006: 29) noted that ‘below Bin Laden was the consultative 
committee, made up of veterans from the Soviet-Afghan war.’  
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nationalist terrorists 128  fight the near enemy - dictatorial Arab regimes in their home 
countries. It is revealing from Figure 4.4 that the 18 veteran Afghan Arabs involved in the 
global Islamist attacks amounted to 37 percent of the 48 perpetrators, and arguably their 
actual role of leadership and organisation hides a more important facet (see Appendix C for 
Afghan Arab involvement in global Islamist terrorism). It is equally recognised that other 
Afghan Arabs were also involved in many of these attacks (for example Ayman al-
Zawahiri), but they had known prior links to Islamist terrorism – the influence of which is 
discussed later in the chapter. Before examining why so many Afghan Arabs became 
involved in Islamist terrorism, a short explanation of these attacks is offered below.   
 
The vehicle bombing of the WTC occurred on 26 February 1993, killing six and injuring 
1,042 civilians.129 Although Gunaratna (2002: 24) and Post (2007: 197) claimed that al-
Qaeda was responsible, there is little evidence to support this. According to the 9/11 
Commission Report (2005: 60), ‘Bin Ladin’s involvement is at best cloudy,’ while 
Sageman (2005: 42) concluded that the ‘extent of al Qaeda’s involvement in this plot is 
unclear.’130 What was clear however, according to the Joint Terrorism Task Force, was that 
‘a disparate group of Afghan Arabs … formed the bulk of the group behind the bombing’ 
(Reeve, 1999: 55). 
 
The next Islamist terrorist attack occurred in November 1995, and was also perpetrated by 
‘a disparate group of Afghan Arabs’131 consisting of four Saudi nationals involving a ‘car 
bombing of the US Training Mission to the Saudi National Guard in central Riyadh, in 
which five Americans and two Indians were killed’ (Hegghammer, 2008a: 20). Although 
the ‘Saudi government arrested four perpetrators, who admitted being inspired by Bin 
Ladin’ (the 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 60), again there is no compelling evidence that 
                                                 
128 As noted in Chapter 1, Hegghammer (2010b: 6) uses the label ‘socio-revolutionary’ while Gerges (2005: 
151) uses the label ‘religious nationalist.’  
129 Veteran Afghan Arab (with no prior terrorist links) involvement in the 1993 WTC attack involved Omar 
Abdul Rahman, Ramzi Yusuf, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, Osama Azmairi, and Ahmad Ajaj. 
130 According to the 9/11 Commission Report (2005: 472), ‘in February 1995, the government filed a 
confidential court document listing Osama Bin Laden and scores of other people as possible co-conspirators 
in the New York City landmarks plot.’ 
131 Veteran Afghan Arab (with no prior terrorist links) involvement in the 1995 Riyadh attack involved 
Abdullah al-Hudhayf (who initiated a pre-attack), Khalid al-Sa’id, Riyadh al-Hajiri, and Muslih al-Shamrani. 
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al-Qaeda was behind the attack (Hegghammer, 2010b: 71; the 9/11 Commission Report, 
2005: 60; al-Bahri, 2005d: 5).132 Again, the common denominator of significance was that 
the terrorists were veteran Afghan Arabs.  
 
The next attacks in August 1998, involved two near simultaneous bombings of the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 213 and 11 civilians, respectively. 133  In the 
intervening years since the 1995 Riyadh attacks,134 Osama bin Laden had been evicted from 
Sudan (19 May 1996); 135  issued his August 1996 fatwa 136  declaring war against the 
Americans; and issued his 1998 fatwa137 calling on Muslims to ‘kill the Americans and 
their allies.’ Out of the 19 Arabs138 involved in the East Africa attacks, six were veteran 
Afghan Arabs (with no prior links to terrorism); five were veteran Afghan Arabs with 
known pre-existing terrorist links; 139  and eight were Arabs (with no foreign fighter 
experience).140  
 
The fourth Islamist terrorist attack included in this chapter occurred in October 2000 in the 
Yemeni port of Aden. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (2005: 190), ‘al Qaeda 
operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked … the USS Cole … killing 17 
members of the ship’s crew and wounding at least 40.’ Again, a veteran Afghan Arab 
(Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri)141 was considered ‘the field commander’ of the attack (the 9/11 
Commission Report, 2005: 190). Finally, the involvement of five veteran Afghan Arabs142 
                                                 
132 According to Nassir al-Bahri (2005d: 5) ‘Shaykh Osama had nothing to do with these operations.’ 
133 Veteran Afghan Arab (with no prior terrorist links) involvement in the 1998 East Africa attacks involved 
Osama bin Laden, Wadih al-Hajj, Abu Faraj al-Libi, Muhammad Odeh, Muhsin Musa, and Musafa Hamood. 
134 The only other major global terrorist attack was the June 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, 
‘carried out principally, perhaps exclusively, by Saudi Hezbollah’ and not by al-Qaeda (The 9/11 Commission 
Report, 2005: 60). 
135 The 9/11 Commission Report (2005: 63). 
136 Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (1996). 
137 Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. World Islamic Front Statement (23 February 1998). 
138 In addition there were three Kenyans, two Tanzanians, and one Sudanese.  
139 The five were all EIJ members: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Muhammad Atif, Saif al-Adil, Abdullah Ahmad 
Abdullah, and Ibrahim Eidarous 
140 For example, Jihad al-Harazi - the cousin of Abdul Rahman al-Nashiri – was one of the suicide bombers 
involved in the attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi.  
141 Due to his interest in maritime terrorism, al-Nashiri was nicknamed ‘Prince of the Sea’ (Lehr, 2016: 211). 
142 Despite having been involved in previous Islamist terrorist attacks (1993 WTC, 1998 Embassy attacks), 
the five were Osama bin Laden, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, Abdul Rahman al-Nashiri, 
and Muhammad Zammar, who had arrived in 1980s Afghanistan with no prior terrorist links.  
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in the 9/11 attacks was crucial to their success, acting as the planners and ideologues. 
Although no veteran Afghan Arab physically participated in the 9/11 attacks, four veteran 
Arab foreign fighters (introduced in Chapter 1) from other conflicts were 9/11 hijackers: 
two appeared to have participated in defensive jihad in Bosnia143 and two in Chechnya.144 
This again suggests some form of linkage between participation in defensive jihad and 
subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorist related activities.   
 
Overview 
 
The gradual shift from involvement in defensive jihad to one of involvement in Islamist 
terrorist related activities is arguably easier to conceptualise as a result of having physically 
participated in close combat in Afghanistan, rather than having watched videos or listened 
to radical preachers. In tandem, it is also arguably easier to contextualise the notion of 
radicalisation - the ‘social and psychological process of incrementally experienced 
commitment to [an] extremist political or religious ideology’ (Horgan, 2009: 152), as a 
result of close combat in the Afghan jihad, rather than the ‘videos and preachers’ analogy 
above. The immediacy and intimacy of battle involving the killing of Soviet troops, or 
witnessing fellow comrades being killed or badly wounded, was unlikely not to have 
affected the Afghan Arabs, albeit differently. However, was there really a radicalising 
effect during, and as a result of, the Afghan jihad that subsequently encouraged and 
supported the killing of civilians and non-combatants? Why was there a subsequent 
willingness on behalf of some Afghan Arabs, to kill civilians and non-combatants, when 
during the Afghan jihad, the Soviet soldier was the identifiable combatant and the 
legitimate target, within the context of a defensive jihad, as noted by O. Roy (1990: 22)? 
 
Existing scholarship does recognise the presence of a radicalising effect in the 1980s 
Afghan jihad, but it tends to lack depth or empirical support. Gerges (2005: 60) suggested 
that many Afghan Arabs were ‘transformed by the baptism of blood and fire,’ and 
                                                 
143 Saudi nationals Khalid Muhammad Abdullah al-Mihdhar and Nawaf Muhammad Salim al-Hazmi (The 
9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 155). 
144 Saudi nationals ‘Ahmed al Ghamdi and Saeed al Ghamdi were identified by Moore and Tumelty (2008: 
423) as ‘two of the 9/11 hijackers’ who had fought in Chechnya. 
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Richardson (2007: 66) maintained that they were ‘hardened and radicalized by the 
experience.’ Also, while Li (2011: 16) noted the presence of “a sort of extraneous 
‘radicalizing’ variable,” Fishman et al. (2008: 27) believed that ‘there is no debate: the anti‐
Soviet Jihad radicalized thousands of Islamist activists.’ These observations do little to 
explain the process of radicalisation, other than it occurred ‘in a conflict zone where they 
learned about Islam in a context of violence’ (Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 83).  
 
It is difficult to recreate the ‘context of violence’ within the Afghan jihad, however 
personal involvement in it appeared to affect some participants. One veteran Afghan Arab, 
Muhammad Loay Bayazid (aka Abu Rida al-Suri), reflected on his experience:  
 
‘I went to Afghanistan with a blank mind and a good heart ... everything was totally 
strange. It was like I was born just now, like I was an infant, and I have to learn 
everything new. It was not so easy after that to leave and go back to your regular 
life’ (Wright, 2006: 109-110).  
 
Interestingly, perhaps there is a close parallel with British soldiers who fought in the First 
World War, where according to D. Winter (1979: 167), ‘they were disconcerted to find how 
their outlook had drifted away from those who had stayed behind.’ Arguably one of the best 
studies on the psychological impact of war was authored by Lord Moran (1945) about his 
experiences during the First World War, where he convincingly recalled how ‘the soldier is 
alone in his war with terror’ (p. ix) and how ‘all men feel fear’ (p.11). Although further 
comparisons between regular and irregular combatants are beyond the scope of this 
thesis,145 it is reasonable to tentatively suggest that some Arab foreign fighters’ outlooks 
may have changed as a result of their situational circumstances participating in defensive 
jihad (Keegan, 1986; Grossman, 2009). This suggestion clearly applies more directly to 
Afghan Arab combatants rather than the support staff (administrative, logistical, 
educational, or ideological), however the role of Afghan Arab combatants in the Afghan 
jihad appears shrouded in myth.  
                                                 
145 Comparing the impact of close combat (including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) on regular soldiers and 
on irregular combatants such as Arab foreign fighters would make a fascinating thesis. 
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First, evidence suggests that the vast majority of Afghan Arabs did not actually engage in 
close combat with the Soviet army. The literature (Gerges, 2005: 84; Kepel, 2008: 147; Lia, 
2008b: 78; Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, 2012: 57; Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 36) is 
united in agreeing that ‘only a fraction had significant exposure to … combat’ 
(Hegghammer, 2010b: 47), whilst ‘the vast majority of volunteers did not go inside 
Afghanistan, let alone fight there’ (Hafez, 2009: 76). One Afghan mujahhideen leader, 
Commander Akhtarjhan, held a similar view: ‘We had some Arabs who were with us for 
jihad credit. They had a video camera and all they wanted to do was to take videos. They 
were of no value to us’ (Jalali and Grau, 1998: 396).  
 
That is not to say that the Afghan Arabs did not fight – indeed the thesis dataset has 
documented 221 fatalities, which supports the scholarly view that many (although perhaps 
not all)146 became involved in the Afghan jihad in order to successfully become martyrs 
(Hafez, 2009: 77; Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, 2012: 57; Al-Bahri, 2013: 16; Hamid 
and Farrall, 2015: 37). However, a close examination of the 18 veteran Afghan Arabs who 
became involved in the global Islamist terrorist attacks (in Figure 4.4 and Appendix C), and 
the 37 who became involved in religious nationalist terrorism (see Appendix D), reveals 
that only three 147  appeared to have been involved as combatants. The others could be 
divided into two cohorts: either they had been in leadership or support positions, or had 
arrived after 1988 as the Soviet army was beginning its withdrawal. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, in the case of 1980s Afghanistan (and not Iraq and Syria as demonstrated later), 
this would indicate that any radicalisation appears to be more as a result of other factors, 
rather than as a result of the experience of combat. Examining the thesis dataset, the 
theoretical framework, and the scholarly literature, these other factors include grievances 
and ideology, terrorist training, indoctrination, the influence of Afghan Arabs with pre-
existing terrorist links, and comradeship ties and friendships. 
                                                 
146 As noted earlier, Saudi Afghan Arab, Abu Zubair al-Madani ‘used to speak and think about one thing, that 
was martyrdom’ (Caravan of Martyrs: Bosnia, 1992). 
147 The three were Abdullah Anas who was in Afghanistan from 1984; Abu Sariyya who was involved in the 
battle of Khost and later nicknamed ‘the Lion of Khost;’ and Osama bin Laden who was involved in the battle 
of Jaji. For various contradictory and conflicting accounts on the battle of Jaji, see Bergen (2006: 56) and 
Tawil (2010: 18-20).  
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Grievances and Ideology 
 
The notion of grievances and ideology are nestled together due to their relationship with 
radicalisation (Neumann, 2011). Research undertaken for this study suggests that 
grievances and ideology appeared to have contributed to the subsequent radicalisation of 
some veteran Afghan Arabs. As noted earlier, many Afghan Arabs had been involved in 
Islamist activism (including terrorism) in their home countries against their regimes, such 
as Ayman al-Zawahiri, who felt that ‘over-throwing the near enemy must take priority over 
everything else’ (Gerges, 2005: 94). Aware of this, regimes took action (arrest and 
persecution) to prevent their return and reintegration, which resulted in further grievances 
against their regimes. Their ideology was primarily takfiri in nature, and by the early 1990s 
after the Soviet withdrawal, they refocussed again on the near enemy, the result of which 
was ‘that armed jihad against rulers of these countries began to rise to the primary interest 
for trainees and Arab camps’ (Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 140). 
 
According to Lia (2008b: 87), ‘Peshawar around 1990 seemed a fertile ground for new 
ideas about jihadism,’ however the actual lack of congruence was remarkable. Abu 
Zubaydah in his diary entry (for 28 August 1992) recalled that ‘in the past we thought there 
were only simple differences among jihadist parties, but now the communist regime has 
collapsed in Afghanistan, it has resulted in fierce fighting amongst the Arab jihadists’ (Abu 
Zubaydah, 1992: 128). According to Hafez (2009: 78) after the Soviet withdrawal, the new 
Afghan Arabs became exposed to a: 
 
‘range of political beliefs along the Islamist spectrum. Invariably, some were 
attracted to the more radical factions. Peshawar was truly an open market place of 
ideas without bounds or censors, and young men had plenty of time on their hands 
to read, discuss, and argue the finer points of jihadi politics.’   
 
Despite the infighting, it appears that the most enduring ideological current within political 
Islam in the early 1990s was still aimed at local Arab regimes (Al-Zayyat, 2004: 62; Gerges, 
2005; Lia, 2008b: 92; Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, 2012: 69; Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 
 93 
140) – and in harmony with the narrative of Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Abdul Salam 
Faraj. This led many Afghan Arabs to re-direct their violence against the near enemy and 
‘fight for state power against a Muslim regime perceived as illegitimate’ (Hegghammer, 
2010b: 6). As Crenshaw (2011: 44) argued, ‘if terrorists perceive the state as unjust, 
morally corrupt, and violent, then terrorism may seem legitimate and justified.’ Certainly, 
this perception was prevalent among the veteran Afghan Arabs, and was summed up by 
Abu Zubaydah (1992: 94): ‘The truth is that all the rulers of the Islamic and Arab, 
especially Arab states, are traitors who work against their religion. That’s the reason there 
are fundamentalists who demand for Islamic law to rule.’  
 
Grievances and Ideology against the Near Enemy 
 
The appeal of the focus on the near enemy is demonstrated within the dataset that shows 
that 37 of the 119 Afghan Arabs who survived the Afghan jihad (and who had no known 
prior terrorist links), became religious nationalist terrorists (see Appendix D). They came 
from six countries: Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia, as represented 
in Figure 4.5. 
 
Figure 4.5: Afghan Arab Involvement in Religious Nationalist Terrorism (n=37) 
 
These statistics should not come as a surprise as according to Rana and Bukhari (2007: 22), 
during ‘the Afghan-Soviet war, these Arabs were also preparing themselves for jihad in 
their own countries.’ For example, the thesis dataset reveals that the majority (68 percent) 
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of Algerian veteran Afghan Arabs returned home and established the GIA,148 a finding 
supported by Bruce (1995), Rubin (1997: 199), and Testas (2002: 163); while 50 percent of 
the Libyan veteran Afghan Arabs, returned home and established the LIFG (Tawil, 2010: 
52). Interestingly, the majority of those who returned to Algeria had arrived in Afghanistan 
after the Soviet withdrawal, with the express desire of gaining training prior to returning to 
Algeria. Their motivation to go to Afghanistan appears to have been to seek training (as 
noted earlier), in order to return and overthrow the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi 
(Hafez, 2009: 75), and establish an Islamic country ruled by Sharia law. The path taken by 
these individuals suggests that they may not necessarily have been radicalised in 
Afghanistan, but may have had some pre-existing links to Islamist (not necessarily terrorist) 
groups. 
 
A key question in the analysis is that considering 14 percent (51) of Afghan Arabs had 
arrived in Afghanistan with pre-existing terrorist links, did those who survived the 
defensive jihad, later return to their home countries to continue their involvement in 
Islamist terrorist related activities? The evidence from the dataset suggests that in fact, the 
vast majority (who had known pre-existing terrorist links) did not return to their countries 
to continue a religious nationalist agenda.149 This was in large part due to their regimes 
banning them from returning (Gerges, 2005; Atwan, 2006: 48; Lia, 2008b; al-Bahri, 2013: 
57; Hamid and Farrall, 2015). It appears that it was those Afghan Arabs who arrived in 
Afghanistan with no known pre-existing terrorist links, who returned to their countries to 
engage in religious nationalist terrorism. Again, it seems that many Afghan Arabs went to 
Afghanistan more focussed on terrorist training, than participating in defensive jihad. This 
desire for terrorist training in Afghanistan, particularly by religious nationalist terrorists, is 
discussed later in the chapter.   
 
                                                 
148 Apart from one (Abu Musab) who died in Bosnia, the remaining 32 percent of Algerians were later 
involved in al-Qaeda related activities, and subsequently ended up in Guantanamo Bay prison. 
149 This is caveated by noting that some veteran Libyan Afghan Arabs (see Appendix D) had been Islamist 
activists (but not necessarily involved in terrorism) prior to their arrival in Afghanistan. They subsequently 
did return to Libya and formed the LIFG. 
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A good example where grievances against the near enemy contributed to a specific Islamist 
terrorist attack, was the November 1995 Riyadh car bombing against a Saudi-US joint 
facility (the 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 60). With Saudi Arabia ‘at the forefront’ of the 
takfiri ideological current (Hamad and Farrall, 2015: 140), perhaps this attack was not 
unexpected. At the time of the Riyadh attack, Saudi Arabia was clamping down on the 
reformist political opposition (the Sahwa) in the kingdom. This naturally led to a lot of 
arrests and widespread torture (Hegghammer, 2010b: 74). In response to such brutality, a 
veteran Afghan Arab named Shaykh Abdullah al-Hudhayf, ‘threw acid in the face of a 
police officer to avenge the arrest of the leaders of the [Sahwa]’ (Hegghammer, 2008a: 20). 
Al-Hudhayf was subsequently arrested and ‘tortured to death by vengeful security officers, 
a suspicion that is probably not unfounded, for his body was never returned to his family’ 
(Hegghammer, 2010b: 72). Four friends of al-Hudhayf, three of them veteran Afghan 
Arabs (Riyad al-Hajiri, Muslih al-Shamrani, and Khalid Sa’id) decided to avenge his 
untimely demise.   
 
According to a former bodyguard to Osama bin Laden, Nassir al-Bahri (2005d: 5), the 
motivation behind the 1995 Riyadh attacks was solely because ‘Muslih al-Shamrani called 
to avenge the death of Shaykh Abdullah al-Hudhayf.’ The notion of revenge is an 
interesting concept, and has been identified by terrorism scholars 150  as one of many 
possible motivations for terrorist violence. According to Silke (2008: 36), the ‘desire for 
revenge and retribution is an extremely common motive for joining terrorist groups.’ 
Although it appears that the motivations behind the 1995 Riyadh bombing included 
grievances against the Saudi regime, an ideology of anti-Americanism, and a desire for 
vengeance (Hegghammer, 2010b: 71), it does raise the question of why veteran Afghan 
Arabs perpetrated the attack. There is little publically available evidence because the Saudi 
regime promptly executed the alleged perpetrators after they gave a televised confession, 
‘no doubt under duress’ (Hegghammer, 2010b: 73). Nevertheless, the common 
denominator was that three of the alleged terrorists were veteran Afghan Arabs. This 
strongly suggests that previous comradeship ties that were developed during the Afghan 
                                                 
150 See Schmid and Jongman (1988); Richardson (2007); Silke (2008); McCauley and Moskalenko (2008); 
and Schmid (2013a). 
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jihad played a role, as does prior explosive training in order to construct the car bomb. 
These two factors of comradeship ties and terrorist training are discussed in detail later in 
the chapter.   
 
Reintegrating Back into Arab Society  
 
One particularly strong grievance against the near enemy pertained to issues concerning 
reintegration, and the inability of many Afghan Arabs to return home due to restrictions 
placed upon them by their respective Arab regimes. The widespread Arab regime policy of 
national self-preservation - denying the return and reintegration of veteran Afghan Arabs - 
was ultimately to result in the creation of a cohort of ‘rootless but experienced operatives’ 
(The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 59), who ‘were left with little other choice’ regarding 
their futures (Kuehn et al., 2014: 2). It was not just those with known pre-existing terrorist 
links, but also those whose regimes knew had been involved in the defensive jihad in 
Afghanistan (Hamid as cited in Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 313). According to veteran 
Afghan Arab, Abu Zubaydah (1992: 94), ‘too many of them could not go back to their 
home countries because they had been documented as terrorists in every state without 
exception.’ A possible exception was Saudi Arabia, where ‘the Saudi jihadis had a standing 
offer from the Saudi authorities to repent and return home to their families’ (Lia, 2008b: 
279). There is of course a contradiction with the Saudi position, in that the Afghan jihad 
was strongly supported by the Saudi regime both financially and ideologically (through the 
state controlled clergy), yet Saudi veteran Afghan Arabs were required ‘to repent.’ Quite 
what they were repenting for, remains unclear. 
 
Most other veteran Afghan Arabs were well aware that by ‘returning to their home 
countries meant certain arrest, torture, and likely death’ (Kohlmann, 2006: 197) - a view 
corroborated by Hegghammer (2010b: 190). To reinforce this critical point, Kohlmann 
(2004: 118) quoted a Tunisian foreign fighter who stated that ‘to become a mujahhid is 
something very serious, a sacrifice. You cannot return home once your government there 
knows what you are. Instead, we must follow the eternal path of jihad.’ Empirically this is 
supported by the thesis dataset, in that only six veteran Afghan Arabs were identified as 
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having reintegrated back into their home countries. 151  The circumstances of these six 
veteran Afghan Arabs (albeit a small sample) are examined at the end of the chapter in 
order to examine why, given the same situational circumstances, these individuals chose to 
dis-engage from defensive jihad after Afghanistan.   
 
Returning to those who were denied re-entry, the case of Egyptian veteran Afghan Arabs is 
instructive. In the early 1990s the Egyptian regime fully appreciated the possible threat 
posed by returning Afghan Arabs, particularly those who had prior terrorist experience in 
EIG or EIJ, and were now ‘ready to move their armed operations to Egypt to fight the 
regime’ (Al-Zayyat, 2004: 61). However, as Al-Zayyat (2004: 55) further noted: 
 
‘Egypt had already started taking security measures against the Arab Afghans by 
trying them before military courts in absentia and issuing harsh sentences, including 
death sentences for the elite of the Arab Afghans, as well as sentences of life 
imprisonment for others.’ 
 
In effect, Egypt had closed its borders to returning Afghan Arab nationals, and as Nassir al-
Bahri remembered, even Osama bin Laden himself ‘explained that the Egyptians were 
obliged to stay in Afghanistan … they simply had no other place to go since they were 
wanted men back home in Egypt’ (al-Bahri, 2013: 57). Looking at the thesis dataset, it is 
worth briefly examining the future trajectories of the surviving 38 Egyptian veteran Afghan 
Arabs. First, 21 had pre-existing terrorist links, thus justifying in part the Egyptian regime’s 
concern of Afghan Arab returnees. Interestingly, none of those 21 Egyptians with pre-
existing terrorist links returned to Egypt voluntarily152 after the Afghan jihad, with the vast 
majority (76 percent) joining al-Qaeda. 153  Of those who joined al-Qaeda, five were 
                                                 
151 These include Saudi Musa al-Qarni, Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and four Syrians who are now 
involved in the Syrian jihad: Abu Faris al-Suri (Jabhat al-Nusrah spokesman); Muhammad Ayman Aboul-
Tout (ideologue for Ahrar ash-Shaam); Baha Mustafa al-Jughl (Ahrar ash-Shaam); and Muhammad Haydar 
Zammar (ISIS, although some reports suggest Ahrar ash-Shaam).  
152 Egyptian Abu Talal al-Qaseemi was a member of EIG, a veteran of the Afghan and Bosnian jihads. He 
was abducted in Bosnia by the CIA in September 1995 in a case of extraordinary rendition and involuntarily 
returned to Egypt. He was sentenced to death (Kohlmann, 2004: 150).  
153 According to al-Bahri (2013: 57) Osama bin Laden admitted that ‘most of the brothers around me are 
Egyptian’ and that the majority of the ‘al-Qaeda top brass’ (p. 96) were Egyptian. The future of the remaining 
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involved in the East Africa embassy bombings (three of whom were also involved in 
planning the 9/11 attacks), and two were involved in the 1993 WTC attack. The remaining 
17 Egyptian veteran Afghan Arabs, who despite having had no known prior terrorist links, 
were now known to Egyptian authorities and therefore reluctant to return to Egypt, 
whereupon ten subsequently joined al-Qaeda (two of whom were involved in the East 
Africa embassy bombings), and five were later killed participating in defensive jihad in 
Bosnia and/or Chechnya.154 
 
This broad security policy adopted by Arab regimes, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, contributed to the deflection, exportation, and spreading of Islamist 
terrorism (and defensive jihad) beyond Arab regime borders. Despite the data collected for 
this thesis on Afghan Arabs, there is no similar canon of data on the ethnic background of 
other foreign fighters in 1980s Afghanistan let alone their post-jihad behaviour. However, 
with so many different ethnicities now (2017) fighting in Syria, governments would be 
wise to study the post-Afghan jihad legacy of the ‘disgruntled and dispossessed of the 
Islamic world’ (Dobbs, 2001). This legacy includes the historical policy consequences of 
denying re-entry to veteran Afghan Arabs (and suspected terrorists); the lack of 
reintegration programmes; 155  and the ideological reorientation of many veteran Afghan 
Arabs to attack the ‘foreign supporters’ of authoritarian Arab regimes (Lia, 2008b: 92) - the 
far enemy. 
 
Grievances and Ideology against the Far Enemy 
 
There has been a plethora of scholarly literature on why the far enemy, as represented by 
‘the US and her allies’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 72), became the target for attacks from Islamist 
terrorists. Gerges (2005: 131) argued that it was the failure of Islamist terrorists to topple 
their own ‘pro-Western Muslim regimes’ that led them to attack Western interests. Perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                     
five Egyptians (without pre-existing terrorist links) included two killed in the Bosnian jihad; two were 
imprisoned and one (Abu Talal al-Qaseemi) sentenced to death in Egypt. 
154 The trajectories of the remaining two Egyptian Afghan Arabs are unknown after the Afghan jihad. 
155 It is acknowledged that since the 9/11 attacks, some Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Yemen, 
have started reintegration programmes for Arab foreign fighters (and Islamist terrorists), and are discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
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more empirically based, Bin Laden (1996) articulated his grievances against ‘the Zionist-
Crusader alliance’ by employing diagnostic framing 156  that included the American 
occupation of Saudi Arabia (after the 1991 Gulf war); American support for Israel; Israeli 
occupation of Palestinian lands; the Israeli 1996 massacre in Qana, Lebanon; and UN 
sanctions against Iraq that had killed thousands of children.157 Whether these were real or 
perceived grievances it led to prognostic framing158 and an ideology that supported and 
encouraged attacks against the far enemy. Despite such prognostic framing promoting 
terrorism, within the narrative of political Islam it was still viewed as defensive jihad by the 
Islamist terrorists; it was only ‘the definition of the enemy’ that had changed (Gerges, 2005: 
14).    
 
Many of the grievances held by veteran Afghan Arabs that later spawned global Islamist 
terrorist attacks against the far enemy, may be explained by the perpetrators themselves. 
First, the 1993 WTC attack, according to Egyptian Omar Abdul-Rahman (1996),159 the 
spiritual leader of the bombing, ‘America is the worst enemy of Islam’ (p. 16); it ‘has 
surrounded Iraq and they have starved its Muslim people (p. 19);160 it ‘preserves Israel (p. 
16); and it ‘loved President Mubarak’ (p. 17). Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (2006: 11) 
explained the 1993 WTC attack motivation was ‘to make US citizens suffer, especially 
economically, which would put pressure on the US government to change its policies.’ 
Finally, Ramzi Yusuf (1998), the leader of the WTC bombing, explained the attack 
motivation was ‘against the United States Government and against Israel, because [these 
countries] are more than terrorists.’ Summed up, ‘the root of the WTC bombers’ intent … 
                                                 
156 Embedded within diagnostic framing is the concept of ‘injustice frames’ that are ‘generated and adopted 
by those who come to define the actions of an authority as unjust’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615). The notion 
of injustice resonates widely across the Arab world, and includes ‘several key regional conflicts (such as 
Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir and the Palestinian territories), that exposes Western double standards’ (Ranstorp 
and Herd, 2007: 6). 
157 By the time of the 1993 WTC attack, Richard Garfield, a Columbia University nursing professor, 
estimated there were 345,000-530,000 Iraqi deaths over the 1990-2002 UN sanctions period. 
158 Prognostic framing ‘involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of 
attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616). This framing advocates a 
plan commensurate with the prognosis. It may entail militant activity, propaganda, or at the macro level, 
however delusionary, the total destruction of the United States. 
159 Omar Abdul-Rahman died (of natural causes) in a US jail on 18 February 2017. 
160 See also Footnote 156. This was arguably a real grievance. On 12 May 1996, Madeleine Albright (then US 
Ambassador to the UN) was interviewed by Stahl (1996) on 60 Minutes, and asked ‘we have heard that half a 
million children have died … you know, is the price worth it?’ Albright replied ‘we think the price is worth it.’ 
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was a strong desire to punish, to seek revenge, and to underscore the dignity of Muslims’ 
(Parachini, 2000: 203). 
 
Looking briefly at the other attacks, al-Bahri (2005b) recounted that the perceived 
motivation behind the 1998 East Africa US embassy attacks was based on Bin Laden’s 
perception that: 
 
‘the two American embassies … were just big American detention centres in Africa. 
They were the plotting minds behind the events that took place in Rwanda, where 
more than 80,000 Muslims were killed … they were feeding that struggle.’  
 
The motivation behind the USS Cole attack, according to al-Bahri (2005a), was ‘to damage 
the USA's reputation in the naval arena, to raise the morale of the Muslims, and to prove to 
the Islamic nation that its sons are capable of striking the nation's enemies wherever they 
may be.’ At a higher level, it was conducted in order to provoke ‘U.S. military retaliation’ 
(The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 191) – but actually ‘provoked no retaliation from 
America’ (Geltzer, 2010: 101).    
 
Although many of these terrorist motivations appeared to be based on real and perceived 
grievances against the US, it is instructive that the US Department of State (1993: 1)161 
predicted correctly ‘the likelihood that US interests increasingly will become targets for 
violence from former mujahidin.’ The report added that such attacks may happen ‘should 
the US appear to be supporting the increasingly repressive policies of these [Arab] regimes’ 
(p. 4) – thus there is a degree of synergy and corroboration between US policy makers, 
academia, and the Islamist terrorists themselves. The real and perceived grievances against 
the far enemy articulated by diagnostic framing are naturally contentious (Lewis, 1990), but 
they do appear to have contributed to the radicalisation of veteran Afghan Arabs. However, 
what was unique about the involvement of veteran Afghan Arabs?  
 
                                                 
161 US Department of State (1993). The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous. 
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As noted from Figure 4.4, veteran Afghan Arabs had a disproportionate influence on five of 
the major global Islamist terrorist attacks, providing in the case of the 1993 WTC attack, 75 
percent of the terrorists. The 9/11 attack involved ‘only’ 30 percent of veteran Afghan 
Arabs yet may be explained by the requirement to use younger and fitter men. However, 
further analysis involving the foreign fighter experience beyond 1980s Afghanistan reveals 
that arguably 59 percent of those directly or indirectly involved in the 9/11 attacks had 
some form of foreign fighter experience.162 Perhaps what was unique about veteran Afghan 
Arab involvement in targeting the interests of the far enemy was their own biographical 
availability163 due to their inability to return home (making the near enemy inaccessible); 
grievances against the far enemy (due to their support of the near enemy); a more extreme 
ideology that expanded the concept of defensive jihad and sanctioned the killing of 
civilians and non-combatants; and the training they received in Afghanistan.  
 
Terrorist Training, Indoctrination, and the Influence of Prior Terrorist Links 
 
Central to the radicalisation of some Afghan Arabs was the existence of terrorist training 
camps, alongside camps where the training was still focussed on defensive jihads ‘at open 
fronts such as Chechnya’ (Kuehn et al., 2014: 34). In the terrorist training camps, the 
recruits ‘underwent four important and interlinked processes: violence acculturization, 
indoctrination, training and relations-building’ (Hegghammer, 2006: 46). The presence of 
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan appears to undercut the very ideology enshrined 
within defensive jihad. If it is true, and not ‘more myth than reality’ (Kuehn et al., 2014: 2), 
then the Afghan jihad was used partially as a pretext for future terrorist training, rather than 
defending co-religionists. Hafez (2009: 76) makes a compelling argument to suggest that 
‘by 1989, after the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, Pakistan and Afghanistan were 
flooded with Arab volunteers seeking training in guerrilla warfare.’ Certainly Abu 
Zubaydah admitted in his diary (6 January 1991) that he had specifically gone to 
                                                 
162 The additional uplift (as noted earlier in the chapter) included two Arab foreign fighters from the Bosnian 
jihad; two from the Chechen jihad; and the four 9/11 pilots who had gone to Afghanistan to train for defensive 
jihad in Chechnya, but were persuaded to get involved in the 9/11 attacks.  
163 Referred to in Chapter 2, ‘biographical availability’ refers to the ‘absence of personal constraints that may 
increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family 
responsibilities’ (McAdam 1986: 70). 
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Afghanistan ‘to receive training;’ while Libyan Afghan Arab Noman Benotman went ‘to 
develop our fighting skills in anticipation of the day we would return to Libya to fight the 
Gadhafi regime’ (Abedin, 2005). The training included ‘urban sabotage, car bombings, 
anti-aircraft weapons, sniper rifles and land mines’ (Hafez, 2009: 77), which according to 
veteran Afghan Arab Mustafa Hamid (as cited in Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 136), ‘were not 
needed by Arab mujahideen in Afghanistan.’  
 
It seems therefore that by 1989, the language of political Islam was in itself readjusting to 
the prevailing political landscape, and justifying the conflation of defensive jihad and 
Islamist terrorism, both global Islamist and religious nationalist. The climate experienced 
by many Afghan Arabs who arrived after 1988 and subsequently became involved in global 
Islamist terrorism, appears focussed more on terrorist training than defensive jihad. US 
Court transcripts of evidence given by veteran Algerian Afghan Arab Ahmad Ressam 
(2001),164 confirmed that training in Khaldan Camp165 in Afghanistan included explosives 
and sabotage against ‘electric plants, gas plants, airports, railroads’ (p. 550) and 
assassinations (p. 551), which is corroborated by Abu Zubaydah in his diary (5 February 
1990). In the Darunta Camp training involved ‘making explosives and electronic circuits’ 
(Ressam, 2001: 555).166  
 
The existence of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan was recalled by veteran Afghan 
Arab, Mustafa Hamid (as cited in Hamid and Farrall, 2015), who claimed that a ‘power 
vacuum’ formed after the battle of Jalalabad in 1989 resulting in the formation of a 
‘Jalalabad School of jihad … characterised by impetuous youth with extreme Salafi 
thoughts’ (p. 165). Hamid also maintained that the ‘Jalalabad School pioneered attacking 
America and planted the idea of 9/11 with Bin Laden’ (p. 322), and that former ‘students’ 
were involved in the 1995 Riyadh attack (p. 169). It is illuminating that the ‘Jalalabad 
School’ also included Ramzi Yusuf and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (involved in the 1993 
                                                 
164 Ahmad Rassam, nicknamed the ‘Millenium bomber’ was an al-Qaeda terrorist imprisoned for his role in 
planning to blow up Los Angeles International Airport on 31 December 1999. 
165 According to Hamid and Farrall (2015: 166), Khaldan Camp recruited ‘students who took a tighter 
doctrinal approach and a political path that was more violent in nature.’ 
166 Jacquard (2002: 263-267) contains a declassified British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) document on 
training camps in 1990s Afghanistan. 
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WTC attack); Osama Azmarai (involved in the 1995 ‘Bojinka’ plot in Asia);167 and Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi (Farrall as cited in Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 301) – the subsequent 
leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. 
 
The thesis dataset supports the notion that some Afghan Arabs in the late 1980s were 
focussed more on Islamist terrorist training than defensive jihad. First, as Figure 4.1 
demonstrates, the majority of Afghan Arabs arrived in Afghanistan after the Soviets started 
their withdrawal (in May 1988). More fine grain analysis also reveals that 53 (80 percent) 
of surviving (veteran) Afghan Arabs arrived in Afghanistan in 1988 or thereafter, where 
training was beginning to be focussed more ‘on outside work’ (Hamad and Farrall, 2015: 
166), and where the debate centred on ‘who the enemy was, and how to fight it’ (Strick van 
Linschoten and Kuehn, 2012: 92). Of these late Afghan Arab arrivals, 58 percent (31) 
became fully involved in Islamist terrorism (GIA, AQ, AQAP); 30 percent (16) remained in 
defensive jihad, whilst 12 percent are unknown.  
 
Second, the thesis dataset also demonstrates that for example, the three main 1993 WTC 
bombers Ramzi Yusuf, Mahmood Abu Halima, and Ahmad Ajaj, all travelled to 
Afghanistan in order to receive training (in Khaldan Camp) between 1988 and 1992. Reeve 
(1999: 138) noted that Ahmad Ajaj ‘went to Afghanistan in April 1992, specifically for 
militant training.’ Also, many of the Arabs (as opposed to Africans) involved in the 1998 
East Africa attacks were trained in Afghanistan in the 1990s. For example, Jerrold Post 
testified in (Nairobi bomber) Muhammad Odeh’s defence in 2001, that ‘he went to 
Afghanistan for training, but also ideological conditioning, which meant that Muhammad 
was indoctrinated beyond his first inchoate ideas to help suffering Muslims’ (Jerrold Post 
cited in Bergen, 2002: 111). Thus, although Muhammad Odeh’s initial ideology may have 
been more consistent with the tenets of defensive jihad, it was only after he had arrived in 
Afghanistan, that he received training and ‘lectures more sophisticated than those … heard 
previously’ (Sageman, 2008: 70). This rather loose term ‘sophisticated’ is more accurately 
conceptualised by Hafez (2009: 78) as being part of the ‘ideological socialization’ whereby 
                                                 
167 The 1995 ‘Bojinka’ plot involved assassinating Pope John Paul II, blowing up 11 aircraft from Asia to the 
US, and crashing a plane into the CIA building in Virginia.  
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Afghan Arab trainees were subjected to ‘Islamic history, theology, and politics from an 
extremist point of view’ – in effect indoctrination.  
 
The existence of indoctrination in the Afghan training camps as claimed by Hegghammer 
(2006: 46), does appear to have academic and empirical support. As noted in Chapter 2, 
conceptually there is broad (but not universal) academic consensus regarding the existence 
of the notion of indoctrination (Crenshaw, 1994; Moghaddam, 2005; Wiktorowicz, 2005b; 
McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Schmid, 2013b). In addition, the existence and influence 
of charismatic authority has scholarly support (Eatwell, 2006; Hofmann and Dawson, 2014; 
Beevor, 2016; Ingram, 2016; Hofmann, 2016), which in the case of Afghan Arab 
subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism, included Bin Laden (Gerges, 2005: 36; 
Bergen, 2006: 258; Mockaitis, 2010: 69). There is evidence however of many instances of 
persuasion whereby volunteers, according to Kuehn et al. (2014), were ‘diverted from their 
desire to get training or undertake armed jihad at an open front, to join al-Qaeda’ (p. 60), 
whereby ‘al-Qaeda’s radicalisation program [included] convincing people to become 
martyrdom operatives’ (p. 72). For example, the 9/11 pilots, who had initially gone to 
Afghanistan for training in order to ‘wage jihad in Chechnya’ in defence of fellow 
Muslims, never eventually went to Chechnya, as ‘al Qaeda quickly recognized their 
potential and enlisted them in its anti-U.S. jihad’ (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 
160). This also happened to Egyptian Afghan Arab Sabri-al-Attar who ‘considered going to 
Chechnya but his mentors opposed the idea [and instead he] received extensive 
indoctrination in their radical ideology’ (Hafez, 2009: 85). Hegghammer (2010b: 189) also 
found that many Saudis, ‘having been indoctrinated in training camps’ in Afghanistan, 
returned to Saudi Arabia ‘with a more global, anti-American and intransigent ideological 
vision.’ Although it is difficult to identify all individuals who were indoctrinated from the 
dataset, as noted earlier, it is instructive that 58 percent of surviving (veteran) Afghan 
Arabs (with no known pre-existing terrorist links) who arrived in Afghanistan in 1988, 
became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities.  
 
Although beyond the scope of this thesis, terrorist training and recruitment continued well 
after the April 1992 collapse of the Soviet backed communist regime (Ressam, 2001), with 
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some trainees later becoming involved in the US embassy bombings in East Africa, the 
USS Cole attack, and the 9/11 attacks (Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 232). Thus although this 
chapter focusses only on veteran Afghan Arabs (1979-1992), it is instructive that unstable 
countries (such as Afghanistan after 1992) provided safe havens for terrorist training, that 
spawned future Islamist terrorists.  
 
Influence of Prior Terrorist Links 
 
Needless to say, the main protagonists for the change in emphasis from defensive jihad to 
terrorist training were largely the Afghan Arabs who had known pre-existing terrorist links 
(Rubin, 1997: 196; al-Zayyat, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 83; Gerges, 2005: 119; Rana and 
Bukhari, 2007: 15). Extracted from the thesis dataset, 14 percent (51) of Afghan Arabs had 
known pre-existing terrorist links, whilst 86 percent had no documented linkage. As noted 
earlier in the chapter, Egyptians with pre-existing terrorist links appear to have had a 
disproportionate influence upon their less experienced Afghan Arab comrades (Tawil, 2010: 
29; Brown, 2013: 91; al-Bahri, 2013: 213), 168  possibly because in Egypt ‘Islamist 
movements were at their most militant’ (Kepel, 2008: 81). Particularly notable Afghan 
Arab members of EIJ include Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda; Saif al-
Adil who has a $5M reward on the US Rewards for Justice (2017) programme; Abu 
Khabab al-Misri (d. 2008) who became responsible for the al-Qaeda biological and 
chemical weapons programme; and five members involved in the 1998 East Africa 
embassy attacks.169 Notable Afghan Arab members of EIG include Omar Abdul Rahman (d. 
2017) and Mahmood Abu Halima, who were both involved in the 1993 WTC attack, and 
Mustafa Hamza who was involved in the 1997 Luxor massacre (Kohlmann, 2004: 150).  
 
It appears that many Afghan Arabs with pre-existing terrorist links were generally in 
Afghanistan to consolidate their position, recruit and train more religious nationalist 
                                                 
168 According to al-Bahri (2013: 213), Egyptian Afghan Arabs with previous terrorist links held ‘six out of the 
nine key al-Qaeda’ posts. Other nationalities with prior terrorist links included Libyans (7), Syrians (5), 
Jordanians (3), and Algerians (5). 
169 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Saif al-Adil, Muhammad Atif (Abu Hafs al-Misri), Abdullah Ahmad al-Alfi, and 
Ibrahim Husayn Abdul Hadi Eidarous. 
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terrorists, prior to returning to their home countries (Gerges, 2005: 57; Kepel, 2008: 139; 
Hafez, 2009: 78). Again, through the prism of political Islam, these Afghan Arabs with 
prior religious nationalist terrorist links saw terrorism as more akin to defensive jihad 
(Brown, 2013: 89; Hafez, 2013: 28), inasmuch as they ‘see themselves to be engaged in 
defensive warfare in the defensive sense of the word … under attack by their own leaders’ 
(Lahoud, 2011: 140). This in turn contributes to the academic conflation of Islamist 
terrorism and defensive jihad (Moghadam and Fishman, 2013: 245).   
 
Interestingly, as with the influence exerted by Afghan Arabs who had pre-existing terrorist 
links, veteran Afghan Arabs were also to become ‘capable … religious ideologues, and 
military commanders that would lead future struggles in places like Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia, 
Chechnya, and Iraq’ (Hafez, 2009: 82). Some had gained charismatic authority as a result 
of the Afghan jihad, and were to command new and less experienced Arab foreign fighters. 
This is corroborated by the thesis dataset that finds that in Bosnia, Saudi Afghan Arab Abu 
Sulaiman al-Makki (aka Khalid al-Harbi)170 was ‘the most celebrated of men’ (Kohlmann, 
2004: 29); in Chechnya, Saudi Afghan Arab Thamir Salih Abdullah al-Suwailam (aka 
Khattab) was to become the leader of Arab foreign fighters; in Iraq, Jordanian Afghan Arab 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became the leader of Arab foreign fighters (and al-Qaeda in Iraq); 
and in Syria, Syrian Afghan Arab Abu Firas al-Suri became the official spokesman for 
Jabhat-al-Nusrah. See Appendix E listing veteran Arab foreign fighter further involvement 
in defensive jihads including in Iraq (post 2003) and/or Syria (post 2011). 
 
Comradeship Ties and Friendships  
 
The link between the process of radicalisation and socialisation in 1980s Afghanistan was 
recognised by Kepel (2008: 148), who identified that: 
 
‘For the international jihadists, the journey to Peshawar was above all an initiation, 
a socialization of the Islamist networks; thereafter, for some of them, it turned into a 
                                                 
170 Former Afghan Arab, Abdul Aziz Barbaros (aka Abdul Rahman al-Dosari) was also a prominent ‘Arab’ 
foreign fighter in Bosnia. Born in 1942 in Saudi Arabia, he was ethnically Indian, not Arab.  
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radicalization process, as they came into contact with militants who were much 
more extreme.’    
 
It is important to reiterate that the scholarly literature (Sageman, 2004; Paz, 2005; Horgan, 
2009; Hegghammer, 2010a; Atran, 2010) is replete with examples of the importance of 
friendship and kinship ties concerning initial involvement in terrorism. For example, Hafez 
(2009: 90) argued that ‘friendship and kinship ties are salient features of terrorist 
radicalization and recruitment.’ Whilst this argument appears to hold true for direct 
recruitment from the general Arab population, this study found that ‘comradeship ties’ were 
more influential in deciding whether veteran Afghan Arabs subsequently became involved 
in Islamist terrorist related activities. 
 
It is suggested that ‘comradeship ties’ appeared to supplant any pre-Afghan jihad ties 
(friendship and kinship) – less for those based on pre-existing terrorist links. The new 
friendships that developed and blossomed during the Afghan jihad, appeared to be based on 
shared hardships, in a hostile environment, that produced a military form of comradeship. 
The idea of ‘comradeship ties’ developed as a result of situational circumstances in a war  
zone, are not unprecedented in military history: Guy Sajer (1971: 83-84) recounted his 
experience during the Second World War on the Eastern Front, and how ‘friendships 
counted for a great deal … consolidating men on the same side in friendships which never 
would have broken through the normal barriers of ordinary peacetime life.’ Fitroy Maclean 
(1950: 329) also recounted how, during the Second World War with Tito’s Partisans in 
Yugoslavia, the ‘common experience of hardships and dangers had overcome all 
differences of class or race or temperament and forged between them lasting bonds of 
loyalty and affection.’  
 
Examples of notable ‘comradeship ties’ developed during the Afghan jihad include Ramzi 
Yusuf befriending Mahmood Abu Halima and Ahmad Ajaj in a militant training camp in 
Afghanistan, that US investigators later believed led directly to the 1993 WTC attack 
(Reeve, 1999: 138). Second, Wadih al-Hajj and Mahmud Abu Halima developed 
‘comradeship ties’ in Afghanistan which were rekindled in 1989 at an Islamic conference in 
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Oklahoma City (Zill, 2001), eventually contributing to Wadih al-Hajj’s role in the 1998 
East Africa embassy attacks. Finally, it is instructive to recognise the ‘comradeship ties’ 
that developed during various defensive jihads by Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri, who planned 
the 2000 USS Cole attack (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 190). He developed 
‘comradeship ties’ with 9/11 hijacker Hamza al-Ghamdi 171  and USS Cole conspirator 
Walid Muhammad bin Attash172 in 1992 (in Tajikistan), Abu Zubaydah173 in 1993, and Bin 
Laden in 1994 - both in Afghanistan.174 Then in 1998 he formally joined al-Qaeda ‘after 
learning of his cousin Jihad Harazi's suicide bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya.’175 This 
last example perhaps suggests that the broad socialisation that occurs in a war zone, 
including friendship, kinship, and ‘comradeship ties,’ all played their part and contributed 
to the subsequent involvement in terrorist related activities by some veteran Afghan Arabs.   
 
The Reintegration Circumstances of Veteran Afghan Arabs 
 
Finally, it is worth examining briefly the seven veteran Afghan Arabs who did return home, 
in order to examine why, given the same situational circumstances, these individuals chose 
to reintegrate back into their societies, and in theory dis-engage from defensive jihad. The 
first, Saudi veteran Afghan Arab, Musa al-Qarni, returned to Saudi Arabia in 1992. 
According to Al-Qarni, he had been a fighter and a Sharia law ideologue, but left 
Afghanistan before the Taliban took over, and despite reintegrating back into Saudi society, 
he retained very strong views on the need for defensive jihad in Iraq (post 2003) in order to 
defeat the ‘infidel occupying armies of the US and other countries’ (Al-Qarni, 2004). He 
stressed ‘that the jihad waged by Muslims in Iraq in order to drive out the enemies from 
among the Jews and the Christians … is legal’ (Al-Qarni, 2005). What is clear from his 
own narrative is that whilst he resettled back in his native country, his ideology (whilst not 
supporting Islamist terrorism) appeared to continue to support defensive jihad.   
                                                 
171 Hamza al-Ghamdi was one of the 9/11 hijackers on United Airlines Flight 175. 
172 Walid Muhammad bin Attash is a Yemeni JTF-GTMO detainee, who was a senior AQ lieutenant. He 
participated in jihad in Tajikistan in 1996 (against the Russians) and in Afghanistan (against the Northern 
Alliance). He was involved in supporting the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. He was to be a suicide hijacker 
for the cancelled SW Asia portion of the 9/11 attacks.  
173 Abu Zubaydah has been widely referenced (through his diaries) in this chapter.  
174 JTF-GTMO Combat Status Review Tribunal (8 December 2006). Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri; p.2. 
175 JTF-GTMO Combat Status Review Tribunal (8 December 2006). Abdul Rahim al-Nashiri; p.3. 
 109 
The second, Jordanian/Palestinian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi departed Afghanistan and 
returned to Kuwait, in time to be evicted (with all other Palestinians) by Kuwait at the end 
of the 1991 Gulf war (for Palestinian support to Iraq). He moved back to Jordan, where due 
to his political agitation, he was imprisoned from 1994 until 1999. Al-Maqdisi continues to 
be a salafist ideologue, living in Jordan, intermittently in and out of jail (Wagemakers, 2012: 
29-50). From a purist perspective, arguably he has not actually reintegrated back into 
Jordanian society. 
 
Lastly, five Syrian veteran Afghan Arabs returned to Syria. Whilst there is little 
information about the intervening years, they are now deeply involved in the Syrian jihad. 
Abu Faris al-Suri is now the spokesman for Jabhat al-Nusrah; Muhammad Ayman Aboul-
Tout is now an ideologue for Ahrar ash-Shaam; while both Baha Mustafa al-Jughl and 
Muhammad Haydar Zammar are/were both members of Ahrar ash-Shaam. Finally, Abu 
Basir al-Tartusi has been an ideologue, particularly concerning martyrdom (al-Tartusi, 
2005). What is instructive about these five Syrian Afghan Arab veterans is that whilst they 
appeared to reintegrate back into Syrian society in the early 1990s, it also appeared that the 
ideology of defensive jihad remained dormant, only to resurface over 20 years later. This 
somewhat begs the question whether a veteran Arab foreign fighter ever completely 
readjusts, and relates to the notion of ‘disengagement’ whereby an ‘individual may leave a 
movement, but may express the same cognitions that suggest a close commitment to the 
social, political and organisational context to terrorist activity’ (Horgan, 2009: 152). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered a compelling case that, for the most part, Afghan Arabs (who had 
no known pre-existing terrorist links) were not necessarily radicalised prior to their 
mobilisation to participate in the defensive jihad, nor did they employ terrorist tactics 
against civilians and non-combatants. In addition, their notion of martyrdom was dying in 
battle in the path of God (fee sabeel Allah) against the Soviets, and not as a result of suicide 
attacks, against civilians and non-combatants. Moreover, despite the relatively small 
research sample, it is also illuminating that the seven veteran Afghan Arabs who did 
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reintegrate back into their societies, all retained to some degree, the ideology of defensive 
jihad.  
 
The chapter found that subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorist related activities was 
underpinned by situational factors experienced by Afghan Arabs during the defensive jihad, 
including real and perceived grievances (against the near and far enemy); terrorist training 
and indoctrination; the influence of those with pre-existing terrorist links; and finally 
comradeship ties developed in the mountains of Afghanistan, and in the markets of 
Peshawar (Pakistan). The grievances were multi-faceted but were broadly either against 
their own Arab regimes, or against the West for the support they provided to those regimes. 
In addition, the inability of many Afghan Arabs to return home and reintegrate back into 
society appeared to play a part in their radicalisation, and arguably contributed to their 
biographical availability. These grievances in turn helped to create a more extreme 
ideology that expanded the concept of defensive jihad; sanctioned the killing of civilians 
and non-combatants; and operationalised the notions of the near and far enemy, first 
proposed by Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj in 1981.    
 
It seems axiomatic that terrorist training, indoctrination, and the presence of Afghan Arabs 
with pre-existing terrorist links, would influence the future trajectories of many Afghan 
Arabs. It appears that the defensive jihad in Afghanistan was ‘hijacked’ - in the words of 
Afghan Arab Abdullah Anas (2015) - at least by the late 1980s when the Soviets started to 
withdraw. The men behind the change of emphasis (from defensive jihad to Islamist 
terrorism) were again perhaps unsurprisingly, largely those Afghan Arabs who had known 
pre-existing terrorist links. Finally, the ‘comradeship ties’ that were developed over time in 
the markets of Peshawar and the mountains of Afghanistan, appeared to surpass the kinship 
and social ties that are often seen as important factors in direct terrorist recruitment. These 
‘comradeship ties’ seemed to provide the trust and loyalty needed by small groups who are 
intent on carrying out Islamist terrorist attacks.  
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Chapter 5: From Defensive Jihad to Islamist Terrorism in Iraq 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter, the second of three case studies, examines why and how some (non-Iraqi) 
Arab foreign fighters in Iraq became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. Unlike 
the veteran Afghan Arabs whose involvement in Islamist terrorism was distinct from the 
Afghan jihad in both time and space, the Arab foreign fighters in Iraq became involved in 
defensive jihad and/or Islamist terrorism at the same time and in the same space. In many 
ways, such overlaps represent a textbook insurgency, broadly defined as ‘a hybrid form of 
conflict that combines subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism … [in] an internal 
struggle in which a disaffected group seeks to gain control of a nation’ (Mockaitis, 1990: 3). 
Identifying and separating the two cohorts, despite their obvious overlaps, was required in 
order to answer the research question. The chapter examines the Iraq insurgency and those 
who participated in defensive jihad by leveraging a dataset of 711 Arab foreign fighters 
(representing between 14 and 23 percent of the total cohort based on figures provided by 
Malet (2015: 10) 176  - not including indigenous Iraqis; the radicalisation framework 
presented in Chapter 2; and the language of political Islam outlined in Chapter 3. Arguably, 
the originality of the research is underpinned by these tools, alongside the central argument 
of the influence of situational factors experienced whilst participating in the defensive jihad 
in Iraq. These included the personal experience of insurgency warfare; the presence of 
grievances and ideology; and being subjected to ideological indoctrination during group 
training. The research period starts from the occupation of Iraq (23 March 2003) by US led 
coalition troops, until December 2009, by which time all UK troops had departed, and US 
casualties were at an all-time low (based on Iraq Coalition Casualty Count for 2009 
provided by iCasualties.org).  
 
The key findings in the chapter included the realisation that the vast majority of Arab 
foreign fighters were not necessarily radicalised in the sense of being committed to an 
                                                 
176 Malet (2015: 10) estimated that there were about 3,000 - 5,000 foreign fighters (including non-Iraqi Arabs) 
in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. 
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‘extremist political or religious ideology’ (Horgan, 2009: 152), but went to Iraq to 
participate in defensive jihad in response to foreign aggression against their co-religionists. 
The second finding was the need to disaggregate the labels of martyrdom operations and 
suicide attacks, in order to better understand the targeting preferences of the two cohorts 
(Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists). This resulted in the suggestion that 
martyrdom operations targeted largely military forces under the auspices of defensive jihad, 
whilst suicide attacks targeted largely civilians and non-combatants under the auspices of 
Islamist terrorism. The chapter found how grievances translated into a more radical 
ideology that promoted takfir - the excommunication of Muslims as apostates (Sageman, 
2008: 39), and how terrorist training and indoctrination in Iraq reinforced this ideology. 
Finally, the chapter highlights the unique nature of the Iraqi insurgency, where the once 
broadly distinct notions of defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism that existed during the 
Afghan jihad, began to overlap and coalesce.  
 
The chapter is broken down into two sections. First there is analysis of the broad ‘setting 
events’ (Taylor and Horgan, 2006: 592) - education, age, and geographic origin, in order to 
contextualise their initial involvement in defensive jihad in Iraq. This is accompanied by a 
brief overview of the Iraqi jihad, aware that it has been covered by many scholars including, 
but not limited to, Cordesman (2005), Krueger (2006), Hegghammer (2007), Hafez, 
(2007b), Fishman, Bergen, Felter, Brown and Shapiro (2008), and Hewitt and Kelley-
Moore (2009). The second section, and the core of the chapter, offers a detailed 
interpretative analysis of Arab foreign fighters in Iraq, and explains why and how some of 
them subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. In order to 
differentiate between their respective ‘rationales’ (Hegghammer, 2009a), their grievances, 
ideology, and targeting preferences are examined. Finally, terrorist training and 
indoctrination in Iraq are examined in order to further explore the trajectory between Arab 
foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists. 
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Background to the 2003 Iraq War 
 
The contemporary history of Iraq includes the rise to power of then-President Saddam 
Hussein and his Sunni orientated Baath Party in 1979, and a continuation of the trend of a 
Sunni Muslim minority (32-37 percent) governing the Shia Muslim majority (60-65 
percent).177 In 1980, Saddam Hussein led his country into an inconclusive eight-year war 
with Iran, followed two years later by invading Kuwait. This resulted in a 1991 US led 
coalition war that forced the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, with two 
repercussions. First after the Gulf war, the US were invited to station some troops in Saudi 
Arabia, a decision that later contributed to Osama bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa.178 The second 
repercussion (as noted in Chapter 3) was the subsequent UN sanctions (Resolution 687) 
against Iraq that resulted in the death of an estimated 500,000 Iraqi children.179 This death 
rate was acknowledged by US administration officials 180  and provided the ideological 
justification for much of the anti-American sentiment amongst many Islamists in the Arab 
world.181 After the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent dismantling of the al-Qaeda network in 
Afghanistan, Iraq again came into the spotlight. Despite ‘only some anecdotal evidence 
link[ing] Iraq to al Qaeda’ (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 334); the lack of credible 
evidence of WMD in Iraq (Iraq Survey Group, 2004); and the lack of a legal basis for 
invading Iraq (Kofi Annan, 2004),182 the US decided on regime change.183 Whatever the 
actual intentions of the US led invasion of Iraq, it resulted in ‘a textbook case of defensive 
jihad. Foreign military forces occupied Muslim territory after what was widely perceived as 
an unjustified aggression’ (Hegghammer, 2007: 9).  
                                                 
177 US Central Intelligence Agency. (2014). The World Fact Book: Iraq. 
178 Declaration of War against the US Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places. 
179 United Nations Children’s Fund (2002). 
180 As noted in Chapter 4, Madeleine Albright (the then US Ambassador to the UN) thought the ‘price of half 
a million children’ dying in Iraq due to UN sanctions believed ‘the price [wa]s worth it’ (Stahl, 1996). 
181 Osama bin Laden ‘spoke of the suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of sanctions imposed after the Gulf 
War’ (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 49). 
182 In September 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, said of the Iraq invasion: ‘from the UN Charter 
point of view, it was illegal’ (Annan, 2004). In November 2008, UK former Lord Chief Justice Lord 
Bingham, described the war as ‘a serious violation of international law’ (Bingham, 2008). 
183 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is acknowledged that some Arab (and non-Arab) foreign 
fighters fled from Afghanistan in 2001, and that some under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Ansar al Islam) did base 
themselves in northern Iraq – but beyond the influence of Saddam Hussein. 
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Analysis of the Data 
 
Setting Events - Overview 
 
The data used in this chapter have been taken from primary and secondary sources 
including martyrdom biographies and previous studies including Cordesman (2005); 
Kohlmann (2005a); Paz (2005); the Sinjar records;184 Hafez (2006b and 2007b); and the 
Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) Suicide Attack Database,185 resulting in 
a dataset of 711 Arab foreign fighters (not including Iraqi fighters who were defending their 
homeland). It is acknowledged that data which include martyrdom biographies ‘are by no 
means perfect sources of information … the evidence they offer is fragmentary and replete 
with propagandistic narratives’ (Hafez, 2012a: 187). 186  That said, they still offer an 
interesting insight into the possible individual motivations for involvement in both 
defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism in Iraq. The research net was cast far and wide in 
order to attempt to dilute any biases in particular datasets,187 such as Cordesman (2005) 
who only examined Saudis, in order to produce a broad and representative sample. Also by 
including individuals who died as a result of self-sacrificial attacks within the thesis dataset, 
the analysis could appear skewed towards the notion of martyrdom and suicide. Whilst this 
may be true, it arguably facilitates perhaps the most important conceptual debate over the 
martyrdom of Arab foreign fighters participating in defensive jihad, and the ‘martyrdom’ 
achieved involving Islamist terrorist suicide attacks.  
 
The Arab foreign fighters in Iraq were well represented educationally and career wise: 87 
(12 percent) of the 711 Arab foreign fighters had a university education, with five of them 
qualified as medical doctors. Whilst these findings are in harmony with those of the Afghan 
                                                 
184 Introduced in Chapter 2, the ‘Sinjar records’ comprised of 707 foreign fighters, including 555 Arabs. 
185 Use of the CPOST Suicide Attack Database is made, aware that it employs a fairly loose definition of a 
suicide attack: ‘an attack in which an attacker kills himself or herself in a deliberate attempt to kill others.’ 
186 Hegghammer (2007: 14) also noted that ‘the biographies on jihadist websites … are repeated in 
standardised phrases, to the extent that one sometimes wonders about their sincerity.’ 
187 Potential biases include data that largely reflects a single country (due to availability, an author’s interest, 
or that certain nationalities - or groups - have greater access to social media).  
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Arab cohort in Chapter 4,188 they hide an interesting facet. Of those 87 with a university 
education, it is instructive to find that actually 66 (76 percent) were university students who 
cut short their education in order to go to Iraq and participate in defensive jihad. Deeper 
interrogation of the thesis dataset reveals that 42 percent were Saudis and 21 percent were 
Libyans, of which 32 percent of Saudi students came from Mecca, and 50 percent of 
Libyan students came from Durna. The importance of Mecca and Durna are discussed 
below under ‘geographic origin.’     
 
Age wise, based on 283 Arab foreign fighters where data were available, they varied 
between 15 years and 54 years, with 49 percent of them 23-years-old or under. The average 
age was 24 and the median was 28. Again, these findings correlate well both with the 
Afghan Arab cohort in Chapter 4,189 and the scholarly literature (Sageman, 2004: 92; Silke, 
2008: 105). The notion of age offers at least two interesting interpretations for involvement 
in defensive jihad in Iraq: biographical availability (McAdam, 1986) and ‘age-related 
vulnerabilities of community members’ (UNSC CTC, 2015b). First, the young age of 
nearly 50 percent of the Arab foreign fighters suggests that their youth indicated the 
‘absence of personal constraints … such as marriage and family responsibilities’ (McAdam 
1986: 70). Later the chapter tests the assertion by R. Hassan (2009), that ‘most suicide 
bombers are both young and male.’ Second, as noted in Chapter 4, the notion of age-related 
vulnerabilities ‘is already well established in other spheres that young males are associated 
with a multitude of dangerous and high-risk activities’ (Silke, 2008: 105), and is discussed 
in greater detail later in the chapter.  
 
The Geographic Origin of Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq 
 
A brief overview of the nationalities of Arab foreign fighters in Iraq offers the opportunity 
to examine the broad social, political, and religious context from where the individuals 
originated. The top three countries of origin were Saudi Arabia (44 percent), Libya (16 
                                                 
188 Chapter 4 found that 52 (14 percent) of the 369 Afghan Arabs had a university education, with five 
qualified as medical doctors. 
189 Chapter 4 found that 60 percent of the Afghan Arabs varied between 11-years-old and 65-years-old, with 
51 percent of them 22-years-old or under. The average age was 23 and the median was 24. 
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percent), and Syria (eight percent). Four Gulf countries (the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, 
Bahrain, and the UAE) appeared to have no citizens involved in the Iraqi jihad. The 
breakdown of the geographic origin of Arab foreign fighters in Iraq from the thesis dataset, 
is presented in Figure 5.1.   
 
 
Figure 5.1: The geographic origin of Arab foreign fighters in Iraq (n=711). 
 
Saudi Arabia being the predominant country of origin was identified by other scholars (al-
Shishani, 2005b; Felter and Fishman, 2007: 7; Hewitt and Kelley-Moore, 2009),190 and is 
largely explained by Saudi state and clerical support for the defensive jihad in Iraq.191 Saudi 
Arabia was more than simply a permissive environment - arguably it was an encouraging 
one, actually promoting the notion of defensive jihad in Iraq. According to Paz (2005: 5), 
the ‘support for violent Jihad in Iraq against the Americans was encouraged by the Saudi 
Islamic establishment,’ whilst Cordesman (2005: 9) noted that ‘interrogations of nearly 150 
Saudis suspected of planning to the join the Iraqi insurgency indicate that they were 
heeding the calls of clerics and activists.’ Such evidence of support includes a fatwa192 
(addressed to the Iraqi people) supported by 26 Saudi clerics, that stressed the legality of 
                                                 
190 The only study to challenge these assessments was Cordesman (2005) who found that ‘the number of 
Saudi volunteers in August 2005 was around twelve percent of the foreign contingent.’ This observation does 
not conform to the multitude of other studies on Arab foreign fighters in Iraq.   
191 A lesser factor was the spill over from a failed AQAP campaign, that was defeated by early 2006 
(Hegghammer, 2010b), freeing up a greater pool of politicised and militarised individuals. The Global 
Terrorism Database shows four confirmed AQAP attacks against the Saudi state in 2004, with the last 
confirmed attack on 24 February 2006. 
192 Open Sermon to the Militant Iraqi People (given on 5 November 2004).  
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the resistance in Iraq, and Saudi cleric (and veteran Afghan Arab) Yusuf al-Uyayri, ‘who 
co-wrote his arguably most influential work, The Crusade in Iraq Series, advising Iraqi and 
Arab foreign fighters on how to resist the Americans (Hegghammer, 2010b: 173).  
 
It is also worth briefly exploring whether religiosity193 within Saudi Arabia was a factor 
that may explain the large contingent of Saudi foreign fighters in Iraq. It is broadly 
accepted that Saudi Arabia follows ‘the rigorously conservative and strict interpretation of 
the Salafi … school of the Sunni branch of Islam’ (US Department of State, 2004),194 often 
labelled Wahhabism. There appears to be a tentative link between Saudi Arabia and this 
‘puritanical sect of Islam’ (International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy, 2013: 3), and 
the suggestion that ‘more religious societies do produce more jihadists’ (Hewitt and Kelley-
Moore, 2009: 219). That said, according to Canetti, Hobfoll, Pedahzur, and Zaidise (2010: 
575), the ‘relationship between religion and support of political violence only holds true 
when mediated by deprivations and psychological resource loss.’ As will be demonstrated 
later, religiosity was a common motivating circumstance for many Arab foreign fighters, 
but in the Saudi specific case, explicit state and clerical support195 for defensive jihad in 
Iraq, appeared to be the dominant factor.   
 
Although Libya was the second most predominant country of origin, it actually had the 
highest involvement per capita (20 per million). The explanation for the relatively large 
participation by Libyan foreign fighters is threefold. First, as noted in Chapter 4, there was 
a tendency for Arab regimes to either export militants abroad or if already abroad, to 
prevent their return. In the case of Libya, ‘local Salafi-jihadist movements [were] in 
conflict with their government … forcing fighters to search for new havens’ (al-Shishani, 
2005b). The second explanation is that the eastern towns of Durna and Benghazi have long 
been associated with Islamic militancy in Libya, particularly in the mid-1990s involving the 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) (Felter and Fishman, 2007: 10). This is supported 
                                                 
193 Introduced in Chapter1, the term religiosity is understood to mean ‘the condition of being religious or 
excessively religious’ (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995: 1161). 
194 The report reflects the religious environment at the time of the Iraqi jihad, highlighting Saudi 
‘denunciations of non-Muslim religions from government-sanctioned pulpits.’  
195 It was only later that Saudi ‘government-affiliated clerics such as Abdul Muhsin al-Ubaykan … declared 
that the insurgency in Iraq amounts to fitna [sedition] and is illegitimate’ (Hegghammer, 2007: 9). 
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by the thesis dataset that reveals that Libyan foreign fighters from either Durna or Benghazi 
made up 64 percent of the Libyan fighters, and ten percent of all Arab foreign fighters in 
Iraq. Concerning Durna, R. Hassan (2009) argued that the reasons why so many came from 
this town included a ‘local tradition of resistance and religious fervor.’ Third, the LIFG that 
formed in 1995, publically supported the October 2006 al-Qaeda declaration of an Islamic 
State of Iraq, and later officially merged with it.196  
 
Finally, the substantial involvement of Syrian foreign fighters has two broad explanations: 
regime support and geographic proximity. Syrian regime support was in a similar vein to 
that of Egypt during the Afghan jihad - getting ‘rid of thousands of the most aggressive 
Salafists with a taste for jihad, packing them off to a foreign war from which many would 
never return to pose a threat’ (Neumann, 2014: 19). This was to lead to Syria being ‘one of 
the leading state sponsors of both Baathist and al-Qaeda terrorism in Iraq’ (Weiss and 
Hassan, 2015: 25). This support included arranging ‘buses to ferry fighters … the issuing of 
documentation … discount on passport fees’ (Abdul-Ahad, 2005), and also ‘the chance to 
receive military training and fight against Coalition forces in Iraq’ (Neumann, 2014: 20). 
This level of Syrian regime support was recognised by the US led coalition, resulting in an 
October 2008 raid on the Syrian border town of Abu Kamal that resulted in the killing of 
the Syrian al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) logistics coordinator, Abu Ghadiya (Gerges, 2016: 
66).197 The second point concerning the large involvement of Syrian Arab foreign fighters 
is the geographic proximity of Syria with Iraq, and their largely porous 599 km border that 
facilitated the movement of both Syrian and other Arab foreign fighters. This suggestion 
could however be countered in that Jordanian foreign fighters made up less than three 
percent of the cohort of 711 Arab foreign fighters, yet Jordan and Iraq share a 181 km 
border. This point more generally demonstrates the lack of a single reason why one 
nationality may be more involved in defensive jihad than another.   
 
                                                 
196 The merger between al-Qaeda and LIFG occurred on November 3, 2007, through an announcement by 
Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Layth al-Libi (Springer, Regens, and Edger, 2009: 267). 
197 In addition, the Iraqi border town of Sinjar was an entry point for Arab foreign fighters coming from Syria, 
and the target for the October 2007 US raid that produced the ‘Sinjar records.’ 
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The apparent non-involvement in the Iraqi jihad of citizens of four Gulf countries (the 
Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE) deserves comment, all the more in that it 
is in stark contrast to their fellow Gulf neighbour, Saudi Arabia. Arguably a more moderate 
religiosity (than Saudi Arabia) may have played a part, although as noted earlier, religiosity 
is a widely discredited factor particularly unless associated with deprivations (Canetti et al., 
2010) – deprivations that these four small oil rich Gulf countries (and indeed Saudi Arabia) 
are generally not known to suffer. Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that these four 
Gulf countries have no notable history in Islamist militancy (including involvement in 
defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism), or links to organisations such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The apparent lack of involvement in the defensive jihad in Iraq by nationals 
from these four Gulf countries, was also noted in Chapter 4 vis-à-vis their lack of 
involvement in the defensive jihad in 1980s Afghanistan.   
 
Finally, it is instructive that unlike the majority of expatriate Afghan Arabs who had been 
living in other Arab countries, the majority (90 percent) of expatriate Arab foreign fighters 
in Iraq had been living in the West.198 Although a small overall number, only three percent 
out of 711, the fact that they mobilised from Western countries may be explained by the 
fact that it was a highly controversial Western inspired invasion of an Arab country. It may 
have made them uncomfortable to remain living and working in the West, particularly in 
Muslim immigrant communities. The most common two Western countries were France 
and Italy, with perhaps unsurprisingly, Arab migrants from mainly Algeria and Tunisia 
respectively. Anecdotally, Cherif Kouachi, a French national of Algerian parentage, who 
was arrested in Paris whilst attempting to go to Iraq in 2005, was later involved in the 2015 
Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks in Paris (Callimachi and Yardley, 2015).  
 
The Lack of Radicalisation in Arab Foreign Fighters Travelling to Iraq 
 
This section of the chapter makes the case that the majority of Arab foreign fighters who 
arrived in Iraq were not necessarily radicalised prior to their decision to participate in 
                                                 
198 Out of the 22 Arab expatriates, 20 were living in the West, and two three were uprooted Palestinians 
working in Jordan. In a separate study, Paz (2005) identified one Moroccan foreign fighter had been living in 
Spain, and one Lebanese foreign fighter had been living in Denmark. 
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defensive jihad. This debate is necessary in order to establish a baseline understanding of 
those who went to Iraq, in order to then examine why and how some ostensibly un-
radicalised individuals subsequently become involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. 
It is often implicit in the scholarly literature that individuals who depart their country of 
residence in order to participate in defensive jihad, in defence of their co-religionists, are 
somehow already radicalised and/or already Islamist terrorists (Rubin, 1997: 179-206; 
Edwards, 2002: 266-71; Dalacoura, 2011: 42). Moreover, even the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC CTC, 2015a) labels such individuals as ‘foreign terrorist fighters.’ This 
perception is taken notwithstanding the fact that despite ‘the numerous endeavours in 
academia … no metrics exist to gauge radicalisation’ (Coolsaet, 2011: 260). As Napoleoni 
(2005: 132) argued succinctly, ‘what in the West is commonly defined as terrorist activity 
is regarded in the Arab world, including in Iraq, as national resistance against an occupying 
power.’ 
 
In the specific case of Iraq, academic consensus on whether Arab foreign fighters were 
radicalised is mixed. In a study of Saudi foreign fighters in Iraq, one of its primary 
conclusions was ‘the unsettling realization that the vast majority of Saudi militants who … 
entered Iraq were not terrorist sympathizers before the war’ (Cordesman, 2005: 5). Atwan 
(2006: 206) also ‘discovered that the majority of foreign fighters were not jihadis before the 
war.’ Finally, Gerges (2005: 268) noted that prior to the Iraq invasion, Arab foreign fighters 
‘had not been politicized [and] had not joined any Islamist, let alone paramilitary 
organization.’ From the thesis dataset, over 98 percent of Arab foreign fighters involved in 
Iraq had no documented pre-existing terrorist links, perhaps indicating the establishment of 
a new generation of young Arab male fighters.  
 
Naturally there were some Arab foreign fighters in Iraq that did have known pre-existing 
terrorist links, the most notable individual arguably being Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Others 
include al-Zarqawi’s brother-in-law Khalid al-Aruri (a member of Jund al-Sham); Abu 
Ayoob al-Misri (a member of EIJ); and Abu Faraj al-Libi (a member of al-Qaeda). Other 
Arab foreign fighters with pre-existing terrorist links who influenced but did not enter Iraq, 
 121 
include Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Musa al-Qarni – present and past 
members of al-Qaeda. The influence of these individuals is covered later in the chapter. 
 
Perhaps more analytically useful than examining what the majority of Arab foreign fighters 
were not (i.e. radicalised), is exploring what they were, for example the suggestion that 
‘many of the volunteers were deeply religious’ (Hashim, 2006: 148). Extracted from the 
thesis dataset (that includes the Sinjar records), it is possible to demonstrate that religiosity 
appeared to play a role in the travelling date of Arab foreign fighters to Iraq. During the 12 
month period from September 2006 to August 2007, 55 percent of Arab foreign fighters 
travelled to Iraq during, or after, one of the four notable occasions in the Sunni Islamic 
calendar: the fasting month of Ramadan (23 September - 22 October 2006); Eid al-Fitr (23 
- 24 October 2006); the Hajj pilgrimage (28 - 31 December 2006); and Eid al-Adha (30 - 31 
December 2006). By noting the travel dates of Arab foreign fighters, the favourite three 
travel months in 2006 correlate directly to these annual Islamic occasions – in effect 
periods of increased religiosity. The most prolific month (October 2006) corresponds to 
Ramadan, the second most prolific month (January 2007) corresponds to the Hajj and Eid 
al-Adha, and the third (November 2006) relates to Eid al-Fitr. This is presented in Figure 
5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Arab foreign fighter deployment months to Iraq: 2006-2007 (n=291). 
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Many Arab foreign fighters appeared to travel to Iraq only after having participated in one 
of these Islamic events, except for Ramadan, where the evidence shows that they often 
deployed throughout the fasting month. Fasting during Ramadan is one of the five pillars of 
Islam, and compliance is rewarded. In the Hadeeth Bukhari, it is said that ‘whoever 
observes fasts during the month of Ramadan out of sincere faith … all his past sins will be 
forgiven.’199 This may help explain a keenness to participate in all or some of Ramadan, 
prior to participating in defensive jihad in Iraq. In effect participation appeared to be a form 
of absolution or self-purification. As noted in Chapter 1, it was during Ramadan that 
Ahmad Abdullah ash-Shaya (and his cousin Adil) decided to travel to Iraq in order to 
participate in defensive jihad. Although this appears to be the first empirical study to 
explicitly highlight this phenomenon, Hegghammer (2007: 17) had recognised that ‘a 
striking number of people travelled during or around the month of Ramadan.’200  
 
The annual Hajj pilgrimage also featured in the accounts of Arab foreign fighters as did the 
umra, which is considered ‘the lesser pilgrimage … a rite that requires several days to 
accomplish’ (Glasse, 2008: 540). The Hajj pilgrimage is another of the five pillars of Islam, 
and attendance offers a similar form of absolution. In the Hadeeth Bukhari it narrates that 
the Prophet Muhammad said that ‘whoever performs Hajj for Allah's pleasure … then he 
will return (after the Hajj) free from all sins as if he were born anew.’201 The influence of 
the Hajj pilgrimage appears to have been twofold. First, it was used by those already 
committed to participating in defensive jihad in Iraq, as a form of absolution. Second, it 
appears that some young Arab nationals were targeted and recruited by individuals whom 
they met during the Hajj.202  
 
Whilst the Hajj pilgrimage is in the Islamic calendar, the umra can be performed at any 
time of the year. Individuals who performed the umra, also appeared to do so as a form of 
                                                 
199 Hadeeth Bukhari. Book 2 (Belief). 1:36 - 1.37: Narrated by Abu Huraira. 
200 Interestingly, CNN reporter Jomana Karadsheh (2006) also reported that ‘with the Islamic holy month of 
Ramadan under way, insurgent attacks in Iraq have risen in the past two weeks.’  
201 Hadeeth Bukhari. Book 26 (Hajj Pilgrimage). 2.596: Narrated by Abu Huraira. 
202 Examples include a 21-year-old Saudi student Adil Mastoor Yahya al-Kaabi; a 21-year-old Tunisian 
student Ali Omar al-Kuki; and a 21-year-old Saudi national Ahmad Mustafa Mufleh al-Kaabi (al-Hazli), who 
were all motivated as a result of conversations during the Hajj pilgrimage.  
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absolution prior to travelling to Iraq, but anecdotally the few that did appeared to be already 
committed to Islamist terrorist related activities including suicide attacks. Examples include 
Jordanian national Raa'id al-Banna who having performed the umra, blew himself up one 
month later (on 28 February 2005) in Iraq killing 120 civilians. Also fellow Jordanian and 
radical ideologue Omar Yusuf Juma, a veteran Arab foreign fighter of 1980s Afghanistan 
and Bosnia, insisted on performing the umra, before travelling to Iraq and serving 
alongside Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The fact that the umra can be performed at any time of 
the year as noted above, suggests that there was a degree of urgency and an unwillingness 
to wait for the next Hajj or Ramadan, which could have been up to ten months away 
(according to the Islamic calendar).    
 
Whilst this thesis is not proposing a cause-effect relationship, it is striking that 55 percent 
of Arab foreign fighters in 2006/7 travelled during, or after, one of these Islamic practices. 
The deduction is that involvement in these annual events in the Sunni Islamic calendar may 
have stimulated their feelings towards their co-religionists in Iraq, whilst at the same time 
gaining a degree of solace aware of the possible realisation that they may not return alive. 
Such a belief may be equated to British soldiers attending Christian services in the Kuwaiti 
desert, prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. As a journalist embedded with the 
Royal Marines, Tim Butcher (2003) noted that ‘the unit's chaplain has been a particularly 
busy man. The number of soldiers attending his services has grown steadily over the past 
few weeks as the seriousness of what many of them might face in the coming days steadily 
became apparent.’ 
 
The emphasis on the religious (Islamic) rather than the radical nature of the Arab foreign 
fighters in Iraq has additional academic ballast, in the form of state and clerical support. 
Hegghammer (2007: 16) noted ‘that both local imams and some senior clerics were 
encouraging participation in the Iraqi resistance.’ Musa al-Qarni (2006b), a Saudi 
intellectual (and veteran Afghan Arab and former AQ member), argued ‘that fighting the 
Americans on the land of Iraq is jihad, that the Americans are aggressors, and that the 
[fighting] of Iraqis and Muslims against the Americans in Iraq constitutes a legitimate and 
obligatory defence.’ It is therefore not surprising that many Arab foreign fighters 
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‘volunteered out of a sense of religious duty and a sincere desire to defend fellow Muslims 
from non-Muslim invaders’ (Hafez, 2007b: 178).  
 
Such religious support resulted in the mobilisation of individuals such as Tunisian foreign 
fighter Walid Muhammad al-Masmudi, who ‘readily admitted that the … exhortations of 
clerics were the primary influences on his decision to go to fight in the jihad’ (Hashim, 
2006: 144). It is instructive that the father of one Saudi foreign fighter (Muqrin al-Utaybi), 
who was killed in Fallujah in November 2004, blames the clerics who ‘corrupted the minds 
of young men’ by calling for ‘jihad against the occupiers as a duty for all who are able’ 
(The Guardian, 22 November 2004). The emphasis on a religious underpinning for 
involvement in defensive jihad in Iraqi appears to have academic support. The themes 
include the revulsion of Arab and Muslim land being occupied by non-Muslims 
(Cordesman, 2005: 9; Hegghammer, 2007: 14); the humiliation of Muslims at the hands of 
non-Arabs (Hashim, 2006: 147; Hegghammer, 2007: 15); and the need to fight in defence 
‘of one’s land, coreligionists and honour’ (Hafez, 2012a: 190).  
 
To conclude this section, it appears that the majority of Arab foreign fighters (with no 
known previous links to terrorism) who travelled to Iraq to participate in defensive jihad in 
defence of fellow Muslims against US led coalition forces, were not necessarily radicalised 
in the sense of being committed to an ‘extremist political or religious ideology’ (Horgan, 
2009: 152). Whilst their motivation had a political and religious dimension, as explained 
above, it was not ‘extremist.’ As with Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya introduced in Chapter 1, 
their initial intention for going to Iraq was simply ‘to fight the Americans on Noble Jihad’ 
(Ballen, 2011: 7). If Arab foreign fighters were generally not radicalised prior to 
participating in defensive jihad in Iraq, why and how did this change in order for some to 
subsequently get involved in Islamist terrorist related activities? 
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The Radicalisation of Arab Foreign Fighters in Iraq: How and Why? 
 
Introduction 
 
To empirically test the argument that the original rationale behind Arab foreign fighter 
involvement in defensive jihad in Iraq was largely to fight the US led coalition, it is worth 
examining their targeting patterns in Iraq from 2003 onwards. As noted earlier, this will 
permit a determination of the ‘relative importance of the different rationales in the 
ideology’ (Hegghammer, 2009a: 260) of Arab foreign fighters. The challenge to such 
research however is that the data on conventional attacks (shootings, mine and IED attacks) 
that targeted coalition troops rarely mention the perpetrator, let alone record whether he/she 
was an Iraqi national or an Arab foreign fighter. Such a challenge may be overcome by 
examining martyrdom operations / suicide attacks instead, which often identify both the 
targets and the perpetrators. Despite the existence of overlaps and the challenge of defining 
civilians and non-combatants (as noted in Chapter 1), research that includes the 
disaggregation of targets may offer a more nuanced understanding of the two tactics 
(martyrdom operations and suicide attacks), and the two cohorts (Arab foreign fighters and 
Islamist terrorists) who adopt them. This concept is not entirely new, for example, one 
study on suicide bombers in Iraq conducted by Seifert and McCauley (2014: 803) argued 
that ‘suicide attacks must be disaggregated by target in order to understand these attacks as 
the expression of different insurgent priorities.’  
 
Whilst Seifert and McCauley (2014: 803) argued for the disaggregation of targets of suicide 
attacks, perhaps they were responding to Crenshaw (2007a: 162) who first recognised the 
‘over-aggregation’ of the tactic of suicide attacks:  
 
‘The tactic is usually treated as though it were a single unified method of violence. 
All types of suicide attacks are merged together, despite their serving different 
instrumental purposes: destroying military targets … killing enemy civilians, or 
massacring co-religionists in factional struggles. For instance, why do some groups 
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target civilians and others military assets or individual officials? Why should the 
manner of violence matter more than the target or the purpose?’ 
 
Such support for the disaggregation of targets offers academic ballast to the thesis 
suggestion that, whilst both tactics in Iraq involved an attacker who ‘does not expect to 
survive the mission’ (Pape, 2005: 10), ‘martyrdom operations’ largely targeted military 
forces under the auspices of defensive jihad, whilst ‘suicide attacks’ largely targeted 
civilians and non-combatants under the auspices of Islamist terrorism. As noted in Chapter 
2, Moghadam (2011: 5) also argued that a martyrdom operation should ‘not be labelled a 
terrorist attack if it is targeted against members of an army, because attacks are ordinarily 
labelled terrorist attacks when they are aimed at non-combatants.’ Finally, the motivation or 
intent of the self-sacrificial attack should be considered. For example, the 2000 suicide 
attack against the USS Cole was intended as a symbolic act of terror to elicit an over-
reaction by the USA, and not an act of jihad or guerrilla warfare intended to whittle down 
the US Navy’s fighting capability. Therefore, aware of the ‘lack of a common definition of 
the concept of suicide terrorism’ (Crenshaw, 2007a: 135), at least drawing a broad 
distinction between ‘martyrdom operations’ and ‘suicide attacks’ offers a degree of 
conceptual clarity when examining the perpetrators.  
 
The idea of linking ‘martyrdom operations’ with defensive jihad resonates within the 
understanding of the Islamic concept of martyrdom in the language of political Islam, in 
that it acknowledges losing one’s life in the path of God (fee sabeel Allah) defending fellow 
Muslims against (normally foreign) military aggression, whilst participating in a defensive 
jihad. In its simplest form, a ‘martyrdom operation’ could involve a lone fighter armed with 
only a rifle or hand grenade attacking a heavily armed enemy position. Perhaps in an even 
more intentionally self-destructive or sacrificial form, the battle of Dien Bien Phu in French 
Indo-China (now Vietnam) is instructive. According to Jules Roy (1965: 72), ‘every 
[Vietminh] soldier’s ambition was to sacrifice himself’ permitting Vietminh battalions to be 
‘preceded by a group of dynamiters with orders to make openings in the barbed-wire 
defences and destroy the blockhouses, blowing themselves up with them’ (p. 119). 
Arguably the Vietminh were also participating in their version of defensive jihad (against 
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foreign occupiers) and were using martyrdom operations (against military targets) where 
(as noted above) they did ‘not expect to survive the mission’ (Pape, 2005: 10).  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, it is illuminating however that some scholars, including Cook (2002) 
place the term ‘martyrdom operations’ inside quotation marks, being unwilling ‘to take a 
stand on the question of whether people who die during the course of these actions [suicide 
attacks] are actually martyrs or not’ (Cook, 2002: 35).203 Within the context of Iraq, by 
distinguishing between suicide attacks and ‘martyrdom operations’ through the 
disaggregation of targets, continuing the argument from Chapter 4, this thesis suggests that 
‘martyrdom operations’ which targeted foreign and Iraqi troops (within the understanding 
of defensive jihad), may be more usefully conceptualised as martyrdom operations outside 
quotation marks, a position adopted throughout the remainder of the chapter, and thesis. 
 
The inverse is also true. Suicide attacks that target civilians and non-combatants are more 
akin to acts of Islamist terrorism, and should not be understood as ‘militant heroic 
martyrdom’ (Singh, 2011: 88), despite some groups (for example HAMAS) potentially 
framing it that way within the language of political Islam. Martyrdom (fee sabeel Allah) is 
more easily understood as being achieved under the auspices of defensive jihad, rather than 
Islamist terrorism. This leads to the notion of radicalisation, and whether Arab foreign 
fighters who conducted martyrdom operations against coalition troops in Iraq were 
radicalised or not. The position taken earlier in the chapter was that the majority of Arab 
foreign fighters (with no known previous links to terrorism) who participated in defensive 
jihad in defence of fellow Muslims against US led coalition forces, were not necessarily 
radicalised. This could lead to the conclusion that Arab foreign fighters who conducted 
martyrdom operations against coalition and Iraqi troops in Iraq, whilst demonstrably 
committed, were also not necessarily radicalised.  
  
                                                 
203 It was also noted in Chapter 2, that Fierke (2014: 207) used the term ‘suicide/martyrdom’ – in order ‘to 
highlight the tension in the relationship between the two concepts.’ 
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The Data 
 
Based on the idea that the defensive jihad in Iraq was a struggle to defend fellow Muslims 
from subjugation, it would be reasonable to expect that the primary target for engagement 
by Arab foreign fighters would be US led coalition forces. The casualty statistics for 
coalition forces and Iraqi civilians, extracted from iCasualties and Iraq Body Count 
respectively, whilst identifying casualties, unfortunately do not allow for a nuanced 
disaggregation of the perpetrators, in order to identify Arab foreign fighters.204 However by 
using data on martyrdom operations and suicide attacks, it permits analysis of the actors 
(Arab foreign fighters or Islamist terrorists) and the opportunity to examine the trajectory 
between them. It is assumed that as Arab foreign fighters ‘constituted the bulk of suicide 
bombers’ (Moghadam, 2011: 223),205 the majority of martyrdom operations and suicide 
attacks were conducted by Arab foreign fighters / Islamist terrorists, and not Iraqis 
(Crenshaw, 2007b: ix). This was confirmed by Hashim (2006: 209), who noted that Iraqi 
nationalist insurgents were reluctant to engage in suicide attacks, and disliked ‘the barbaric 
and provocative behaviour of the foreigners.’ One explanation offered by Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi (2004a), was that ‘the Iraqi brothers still prefer safety and returning to the arms of 
their wives, where nothing frightens them.’206 
 
Extracted from the thesis dataset, Figure 5.3 suggests that the initial targeting by Arab 
foreign fighters was aimed at US led coalition forces involving martyrdom operations, 
however the targeting soon switched to Iraqi civilians and non-combatants, involving 
suicide attacks.   
 
                                                 
204 For Iraqi civilian casualties, perpetrators are listed as (1) any perpetrators; (2) US led coalition, no Iraqi 
state forces; (3) US led coalition, including Iraqi state forces; (4) Iraqi state forces without coalition, (5) anti-
government / occupation forces; (6) unknown actors. For US led coalition casualties, the perpetrators are not 
identified.    
205 In May 2007 US General Petraeus also confirmed that ‘80 to 90 percent of the suicide bombers come from 
outside Iraq’ (Partlow, 2007). 
206 This letter was captured by US forces in Iraq on 23 January 2004, and after translation, was released by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in February 2004. 
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Figure 5.3: Targeting comparison of self-sacrificial attacks in Iraq (2003 – 2009). n1=86 martyrdom 
operations perpetrated by Arab foreign fighters targeting the US led coalition troops. Source: Thesis dataset 
(incorporating CPOST, iCasualties, and GTD); n2=226 suicide attacks (by unknown perpetrators, but 
assumed non-Iraqi Sunni Arabs) targeting Iraqi civilians and non-combatants. Source: GTD database;207 n3= 
200 martyrdom operations perpetrated by Arab foreign fighters targeting Iraqi police and army units. Source: 
GTD database. 
 
The reliability of the data in Figure 5.3 is supported by other academic studies: the peak in 
2005 is also present in the analysis conducted by Hafez (2007b), while both peaks in 2005 
and 2007 are present in the findings by Seifert and McCauley (2014). Also, by using the 
data on the number of actual attacks as opposed to the number of casualties, it removes a 
potential distortion in the analysis, as civilian casualties were vastly higher than coalition 
and Iraqi troops, due to their lack of protection and hence viewed as ‘soft targets’ (Piazza, 
2009:63). What was apparent in Iraq from 2005, was that civilians were ‘the target of 
choice’ (Crenshaw, 2007b: ix). 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the point of inflection (in 2004) that resulted in the strategic shift to 
increase suicide attacks against Iraqi civilians / non-combatants, and Iraqi police and 
soldiers, with a corresponding reduction (in 2005) of martyrdom operations against 
coalition troops. It suggests that the initial targeting of coalition troops was consistent with 
the notion of a defensive jihad, whilst the later targeting of Iraqi civilians and non-
                                                 
207 GTD Search Criteria: ‘Years: (between 2003 and 2009); all incidents regardless of doubt; including only 
suicide attacks; Country: (Iraq).’ It is noted that the GTD does not include a definition of a ‘suicide attack’ in 
the 2015 GTD Codebook. 
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combatants was consistent with the notion of takfir, within the context of Islamist terrorism. 
It is also suggested that whilst the almost parallel targeting of Iraqi police and soldiers (with 
that of Iraqi civilians and non-combatants) was consistent with the notion of takfir, such 
targeting (of Iraqi police and soldiers) was more within the context of a defensive jihad. 
Regarding Iraqi civilians and non-combatants, the pendulum within political Islam had 
swung from defensive jihad to Islamist terrorism, although ideologically the rhetoric of 
political Islam was the same – it remained framed under the rubric of a defensive jihad.  
What is also demonstrated in Figure 5.3 is the coexistence of the notions of defensive jihad 
and Islamist terrorism, which may also explain their widespread conflation, intentional or 
not, in academia, the media, and among policy makers.   
 
A further extraction from Figure 5.3 produces Figure 5.4, which specifically disaggregates 
the targets of attacks that involved both martyrdom operations and suicide attacks.   
 
 
Figure 5.4: Targeting Comparison of 731 self-sacrificial attacks in Iraq (2003 – 2009). n1=86 ‘martyrdom 
operations’ targeting foreign troops. Source: Thesis dataset (incorporating CPOST, iCasualties, and GTD); 
and n2=645 martyrdom / suicide attacks targeting Iraqi police and army, Iraq civilians and non-combatants, 
Iraqi government, Iraqi businesses, and Shia institutions. Source: GTD database. 
 
Figure 5.4 represents the targets that were killed by each martyrdom operation or suicide 
attack, rather than the possible intended target, which would have been largely speculative. 
In a study of suicide attacks in Iraq, Seifert and McCauley (2014: 808) claimed to have 
‘identified the intended target of each suicide attack’ and coded accordingly. The research 
conducted for this thesis found such identification is, in reality, largely subjective. At best, 
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research can generally only identify the cluster of targets, a policy adopted by GTD, for 
example ‘Government (General); Military; Private Citizens & Property; Religious 
Figures/Institutions.’208 Such target groupings despite the obvious overlaps, reveals that 37 
percent of attacks involved Iraqi civilians and non-combatants including Shia religious 
figures; 24 percent involved Iraqi government and businesses; 28 percent involved Iraqi 
police and troops; and only 11 percent involved foreign troops.  
 
Although touched on in Chapter 1, it is worth clarifying that Iraqi police or military 
‘recruits’ are considered civilians and/or non-combatants, and that attacking them is an act 
of Islamist terrorism. For example, the GTD database records that on 11 February 2004, a 
‘suicide bomber driving a car targeted Iraqi military recruits waiting outside an army 
recruitment centre in Baghdad.’209 However the label ‘recruit’ is potentially misleading as 
they were in fact Iraqi civilians - ‘job-seekers’ (Ani and Murphy, 2005). This would also 
apply to Iraqi police recruitment centres where individuals are ‘recruits in the process of 
signing up to work for the Iraqi police.’210 This disaggregation (between civilians looking 
for work, and members of Iraq’s armed forces) also conforms to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, 2015a), in that civilians are defined ‘as persons who 
are not members of the armed forces.’ Iraqi volunteers outside army or police recruitment 
centres would thus be considered civilians, and attacking them would reasonably be 
considered a terrorist act. 
 
Accepting that most Iraqi government posts including the police and army were made up of 
Iraqi Shia (al-Shishani, 2005a), research suggests that 89 percent of all self-sacrificial 
attacks in Iraq targeted Iraqi Shia Muslims – in effect confirming the takfiri ideology of the 
perpetrators. The ideology supporting the 61 percent of attacks that targeted Iraqi 
businesses (24 percent), civilians and non-combatants (37 percent), are best understood as 
terroristic and takfiri in nature, in that it justified suicide attacks against fellow Muslims. 
The ideology supporting the remaining 39 percent of attacks that targeted coalition and 
                                                 
208 For example the 30 April 2005 suicide attack in Baghdad. GTD ID: 200504300006. 
209 Conducted by Lebanese suicide bomber (Abbas Hassan) on 11 February 2004, in Baghdad, (CPOST 
Attack ID 1225780728; GTD Database Incident ID 200402110004). 
210 For example, the 4 May 2005 suicide attack in Irbil (GTD Database Incident ID 200505040004). 
 132 
Iraqi armed forces is more consistent with martyrdom operations (fee sabeel Allah), despite 
28 percent being Iraqi forces and consistent with takfir. Overlaps notwithstanding 
(particularly takfiri martyrdom operations against the Iraqi police and military), this 
conceptualisation permits the disaggregation of Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists 
in the unique context of the Iraq insurgency.  
 
Using the thesis data and working within the conceptual parameters outlined above, the 
Arab foreign fighters who crossed the radicalisation threshold from defensive jihad to 
Islamist terrorism, by targeting Iraqi civilians and non-combatants, appeared to be driven 
by ‘many alternative causal paths to the same outcome’ enshrined within the notion of 
‘equifinality’ (George and Bennett, 2005: 10). These alternative paths appeared to merge 
being influenced of situational factors experienced whilst participating in the defensive 
jihad (insurgent violence) in Iraq. These included the presence of grievances and ideology, 
and being subjected to ideological indoctrination during group training. 
 
Grievances and Ideology 
 
The notion of grievances and ideology are again nestled together due to their relationship 
with radicalisation (Neumann, 2011), in that they appear to have been central to the 
radicalisation of many Arab foreign fighters in Iraq. In effect they mirror the philosophy of 
‘diagnostic framing and prognostic framing’ proposed by Benford and Snow (2000).211 The 
two macro-level factors embedded within political Islam that include ‘grievances and 
ideology’ are the concept of takfir, and the ideology supporting suicide attacks against Iraqi 
civilians and non-combatants. 212  Importantly, these macro-level factors are broadly 
consistent with salafi jihadism – an ideology that supports ‘violence and revolution’ 
(Wiktorowicz, 2006: 208). According to Moghadam (2008: 62), salafi jihadis ‘engage in 
                                                 
211 First raised in Chapter 4 (Footnote 155), according to Bedford and Snow (2000), embedded within 
diagnostic framing is the concept of ‘injustice frames’ which are ‘generated and adopted by those who come 
to define the actions of an authority as unjust’ (p. 615); while prognostic framing ‘involves the articulation of 
a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan’ (p. 
616). 
212 There were of course micro-level grievances including the 2003 ‘massacre’ of Iraqi civilians in Fallujah, 
and the 2004 Abu Ghrayb prison abuses, which motivated some Arab foreign fighters to travel to Iraq (Hafez, 
2007b: 44; Duyvesteyn and Peters, 2015: 19). 
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takfir … condone the targeting of civilians … and support the use of suicide operations.’ 
Some may argue that in Iraq (as opposed to a Western context) the concept of takfir and the 
employment of suicide attacks targeting Iraqi civilians and non-combatants are one and the 
same, bearing in mind (as noted earlier) that 99 percent of Iraqis are Muslims.213 However 
overlaps notwithstanding, takfir and the use of suicide attacks (against Iraqi civilians and 
non-combatants) are disaggregated in this chapter in an attempt to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of the situational circumstances that inspired Arab foreign fighter 
involvement in Islamist terrorist related activities in Iraq.  
 
Takfir against Iraqi Shia Muslims 
 
The grievances against Iraqi Shia Muslims became more pronounced after the transfer of 
sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government on 28 June 2004. This led to an ideological 
switch from targeting the far enemy (the US led coalition) to the near enemy (Iraqi Shias), a 
switch that was recognised by Hegghammer (2013a), 214  and supported by the 2004 
inflection point in Figure 5.3. The grievances against the Shia, articulated by Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi (2004a), included their ‘control of the institutions of the state;’ their ‘reign over 
the army and police apparatus;’ and their desire to ‘establish a Shia state stretching from 
Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.’ These grievances amounted to the ‘suppression’ 
and ‘liquidation’ of the Sunnis (al-Zarqawi, 2004a). His ideological solution was takfir 
against the Shia in that ‘fighting against the Shia is the way to drag the ummah into the 
battle’ (al-Zarqawi, 2004a). On the ground in Iraq and demonstrated in Figure 5.3, this led 
to an almost parallel upsurge in violence directed against Iraqi Shia civilians, non-
combatants (including those who were in the process of signing up to work in Iraq’s 
security forces), and operational Iraqi police and army units. This became the watershed or 
point of inflection of the Iraq insurgency where the defensive jihad against the US led 
coalition, whilst now including Iraqi forces, also began to morph into Islamist terrorism by 
targeting civilians and non-combatants, under the overarching Islamist ideology of takfir.   
  
                                                 
213 US Central Intelligence Agency. (2014). The World Fact Book: Iraq. 
214 According to Hegghammer (2013a), initially in ‘Iraq post 2003 … the declared motivations of foreign 
fighters … suggest that anti-Americanism was a much more important motivator than anti-Shiism.’ 
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It is instructive that al-Zarqawi’s former mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, expressed 
his concerns about the ‘indiscriminate violence and takfir of entire groups of people 
because it is wrong to do so and hurts the image of Islam’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 47). In 
response, al-Zarqawi formally announced the establishment (in May 2005) of the Al-Baraa 
bin Malik Brigade comprising of a ‘specialised cell of suicide bombers within al-Qaeda in 
Iraq’ (START, 2012), and issued a fatwa (dated 18 May 2005) in order to ‘clarify the 
position of the Shari'a regarding such incidents in which Muslims are killed incidentally.’ 
Covered in Chapter 3, but repeated here for completeness, al-Zarqawi (2005) argued that:  
  
‘The legitimacy of … killing a number of Muslims even if it is known that they are 
likely to be there at the time … is justified under the principle of daroorah 
[necessity], due to the fact that it is impossible … to distinguish between them and 
those infidels against whom war is being waged … it is permissible to commit this 
evil … in order to ward off a greater evil, namely, the evil of suspending jihad.’ 
 
Although at first glance, it appears difficult to fully comprehend the logic behind this fatwa, 
and arguably supports the view that al-Zarqawi had ‘few intellectual inclinations’ (Brisard 
and Martinez, 2005: 11), and was ‘theologically illiterate’ (Gerges, 2016: 90). Yet on closer 
inspection, al-Zarqawi’s use of the Arabic word daroorah is in complete harmony with the 
‘doctrine of necessity’ (Cooper, 1977), whereby terrorism may be ‘justified as a response to 
something even more unsavory’ (p. 26), which in al-Zarqawi’s case, was the ‘evil of 
suspending jihad.’ As Cooper (1977: 17) argued, an ‘understanding of this viewpoint, 
whether acceptable or not, is essential to an understanding of the terrorist.’ The result, as 
Figure 5.3 demonstrates, was that Iraqi Shia civilians and non-combatants were heavily 
targeted in 2004 and 2005 by Islamist terrorists to the extent that al-Qaeda’s deputy Ayman 
al-Zawahiri (2005) wrote to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (in July 2005) concerned that ‘many of 
your Muslim admirers amongst the common folk are wondering about your attacks on the 
Shia … what loss will befall us if we did not attack the Shia?’  
 
The main concern articulated by al-Zawahiri (2005) was losing ‘the popular support of the 
Muslim masses in Iraq.’ Just over 20 percent of the thesis dataset has information on how 
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Arab foreign fighters and/or Islamist terrorists died in Iraq.215 It shows that out of the 66 
individuals on whom data are available, 77 percent died fighting the US led coalition (in 
gun battles or martyrdom operations), while the remaining 23 percent died targeting Iraqi 
civilians and non-combatants. This finding however conflicts with the earlier finding that 
61 percent of attacks targeted Iraqi businesses, civilians and non-combatants. It is suggested 
that these figures perhaps expose the challenges of terrorism research, where the 
perpetrators are often intentionally anonymous or unknown. The view taken in this thesis is 
that despite the apparent anonymity of many of the attackers, as noted earlier in the chapter, 
it is reasonably assumed that they were Arab foreign fighters turned Islamist terrorists. 
Therefore, the 23 percent who died targeting Iraqi civilians and non-combatants maybe 
considered representative of the larger cohort responsible for the 61 percent of attacks that 
targeted Iraqi businesses, civilians and non-combatants. 
 
The Ideology Supporting Suicide Attacks against Civilians and Non-Combatants 
 
There have been many studies examining the motivations and circumstances of suicide 
bombers in Iraq including, but not limited to, Hafez (2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 2009), 
Moghadam (2011), and Seifert and McCauley (2014). Despite the inclusion of impressive 
data and evidence of academic rigour, they still tend to aggregate military targets (coalition 
and Iraqi forces) and civilians and non-combatants. Hafez (2007b: 95) argued that the 
circumstances behind the suicide bombings were the ‘humiliation of Muslims at the hands 
of foreigners, impotence of official Muslim governments in the face of hegemonic powers, 
and redemption through faithful sacrifice.’ Moghadam (2011: 230-231) believed that the 
circumstances included ‘anger at the United States … a belief in the need to defend a 
religion that is perceived to be under attack … and reaping the benefits of martyrdom.’ In 
both findings the common grievance is against the US and an ideology of action 
                                                 
215 This 20 percent represents 143 Arab foreign fighters. This is broken down to 77 who died in self-sacrificial 
attacks (but critically their intended target was not identified). The remaining 66 Arab foreign fighters are 
broken down to 33 who died in conventional combat against US led coalition forces; 18 who died in 
martyrdom operations against US led coalition forces; and 15 who died in suicide attacks against Iraqi 
civilians and non-combatants.  
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underpinned by martyrdom and redemption, yet the grievance(s) and ideology arguably do 
not explain why Iraqi Muslim civilians and non-combatants were targeted. 
 
What appears particularly contradictory in the assessment by Moghadam (2011), is that ‘the 
need to defend a religion’ translated into attacks aimed at co-religionists, notwithstanding 
the sectarian context in that they were Shia Muslims. Therefore arguably, perhaps it would 
have been more accurate to say ‘a belief in the need to defend Sunni Islam that is perceived 
to be under attack.’ Contextually, attacking Shia Muslims would then help to explain the 
emergence of the notion of takfir in Iraq, with the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty to a 
Shia led government. 
 
According to Hafez (2007b: 117), suicide attacks on Shia civilians were based on 
ideological (conspiratorial worldviews) and theological (legitimisation of killing civilians) 
justifications. This was based on the perception that the Shia led Iraqi government was seen 
to be helping the ‘infidel Americans,’ thus the whole Shia community were ‘guilty’ of 
apostasy. This rationale appeared to support the ideological overlap justifying suicide 
attacks (against the Shia), and the notion of takfir. Therefore, according to the ideology, 
fighting the ‘apostates’ would take ‘precedence over fighting the original infidels’ (Hafez, 
2007b: 127), leading to the 2004 point of inflection identified in Figure 5.3.  
 
Although Cordesman (2005: 5) noted correctly that ‘the vast majority of Saudi militants 
who have entered Iraq were not terrorist sympathizers before the war,’ he does not explain 
how Saudis were ‘overrepresented among suicide bombers’ (Hegghammer, 2007: 4) - a 
finding corroborated by Fishman et al. (2008: 56), Hafez (2006b: 616), and Moghadam 
(2011: 225). Again, whilst it is broadly accepted that ‘most Saudi recruits genuinely did 
hold a deep belief in and desire for martyrdom’ (Hegghammer, 2007: 14), this desire for 
martyrdom should not necessarily be conflated with suicide attacks. First, by examining the 
thesis dataset, although Saudis were overrepresented among suicide bombers on a 
numerical basis, they were not on a per capita basis (2.16 per million), trailing Kuwait at 
5.13 per million. Second, by disaggregating martyrdom operations and suicide attacks, only 
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54 percent of attacks by Saudi nationals targeted Iraqi civilians (with the remaining 46 
percent targeting coalition troops).  
 
Istishhaad or Intihaar in Iraq 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, Syrian ideologue and veteran Afghan Arab, Shaykh Abu Basir al-
Tartusi, published a fatwa (Suspicions of Sin in Martyrdom or Suicide Attacks) making the 
distinction between suicide attacks and martyrdom operations. Al-Tartusi (2005) argued 
that suicide ‘attacks are closer to suicide [intihaar] than to martyrdom [istishhaad] and they 
are forbidden because of sins they may potentially entail … which sow discord between 
Muslims and their 'ulama.’ However, al-Tartusi (2005) supported the notion of martyrdom 
gained through inghimasi operations (covered in detail in Chapter 6), conducted by 
‘plunging into enemy lines … not to kill one’s self, but rather to enter into situations where 
one is killed by the enemy.’ 
 
One influential study on Arab foreign fighters in Iraq that arguably conflated the notion of 
being a martyr (fee sabeel Allah) with that of a suicide bomber, was authored by Felter and 
Fishman (2007) under the title Al Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the 
Sinjar Records. Despite the written records in Arabic showing istishhaadi - ‘one who 
desires martyrdom’ (Wehr, 1980: 489), the authors “coded all such individuals ‘suicide 
bombers’ in an effort to avoid confusion” (Felter and Fishman, 2007: 18). Based on this 
arguably reductionist coding, Felter and Fishman (2007) found that “85.2 percent … of 
Libyan fighters listed ‘suicide bomber’ as their work in Iraq” (p. 19), and therefore 
concluded that ‘Libyan fighters were much more likely than other nationalities to be listed 
as suicide bombers’ (p. 27). 216  Perhaps equally surprising, is that other scholars have 
referenced and regurgitated these findings uncritically, including Moghadam (2011: 227), 
Malet (2015: 14), and Dodwell, Milton, and Rassler (2016b: 22).  
 
                                                 
216 Even in their subsequent analysis of the Sinjar Records, Fishman et al (2008: 6) still concluded that 
“Libyan and Moroccan nationals registered as ‘suicide bombers’ at a higher rate than their Saudi counterparts.” 
This finding is only true on a per capita basis (which was not mentioned) for Libya (9.14 per million); Saudi 
Arabia second (3.03 per million); and Jordan third (1.47 per million). 
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Based on the data collected on 110 confirmed self-sacrificial attacks in Iraq (martyrdom 
operations and suicide attacks),217 Libyans do not appear to feature so strongly, appearing 
only ninth equal in comparison with other Arab countries, as presented in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Country of origin of perpetrators of self-sacrificial attacks (n=110). 
 
Examined another way, one would also expect Libyans as a percentage of the overall 
Libyan cohort to be more strongly represented as martyrs and/or suicide bombers, in line 
with the finding of Felter and Fishman (2007). Again this appears not to be the case. Using 
the data on the perpetrators of martyrdom operations and suicide attacks in Figure 5.5, and 
the data on the geographic origin of all 711 Arab foreign fighters in Iraq (in Figure 5.1), the 
country of origin of perpetrators of self-sacrificial attacks as a percentage of each national 
cohort may be calculated.  
 
                                                 
217 This data has been extracted from various sources including the Chicago Project on Security and Threats 
(CPOST) Suicide Attack Database; Kohlmann (2005a, 2005b); and Hafez (2007b).    
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Figure 5.6: Country of origin of perpetrators of self-sacrificial attacks as a percentage of each national cohort 
(n=110)  
 
Naturally care is required when interpreting the thesis dataset, for example the high 
Lebanese position may be due to greater publicity of their biographies as a direct result of 
their involvement in a self-sacrificial attack, or because many Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon used the pseudonym of al-Labnani (Aqil, 2004). In the same vein, a lack of 
publicity may also partially explain the finding from Figure 5.5, that suggests that Libyan 
fighters were much less likely than other nationalities to be suicide bombers, despite having 
been listed as ‘much more likely’ by Felter and Fishman (2007: 27). An interesting 
corollary to the Felter and Fishman (2007) report, is that two of the Libyan so called 
‘suicide bombers’218 were languishing in an Iraqi prison by 2012 (Zelin, 2013a). 
 
Again, the point to be made here is perhaps the need for a more nuanced understanding 
amongst academics, the media and policy makers, of istishhaad (martyrdom) within the 
language of political Islam, and consequently a more nuanced analysis of such data. In 
Chapter 6 this dichotomy occurs again with the publication by Dodwell, Milton, and 
Rassler (2016a), of a report analysing ‘over 4,600 unique Islamic State personnel records’ 
(p. iv), that directly translates istishhaadi as a suicide bomber (p. 28), without even 
contemplating the complexities of the meaning and context of martyrdom. It is interesting 
                                                 
218 Adil Juma al-Shalali and Hamza Ali Awad. 
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that there is still even with the backdrop of the Syrian jihad, a lack of consensus amongst 
scholars concerning the concepts of martyrdom operations and suicide attacks, as there was 
in Iraq between al-Zarqawi and both al-Zawahiri and al-Maqdisi. To address this 
disharmony in Iraq and to encourage Arab foreign fighters to target civilians and non-
combatants, there appears to have been training and indoctrination that helped to reinforce 
the ideology of al-Zarqawi’s AQI particularly pertaining to terrorist suicide attacks.  
 
Terrorist Training and Indoctrination 
 
Once an individual decided to participate in defensive jihad in Iraq, unless they had 
received prior military training (possibly as conscripts) they entered training camps 
established in either Syria or Iraq. One Syrian foreign fighter, Abu Ibrahim, recalled how 
his group were transported ‘across the border and then into villages on the Iraqi side; and 
from there the Iraqi contacts would take the mujahhideen to training camps’ (Abdul-Ahad, 
2005). According to Hegghammer (2011b: 298) these ‘training camps generated an ultra-
masculine culture of violence which brutalized the volunteers and broke down barriers to 
the use of violence.’ Some Arab foreign fighters were trained to be shuhada (martyrs) 
leading to their subsequent involvement in either a martyrdom operation or a suicide attack 
– although at the group (AQI) level, there appeared to be little distinction.  
  
A unique insight into the training of suicide bombers in Iraq was obtained in a rare 
interview for Time magazine by Aparisim Ghosh (2005). Although the suicide bomber was 
an Iraqi (not a foreign Arab), Marwan Abu Ubaydah’s story is instructive. According to 
Ghosh (2005), Marwan admitted to having undergone a programme to discipline the mind 
and cleanse the soul. The training, ‘supervised by field commanders and Sunni clerics was 
mainly psychological and spiritual.’ They were ‘expected to immerse themselves in 
spiritual contemplation and prayer.’ In addition to reading the Quran, they also read about 
the history of defensive jihad, in particular the stories of Afghan Arab martyrdom, written 
by Abdullah Azzam. Noting from Chapter 4 that no Afghan Arabs were understood to have 
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committed suicide attacks during the Afghan jihad,219 it is instructive that Sunni clerics in 
Iraq had relied on such stories of martyrdom (fee sabeel Allah) in order to motivate their 
suicide bombers.  
 
Indoctrination 
 
As mentioned earlier, the involvement in Islamist terrorism in Iraq was uniquely different 
from the subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism by veteran Afghan Arabs, in that in 
Iraq, defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism coexisted in the same time and space. The 
trajectory in Iraq from involvement in defensive jihad to subsequent participation in 
Islamist terrorism did not require travel to, or training in, another country; it all took place 
within the ‘war zone or a war-like setting combat environment’ (US Department of State, 
2015: 388) of Iraq. However much of the literature on terrorism presupposes correctly, that 
much of the recruitment, possible indoctrination, and radicalisation prior to involvement in 
Islamist terrorism, occurs in an individual’s home country. This nevertheless appears not to 
be true concerning Iraq, where individuals had already left their home countries and 
committed themselves to participate in defensive jihad even though, as noted earlier in the 
chapter, the majority of Arab foreign fighters arriving in Iraq were not necessarily 
radicalised (Cordesman, 2005: 5; Gerges, 2005: 268; Atwan, 2006: 206). This implies that 
most radicalisation that led to subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism in Iraq actually 
took place, in Iraq. With this in mind, terrorism studies literature explaining the 
involvement in terrorism by foreigners in Iraq may have been better situated had it 
acknowledged the context and impact of the crucible of defensive jihad, experienced by 
them. For example, the notions of ‘indoctrination’ (Horgan, 2005) or ‘culturing’ 
(Wiktorowicz, 2005b) often considered to take place within domestic radicalisation, may 
have a wider applicability than what they were originally conceptualised to explain. 
 
The notion that some Arab foreign fighters were indoctrinated (during training in Iraq) to 
later become suicide bombers targeting Iraqi civilians and non-combatants is worthy of 
                                                 
219 A conclusion also reached by Muhammad Hafez (2012a): ‘these Afghan Arabs did not engage in suicide 
attacks per se.’ 
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examination as it supports the research question. Schmid (2013a: 4) discerned ‘the more 
recent trend [of] indoctrination and training’ within the ‘ideology and structure of terrorist 
groups,’ a view corroborated by other academics (Crenshaw, 1994; Moghaddam, 2005; 
Wiktorowicz, 2005b; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). The term ‘indoctrination’ is 
understood to mean the teaching of ‘a person or group systematically to accept partisan or 
tendentious ideas uncritically.’220 As noted in Chapter 2, Wiktorowicz (2005b: 27) adopted 
the alternative label of ‘culturing’ to portray the transmission of ‘information to persuade 
audiences to change attitudes, preferences, and values.’ Implicit in the notion of 
indoctrination is the idea of a possible vulnerability to a certain ideology. Although situated 
within a Western context, the concept of ‘vulnerable people being drawn into terrorism’ 
(UK Government, 2015: 2) is recognised and acknowledged by the UK Government in 
various official documents, including UK Government (2012 and 2015).   
 
Horgan (2005: 103) implicitly links the notions of vulnerability and indoctrination, but 
argued that ‘vulnerability … might be more appropriate if not useful to consider it more in 
terms of how the individual may be more open to influence at any juncture.’ This may be as 
a result of ‘a sense of disillusionment with alternative avenues’ (Horgan, 2005: 95) or ‘a 
provocative event’ (Horgan, 2005: 84). Possible examples of Arab foreign fighters who 
may have been potentially ‘more open to influence’ include Saudi national Abdul Aziz al-
Gharbi who had tried to join the Imam Mohammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Al-Ahsa, 
but was rejected. This rejection contributed to his decision to go to northern Iraq and blow 
himself up at a checkpoint in March 2003. 221 There was also Tunisian national Abdul 
Halim Badjoudj, an unemployed second-generation immigrant living in France, who ‘saw 
no future for himself’ and blew himself up while driving a car near a US military patrol.222  
 
Although Hafez (2007a: 112) does not distinguish between martyrdom operations and 
suicide attacks, he suggests that ‘volunteers for suicide attacks are not brainwashed victims 
                                                 
220 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995: 693). 
221 CPOST Attack ID 1230594988. Abdul Aziz Al-Gharbi used to lead prayers at the Imam Bukhari Mosque 
in Dammam 75 District. On March 22, 2003, he killed four people in a suicide attack in Kirkuk, including an 
Australian cameraman Paul Moran.  
222 Kohlmann (2005a: 1). No GTD database details. This attack occurred on 20 October 2004. 
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of opportunistic recruiters, nor are they manipulated individuals who are fooled by 
calculating terrorists.’ Again, this position should not go unchallenged, as research 
undertaken for this thesis suggests otherwise. Two factors are identified: the existence of a 
short training or incubation period conducted after arrival, and the young age of many Arab 
foreign fighters, both of which may contribute to explaining the trajectory from Arab 
foreign fighter to Islamist terrorist, specifically in becoming a suicide bomber.  
 
First, the short training period after their arrival in the crucible of defensive jihad in Iraq, 
away from family and friends, suggests that they may have been at their most vulnerable or 
impressionable, and hence ‘more open to influence’ (Horgan, 2005: 103). Whether training 
for martyrdom operations or suicide attacks, this training involved ‘the creation of a point 
of no return’ in order to make sure that individuals did not change their minds (Gambetta, 
2005). There are many examples of individuals who conducted martyrdom operations or 
suicide attacks after only a short incubation period in Iraq. They include Saudi foreign 
fighter, Muhammad al-Halil, who ‘less than a month later … detonated his car beside an 
American Humvee’ vehicle (Chehab, 2005: 53); Saudi foreign fighter, Abdullah al-Shimri, 
who had only been in Iraq for two months before he blew himself up amongst German 
contractors;223 and Jordanian foreign fighter, Raa'id Mansur al-Banna, who blew himself up 
within a month of arrival, killing 120 Iraqi civilians.224 Also noted in Chapter 1, it was less 
than two months after Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya had arrived in Iraq that he carried out his 
suicide attack killing 12 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad. Naturally in the examples above there 
may be competing explanations including that some individuals may have arrived in Iraq 
already intent and committed to conduct a martyrdom operation or suicide attack. 
Additionally, it is interesting that while all the perpetrators only had a short incubation 
period having arrived in Iraq, they conducted both martyrdom operations and suicide 
attacks, perhaps indicating that the training for such missions was more focussed on the 
                                                 
223 CPOST Attack ID 2127396409. He belonged to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group Jama'at al-Tawhid and 
Jihad. He targeted a convoy of German contractors in Baghdad (14 June 2004), killing more than 78 and 
injuring over 50.   
224 CPOST Attack ID 1214934544; Hafez (2006b: 617-619). The attack was in Hillah on February 28, 2005, 
considered ‘the worst single massacre since the U.S. invasion.’ He had also made the Islamic pilgrimage 
(umra) prior to going to Iraq.  
 144 
merits of martyrdom, and that the trainers did not necessarily make any targeting 
distinctions for such operations.  
 
Second, as noted earlier, the UNSC CTC (2015b) acknowledged the notion of ‘age-related 
vulnerabilities’ and thus it is worth briefly exploring whether there was an age difference 
between the participants of martyrdom operations and those of suicide attacks. In the 
literature, Horgan (2005: 102) recognised ‘the emotional responsiveness of people at a 
younger age and the increased susceptibility towards greater involvement this might bring.’ 
In Iraq, according to Gerges (2005: 269), many young Arab foreign fighters were 
‘ideologically transformed by their experience … coupled with socialization with hard-core 
jihadis.’ Extracted from the thesis dataset (n=19), the average age of Arab foreign fighters 
who subsequently conducted suicide attacks (against Iraqi civilians and non-combatants) 
was only 21-years-old, while the average age of those who conducted martyrdom 
operations (against coalition and Iraqi forces) was 25-years-old. This may tentatively 
suggest that those slightly more mature Arab foreign fighters were committed to defensive 
jihad that included martyrdom operations, while perhaps the younger cohort may have been 
more ‘more open to influence’ (Horgan, 2005), concerning involvement in Islamist terrorist 
suicide attacks.  
 
Conclusion 
 
By using systematic, scientific and empirically based research (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 
2010: 889), this chapter has illuminated the circumstances and factors that radicalised some 
Arab foreign fighters in Iraq to subsequently embrace terrorist related activities, including 
suicide attacks that targeted Iraqi civilians and non-combatants. Using data that leveraged 
711 biographies, albeit often fragmentary and propagandistic, there were four key findings, 
from which modest inferences may be drawn. First, the principal motivation for initial 
involvement in the Iraqi jihad was a genuine desire for defensive jihad in response to 
foreign aggression against co-religionists. The Arab foreign fighters were largely young 
men, many with a university education. The vast majority had no known previous militant 
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or terrorist links, and consequently it is argued that they were not necessarily radicalised 
prior to leaving their home countries.  
 
Second, unlike 1980s Afghanistan where defensive jihad and subsequent involvement in 
Islamist terrorist related activities were separated in time and space, the unique situation in 
Iraq witnessed the coexistence of both defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. In order 
therefore to be able to distinguish between these two practices, there was a need to 
disaggregate the targeting preferences of the two cohorts (Arab foreign fighters and Islamist 
terrorists), as well as to disaggregate martyrdom operations and suicide attacks. This led to 
the suggestion that in Iraq, Arab foreign fighters conducted martyrdom operations against 
military forces under the auspices of a defensive jihad; while Islamist terrorists conducted 
suicide attacks against civilians and non-combatants under the auspices of Islamist 
terrorism.  
 
Third, the trajectory between Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists appeared to be 
underpinned by grievances (against Iraqi Shia Muslims), and a corresponding ideology that 
invoked the notion of takfir, and justified the employment of suicide attacks (61 percent) 
against Iraqi civilians and non-combatants by Islamist terrorists; and martyrdom operations 
(28 percent) against Iraqi military forces by Arab foreign fighters.225 This suggests that in 
the case of the Iraqi jihad, the presence of a strong ideological link between martyrdom 
operations / suicide attacks and takfir.  
 
Fourth, the trajectory between the two cohorts appeared to have been primarily conducted 
in Iraq (although sometimes in Syria), involving training and indoctrination. There is 
evidence that the training included strong exhortations towards martyrdom – that later 
translated into both suicide attacks and martyrdom operations. Although it appeared that 
there was little distinction between the two tactics at the group (AQI and later ISI) level, 
ideologically within the language of political Islam it was contested by ideologues such as 
al-Maqdisi (Wagemakers, 2012: 47) and al-Zawahiri (2005). Further evidence suggests that 
                                                 
225 As noted earlier in the chapter, the remaining eleven percent of attacks were directed against US led 
coalition forces. 
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many Arab foreign fighters having arrived in Iraq were more ‘open to influence’ (Horgan, 
2005) by the terrorist narrative, largely due to their social isolation within a combat zone, 
and/or due to ‘age related vulnerabilities’ (UNSC CTC, 2015b).    
 
Lastly, it is perhaps instructive that back in 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was to make two 
important prophecies. First, he believed that ‘if a sectarian war was to take place, many in 
the Islamic world would rise to defend the Sunnis in Iraq’ (2004a) – a belief that has largely 
materialised. Second, he also raised the prospect of jihad in Syria (involving a town called 
Dabiq), noting that ‘the spark has been lit in Iraq and its flames will blaze, God willing, 
until they consume the Armies of the Cross in Dabiq’226 (al-Zarqawi, 2004b). Whilst this 
prospect that has yet to materialise,227 it is illuminating that Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya, the 
Saudi suicide bomber who survived his 2004 attack in Baghdad and repatriated back to 
Saudi Arabia, reappeared again in Syria on 18 November 2013, ‘honoured to be a soldier’s 
soldier of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’ (Shaghor, 2013).  
  
                                                 
226 According to Hadeeth Muslim 2897, as narrated by Abu Hurairah ‘The Last Hour would not come until the 
Romans would land at Al-A’maq or Dabiq. An army consisting of the best (soldiers) of the people of the earth 
at that time will come from Medina … win and … be conquerors of Constantinople.’ In effect, this signified a 
climactic battle involving a final Muslim victory over non-Muslims. 
227 Such a battle appears unlikely and is now perhaps acknowledged by the Islamic State, who changed the 
name of their magazine Dabiq, to Rumiyah (Rome), publishing Rumiyah Issue 1, on 5 September 2016. 
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 Chapter 6: Arab Foreign Fighters and Islamist Terrorists in Syria  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter, the last of the three case studies, examines why and how some Arab foreign 
fighters subsequently became (and continue to become) involved in Islamist terrorist 
related activities in Syria.228 Due to the inherent overlaps between defensive jihad and 
Islamist terrorism, the conflict in Syria is perhaps best understood as an insurgency, defined 
as ‘a hybrid form of conflict that combines subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism … 
[in] an internal struggle in which a disaffected group seeks to gain control of a nation’ 
(Mockaitis, 1990: 3). These overlaps were correctly identified by Borum and Fein (2016: 
10), who recognised that the Syrian insurgency appeared to ‘blur the lines between civil 
war and terrorism, pushing many of the foreign fighters aggressively towards terrorist 
tactics.’ This suggests that perhaps civil war is a higher-level manifestation of political 
violence that could also incorporate lower-level manifestations such as terrorism and 
guerrilla warfare.229 Unlike the Iraqi insurgency that witnessed defensive jihad against US 
led coalition troops (the far enemy) and Islamist terrorism against fellow Muslims (the near 
enemy), the Syrian insurgency involves defensive jihad against Syrian regime forces and 
Islamist terrorism against Syrian civilians – both the near enemy per se.  
 
Despite the Syrian insurgency becoming entangled with the prolonged Iraqi insurgency due 
to the cross-border influence of groups such as the Islamic State,230 this chapter specifically 
examines the insurgency in Syria and the Arab foreign fighters (not including indigenous 
Syrians) who participated in defensive jihad and who subsequently became involved in 
Islamist terrorist related activities. The research period is from 29 August 2011 - the first 
documented death of an Arab foreign fighter (Saudi national Husam al-Mutayri) 231  in 
Damascus, until 28 July 2016 - when the rebel group Jabhat al-Nusrah ostensibly 
                                                 
228 This chapter does not seek to explain why some Arab foreign fighters may later become involved in 
terrorist related activities in their home countries, having returned from Syria. 
229 An historical example would be the Algerian civil war (Horne, 2006). 
230 This chapter uses Islamic State, IS and ISIS interchangeably. 
231 Shamukh al-Islam Jihadi Forum (17 February 2012) – now password protected. 
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announced their cessation of links with al-Qaeda (and rebranded itself Jabhat Fatah al-
Sham).   
 
This chapter leverages a thesis dataset of 1,930 Arab foreign fighters; the radicalisation 
framework presented in Chapter 2; the language of political Islam outlined in Chapter 3; 
and historical reflections on irregular warfare that make the chapter richer and help 
contextualise the behaviour of many combatants. Arguably, the originality of the research is 
underpinned by these tools, and in particular the thesis dataset which is based on data 
obtained through social media, much of which are no longer available due to the suspension 
of many ‘jihadi’ accounts by Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.232 The dataset represents 
between 12 and 19 percent of the overall cohort of Arab foreign fighters based on figures 
published by Malet (2015: 10).233 The data are not time specific (for example 2013-2014 in 
Dodwell et al., 2016a);234 group specific (for example Jabhat al-Nusrah in Lister, 2016); or 
action specific (for example ‘suicide attacks’ in C. Winter, 2017b). The bar for inclusion in 
the dataset was set at all non-Syrian Sunni Arab fighters who were (or continue to be) 
involved physically or ideologically235 in the Syrian insurgency and who were (or continue 
to be) aligned with a non-state armed group. Researching Sunni Arab fighters (as opposed 
to Western fighters) is largely predicated on the reality that ‘Arabs dominate the list of 
foreign jihadists … in Syria, and nine of the top ten countries represented are from the Arab 
world’ (Zelin, 2013b). 
 
The key findings in this chapter are firstly that the majority of Arab foreign fighters were 
not necessarily radicalised but went to Syria to participate in defensive jihad in response to 
the unequivocal Syrian regime violence against fellow Sunni co-religionists. Second, once 
in Syria, the study found that the majority of Arab foreign fighters were (and still are) 
                                                 
232 Examples of suspended accounts are www.facebook.com/Strangers.Sy1 and www.Shaghor.com. By 5 
February 2016, Twitter had ‘suspended over 125,000 accounts for threatening or promoting terrorist acts, 
primarily related to ISIS’ (https://blog.twitter.com/2016/combating-violent-extremism). 
233 Malet (2015: 10) estimated there were 10,000-16,000 foreign fighters (including non-Syrian Arabs) in 
Syria (2011-2015), while Schmid (2015: 3) determined there were 17,500 ‘from the Arab Middle East and 
North Africa’s Maghreb region.’ 
234 Dodwell et al. (2016a) analysed ‘over 4,600 unique Islamic State personnel’ (p. iv), and identified 4188 
foreign fighters (p. 3), of which 1841 were Arab foreign fighters (p. 9). 
235 Prominent Arab foreign fighters who are not in Syria but are ideologically involved include Egyptian al-
Qaeda chief, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Jordanian ideologue, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.  
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participating in defensive jihad, fighting in conventional battles against the Syrian Arab 
Army and other rebel combatants, rather than executing suicide attacks against civilians 
and non-combatants. The terrorist related activities perpetrated by armed non-state groups 
in Syria appear, in many instances, to be more consistent with genocide (defined later in the 
chapter) often involving brutal mass executions, as a result of exposure to ideological 
indoctrination and combat itself, with parallels in military history to the 1968 My Lai 
massacre. Many of the Arab foreign fighter excesses in Syria may be understood from 
situational and obedience perspectives that appear broadly consistent with earlier research 
findings based on psychology, including those by Arendt (1994), Milgram (1963), 
Zimbardo (1971), and Staub (1989). 
 
This chapter is broken down into two component sections. First there is a brief overview of 
the Syrian insurgency, aware that it has been covered by many scholars including, but not 
limited to, Hegghammer (2013a), Zelin (2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c), Mironova, 
Mrie and Whitt (2014), Weiss and Hassan (2015), Neumann (2015), Gerges (2016), 
Dodwell et al. (2016a), and C. Winter (2017b). Next there is a short analysis of the broad 
‘setting events’ - age, geographic origin, and previous experience in defensive jihad and/or 
Islamist terrorism - in order to contextualise Arab foreign fighter initial involvement in 
defensive jihad in Syria. The first section therefore takes the readership up to a point of 
departure for the rest of the chapter, which is when Arab foreign fighters have arrived in 
Syria and joined a non-state armed group. The idea of researching individuals who have 
‘already arrived in Syria … and joined one of the fighting parties’ was first pioneered by 
Reed, Van Zuijdewin, and Bakker (2015), who identified that the three subsequent 
‘pathways’ for these individuals was ‘fighting, supporting terrorist activity, or leaving the 
jihadi group’ (p. 2). This chapter seeks to explain how and why some Arab foreign fighters 
subsequently opted for ‘supporting terrorist activity’ in Syria.   
 
Using this point of departure, the second section and the core of the chapter, explains why 
and how some Arab foreign fighters subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist 
related activities. It examines the targeting of groups such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and the cause of death of their fighters (as a result of 
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conventional combat or self-sacrificial attacks). For example, if an Arab foreign fighter was 
killed fighting against the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), this is broadly conceptualised as being 
in harmony with the notion of defensive jihad. However, if an Arab foreign fighter was 
killed whilst detonating an explosive vest amongst civilians and non-combatants, this is 
interpreted as a suicide attack and more consistent with Islamist terrorism. Further 
examples that may lie outside these conceptualisations are also covered. This section 
explores the genuine grievances against the al-Assad regime and more widely Shia 
Muslims, and the ‘different rationales in the ideology’ (Hegghammer, 2009a: 260) of the 
Arab foreign fighters to address those grievances. Finally, terrorist training, indoctrination, 
and socialisation within the groups in Syria are examined in order to further explore the 
trajectory between Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists. 
 
Terminology 
 
The Syrian insurgency has spawned and resurrected a Sunni Arab terminology that 
warrants a brief explanation, as the labels are present in much of the Sunni anti-Shia 
rhetoric.236 They include Alawite, nusairi, rafidah, murtadd, and taghoot. According to 
A.R. Taylor (1988: 78) Alawites are ‘a heterodox Shiite denomination,’ often considered 
‘remnants of a wave of Shi'ism which swept over the region a thousand years ago’ (Kaplan, 
1993). The term nusairi is defined as ‘a gnostic sect in Syria’ (Wehr, 1980: 970), and is 
more generally understood as a ‘derogatory term for Alawites’ (Rikab, 2015). In some 
English language Islamist magazines, the label is constructed as ‘nusairi Alawite.’237 Due 
to the many variations in spelling and for clarity, this chapter will use the labels nusairi and 
Alawite interchangeably.  
 
The next term rafidah is ‘a pejorative term’ (Maher, 2016a: xix), commonly used within the 
Syrian insurgency and refers to ‘dissenters, defectors, a Shiitic sect’ (Wehr, 1980: 349); in 
effect another term for Alawites. Its wide use is confirmed by its appearance 173 times in 
the Islamic State magazine Dabiq 13. The term murtadd refers to an ‘apostate’ (Wehr, 1980: 
                                                 
236 Chapters 1 and 3 briefly covered the roots of the Sunni-Shia divide (Gonzalez, 2009). These labels were 
initially introduced in Chapter 3 concerning their use by Ibn Taymiyya. 
237 For example, Abdullah al-Adaam (2012). Do Not Consult Anyone in Killing the Alawites. July 12, 2012. 
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334) within both Sunni and Shia Islam, and again its wide use is demonstrated by its 
appearance 59 times in the Islamic State magazine Dabiq 13. Finally, the label taghoot 
(plural tawagheet) is a Quranic term, defined as ‘an idol, tyrant, oppressor’ (Wehr, 1980: 
561), which is widely used by rebel groups in Syria to denote al-Assad and his regime 
(tawagheet). In political Islam it is understood to signify ‘the near enemy, meaning 
oppressive regimes in Muslim countries’ (Kepel and Milelli, 2008: 302), and was 
operationalised by Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj (1981) and Abdullah Azzam (1987).238 
The chief ideologue for ISIS, a Bahraini foreign fighter named Turki Binali, defines 
taghoot as a ‘despot ruler who assails the rulings of God’ (al-Tamimi, 2014). The 
widespread use of such derogatory and dehumanising terms underpins the deep seated 
sectarian hatreds held by the combatants on all sides of the Syrian insurgency.   
 
Background to the Syrian Insurgency 
 
The contemporary history of Syria includes ‘the arbitrary partition of the Arabic-speaking 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire by Britain and France after WW1’ (McHugo, 2015), and 
the creation of the modern Syrian state as a French mandate. British traveller Dame Freya 
Stark (1928 as cited in Pipes, 1990: 13) who travelled through Syria observed the absence 
of any ‘national feeling: it is all sects and hatreds and religions.’ This sectarian existence 
continued and arguably became more pronounced in 1970 when the al-Assad family came 
to power in a bloodless coup, led by Hafez al-Assad, father of the current President Bashar 
al-Assad. After the coup, Hafez al-Assad immediately increased Alawite dominance of the 
security and intelligence sectors to a near-monopoly (Hinnebusch, 2001: 65; Gerges, 2016: 
171) - resulting in a Shia Alawite minority (13 percent) presiding over a Sunni Muslim 
majority population of 73 percent.239 This arguably is a reverse of the situation in pre-2003 
Iraq, where as noted in Chapter 5, a Sunni Muslim minority (under Saddam Hussein) 
governed a Shia Muslim majority. 
                                                 
238 Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj, the ideologue behind the assassination of Egyptian President Muhammad 
Anwar as-Sadat and author of The Neglected Duty, wrote that ‘only the sword can remove the tawagheet, the 
idols of this world’ (Jansen, 1986: 6). Abdullah Azzam (1987) in Join the Caravan, also labelled Arab 
regimes as tawagheet (tyrants). 
239 US Central Intelligence Agency. (2014). The World Fact Book: Syria. The remaining 14 percent includes 
Christians, Druzes, and Jews. 
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The autocratic rule of Hafez al-Assad was challenged, particularly by Syrian Islamists in 
Hama in 1982, but was crushed when ‘the Syrian army massacred thousands of civilians’ 
(Rubin, 2002: 35).240 The next major challenge to the al-Assad dynasty (now controlled by 
Bashar al-Assad) was the Arab Spring,241 led by pro-democracy movements in March 2011, 
starting in the southern governorate of Daraa but quickly spreading to other parts of the 
country. According to Human Rights Watch (2012), the Syrian ‘security forces responded 
brutally, killing at least 3,500 protesters and arbitrarily detaining thousands, including 
children under age 18, holding most of them incommunicado and subjecting many to 
torture.’ The level of Syrian regime violence against Syrian civilians and non-combatants 
was noted at the United Nations, prompting a draft resolution (S/2014/348 dated 22 May 
2014), vetoed only by China and Russia, referring Syria to the International Criminal 
Court. It is this level of unequivocal violence directed against fellow Muslim civilians and 
non-combatants, that appears to provide the basis for the genuine grievances against the al-
Assad regime, resulting in ‘the largest foreign fighter mobilisation of Islamist foreign 
fighters in history’ (Hegghammer, 2015).  
 
The civilian and non-combatant fatalities in the Syrian conflict are enormous. The Syrian 
Network for Human Rights (2016) estimated that over the period March 2011 to November 
2016, Syrian government forces have been responsible for 188,729 civilian deaths,242 with 
ISIS responsible for 2,998 civilian deaths, (which represents 92.92 percent and 1.48 percent 
of civilian deaths, respectively). This is important and perhaps puts the conflict in context, 
while at the same time providing the basis for the genuine grievances of both Syrian Sunni 
Muslims and Sunni Arab foreign fighters. The Syrian Revolution Martyr Database (as of 7 
July 2016) identified 1,613 Syrian civilian deaths specifically due to a ‘gunshot from ISIS’ 
and 347 as a result of a ‘bombing or explosion by ISIS’ – a total of 1,960 Syrian civilian 
deaths as a result of ISIS violence. However, it is important to recognise that whilst Arab 
foreign fighters ‘have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, 
                                                 
240 A recently (2016) declassified US Defence Intelligence Agency (1982) report on Syria and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, estimates ‘the total casualties for the Hama incident probably number about 2,000’ (p. 7). 
241 Literature covering the Arab Spring includes, but is not limited to, Bradley (2012), Lin & Warren (2012), 
Wieland, (2012), and McMillan (2016). 
242 This represents 1.05 percent of the Syrian population (based on a population of 17,951,639) - estimated by 
the US Central Intelligence Agency. (2014). The World Fact Book: Syria. 
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including abductions, torture and summary killings … Syrian Government forces have been 
responsible for the majority of violations’ (Amnesty International, 2016: 4). This suggests 
that Arab foreign fighters are more generally engaged in defensive jihad against the al-
Assad regime, which has all the hallmarks of an insurgency: subversion, guerrilla warfare 
and terrorism.  
 
Analysis of the Data 
 
Setting Events - Overview 
 
As in the previous case study chapters, this chapter also leverages the notion of ‘setting 
events’ that ‘represent the context from which the individual comes’ (Taylor and Horgan, 
2006: 59). In order to portray the context of Arab foreign fighters, their age, geographic 
origin, and previous experience in defensive jihad and/or Islamist terrorism are studied. As 
highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5, the notion of age facilitates examination of the influence of 
biographic availability (McAdam, 1986)243 and ‘age-related vulnerabilities of community 
members’ (UNSC CTC, 2015b). The inclusion of geographic origin offers examination of 
the influence of state support and the sometimes complex nature and competing 
relationships states have with their citizens. Finally, examining the previous experience in 
defensive jihad and/or Islamist terrorism of Arab foreign fighters facilitates research on 
their later influence (as charismatic leaders and ideologues) on other Arab foreign fighters, 
and how that influence may have affected the subsequent trajectories of those newly arrived 
in Syria. 
 
Age of Arab Foreign Fighters in Syria 
 
Age wise, based on 185 Arab foreign fighters in Syria where data were available, they 
varied between 16 and 65-years-old with 44 percent of them 23-years-old or under. The 
average age was 26 and the median was 33. Again, these findings correlate fairly well with 
                                                 
243 Noted in Chapter 4 and 5, biographical availability refers to the ‘absence of personal constraints that may 
increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage, and family 
responsibilities’ (McAdam, 1986: 70). 
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Arab foreign fighters in Iraq (post 2003),244 the Afghan Arab cohort,245 and other reports on 
Arab foreign fighters in Syria (Dodwell et al., 2016a; Rosenblatt, 2016; Perlinger and 
Milton, 2016),246 although it does raise two points. First, the slightly higher average age of 
26 (compared to those Arab foreign fighters who fought in 1980s Afghanistan and Iraq) is 
probably due to the number of older Arab foreign fighters, many of whom are over 50 years 
old; indeed the thesis dataset reveals 22 veteran Afghan Arabs (see Appendix E, Table 2) 
who vary between 49 and 65-years-old.247 Second, even when removing the older cadre of 
Arab foreign fighters, the average age only lowers to 25-years-old. This suggests that their 
involvement in defensive jihad may be less due to the notions of vulnerability and 
indoctrination, and more due to the notion of personal agency248 (Hegghammer, 2013a), 
and making (what appears to them) rational decisions to engage in defensive jihad.  
 
The Geographic Origin of Arab Foreign Fighters in Syria 
 
A brief overview of the nationalities of Arab foreign fighters in Syria offers the opportunity 
to examine the broad social, political, and religious context from where the individuals 
originated. The geographic origin of Arab foreign fighters in Syria from the thesis dataset is 
presented in Figure 6.1.  
 
                                                 
244 Chapter 5 found that based on the available data of 283 Arab foreign fighters in Iraq, they varied between 
15 years and 54 years with 49 percent of them 23-years-old or under. The average age was 24; the median 28.  
245 Chapter 4 found that based on the available data of 102 Afghan Arabs, they varied between 11 years old 
and 65-years-old, with 51 percent of them 22-years-old or under. The average age was 23; the median 24. 
246 Dodwell et al. (2016a: 12) found ‘the average prospective fighter was 26-27-years-old;’ Rosenblatt (2016: 
7) found ‘the average age of a fighter … was approximately 26 or 27; and Perlinger and Milton (2016: 21) 
found the average age of 24-years-old. 
247 The veteran Afghan Arabs involved in the Syrian insurgency are an Algerian named Saif Areef (49-years-
old), and the al-Qaeda chief, Ayman al-Zawahiri (65-years-old). Both hold command level positions. 
248 ‘Agency refers to the belief that one can alter conditions or policies through collective action’ (Hellmich, 
2010: 75). 
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Figure 6.1: The geographic origin of Arab foreign fighters in Syria (n=1,930).  
 
Figure 6.1 shows the top three countries of origin being Saudi Arabia (28 percent), Libya 
(16 percent), and Tunisia (15 percent), a consistent finding mirrored three years ago by 
Zelin (2013a). At the other end of the scale, the Sultanate of Oman had only two nationals 
participating in defensive jihad in Syria. It also appears to suggest that there are very few 
Iraqi foreign fighters in Syria, arguably due to them being more focussed on the battles in 
Iraq, a finding supported by Todenhöfer (2016: 164).249 The thesis dataset compares well 
with the data presented by Dodwell et al. (2016a: 9), less for Palestinian foreign fighters. 
The thesis dataset identifies 75 Palestinians (not including seven Palestinian refugees living 
in Jordan) – whilst Dodwell et al. (2016a: 9) identify the presence of only 30. This 
discrepancy may be due to their report’s time frame (2013-2014) as the thesis dataset 
identifies 19 Palestinians as having entered Syria in 2012; and their report focussed only on 
ISIS, whereas the thesis dataset includes 13 Palestinians in Jabhat al-Nusrah, and five in the 
FSA.  
 
Saudi Arabia being the predominant country of origin250 was identified by other scholars 
(Zelin, 2014a; Dodwell et al., 2016a) and is perhaps best explained by the structural 
                                                 
249 It is also noteworthy that the thesis dataset only identifies 28 Syrian foreign fighters in Iraq, perhaps 
unsurprisingly suggesting that Syrian fighters are more focussed on their country. 
250 Per capita, the top three Arab countries were Libya (50 per capita); Jordan (30.1 per capita), and Tunisia 
(27.4 per capita). 
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influences within Saudi Arabian Wahhabi251 society, aware that ISIS rely heavily on the 
ideology of Muhammad Abdul Wahhab (al-Tamimi, 2014). First, Saudi Arabia appears to 
conform to the observation that some ‘national governments … [are] enabling foreign 
fighters to arrive on the battlefield … by providing material resources or turning a blind eye 
when recruits leave the country to fight’ in Syria (Duyvesteyn and Peters, 2015: 4). This 
may be understood within the context of Saudi / Iranian geo-strategic regional hostilities 
(Hokayem, 2014), generally predicated on Sunni / Shia rivalries. Toby Matthiesen (2015) 
who studies political Islam inside Saudi Arabia argued that the Saudi state considers itself 
“as the defender of the ‘Sunnis’ in the region” (p. 1), and that ‘Saudi recruits … are often 
motivated by a desire to contain Shiism and stem Iranian influence in the region – strategic 
objectives that Saudi media perpetuates ad infinitum’ (p. 7). Yet the Saudi position is 
arguably a contradiction: on the one hand they gave ‘open support for the Syrian revolution 
from the summer of 2011’ (Lacroix, 2014: 5), while on the other, in ‘early February 2014, 
the Saudi government issued a royal order declaring that any citizen who fights in conflicts 
abroad will face three to twenty years of jail’ (Zelin, 2014a). According to Obaid (2016), 
despite this royal order, Saudi Arabia’s ‘ultimate objective in Syria is to take on … al-
Assad and the Iran-created Shia militias, which are the source of as much, if not more, 
regional terror than ISIS and Al Qaeda.’ It is not known whether this royal order is 
enforced, although in July 2015 the Saudi Ministry of Interior arrested three Saudis who 
were linked to the bombing (in June 2015) of a Shia mosque in Kuwait (Al-Jazeera, 
2015b); and also arrested ‘431 people suspected of belonging to ISIL cells’ (Al-Jazeera, 
2015c).  
 
The second point why Saudi Arabia appears to be the predominant country of origin of 
Arab foreign fighters is that Saudi ‘Islamic scholars do wield a considerable amount of 
power in the political system’ (Matthiesen, 2015: 1). An example of this power is 
demonstrated in a 2013 statement (Al-Moslim.net, 2013) by 72 prominent Saudi shaykhs 
                                                 
251 Two interpretations of wahhabism are (1) ‘a puritanical form of Islam virtually synonymous with Salafism’ 
(Moghadam, 2011: 122); and (2) ‘a particularly puritanical, bland, ultra-orthodox and forbidding 
interpretation of Islam concerned with … notions of moral corruption and the need for purity’ (Denoeux, 
2011: 59). 
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supporting the need for defensive jihad in Syria and the creation of the Islamic Front.252 Of 
particular influence is Saudi Shaykh Abdullah al-Muhaysani, who in September 2015 gave 
a speech in Idlib (Syria), uploaded to YouTube, emphatically declaring that the defensive 
jihad in Syria is an existential battle ‘between the Sunnah and the Nusayri Alawites and the 
rafidah’ (al-Muhaysani, 2015). Thus, despite the Saudi regime’s belated opposition to 
Saudi nationals participating in defensive jihad in Syria, Saudi clerical backing 253  for 
involvement in the Syrian jihad had ‘huge support amongst the Saudi population, and was 
seen as a just uprising against a dictatorial ... Shiite Alawite regime’ (Matthiesen, 2015: 6).  
 
Third, some areas of Saudi Arabia embrace political Islam more than others. For example 
according to Hegghammer (2010b: 121), the central Najd region consisting of Riyadh, al-
Qaseem, and Ha’il, is considered ‘the heartland of the Saudi Islamist landscape.’ It is 
perhaps therefore no surprise that 23 percent (121) of the 531 identified Saudi foreign 
fighters in Syria originated from the Nejd region, including Shaykh Abdullah al-Muhaysani. 
Even historically, 22 percent (31) of the original 139 Saudi detainees in Guantanamo Bay 
prison originated from the Nejd region (Warren, 2012). The significance of a region is not 
suggesting a cause-effect relationship, but rather that individuals due to their geographic 
origin, may be more pre-disposed to Islamist activities, that include participating in 
defensive jihad.  
 
Veteran Arab Foreign Fighters and Islamist Terrorists 
 
The last ‘essentially past contextual influence’ (Taylor and Horgan, 2006: 592), namely 
previous experience as an Arab foreign fighter and/or Islamist terrorist, is arguably of great 
significance. According to Ahmed, Comerford, and El-Badawy (2016: 5), ‘relationships 
formed as far back as Afghanistan in 1979 directly influence the brutality we see in Syria.’ 
Noting from Chapter 4 that many veteran Afghan Arabs remained involved in defensive 
                                                 
252 The Islamic Front was formed on 22 November 2013, consisting of Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Sham, the 
Tawhid Brigade, the Haq Brigade, Ansar al-Sham, the Islam Army, and the Kurdish Islamic Front (Lund, 
2014).  
253 Other clerics that have great influence in Saudi Arabia include Egyptian Yusuf al-Qaradawi (based in 
Qatar) who decreed that ‘anyone who has the ability, who is trained to fight … has to go; I call on Muslims to 
support their brothers in Syria’ (Zelin, 2014a). 
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jihad (such as in Bosnia or Chechnya), one might reasonably expect to see a plethora of 
individuals in Syria with similar background experiences. This however is not the case, 
with only 3.8 percent (74) identified from the dataset254 – nevertheless their influence and 
impact appears to be a more qualitative not quantitative issue. The thesis dataset compares 
moderately favourably with the study conducted by Dodwell et al. (2016a), who found that 
about 7.1 percent ‘had previously engaged in jihad’ (p. 27).255 The thesis dataset breakdown 
of prior experience of defensive jihad by Arab foreign fighters in Syria is presented in 
Figure 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Prior experience of defensive jihad of Arab foreign fighters in Syria (n=74) 
 
Whilst there is a general convergence between the thesis findings and those of Dodwell et 
al. (2016a) - particularly the prominence of defensive jihad in Libya256 and Afghanistan 
(post 2001) - the strong showing of veteran Arab foreign fighters from the defensive jihad 
in Iraq (post 2003) found in the thesis dataset (see Appendix E, Table 3), is entirely absent 
from their findings. Regardless of Arab nationality, from the perspective of geographical 
                                                 
254 Many of these individuals had participated in multiple defensive jihads. The 74 identified had participated 
in 81 defensive jihads. In addition to the major jihads in Figure 6.2, other locations included Somalia, Yemen, 
Gaza, and the Sinai Peninsula.  
255 This was calculated having removed those Arab foreign fighters who had included on their ‘Islamic State 
foreign fighter records’ participation in the defensive jihad in Syria. 
256 Involvement in the Libyan jihad (which was supported by NATO) was not exclusive to Libyan fighters. 
The thesis dataset also reveals the presence of two Egyptian (Ahmad al-Barra and Walid Badr) and one 
Palestinian foreign fighter (Osama Kishta).   
0
5
10
15
20
25
Afghan Arab Bosnia Chechnya Afghanistan Iraq Libya
 159 
proximity (between Iraq and Syria), and ideological synergy (AQI and ISI are forefathers of 
the Islamic State), arguably such a gap has the potential to skew the findings and analysis 
of Dodwell et al. (2016a). In addition, there have been copious reports linking involvement 
in the Iraqi jihad to the emergence of the Islamic State (Weiss and Hassan, 2015; Gerges, 
2016: 50; Ahmed et al.; 2016: 19), and indeed former UK Prime Minister Blair went on 
record admitting that ‘you can't say that those of us who removed Saddam in 2003 bear no 
responsibility for the situation’ in Syria (Blair, 2015). Particularly prominent and influential 
veterans of the Iraqi jihad include Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (overall leader of IS); Abdul 
Rahman al-Qaduli (deceased, deputy leader of IS); Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (deceased, 
former Emir of IS in Syria and director of external operations); Abu Muhammad al-Gholani 
(leader of Jabhat al-Nusrah); Hashim al-Shaykh (current 2016 leader of Ahrar al-Shaam); 
and Abu Hammam al-Suri (deceased, former leader of military wing of Jabhat al-Nusrah). 
The positions of authority and overall influence of these Iraqi jihad veterans on the 
direction of the Syrian jihad (including ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah), are self-evident.  
 
A further important observation to make is that many of the groups in Syria were founded 
by veteran Arab foreign fighters and formed largely on their geographic (national) origins. 
Examples would be Kateebat al-Battar and Jaysh Muhammad fee Balad ash-Shaam 
established by Libyan foreign fighters;257 and Harakat Shaam al-Islam established by three 
Moroccan foreign fighters from the defensive jihad in Afghanistan (post 2001).258 Thus 
although small in number (only 3.8 percent of the thesis dataset), veteran Arab foreign 
fighters arguably had a disproportionate influence over the Syrian insurgency.  
 
Overlaps notwithstanding between veteran Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists, it is 
also important to identify the presence and influence of veteran Islamist terrorists (35) 
                                                 
257 The thesis dataset reveals Muhammad al-Qab (https://www.facebook.com/Strangers.sy4 posted 29 October 
2013); Husaam al-Shataywi (Convoy of Martyrs); Abdul Qadir al-Misrati 
(http://documents.sy/image.php?id=2443&lang=en posted 28 July 2013); Abu Ibrahim al-Libi, Abu Dharr, 
and Mu’aweeya al-Libi (Zaman al-Wasl, March 8, 2016) were involved in the Libyan jihad to overthrow the 
Gaddafi regime in 2011. 
258 They were Ibrahim Shakaran, Muhammad Ahmad Mazouz, and Muhammad Sulayman al-Alami, who 
incidentally, were also former detainees at Guantanamo Bay prison. Other Arab and non-Arab groups with 
national identities include Jund ash-Shaam and Fatah al-Islam (Lebanese); Jaysh al-Muhajjireen wa- Ansar 
(Chechens); Kateebat Tawhid wa Jihad (Uzbeks); and Crimean Jamaat (Russian and Crimean Tartars).   
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within the Syrian conflict, mostly those linked with al-Qaeda (19) and HAMAS (7).259 
According to Ahmed et al. (2016: 5), the ‘leaders of Jabhat al-Nusrah and ISIS today can be 
linked through personal contacts over generations to the forefathers of global jihad [Islamist 
terrorism].’ The overlaps include 18 Islamist terrorists who were also veteran Arab foreign 
fighters from previous conflicts, supporting the argument that many Arab foreign fighters 
do eventually become involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. Notable veteran 
Islamist terrorists involved in the Syrian insurgency include Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of 
al-Qaeda, linked to Jabhat al-Nusrah until July 2016); Abu Firas al-Suri (deceased, former 
al-Qaeda Shura council member and spokesman for Jabhat al-Nusrah); Abu Khalid al-Suri 
(deceased, former al-Qaeda member and former leader of Ahrar al-Shaam in Aleppo); and 
Muhammad Haydar Zammar - the Syrian al-Qaeda ‘source of inspiration’ for the 9/11 
pilots (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005: 164), who joined ISIS in Raqqah.  
 
Again, the point to be made is that veteran Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists 
appear to have had a disproportionate influence over the Syrian conflict. According to 
Ahmed et al. (2016), while the majority of Arab foreign fighters were inexperienced with 
no prior experience of defensive jihad or Islamist terrorism, once in Syria ‘on the battlefield, 
jihadi novices are being introduced to seasoned veterans’ (p. 9) in the form of ‘an ideologue 
or a top-level operative’ (p. 29). Whilst perhaps unsurprising, it does lend a degree of 
credence to the existence of charismatic leaders and ideologues, and their influence through 
indoctrination on those arriving in Syria, which is covered later in the chapter.  
 
Debunking the Myth of Radicalised Arab Foreign Fighters 
 
This section of the chapter continues to make the case that the majority of Arab foreign 
fighters who travelled to Syria were not necessarily radicalised260 prior to their decision to 
participate in defensive jihad. It is often implicit in the scholarly literature on Arab foreign 
fighters in Syria, that individuals who depart their country of residence in order to 
                                                 
259 The remaining nine belonged to either EIJ, EIG, Fatah al-Islam, LIFG, and/or MIFG. 
260 From Chapter 1, radicalisation was defined as the ‘social and psychological process of incrementally 
experienced commitment to [an] extremist political or religious ideology’ (Horgan, 2009: 152), that may 
eventually cross a threshold that leads to violence. 
 161 
participate in defensive jihad in defence of their co-religionists, are somehow already 
radicalised and/or already Islamist terrorists (Nilsson, 2015; Dodwell et al., 2016a: 10; 
Borum, 2016).261 Berger and Stern (2015) go further to suggest that ISIS ‘sought recruits 
… who were further down the path toward ideological radicalization or more inclined by 
personal disposition toward violence;’ a position not supported by P. Engel (2015).262 Even 
at the international level, the ‘Arab foreign fighters’ in the thesis dataset are labelled by the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC CTC, 2015a) as ‘foreign terrorist fighters.’ Those 
who do recognise that not all foreign fighters in Syria are radicalised, include Hegghammer 
(2013a), Cafarella (2014: 9), and the EU's Director of Justice and Home Affairs, Gilles de 
Kerchove (2013).263 
 
This idea that Arab foreign fighters are somehow already radicalised (based on their 
international volunteerism), whilst compelling, is not persuasive. Nathan Patin (2015), an 
investigative journalist, researched the motivations of 108 foreign fighters in Syria. Citing 
the exact words of the foreign fighters themselves, the circumstances supporting their 
personal (not group) involvement included:  
 
‘the killing of innocent people that couldn’t even defend themselves’ (p. 21); 
‘religion is a major one’ (p. 23); ‘I’m going to have an adventure’ (p. 26); ‘to fight 
on my terms against an enemy I know is evil … it is redemption, in a sense’ (p. 29); 
and ‘governments weren’t doing [anything] about it - by God we will’ (p. 30).  
 
The circumstances highlighted above appear to lack the notion of radicalisation and perhaps 
more accurately demonstrate a certain compassion towards victims, a mild religious fervour 
to act, and the need of many young men – that of adventure and excitement. What is 
particularly striking about the study conducted by Patin (2015), is that it was actually 
                                                 
261 It is important to recognise that many Arab foreign fighters went to Syria and joined a group, often based 
on their geographic origin, only to later join groups such as Jabhat al-Nusrah or ISIS.  
262 P. Engel (2015) analysed an AQ guide, A Course in the Art of Recruiting, written by Abu Amry al-Qa’idy 
in 2010. She noted that ‘ISIS recruiters seem to follow many of the same basic guidelines [as al-Qaeda] for 
luring people into their group.’    
263 The EU's Director of Justice and Home Affairs, Gilles de Kerchove (2013), told the BBC on 24 April 2013, 
that ‘not all of them are radical when they leave, but most likely many of them will be radicalised there.’ 
 162 
investigating ‘American volunteers travelling to Iraq and Syria to fight against the Islamic 
State’ (p. 1), not alongside the Islamic State. Interestingly, in a separate study conducted by 
El-Badawy, Comerford, and Welby (2015: 5), Inside the Jihadi Mind, the ‘system of ideas’ 
that attracted recruits to ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah (and AQAP), broadly mirrored the study 
by Patin (2015), and included the influence of ‘creedal values,’ ‘the enemy,’ ‘nobility of 
jihad,’ and ‘allies of God.’ The synergy between the two reports is striking and their 
findings have an uncanny resemblance, yet the subjects of research were complete 
opposites. Therefore, were the Americans fighting against ISIS also ‘foreign terrorist 
fighters’ and are they also assumed to be radicalised? The conclusion by Patin (2015) was 
that the American foreign fighters were motivated by ‘a sense that something needed to be 
done in the face of IS’s continuing barbarity,’ arguably the same inspiration as Arab foreign 
fighters ‘in the face of al-Assad’s continuing barbarity.’ This suggests perhaps more the 
presence of rationality, rather than radicalisation. 
 
By 2014, it appeared that US policy “chose to stand by those advocating ‘jihad only in 
Syria’ and against the regional and global jihadist trend represented by ISIS” (Ballout, 
2014). This implicitly acknowledged that defensive jihad (against the al-Assad regime or 
the Islamic State) was now somehow different from global Islamist terrorism. Perhaps it 
signalled an embryonic awareness and realisation of the distinction between Arab foreign 
fighters and Islamist terrorists, going back to the 1980s. This drawing of distinctions was 
further demonstrated by the use of the term ‘moderate’ in statements made by the US White 
House and Department of State, in relation to those forces opposing al-Assad’s regime and 
the Islamic State. Such terms include ‘moderate opposition forces’ (Obama, 2016) and 
‘moderate groups’ (Kerry, 2016a), however what is meant by ‘moderate groups’? Are they 
‘un-radicalised’ fighters and followers of ‘moderate Islam’? Certainly, according to Safadi 
(2015), it is ‘virtually impossible to bracket these fighters into distinct moderate or non-
moderate categories.’ The point to be made is that, by painting every Arab foreign fighter 
with the label of being ‘radicalised’ or ‘moderate,’ it is not helpful in trying to gain a 
nuanced understanding of their motivations and circumstances. The actions of the few 
should not define them all. 
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Finally, it is instructive that the US Treasury Department issued a waiver authorising the 
provision of logistical and financial support to the FSA (L. Rosen, 2012). This presupposes 
that the FSA are considered a moderate conglomeration of opposition groups in Syria, 
despite their loose alliances and shifting allegiances. Yet the thesis dataset identifies 126 
Arab foreign fighters within the FSA, arguably resulting in them being supported by the US 
Treasury Department whilst at the same time being labelled ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ by 
the United Nations Security Council. Arguably more worrying is that the thesis dataset also 
reveals that 10 out of the 126 Arab foreign fighters in the FSA conducted self-sacrificial 
attacks (martyrdom operations) against SAA units;264 attacks that would be labelled by 
most governments and academics, as ‘terrorist attacks.’265 This leads to the contradiction of 
being both supported by the US, whilst also being labelled ‘suicide bombers.’ This 
inconsistency appears to demonstrate an overall misunderstanding and misrepresentation of 
many Arab foreign fighters in Syria, and their modus operandi. Therefore, whilst it is 
impossible to prove definitively that the majority of Arab foreign fighters were not 
necessarily radicalised based on their decision to travel to Syria, there is little convincing 
empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. However, the absence of evidence is not evidence 
of absence. That said, having arrived in Syria, it is accepted that some ‘will become 
radicalised as they spend time in the trenches’ (Hegghammer, 2013a) – in the crucible of 
defensive jihad.  
 
The Radicalisation of Arab Foreign Fighters in Syria: How and Why? 
 
Introduction 
 
The notion of becoming radicalised as a result of ‘time spent in the trenches’ in Syria has 
some academic and governmental support. Academically, the three broad strands put 
                                                 
264 The martyrdom operations included attacks against Syrian Army checkpoints ‘Panorama,’ ‘Wadi Elbow,’ 
Barrier 68, and ‘Tumeah;’ Nabq military intelligence building, and Mingh airbase. 
265 For example, on 23 December 2011, an Iraqi Arab foreign fighter conducted a martyrdom operation 
against the Military Intelligence building in Damascus. The UN Security Council (SC/10506 dated 23 
December 2011) denounced the attacks as ‘terrorist attacks.’ Additionally, Agence France Presse (23 
December 2011); The Daily Beast (4 January 2012); and Jerusalem Post (25 December 2011) also labelled 
the attack a ‘suicide attack’ (cited under CPOST Attack ID 377522234). 
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forward by scholars appear to be situational, social, and ideological. These strands are not 
individually distinct, but overlap with each other, and are also not in ‘a process of linear, 
discrete progression’ (Horgan, 2009: 140). The situational aspect of personal involvement 
on the battlefields in Syria includes the duration and intensity of combat, as well as the 
‘comradeship ties’ developed between individuals. Scholars who leverage this theory 
include Mironova et al. (2014: 15) who claim that ‘individuals … become more radical 
over time;’ Barrett (2014: 7) who argued that ‘all of them will have been exposed to an 
environment of sustained radicalization and violence;’ while Reed et al. (2015: 5) 
suggested a ‘radicalising effect of fighting abroad.’ The theory of socialisation within the 
ranks of the various rebel groups is advanced by Ahmed et al. (2016: 9), who suggested that 
‘on the battlefield, jihadi novices are being introduced to seasoned veterans.’ Finally, the 
ideological aspect of radicalisation in Syria is proposed by Borum and Fein (2016: 10), who 
champion the ‘incubation of a terrorist ethos’ – which Zelin (2014b: 29) conceptualises as 
‘the radicalization … into Salafism.’ These rather broad academic explanations all have 
their merits, and are explored and tested later in the chapter.  
 
At governmental level, former NCTC Deputy Director Nicholas Rasmussen (2014) noted 
that foreign fighters ‘may eventually return to their home countries battle-hardened [and] 
radicalized’ - implying perhaps that their radicalisation occurred in Syria (and not in their 
home countries). Rob Bertholee (2013: 4), a former head of the Dutch General Intelligence 
and Security Service (AIVD), also reported that ‘numerous foreign fighters … are trained, 
traumatised or radicalised … having travelled to Syria;’ while the British Security Service 
(MI5) (2016a) website acknowledged that ‘experience of fighting overseas with terrorist 
groups can also promote radicalisation.’ Thus at governmental level, there appears to be 
broad acknowledgement that the radicalisation of many foreign fighters maybe forged in 
the crucible of defensive jihad in Syria.  
 
Research conducted for this chapter suggests that the theoretical framework which is 
underpinned by the concept of radicalisation appeared to struggle to explain why some 
Arab foreign fighters having arrived in Syria, subsequently embraced Islamist terrorist 
related activities. As noted in Chapter 2, conventional radicalisation theories tend to assume 
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a home-grown gradual process within a Western (peacetime) environment often involving a 
‘bunch of guys’ (Sageman, 2008: 87), rather than within an insurgency such as Syria, 
involving foreign fighters. That said, while there is no single factor or circumstance to 
explain why some Arab foreign fighters in Syria subsequently became (and continue to 
become) involved in Islamist terrorist related activities, it is suggested that grievances, 
ideology, and training (that includes indoctrination) do have explanatory value. However, 
these are not discreet circumstances, for example grievances and ideology are nestled 
together due to their essential interconnectedness (Neumann, 2011), while ideology and 
training both involve elements of indoctrination. 
  
Grievances and Ideology 
 
Using a reduced dataset of 305 Arab foreign fighters where their grievances and ideology 
may be inferred, this section explores these circumstances in order to help explain why 
some of them subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. Whilst 
this thesis broadly agrees that ‘ISIS is a creature of accumulated grievances [and] 
ideological and social polarization’ (Gerges, 2014: 343), identifying their content and 
impact is central to the chapter. With the increased access to, and granularity of, data on 
Arab foreign fighters in Syria, it is now possible to analyse them by identifying their 
respective groups (FSA, ISIS, or Jabhat al-Nusrah); their adopted method of attack 
(conventional or self-sacrificial); their intended target (military or civilian / non-combatant); 
and their cause of death (fighting the SAA, internecine warfare, terrorism, or coalition 
bombing). Using this empirical data, inferences may be made concerning the cause of their 
grievances, and the group and individual ideology that supported the method of attack 
against a particular target (Drake, 1998: 54).  
 
An interesting and evidence based finding of the cause of death of Arab foreign fighters 
within rebel groups in Syria, is presented in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3: Cause of death of Arab foreign fighters within rebel groups in Syria (n=305). 
 
Figure 6.3 offers some inferences that demonstrate that the primacy of grievances held by 
Arab foreign fighters is against the SAA - grievances that include support for the ideology 
of takfir against all ‘nusairi Alawites’; the tactic of self-sacrificial attacks primarily 
targeting the SAA; and the dearth of recorded suicide attacks that targeted civilians and 
non-combatants. Thus, despite the UN listing of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah as terrorist 
organisations, 266  the evidence suggests that their actual modus operandi has little in 
common with the ‘revised academic consensus definition of terrorism’ compiled by Alex 
Schmid (2013a: 86), in that they are often not ‘targeting mainly civilians and non-
combatants.’ Arguably, it is the ISIS modus operandi in the West (inspired and actual) 
rather than in Syria, that is often more visible and terroristic in nature, particularly the 
attacks in Paris, Brussels, and Nice.267 In Syria, the terroristic nature of ISIS and Jabhat al-
Nusrah may be better understood by examining their genocidal atrocities against civilians 
and non-combatants off, rather than on, the battlefield.  
 
                                                 
266 The ISIS was designated a terrorist organisation on 13 December 2011, 30 May 2013, 14 May 2014, and 2 
June 2014 under the UN 1267 Sanctions List (20 June 2016), p. 53. Jabhat al-Nusrah was designated a 
terrorist organisation on 14 May 2014 under the UN 1267 Sanctions List (20 June 2016), p. 50. 
267 The Paris terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015, killed 130 civilians; the Brussels terrorist attacks on 22 
March 2016, killed 35 civilians; and the Nice terrorist attack on 14 July 2016, killed 84 civilians. 
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Grievances 
 
The primacy of grievances against the al-Assad regime and the resultant ideology of takfir 
against all nusairi Alawites, appears to underpin much of the modus operandi of all three 
major non-state groupings (FSA, ISIS, and Jabhat al-Nusrah). The vast majority of rebel 
fighters are engaged in an insurgency against forces aligned with al-Assad (the SAA, 
Iranian militias, Lebanese Hezbollah), and also in internecine battles between rebel groups. 
The grievances or ‘diagnostic framing’ (Benford and Snow, 2000)268 against the al-Assad 
regime arguably are more genuine than perceived - there are well documented cases of 
Syrian regime extra-judicial killings, detainee abuses, and the widespread use of barrel 
bombings on civilian areas. One investigation conducted by the UN Commission of Inquiry 
on Syria concluded that: 
 
‘Syrian Government forces … have committed crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and gross human rights violations. These crimes included murder, summary 
execution, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual violence, violations of 
children’s rights, pillaging and destruction of civilian objects - including hospitals 
and schools’ (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2012).  
 
As noted earlier in the chapter, confronting these genuine unequivocal grievances against 
the al-Assad regime appears to have been the major motivation for many Arab foreign 
fighters to get involved in defensive jihad in Syria. The ISIS magazine Dabiq is replete with 
grievances against the al-Assad (‘nusairi’) regime, offering graphic images as evidence.269  
 
It appears that having physically witnessed (as outlined above) the ‘crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and gross human rights violations’ (UNHR, 2012), Arab foreign 
fighters began to seek revenge for these grievances. It is instructive to note that a later 
                                                 
268 Covered in Chapter 5, embedded within diagnostic framing is the concept of ‘injustice frames’ that are 
‘generated and adopted by those who come to define the actions of an authority as unjust’ (Bedford and Snow, 
2000: 615). 
269 For example, Dabiq Issue 1, pp. 42-43, includes an incident when ‘the Nusayri regime carried out an 
airstrike in Ar-Raqqah resulting in … all of them being civilian casualties.’ 
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report commissioned by the UNHR (2016), revealed that although cases of ‘torture and 
other ill-treatment by armed opposition groups occurred in isolated incidents in the early 
phase of the conflict … this phenomenon appears to be on the rise.’ It is suggested that this 
increase in torture and ill-treatment by rebel groups was in part, driven by the need to 
reciprocate in kind. The notion of revenge is firmly established in the Quran (Ash-Shuraa 
42: 40),270 and its link to terrorism is well documented in the literature (Richardson, 2007; 
Hafez, 2007b: 44; Moghadam, 2011: 230; Silke, 2008: 113).271 To further contextualise the 
idea of revenge, it can also be found in conventional wars fought between national standing 
armies of participating states; for example a former Alsatian Wehrmacht soldier on the 
Russian front in WWII, concluded that ‘war always reaches the depths of horror because of 
idiots who perpetuate terror … under the pretext of vengeance’ (Sajer, 1971: 119). Such 
contextualisation may help explain the cycles of increasing violence between both Arab 
foreign fighters and forces aligned to the al-Assad regime, while also suggesting the 
existence of vengeance within radicalisation processes. 
 
Lastly, the apparent willingness of some Arab foreign fighters in Syria to participate in 
atrocities may be as a result of situational factors - an explanation supported in the 
scholarly literature and discussed earlier. Arendt (1994) established that ‘a rather ordinary 
individual could find himself in a situation in which he could become responsible for the 
cold-blooded murders of large numbers of people. The situation thus drove evil behaviour’ 
(as cited in Sternberg, 2003: 301). This explanation was subsequently reinforced by 
Zimbardo (2007: 8) who concluded that an individual’s action can be ‘traced to factors 
outside the actor, to situational variables and environmental processes unique to a given 
setting.’ To contextualise this within an insurgency, Fitzroy Maclean who fought alongside 
Tito’s Partisans in Yugoslavia in WWII, observed that the impact of the unrestrained 
violence, shaped the character and behaviour of the fighters (Maclean, 1950: 340). In these 
circumstances, the context and situation in which grievances are experienced appear to 
influence the behaviour of individuals, to the degree that they may subsequently commit 
atrocities. With the situation of the largely uncontained violence in the Syrian insurgency, it 
                                                 
270 See Appendix A. 
271 In Arabic, the term qisaas translates to ‘reprisal, retaliation’ (Wehr, 1980: 766). 
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is likely that the role of grievances, real and perceived, contribute to some Arab foreign 
fighters moving further along the continuum to Islamist terrorism. One of the missing 
pieces appears to include ideology, insomuch as ‘without ideology, grievances are not acted 
upon’ (Neumann, 2011).  
 
The Ideology of Arab Foreign Fighters in Syria 
 
Before discussing the ideology of Arab foreign fighters in Syria, it is worth briefly touching 
on the ideologues and scholars who promote the ideology. According to Wiktorowicz 
(2005b: 25) ‘the reputation of scholars is critical in persuasion: Muslims need to trust the 
reliability of the interpreter to accept the reliability of the interpretation.’ It is suggested, as 
with Osama bin Laden who lived amongst the Arab foreign fighters in Afghanistan, that the 
credibility of ideologues is predicated on the shared experiences of combat and danger in 
Syria. The main ideologues who are based in Syria include, but are not limited to, a 
Bahraini named Turki Binali (ISIS), a Jordanian named Iyad al-Uraydi (Jabhat al-Nusrah), 
and a Saudi named Shaykh Abdullah al-Muhaysani (unaffiliated Islamist ideologue). It is 
instructive that Wagemakers (2016: 501) contends that in the Syrian insurgency, it is a 
‘question of who speaks for jihad: scholars with their theoretical knowledge of Islamic law, 
or fighters, with their practical knowledge of actual combat.’ This point was also echoed by 
Maher (2016a: 12), who noted that ‘fighters in the field are driven by a real-time, ad hoc 
form of jurisprudence that is borne of both the privations and exigencies of war.’ Touched 
on later in the chapter is the credibility of the ideologues (particularly between those inside 
and outside of Syria), and the role of ‘charismatic authority’ (Hofmann and Dawson, 2014), 
and ‘charismatic leadership’ (Eatwell, 2006; Galesic, 2016).  
 
According to Maclean (1950: 330), ‘in guerrilla war, ideas matter more than material 
resources,’ and within the insurgency in Syria, some scholars claim that the ideas and 
ideology of the Arab foreign fighters are underpinned by Salafi-jihadism (Zelin, 2014b; 
Gerges, 2016). Despite there being ‘no clear definition of jihadi Salafism’ (Hegghammer, 
2009b: 28), the label ‘has been employed by the Islamist actors themselves’ (Hegghammer, 
2009a: 252), thus debating its relevance in Syria does have merit. The concept of Salafi-
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jihadism (also referred to as jihadi-Salafism) within political Islam is understood to mean 
the ideology that supports ‘jihad … against Muslim rulers … whose conduct - particularly 
with regard to legislation - is not in accordance with Sharia law … [and] to defend the 
abode of Islam from invasions’ (Wagemakers, 2012: 63). Moghadam (2011: 100) expands 
this understanding of Salafi-jihadism by also including the intent of declaring ‘an Islamic 
state … on as large a territory as possible … [focussing] not only on local regimes in the 
Middle East … but also on the far enemy.’  
 
In the context of the insurgency in Syria, there appears to be little agreement over the 
underlying ideology of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah. Whilst Gerges (2016: 223) argues that 
‘Al-Qaeda and ISIS belong to the same family – Salafi-jihadism;’ Bunzel (2015: 7) 
contends that ‘Jihadi-Salafism is to a large degree what separates the Islamic State from al-
Qaeda today.’ The middle ground argued by H. Hassan (2016) is that ISIS’s ideology being 
‘traceable straight back to Salafism’ is an ‘illusion’ (p. 4); rather it is a ‘confluence of 
fundamentalist and revolutionary strands’ (p. 19). Perhaps it is a moot point – Salafism is 
broadly a ‘Sunni fundamentalist movement’ (Olidort, 2016: vii) and ‘the jihadi faction’ 
within Salafism ‘calls for violence and revolution’ (Wiktorowicz, 2006: 208). It is 
suggested that the overarching ideology of both ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah draws on Salafi-
jihadism, particularly according to Moghadam (2011), due to both groups’ emphasis on the 
ideology of takfir (p. 101); the justifications for targeting and killing of civilians and non-
combatants (p. 102); and the permissibility of suicide attacks (p. 103) - which are discussed 
in the next section. 
 
The Ideology Supporting Takfir in Syria  
 
The ideology of takfir against ‘nusairi Alawites’ arguably originated from the ‘extremist 
ideas brought to Iraq by al-Qaeda after 2003’ (H. Hassan, 2016: 9). Whilst Mironova et al. 
(2014: 16) suggest that in Syria ‘Islamist group leaders appear to be better at using religion 
to channel collective sectarian grievances,’ arguably it is not the religion of Islam per se, 
but political Islam. Gerges (2016: 292) succinctly argued that the operationalisation of 
takfir is as a result of ‘the instrumentalization of religion for political purposes.’ This 
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appears a more accurate portrayal, and one that has broad academic support (Hamid, 2014; 
Wood, 2015; Dodwell et al., 2016a: 32). Evidence from the thesis dataset and from Figure 
6.3, supports the centrality of takfir against Alawite soldiers, and other Sunnis who warrant 
being labelled a kufr (particularly other Sunni rebel groups). This takfiri ideology has led to 
‘the largest religious cleansing strategy that has ever been planned in human history’ 
(Todenhöfer, 2014).  
 
It is instructive that Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who is considered ‘one of the most 
important ideologues of Jihadi-Salafism’ (Hegghammer, 2009a: 255), and once ‘the true 
spiritual father of the Islamic State’ (H. Hassan, 2016: 7), is now labelled a ‘donkey of 
knowledge’ by the Islamic State in their magazine Dabiq 10 (p. 58). This was in large part 
due to al-Maqdisi ‘denouncing the Islamic State upon rumours of excess in violence and 
takfir’ (Bunzel, 2015: 11). In a fatwa, al-Maqdisi (2014) labelled ISIS ‘a deviant 
organisation from the path of truth … which leans towards extremism (ghuluw) … and who 
have become embroiled in the unlawful spilling of blood;’ a position he reaffirmed in June 
2015 (al-Maqdisi, 2015). In essence al-Maqdisi, whilst supportive of takfir against the 
‘Alawite regime,’ believes the ideology of takfir against other Sunni groups (particularly 
Jabhat al-Nusrah) to be wrong. It is however revealing that whilst labelling al-Maqdisi a 
‘donkey of knowledge,’ a dispute had already ‘emerged among senior theorists within the 
Islamic State over the practice of takfir,’ leading to the arrest of some Arab foreign fighters 
(Ali, 2014).272 This lack of overall ideological cohesion appears to have led to varying 
shades of takfir with ISIS - creating what H. Hassan (2016: 1) labels ‘a culture of takfirism 
within takfirism.’  
 
The Ideology Supporting the Tactic of Self-Sacrificial Attacks in Syria  
 
The ideology supporting the tactic of self-sacrificial attacks in Syria first needs to be put 
into context. According to Kenneth Pollack (2004: 573), who conducted an assessment of 
the strengths and weaknesses of conventional Arab militaries, ‘the majority of Arab 
                                                 
272 The arrested Arab foreign fighters included Abu Musab al-Tunisi, Abu Asid al-Maghrabi, Abu al-Hawra 
al-Jazari, and Abu Abdullah al-Maghrabi, who were charged with excessive takfir accusations. 
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military personnel demonstrated impressive degrees of self-sacrifice and personal bravery.’ 
This suggests that the notion of sacrifice and martyrdom in battle fee sabeel Allah is not an 
aberration in the Arab world. The parallel to be drawn is that these Arab militaries were in 
combat against other conventional militaries (either Iranian or Israeli), in the same way that 
the FSA, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah are against the SAA. This section makes the argument 
that the employment of self-sacrificial attacks by Arab foreign fighters against the SAA (or 
other rebel combatants) is ideologically more akin to a martyrdom (istishhaad) operation, 
rather than to a suicide (intihaar) attack. It continues to develop the argument in Chapter 5 
that in Iraq (post 2003), Arab foreign fighters conducted martyrdom operations against 
military occupation forces under the auspices of a defensive jihad; while Islamist terrorists 
conducted suicide attacks against civilians and non-combatants under the auspices of 
Islamist terrorism. It is also instructive that in the Syrian conflict, the term inghimasi (a 
self-sacrificial tactic explained in detail below) has resurfaced within political Islam, 
perhaps to support and reinforce the legitimacy of self-sacrificial attacks. Aware that most 
self-sacrificial attacks (martyrdom, suicide, and inghimasi) in Syria appear to be conducted 
by foreigners (Reuter, 2015; Weiss and Hassan, 2015: 168; Dodwell et al., 2016a: 31; 
Gerges, 2016: 67), it is essential to disaggregate them in order to understand the nuances 
between them and their respective motivational ideologies.  
 
The ideological distinctions between ‘martyrdom operations’ and ‘suicide attacks’ 
conducted in Syria become apparent by using three approaches: targeting, lessons from 
historical military precedencies, and inghimasi operations. These three approaches 
reinforce the suggestion advanced by Fierke (2014: 198), that ‘the distinction between 
suicide and martyrdom is closely linked to the intention of the agent.’ 
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Targeting 
 
Using data extracted from the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) Suicide 
Attack Database, 273  it suggests that self-sacrificial attacks in Syria appear to target 
primarily Syrian military units, and not civilians and non-combatants. This is demonstrated 
in Figure 6.4.   
 
 
Figure 6.4: Targeting comparison for self-sacrificial attacks in Syria: 2012-2015 (n=168) 
 
The CPOST data from Figure 6.4 ostensibly reveal that 75 percent (125) of ‘suicide attacks’ 
were targeting the Syrian military, whilst only 25 percent (43) were classified as targeting 
civilians (and non-combatants). Yet closer examination using content analysis of 
supporting media articles reveals that although the ‘target’ may be documented by CPOST 
as ‘civilian,’ this often appears to have been inaccurate. Examples include an attack on the 
‘al-Kindi hospital’ that was not occupied by civilian staff or patients, but was occupied and 
being defended by the SAA,274 hence it was attacked. This analysis resulted in establishing 
that out of the 43 ‘suicide attacks’ listed by CPOST as attacks against ‘civilian’ targets, 
actually only 28 could reasonably be considered as suicide attacks targeting civilians and 
                                                 
273 As noted in Chapter 5, CPOST defines a suicide attack ‘as an attack in which an attacker kills himself or 
herself in a deliberate attempt to kill others.’  
274 CPOST Attack ID 147281505 (20 December 2013). 
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non-combatants,275 with the remaining 12 attacks being more consistent with defensive 
jihad, against combatant targets. The detailed analysis of CPOST attacks (2012-2015) is 
presented in Appendix F. This therefore means that out of the 168 self-sacrificial attacks in 
Syria, 82 percent (137) should be classified as martyrdom operations against military 
targets, and aligns the ideological motivation of most Arab foreign fighters to defensive 
jihad. It is instructive that C. Winter (2017b: 17), having researched 923 Islamic State 
suicide operations between 1 December 2015 and 30 November 2016, found that ‘84 
percent … were geared towards achieving military goals … [while] just 16 percent of the 
time, IS used suicide attacks to target civilians.’ This independent corroboration of the 
thesis findings suggests a more nuanced appraisal of self-sacrificial attacks in Syria. 
 
In their own words, Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists appear to offer conflicting 
views over the employment of self-sacrificial operations in Syria. For instance, according to 
Saudi foreign fighter, Ayachi Abdul Rahman (aka Abu Hajar), ‘killing the innocent along 
with the enemy is not acceptable. If my target is military and I knowingly kill even one 
innocent, this is terrorism’ (Shelton, 2013). Yet Iraqi foreign fighter, Ibrahim Ammar Ali 
al-Khazali, admitted that ‘it was about hitting as many people as possible – especially 
police officers, soldiers and Shiites … they are infidels’ (Reuter, 2015). Despite the 
vagueness in defining Shiites (which could reasonably include civilians and non-
combatants), it raises an interesting question whether ‘infidels’ are perceived as belonging 
to the category ‘civilians and non-combatants.’ Tentative evidence from Figures 6.3 and 6.4 
suggest otherwise - the targeting priority appears to be focussed on ‘infidel’ police officers 
and soldiers. In a separate interview al-Khazali admitted that whilst ‘most people who died 
were valid targets … those who were caught up in the attacks will be accepted by God’ 
(Chulov, 2015) – in other words collateral damage.  
 
The evidence that the majority of Arab foreign fighters targeted only SAA and other 
combatants raises three issues. First it reinforces the argument made by Moghadam (2011: 
5), that an attack should ‘not be labelled a terrorist attack if it is targeted against members 
                                                 
275 Out of an original total of 46 attacks, three of the attacks were duplicate entries and removed. That left 28 
attacks targeting civilians and on-combatants, 12 attacks against combatants, and three attacks with no clearly 
identifiable intended target. See Appendix F for detailed analysis. 
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of an army, because attacks are ordinarily labelled terrorist attacks when they are aimed at 
non-combatants’ – as discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. Second, it supports the personal view 
of Hegghammer (2013b), that maybe ‘the Syrian rebel cause is just and that some of the 
foreign fighters leave with noble intentions’ – normative arguments notwithstanding. Lastly, 
it challenges the view that ‘suicide attacks for the most part … rarely occur against truly 
military targets’ (Cook, 2002: 9), a position that now appears increasingly obsolete and 
unrepresentative of the realities on the battlefields in Syria.  
 
Historical Military Examples of Self-Sacrificial Attacks 
 
The use of self-sacrificial attacks against military targets is not unique to the Syrian 
insurgency. There are numerous historical military examples of ideologically supported 
self-sacrificial attacks, including Japanese kamikaze pilots in WWII, and Communist Viet 
Minh forces in the French-Indochina war. There has been some literature drawing analogies 
and similarities between Japanese kamikaze pilots and Islamist ‘suicide bombers’ (Sprinzak, 
2000; Israeli, 2003; Elster, 2005; Pape, 2005; C. Winter, 2017b), notwithstanding kamikaze 
pilots ‘were acting on behest of a state at war’ (Moghadam, 2011: 5). However, in Syria 
(and Iraq), it could be argued that ISIS are ‘acting on behest of a state at war.’ According to 
Shiv Malik (2015), ‘leaked documents show how ISIS is building its state;’ and Todenhöfer 
(2016: 218) recognised that ISIS were keen ‘to demonstrate [that] the Islamic State is not a 
state in name only, but really is a state.’276 After the establishment of the Islamic State in 
June 2014, some scholars do suggest that the Islamic State could be conceptualised as ‘a 
quasi-state entity’ (Gerges, 2016: 224), or even ‘a phantom, abstracted, delusional and fake 
state’ (Dabashi, 2016). Either way, it ‘isn’t only a terrorist organization’ (Weiss and Hassan, 
2015: xv). Therefore, aware that Islamic State targeting for self-sacrificial attacks appears 
primarily focussed on enemy combatants (C. Winter, 2017b), perhaps the circumstances 
and ideological motivations for ISIS volunteers (being quasi-state fighters) have certain 
similarities to Japanese kamikaze pilots who targeted the American military in the Pacific.  
 
                                                 
276 The Islamic State ideologue, Shaykh Turki Binali, also confirmed that ‘the Islamic State is a sovereign 
polity with courts and a legal system’ (Bunzel, 2014). 
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The parallels are instructive insofar that ‘Japanese suicide attackers seemed to be motivated 
more by a desire to protect their country’ (Moghadam, 2011: 14). In a similar vein, Saudi 
foreign fighter Ayachi Abdul Rahman argued that ‘it is not terrorism to defend your 
country, whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Syria’ (Shelton, 2013). Implicit in 
Abdul Rahman’s argument is the notion of the ummah – the ‘global community of Muslim 
believers’ (Moghadam, 2008a: 253) - and the need to defend them from attack – both 
externally (in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya), and internally (in Syria). To label such 
defence as terrorism and the combatants as terrorists is not entirely persuasive. A more 
nuanced understanding includes the notion of an ‘intra-Sunni solidarity norm [involving] 
young men … who go to Syria, [who] see its people as their own and feel a more moral and 
religious obligation to defend them’ (Hegghammer, 2013a). This is somewhat echoed by 
Gordts (2014), who argued correctly that ‘a lot of people … were motivated by the plight of 
the Syrians. They were certainly Islamists, but they were not necessarily full-blown jihadi 
terrorists.’  
 
The second historical military example of ideologically supported self-sacrificial attacks, 
involves the Communist Viet Minh forces in the 1954 battle of Dien Bien Phu in French-
Indochina. According to Fall (1985: 368), the Viet Minh often employed ‘Communist death 
volunteers loaded with explosives.’ Those in the French Foreign Legion who witnessed 
these attacks recalled ‘death volunteers carrying satchel charges for the French machine-
gun posts’ (Windrow, 2004: 398); and that ‘death volunteers … with twenty pounds of 
TNT strapped to their chests, came out of the trenches and threw themselves at the French 
blockhouses’ (Morgan, 2010: 536-537). It is instructive to draw parallels between the 
militarily inferior Arab foreign fighters in Syria, and the militarily inferior Viet Minh 
fighters at Dien Bien Phu who were compelled to adopt self-sacrificial attacks in order to 
defeat the well defended French strongpoints. This chimes with Bar (2006: 14), who argued 
that ‘jihadis’ conduct self-sacrificial attacks against armies because they ‘do not have the 
military power of their adversaries’ – therefore self-sacrificial attacks by Arab foreign 
fighters are, as Hoffman (2006: 155) claims, a ‘weapon of the weak.’ These two historical 
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military examples demonstrate that, despite sometimes being labelled ‘suicide bombers’277 
or ‘death volunteers,’ self-sacrificial attacks are not unique to the Syrian insurgency, and 
support the argument of Akram (2016), that (terminology notwithstanding), ‘the use of a 
suicide bomber is more often to do with gaining military advantage.’278 
 
Inghimasi Operations 
 
The last point drawing distinctions between ‘martyrdom operations’ and ‘suicide attacks’ in 
Syria, is the use of the term inghimasi279 which has re-surfaced in media releases from both 
ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah. 280  In the scholarly literature the term inghimasi is often 
conflated with suicide attacks and/or more vague labels such as ‘fully committed’ (Zelin, 
2014a: 13); ‘suicidal’ (El-Badawy et al. 2015: 20); ‘commando’ (al-Tamimi, 2016), or 
‘suicide fighter’ (al-Kadhimi, 2016; Dodwell et al., 2016a: 28). Probably the most 
contextualised scholarly definition of inghimasi from among many (Hafez, 2007b: 117; 
Cook, 2007: 153; Moghadam, 2011: 104; Bloom, Horgan, and Winter, 2016: 30-31), 
‘refers to special operations involving fighters … distinct from suicide bombers … that 
willingly put themselves in harm’s way, maximising the risk of their deaths in order to 
cause as much damage as possible’ (C. Winter, 2017b: 5). The broad constituent parts of an 
inghimasi operation appear to involve the target being ‘an enemy position’ (implicitly 
military); the offensive employment of light weapons and bombs (not just an explosive 
vest); and that the likelihood of survival is low - although not impossible (Slavicek, 2008: 
560; C. Winter, 2017a). The idea that inghimasi combatants are necessarily terrorists whilst 
comforting and even compelling, should not go unchallenged – especially when they are 
not ‘targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants’ – a key tenet in the ‘revised academic 
consensus definition of terrorism’ (Schmid, 2013a: 86), as noted earlier.  
                                                 
277 As Fierke (2014: 205) noted, “‘suicide bombing’ and ‘suicide attack’ are examples of Western 
terminology.”  
278 An excellent example of a potential martyrdom operation involving an Arab fighter (of unknown 
nationality) may be found on YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nBc0ksZLHg). He successfully 
destroyed a Syrian army tank with just a hand grenade. He survived, although had he died, it could reasonably 
be conceptualised as a martyrdom operation.  
279 The Arabic verb ghamasa means ‘to plunge, immerse, submerse’ (Wehr, 1980: 684). 
280 The first mention of an inghimasi operation (in Syria) was a Jabhat al-Nusrah attack on 100 Syrian Arab 
Army soldiers occupying the Al-Kindi Hospital in Aleppo on 20 December 2013 (CPOST Attack ID 
47281505). 
 178 
The term inghimasi is however a contested term, perhaps less amongst ideologues but 
certainly between groups. Ideologically, according to Molloy (2009: 17), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 
1328) justified inghimasi operations under the pretext of ‘a soldier on a battlefield deciding 
to carry out an attack that will likely result in his death.’ Contemporary ideologue Abu 
Basir al-Tartusi (2005) permits inghimasi operations ‘even if it leads to one being killed by 
the enemy … so long as there is benefit to jihad, to Islam, and to Muslims.’ The ideological 
emphasis is military in nature and appears to be the position adopted by the Islamic State, 
but not by al-Qaeda affiliated groups. 
 
The Islamic State interpret inghimasi operations as a military tactic, against enemy 
combatants who are generally labelled ‘apostate soldiers’; 281  ‘murtaddeen officers and 
soldiers’;282 or ‘PKK and FSA murtaddeen.’283 In an August 2015 ISIS video284 the targets 
identified as suitable for inghimasi operations included ‘well protected targets with 
barricades, solid buildings, or enemy commanders.’ The ISIS video also specified that an 
inghimasi volunteer must be of ‘good moral disposition’ (hasan al-khuluq), and ‘like 
sacrificing in the path of God’ (hubb at-tadh-heeya fee sabeel Allah). A typical ISIS report 
of an inghimasi operation found in magazines such as Dabiq would include: 
 
‘inghimasi soldiers of the Khilafah armed with light weapons and explosive belts,285 
‘plunging into the enemy ranks’ 286  and ‘following the clashes, the two 
inghimaasiyyeen detonated their explosive belts in the midst of the murtaddeen, 
killing a number of the officers and commanders.’287   
 
Al-Qaeda affiliated groups appear to adopt a different interpretation. In al-Qaeda’s 
magazine Inspire (2014),288 it defines an inghimasi as ‘an individual or a small group 
immersing themselves within a large army of non-believers in search of martyrdom and 
                                                 
281 Dabiq. Issue 2, p. 13. 
282 Dabiq. Issue 11, p. 29. 
283 Dabiq. Issue 13, p. 17.  
284 The Islamic State (2015). The Inghimasis – The Pride of the Nation. 
285 Dabiq. Issue 14, p. 20.  
286 Dabiq. Issue 2, p. 13. 
287 Dabiq. Issue 14, p. 23. 
288 Inspire. Issue 14, pp. 42-45. 
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causing damage to them’ (p. 43). Al-Qaeda cited examples of inghimasi operations 
including the 2008 attacks in Mumbai; the 2009 attack by Major Nidal Hassan in Fort 
Hood; and the 2013 attack in Nairobi’s Westgate Mall (p. 44). The Islamist terrorist leaning 
of these examples, involving civilians and non-combatants is unmistakable. It appears that 
such nuances and subtleties between Islamist groups in general, and in Syria in particular, 
limit our current understanding of inghimasi operations.  
 
To conclude, there is a compelling case to conceptualise Arab foreign fighters, who attack 
military targets in a war zone, as being more analogous with Kamikaze pilots and Viet 
Minh fighters, rather than being labelled suicide bombers. As noted in Chapter 1, Fierke 
(2014: 207) recognised the tension in the relationship between ‘suicide terrorism’ and 
‘martyrdom operations,’ and uses “the term ‘suicide/martyrdom’ when pointing to it.” 
There appears to be a need to distinguish between self-sacrificial attacks (martyrdom 
operations, inghimasi operations, and suicide attacks), as there is a tension between the 
various labels largely based on the differences in targeting. It is suggested that the ideology 
supporting the tactic of self-sacrificial attacks against military targets is consistent with the 
more general trend of martyrdom fee sabeel Allah, rather than supporting suicide attacks 
against civilians and non-combatants. This leads to the suggestion that Arab foreign 
fighters who conducted self-sacrificial attacks against the SAA, should not necessarily be 
considered suicide bombers, let alone Islamist terrorists. After all, there is no known 
documentary evidence that Kamikaze pilots or the Communist Viet Minh were ever 
labelled terrorists. This suggestion clearly challenges much of the existing literature on 
suicide terrorism, and is addressed in Chapter 7.  
 
The Ideology Supporting the Targeting and Killing of Civilians 
 
The ideology (within Salafi-jihadism) supporting the killing of civilians and non-
combatants by Arab foreign fighters in Syria, appears to often manifest itself in the form of 
genocidal atrocities, rather than entirely as a result of Islamist terrorism. Although the scale 
of ISIS atrocities amounts to ‘only’ 2,998 (1.48 percent of) civilian deaths in Syria 
(highlighted earlier in the chapter), the atrocities against the Shia, Sunni, Christian, and 
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Yazidi civilians particularly by ISIS, have been well documented (UNHRC, 2016; USCIRF, 
2016: 121), 289  lending support that the atrocities could arguably be conceptualised 
ideologically through the prism of genocide (that includes ethnic cleansing),290 as well as 
through the prism of Islamist terrorism. To support this argument, ‘the legal definition of 
genocide,’ is defined under Article II of the United Nations (1948) Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (p. 280) as: 
 
‘any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’ 
 
That does not mean that a suicide attack directed against a Shia mosque is not terrorism, but 
to recognise the intention behind certain attacks, and (as noted earlier) ‘the intention of the 
agent’ (Fierke, 2014: 198). Interestingly, it was only in March 2016, five years after the 
conflict in Syria had erupted, that the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, publically went on 
record and acknowledged that ISIS ‘is genocidal by self-proclamation, by ideology, and by 
actions – in what it says, what it believes, and what it does’ (Kerry, 2016b).  
 
It is therefore instructive that Staub (1989) in his seminal book, The Roots of Evil, found 
that ‘perpetrators change, as individuals and as a group, as they progress along a continuum 
of destruction that ends in genocide’ (p. 13). This perhaps is a key finding that has wider 
applicability to help explain the subsequent behaviour of some Arab foreign fighters in 
Syria. It supports the argument that despite not necessarily being radicalised prior to their 
arrival in Syria, over time they can change as individuals and groups, and later embrace a 
                                                 
289 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) (2016: 121) ‘concluded that ISIL was 
committing genocide against the Christian, Yazidi, Shi’a, Turkmen;’ while the UNHRC (2016: 1) confirmed 
that ‘ISIS has committed the crime of genocide as well as multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes 
against the Yazidis.’ 
290 According to the Office of the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (n.d.), ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
is one of ‘the elements of the crime of genocide as defined in Article 6 of the Rome Statute’ (p. 3). 
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more violent ideology. Therefore, although perhaps not currently on the scale of the 
genocide in Rwanda (Dallaire, 2003: 375), 291  many of the crimes committed by Arab 
foreign fighters are perhaps more analogous to genocide (including ethnic cleansing), rather 
than Islamist terrorism. It is worthy of inclusion to note that some scholars, including 
Shaykh Abdullah al-Muhaysani,292 post tweets that use the Arabic verb ‘to exterminate, 
eradicate, or annihilate’ (ibaada) 293  on their Twitter accounts. The ideologues are not 
necessarily invoking the virtues of martyrdom ‘gained’ in a suicide bombing, but 
dehumanising Alawite civilians and non-combatants, and legitimising genocide against 
them. This again suggests that simply labelling Arab foreign fighters as Islamist terrorists 
due to their often unrestrained violence off the battlefield, is not necessarily helpful in 
trying to understand them. 
 
Finally, some scholars (H. Hassan, 2016: 17; Gerges, 2016) believe that the ideology 
supporting the killing of civilians is underpinned by Abu Bakr al-Naji’s (2004)294 treatise, 
The Management of Savagery (idaarat at-tawahhush) - translated by McCants (2006). It 
deserves inclusion as, according to Gerges (2016: 36), it provides the ‘intellectual and 
ideological motivation and inspiration for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his ideologues;’ and 
according to the Islamic State magazine Dabiq 12 (p. 39), it ‘describes very precisely the 
overall strategy of the mujahhideen.’ However, it raises two points. First, whilst the 
translation of at-tawahhush as ‘savagery’ (McCants, 2006) is eye-catching and sensational, 
a degree of caution is required as Dabiq 1 (p. 38) and Dabiq 5 (p. 31) translate at-
tawahhush as ‘mayhem’ (p. 38);295 whilst Dabiq 8 (p. 60) and McCants (2006: 26) also 
translate at-tawahhush as ‘chaos.’ Second, whilst The Management of Savagery discusses 
‘the path for establishing an Islamic state’ (McCants, 2006: 36), it arguably does not, as 
Maher (2016b) proposed, necessarily provide the ‘rationale for how the movement behaves 
today.’ This is primarily due to the many contradictions between the behaviour, tactics and 
                                                 
291 According to Dallaire (2003: 375), 800,000 Rwandans were killed by 30 June 1993 in a genocide. 
292 Twitter @meisny 6 May 2015.  
293 Wehr (1980: 85). 
294 Abu Bakr al-Naji (possibly also known as Muhammad Hassan Khalil al-Hakim) authored a ‘blue print’ for 
the establishment of an Islamic State, which ISIS draws upon selectively (Gerges, 2016: 34).  
295 Wehr (1980: 1056) translates at-tawahhush as ‘wildness, savageness, barbarity, brutality.’ 
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modus operandi of the Islamic State, and what is recommended in The Management of 
Savagery.   
 
For example, despite the guidance of al-Naji (2004) to ‘lighten the severity of the violence 
against reasonable people amongst the enemy’ (p. 76),296 and ‘to focus on economic targets, 
particularly petroleum’ (p. 47), it appears that this has not been embraced by the ‘foreign 
fighters … [who] have been among the worst perpetrators of … serious abuses including 
indiscriminate attacks, extrajudicial executions, kidnapping, and torture’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014). In addition, reference to ‘the rafidah Shia’ appears only once (p. 235), and 
perhaps most surprising is that there is no explicit inclusion of takfir, with al-Naji noting 
only that ‘the rules governing the killing of [Muslim] tyrants are conflicting’ (p. 73). This 
final point was also raised in Dabiq 12 (p. 39) that claimed that ‘al-Naji fell into some 
errors in his discussions on issues related to the takfir of parties who forcefully resist the 
Sharia laws.’ Similar to the broad ideological current of jihadi-salafism, relying on Abu 
Bakr al-Najdi’s (2004) treatise to explain the ideology of the Islamic State is overly 
simplistic. It offers little in the way of nuance and despite the importance of ideology when 
selecting targets (Drake, 1998: 54), al-Naji’s treatise has little explanatory value as to why 
some Arab foreign fighters in Syria, may adopt certain ideologies analogous with Islamist 
terrorism.  
 
To conclude, the ideology that appears to support the targeting of civilians and non-
combatants in Syria, maybe be better understood as a form of genocide off the battlefield, 
due to a toxic mixture of takfir, the ‘situational circumstances’ (Zimbardo, 2007: 8) Arab 
foreign fighters experience in combat in Syria; the grievances and need for revenge against 
the Shia; and the notion of ‘a continuum of destruction’ (Staub, 1989: 13). Using a 
historical military example for context, Guy Sajer (1971: 234) - an Alsatian Wehrmacht 
soldier on the Russian front in WWII (referenced earlier in this chapter) - recalled that the 
brutality both on and off the battlefield often induced ‘the most innocent of youths on 
whatever side to commit inconceivable atrocities.’   
                                                 
296 This call for moderation by al-Naji (2004) contradicted his earlier guidance that ‘the ingredient of softness 
is one of the ingredients of failure for any jihadi action’ (p. 72). 
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Terrorist Training and Indoctrination 
 
Introduction 
 
As in the previous chapters the notion of terrorist training and indoctrination is present in 
both academic and governmental literature, including a British Security Service (MI5) 
(2016b) webpage devoted to Terrorist Training and Indoctrination. This section explores 
the philosophy of the structural influences of such training and indoctrination in Syria, and 
how it may have facilitated the subsequent adoption of Islamist terrorism by some Arab 
foreign fighters. It includes the need for obedience to those in authority; the near absence of 
traditional terrorist training in preference for conventional military training needed in the 
insurgency; and the existence of indoctrination.   
 
In the first issue of the Islamic State’s magazine Dabiq 1 (p. 35), the ‘roadmap towards an 
Islamic Caliphate for the mujahhideen’ was based upon that proposed by the late Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi, and included obedience (to those in authority), training, and fighting. 
This particular emphasis on obedience and training was reiterated in Dabiq 12, which 
strongly advised newly arrived Arab foreign fighters ‘to listen to and obey those whom 
Allah has given authority over the affairs of the mujahhideen’ (p. 9); and that it ‘is 
obligatory to yield to the opinion he has chosen and submit to his order’ (p. 10). 297 
According to Lia (2008a: 520), this emphasis on obedience to a leader and the leader’s 
power over the group was a cornerstone of the training doctrine of veteran Afghan Arab, 
Abdul Aziz al-Sharif (aka Dr Fadl).298  
 
This notion of obedience to authority (and charismatic leadership) during both training (and 
in combat) has explanatory value as to why some Arab foreign fighters became involved in 
terrorist related and/or genocidal activities. As noted earlier in the chapter, the existence of 
                                                 
297 As an addendum, a later ISIS document dated 17 May 2017, entitled That Those Who Perish Would Perish 
Upon Proof and Those Who Live Would Live Upon Proof, demanded that even if authority figures ‘command 
something that the soul dislikes, obeying them is obligatory’ (Price and Al-‘Ubaydi, 2017).   
298 According to Lia (2008a: 526) Abdul Aziz al-Sharif ‘became the most influential voice in the new jihadi 
trend’ as an EIJ member and an Afghan Arab, and advocated religious nationalist jihad in order to defeat the 
Egyptian government and establish an Islamic state. See Appendix C for a short biography. 
 184 
charisma is ‘a potentially critical element in the process of radicalization’ (Hofmann and 
Dawson, 2014: 358), and probably worked in tandem together. The idea of obedience to 
authority was scientifically explored by Milgram (1963), and later confirmed by Staub 
(1989). Specifically, Milgram (1963) in his infamous ‘obedience to authority experiment’ 
uncovered ‘the sheer strength of obedient tendencies … to hurt another person’ (p. 252). 
This contention is buttressed by Staub’s (1989) own finding that a ‘strong respect for 
authority and strong inclination to obedience are other predisposing characteristics for mass 
killing and genocide’ (p. 19), and that the ability of those in authority to ‘repress dissent … 
enhances the potential for evil’ (p. 28). This demand for obedience, coupled with the 
existence of ‘charismatic authority’ and ‘charismatic leadership’ (covered earlier), helps to 
explain the trajectory from defensive jihad to Islamist terrorist related activities. 
Empirically, the thesis dataset drew on a cache of ‘ISIS jihadist personal data’ released by 
Zaman Al Wasl (2016), which demonstrated that Islamic State fighters were/are assessed 
on their ‘level of hearing and obedience’ (mustawa’ sama’ wa aT-Taa’a), a fact later 
corroborated by Dodwell et al. (2016a: 5). It appears to be the case that Arab foreign 
fighters in Syria are required to respect authority, which when that authority redirects its 
violence, those individuals feel compelled to obey.  
 
Training 
 
The ability of Arab foreign fighters to train in Syria is similar to 1980s Afghanistan in that 
rebel groups hold and control territory within Syria, allowing for the establishment of 
training camps, with the necessary infrastructure to practise basic and more advanced 
military drills and exercises. According to Perliger and Milton (2016), ‘training camp 
attendance … [for] members of Islamic State [occurred] in 96% of cases’ (p. 37) 
demonstrating the ‘nearly obligatory part of the experience of all foreign fighters entering 
Syria’ (p. iv). Evidence of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah training is widely available on the 
Internet, 299  but perhaps counter-intuitively, it generally concentrates on conventional 
military training required for an insurgency. In an ISIS Arabic language training video 
(released in January 2016) the training included physical preparation (al-idaad al-badani), 
                                                 
299 The Islamic State (2016). Terrify the Enemy of God and Your Enemy. 
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weapon training, night raids (al-iqtihamaat al-layliya), ‘freeing of POWs’ (fikaak al-asra), 
fighting in urban areas, and anti-ambushes drills (tafaadi al-kumaa’in). Although there is 
an obvious propagandistic nature to these videos, they do demonstrate a solid training 
infrastructure and a well-developed training regime. 300  Despite the military training 
overlaps between defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism, training for suicide attacks was 
notably absent from this training video, although such omissions are arguably compensated 
for by ‘martyrdom’ videos that often show the training, preparation, farewell statements, 
and results.301  
 
According to H. Hassan (2015), who personally conducted interviews with members of 
ISIS, he discovered that the ISIS training regime was heavily influenced by religious 
instruction that included Islamist ideology. He recalled a young Arab man, Hamid 
Ghannam, who had trained in an ISIS camp near Deir Ezzor. In Ghannam’s own words: 
‘they test you first ... they check your knowledge of religion ... they discuss with you 
everything. They talk to you about the nusairi regime and … all the misguided groups.’ H. 
Hassan (2015) also established that ‘new recruits join training that ranges from two weeks 
… up to one year. Inside the camps, students receive a mix of military, political and Sharia 
orientation, usually given by around five instructors.’  
 
The Islamist current is demonstrated in the Islamic State Training Camp Textbook, 
Curriculum in Monotheism (muqarrar fee tawhid), particularly within the Sharia chapter, 
which was authored by Bahraini cleric Shaykh Turki Binali, and translated by al-Tamimi 
(2014). The curriculum is heavily reliant on the writings and ideology of both Ibn 
Taymiyya and Muhammad Abdul Wahhab. The continual referencing to past ideologues 
adds to the legitimacy of the ISIS narrative, and helps prevent any challenge to it. A major 
section of the curriculum exposes the aspiring ISIS recruits to ‘the ten nullifiers of Islam’ 
written by Muhammad Abdul Wahhab which ‘outlines ten things that automatically expel 
                                                 
300 An example of a Syrian training camp regime, included a ‘timetable … which detailed when [recruits] had 
to train, eat, pray and stressed that they had to be in bed by 10pm unless they were on guard duty’ (Whitehead, 
2014). 
301 It is acknowledged that videos for suicide attacks and martyrdom operations have considerable overlaps, as 
both are used to revere the ‘martyr’ and to recruit new members. 
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someone from the religion’ of Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2005a: 81). As al-Tamimi (2014) 
observed, inclusion of the ten nullifiers is ‘a distinctly Wahhabi concept, and provides a 
very fertile basis for the takfir tendencies’ of the Islamic State. The most central (fourth) 
nullifier which undergirds the Syrian insurgency is when Muslims prefer the ruling of a 
taghoot (tyrant) over Allah’s ruling. This leads to those Muslims being labelled disbelievers 
who require takfir (excommunication), which in Syria results in death. The common thread 
of takfir throughout much of this chapter does appear to be a central component of the 
ideology of both ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah.  
 
However, there is evidence that ISIS are selective in their references in that whilst relying 
heavily on Muhammad Abdul Wahhab, he is not referenced concerning martyrdom, due in 
part, that ‘at no point in any of his writings does he promote the concept of martyrdom or 
encourage Muslims to seek it’ (DeLong-Bas, 2004: 59). The existence of training for self-
sacrificial attacks in Syria is largely anecdotal, and whilst such individuals are eulogised 
after blowing themselves up, as noted earlier, these ‘martyrdom’ videos do often show the 
training and preparation (particularly the preparation of the suicide vehicle borne 
improvised explosive devices).302 It is suggested, that whilst such training does take place 
(Reuter, 2015; Chulov, 2015), because the majority of self-sacrificial attacks appear to be 
woven into the modus operandi of the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah and employed 
against military targets, arguably they are more reliant on bravery, bravado, and brazenness, 
rather than formal military training. This is arguably applicable within conventional armies 
too, where the notion of bravery is not necessarily gained through military training, but 
rather that ‘a man of character in peace becomes a man of courage in war’ (Moran, 1945: 
170). 
 
Lia (2008a: 519), a researcher of ‘jihadi terrorist training’ identified ‘four leading jihadi 
scholars’ who wrote ‘about principles for training and preparation in some depth.’ They 
were Abdullah Azzam (covered in Chapter 3 and 4), Abdul Aziz al-Sharif and Abu Bakr al-
                                                 
302 Recent examples of the preparation of SVBIEDs in Aleppo are found at @AABoroma 19 October 2016 
(1:50PM), and 21 October 2016 (2:40PM).   
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Naji (covered earlier in this chapter), and Abu Musab al-Suri.303 According to Lia (2008a: 
518), whilst these four individuals (who incidentally were all veteran Afghan Arabs) agreed 
on the importance of training, they also stressed ‘that ideological indoctrination and 
spiritual preparation should take precedence over physical and military training.’ It is 
perhaps instructive therefore that according to H. Hassan (2015), “in some cases, new 
members who struggle with the brutality of the Islamic State’s acts will be sent back to 
receive more training to ‘strengthen’ their faith.” The notion of strengthening their faith has 
many of the hallmarks of ideological indoctrination, which Abdul Aziz al-Sharif claims, 
‘compensates for numerical inferiority and lack of resources’ (Lia, 2008a: 527). Overlaps 
notwithstanding, it is suggested that the transition between involvement in defensive jihad 
and Islamist terrorism in Syria likely includes the notion of exposure to ‘ideological 
indoctrination and spiritual preparation’ (Lia, 2008a: 518).   
 
Ideological Indoctrination 
 
The indoctrination explanation304 proposed in this chapter has academic ballast (Crenshaw, 
1994; Moghaddam, 2005; Wiktorowicz, 2005b; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008), and 
builds on the findings in Chapter 5. The ultimate aim of indoctrination is to ‘produce battle-
hardened, martyrdom-seeking fighters, whose primary strength lies in their spiritual 
determination, their patience, and a willingness to employ savagery against the enemy’ 
(Lia, 2008a: 518). Again, the notion of indoctrination is underpinned by the concepts of 
vulnerability and peer pressure, experienced by an Arab foreign fighter who has left his 
home country and finds himself involved in an insurgency in Syria, where ‘the rebel group’ 
becomes his new family, upon which he becomes reliant for everything. Although the 
notion of ‘age-based vulnerabilities’ was largely discounted earlier in the chapter, more 
promising perhaps are ‘the experiences of violence, displacement, trauma and loss’ in Syria 
(Aubrey, Brodrick, and Brooks, 2016: 10).  
 
                                                 
303 According to Lia (2008b), Abu Musab al-Suri, author of Call to Global Islamic Resistance, ‘advocated 
mass casualty terrorism in the West’ (p. 3) and that ‘confrontation with America is fundamental’ (p. 412). 
304 According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary (1995: 693), indoctrination includes ‘the teaching of a 
person … to accept ideas uncritically.’ 
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It is suggested that the situational circumstances ‘of violence, displacement, trauma and 
loss’ are likely to increase the ‘vulnerability’ of Arab foreign fighters to the ideological 
indoctrination within rebel groups. Noted in Chapter 5 but worth repeating again, 
vulnerability should be considered ‘in terms of how the individual may be more open to 
influence at any juncture’ (Horgan, 2005: 103). The juncture perhaps most relevant to Arab 
foreign fighters is the time they arrive in Syria, where they are ‘isolated from the other 
members, their passports are taken away and they attend meetings in which they are 
brainwashed’ (Waldeck, 2015: 66). 305  Despite perhaps the loose terminology (using 
‘brainwashed’), this reception on arrival in Syria is likely to reinforce the notions of a 
vulnerability to indoctrination. 
 
Evidence of the notion of indoctrination in Syria is apparent in the ‘textbooks, guidance 
literature, and indoctrination methods of the Islamic State’ (Olidort, 2016). Specifically, 
according to Olidort (2016) the Islamic State has ‘a deliberate strategy it can apply 
systematically to indoctrinating its followers’ (p. 8) and ‘an indoctrination program for 
areas under its control’ (p. 6). The result of this strategy was witnessed by a journalist, 
Jurgen Todenhöfer, who conducted a rare visit in 2014 to meet Arab and other foreign 
fighters of the Islamic State, in areas under its control including Raqqah (Syria) and Mosul 
(Iraq). At the end of his visit, he summarised the fighters as ‘completely brainwashed; I've 
never in my life met people like this’ (Todenhöfer, 2015). As noted earlier, this first-hand 
observation chimes with the importance placed on ideological indoctrination and spiritual 
preparation, and also confirms the finding in a year-long study of over 350 FSA and Jabhat 
al-Nusrah fighters, that ‘many fighters are aggressively socialised and exposed to religious 
preaching once inside the group’ (Mironova et al., 2014: 16).  
 
According to Gerges (2016: 266), Arab foreign (and Syrian) fighters who decide to join the 
Islamic State have ‘to undergo religious re-education to indoctrinate them with the group’s 
theology.’ This appears to include religious stories, often taken out of context, in order ‘to 
help Islamic State members who struggle with committing acts of extreme violence’ (H. 
                                                 
305 This arrival procedure is corroborated by Byman and Shipiro (2014: 6) who noted that ‘foreign fighters 
often have their passports taken away when they join … and become highly dependent on the group.’ 
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Hassan, 2016: 18). This gradual acceptance of more extreme violence may underpin the 
transition from Arab foreign fighter to Islamist terrorist - a point raised by Khaja (2014), 
who noted that fighters in the Islamic State become more ideologically motivated over 
time, especially having been exposed to the combat environment of Syria, and attended 
additional courses.  
 
The other main Islamist group in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusrah, also appears to adopt a strategy to 
indoctrinate Arab foreign (and Syrian) fighters. One, albeit a Syrian fighter, Muhammad 
Amin al-Abdullah, explained that “Jabhat al-Nusrah leaders kept ‘brainwashing’ him and 
others about the need for jihad and the rewards that good Muslims get in the Hereafter.”306 
It is also instructive that if a ‘suicide bomber’ does have a ‘last minute’ change of mind (as 
happened with Saudi suicide bomber Muhammad al-Owhali in the 1998 Nairobi US 
Embassy attacks), the attack coordinator can remotely blow up the explosive laden vehicle. 
In a double self-sacrificial attack against a Syrian Intelligence building in Damascus on 10 
May 2012, 307  Jordanian foreign fighter Abu Musab and Palestinian foreign fighter 
Muhammad al-Ghazi, were both monitored. According to Al-Abdullah ‘there was a remote 
detonator controlled by the leader, who if the suicide bombers failed to blow up the 
vehicles for any reason, he would detonate the vehicles from a distance’ (CPOST Attack ID 
1457441285). This is an interesting revelation that perhaps challenges the notion 
(highlighted earlier) suggested by Todenhöfer (2015) that each and every fighter is 
‘completely brainwashed.’  
 
Finally, this leads to the notion of deception, given that there is evidence that some Arab 
foreign fighters are deceived. Muhammad Azzam (2016), a journalist for The New Arab, 
has documented many cases where Arab foreign fighters are duped by the Islamic State into 
participating in ‘a suicide mission targeting Syrian army soldiers’ that later proved to be 
other ‘Syrian opposition groups [including] the al-Nusrah Front.’ In addition, M. Azzam 
(2016) cites Arab foreign fighter, Abu Musab al-Tunisi, who posted a video on YouTube, 
                                                 
306 CPOST Attack ID 1457441285, includes Syrian Documentary on Al-Nusrah Front. Damascus Television 
Service. 9 June 2012.  
307 The attack ‘killed 55 people and injured 372’ (CPOST Attack ID 1457441285), but were not designated 
military or civilian personnel. 
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accusing the Islamic State of ‘using religious rhetoric in order to convince them their 
targeted attacks would not harm women or children,’ which was untrue. Perhaps more 
alarmingly, M. Azzam (2016) also established that Arab foreign fighters who did not 
volunteer for self-sacrificial attacks were now bound by their pledge of obedience and 
allegiance to the group. A good example, uploaded to YouTube,308 shows a weeping and 
reluctant Uzbeki foreign fighter – Jaffar al-Tayyar – who ‘is ordered to drive an armoured 
vehicle packed with explosives into the besieged villages of Fua and Kafriyeh’ in Syria (J. 
Hall, 2015). Whilst the frequency of such orders is unknown, as is the use of attack 
coordinators who can remotely blow up an explosive laden vehicle (noted above), it does 
perhaps demonstrate that in some cases, there may be a lack of successful indoctrination 
and/or a lack of martyrdom/suicide volunteers. 
 
A Historical Military Example of the Normality of Terrorism / War Crimes 
 
It is helpful to conclude this chapter with a short historical military example of how trained 
soldiers can also conduct war crimes in the form of mass casualty attacks against a civilian 
population. Although war crimes and terrorism are considered different under international 
law, according to the ICRC Rule 156, ‘war crimes are violations committed either by 
members of the armed forces or by civilians against members of the armed forces, civilians 
or protected objects of the adverse party.’ This suggests an overlap, and whilst the 
multitude of rules (pertaining to war crimes) under international law are beyond the scope 
of this thesis, it is suggested that there is a situational overlap between war crimes and 
terrorism. Such a suggestion perhaps contextualises the violence inherent in a war zone and, 
moral equivalencies (between state and non-state actors) notwithstanding, demonstrates 
how atrocities can somehow be normalised and justified.  
 
The example used here is the infamous 1968 My Lai massacre of hundreds of unarmed 
civilians by US Marines in South Vietnam. According to Hugh Thompson (n.d.), a 
helicopter pilot during the massacre, ‘there was a lot of evil … five hundred and four 
                                                 
308 Jafar Al-Tayyar Crying before Suicide bombing in Syria Terrorists. YouTube. 27 September 2015. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHaxkHtWBZE (last accessed 15 July 2016). 
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people were murdered. It was a massacre, and civilians were murdered, not killed.’ 
Thompson believed that the massacre was due to ‘revenge, prejudice, negative peer 
pressure, and bad leadership.’ Although perhaps not a common occurrence in Vietnam,309 
the parallels with the modus operandi of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah are striking. Whilst 
revenge was covered earlier in the chapter, the notion of dehumanisation directed against 
the Vietnamese population appears tantamount to takfir310 – indeed Thompson (n.d.) in his 
own words recalled that ‘our training had dehumanized the enemy.’ The negative peer 
pressure on individuals away from home fighting in Syria has parallels with US Marines in 
South Vietnam, vis-à-vis vulnerabilities, obedience to authority, indoctrination, and mixing 
with peers who were perhaps more experienced, or in the words of Thompson (n.d.) 
‘hoodlums, renegades disguised as soldiers.’ The point to be made is that the killing of 
civilians and non-combatants is not the sole preserve of Islamist terrorists in Syria, and 
highlights the parallels of involvement in atrocities (war crimes) by conventional militaries, 
and in terrorism in Syria by some Arab foreign fighters. Within the context of a ‘normality 
of excess,’ according to Max Taylor (1991: 265), ‘at My Lai, a group of otherwise perfectly 
normal soldiers engaged in a series of horrific acts.’ 
 
Conclusion 
 
The research undertaken for this chapter suggests (although not proved) that the majority of 
Arab foreign fighters (with no known prior terrorist links) were not necessarily radicalised, 
but went to Syria to participate in a defensive jihad in response to the unequivocal Syrian 
regime violence against fellow Sunni co-religionists. Once in Syria, it appeared that the 
majority of Arab foreign fighters were participating in a defensive jihad, fighting in 
conventional battles against the Syrian Arab Army and other rebel combatants. The 
incidence of suicide attacks against civilians and non-combatants appears minimal, and the 
actions of the few should not define the majority. That said, some Arab foreign fighters did 
subsequently get involved in Islamist terrorist related activities, although arguably they 
                                                 
309 Arguably it may have been a common occurrence. According to Cookman (2007: 154), on the same day as 
the My Lai massacre, ‘another company massacred ninety women and children a mile away in My Khe.’   
310 Whilst ISIS label their enemy kufr, rafidah, nusairi, taghoot, and murtadd, the US Marines in Vietnam 
used ‘gooks,’ ‘dinks,’ and ‘slopes’ (Cookman, 2007: 156).     
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gained more publicity when conducted in Europe, rather than in Syria. Those terrorist 
related activities that did take place in Syria appeared however to be closer to genocide 
(including crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing). It seemed that over time, being 
forged in the crucible of defensive jihad, involving exposure to a more extreme takfiri 
ideology, training, indoctrination, and combat itself, some Arab foreign fighters did commit 
atrocities that also have parallels in military history, such as My Lai. It is suggested that 
many of the Arab foreign fighter excesses in Syria have less to do with radicalisation, and 
may be better understood as a result of ‘obedience to authority’ and ‘toxic situational 
forces,’ consistent with the research findings of Milgram (1963, 1974) and Zimbardo (1971, 
2007), respectively. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
The three case study chapters that were supported by a dataset of 3,010 Arab foreign 
fighters, established a series of findings that suggested the need for a more contextualised 
approach to understanding defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. Specifically, the three 
major findings are (1) that Arab foreign fighters who participate in defensive jihad should 
not be conflated with Islamist terrorists; (2) that suicide attacks aimed at civilians and non-
combatants are not necessarily synonymous with martyrdom operations aimed at military 
targets; and (3) those Arab foreign fighters that subsequently became involved in Islamist 
terrorist related activities were influenced by key situational factors including, but not 
limited to, the personal experience of close combat in a war zone; being subjected to 
ideological indoctrination (as part of group training and socialisation); and being exposed to 
charismatic authority and obedience to it – all facets of the Lucifer Effect.311 These findings 
constitute a significant and original contribution to knowledge insofar that they challenge 
much of the existing literature on Arab foreign fighters, Islamist terrorists, and the nexus 
between them. After a short introduction, this chapter analyses these three major findings 
and enters into a philosophical debate about their relevance and relationship to political 
contestation.  
 
Analysis of Case Study Findings 
 
The Conflation of Arab Foreign Fighters with Islamist Terrorists  
 
Introduction 
 
The first major finding of this research is that Arab foreign fighters who participated in 
defensive jihad should not necessarily be conflated with Islamist terrorists, in that 
                                                 
311 For completeness, the Lucifer Effect is understood as ‘processes of transformation at work when good or 
ordinary people do bad or evil things [and] may be traced to factors outside the actor, to situational 
variables … unique to a given setting’ (Zimbardo, 2007: 5-8). 
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conflation of the two groups, overlaps notwithstanding, is misleading and represents a form 
of sociological essentialism. Such conflation is apparent at all levels of government, 
including the United Nations Security Council (2014: 2) who passed Resolution 2178: 
 
‘expressing grave concern over … foreign terrorist fighters, namely individuals 
who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the 
purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist 
acts …’  
 
Based on the research conducted for this thesis, this resolution is not evidence based - there 
is no research to support it – to the degree that (as noted in Chapter 1), Schmid (2015: 5) 
argued that “a distinction ought to be made between a ‘Foreign Fighter’ and a ‘Foreign 
Terrorist Fighter.’” This conflation of violent Islamist activities (defensive jihad and 
Islamist terrorism) appears to demonstrate a lack of a nuanced understanding, and may 
ultimately lead to flawed policies and resolutions. Perhaps such labelling should not come 
as a surprise, inasmuch as Silke (2009: 34) maintained, ‘governments and security agencies 
are extremely quick to try to label their enemies as terrorists in the hope that this will 
undermine international sympathy for the organisation and deflect criticism away from any 
policies used to fight the group.’ Although beyond the scope of this study, it is instructive 
to note that while governments and the media accept and embrace the term ‘jihadi’ which is 
also used by ‘groups such as AQ’ (Silke, 2008: 100), such linguistic collaboration is not 
extended to the label ‘martyrdom operation’ (used by most Islamist terrorist groups) where 
‘suicide attack’ is deemed a more appropriate and pejorative term. Therefore, whilst this 
thesis fully acknowledges the terrorist threat posed by some returning Arab (and Western) 
foreign fighters, by simply labelling them all as ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ appears to be a 
mischaracterisation.   
 
Even at the academic level, such conflation is more the norm than the exception, as noted in 
Chapter 1. It is instructive for example, that whilst scholars justify using the label ‘jihadi 
salafi’ because ‘it has been employed by the Islamist actors themselves’ (Hegghammer, 
2009a: 252), such synergy between academics and non-state actors is not extended when it 
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comes to the labels mujahhideen (those who partake in defensive jihad) and irhaabiyeen 
(those who conduct terrorist acts). 312  It is instructive that Western governments have 
supported mujahhideen directly or indirectly, for example in 1980s Afghanistan, Libya 
(2011),313 and in Syria (post 2011)314  – yet they often retrospectively label those they 
supported as terrorists. Perhaps most striking is the term ‘global jihad’ (DeLong-Bas, 2004; 
Gerges, 2005; Lia, 2009; Riedel, 2011; Moghadam and Fishman, 2013), or ‘global salafi 
jihad’ (Sageman, 2004) – terms that implicitly confuse and conflate the notion of defensive 
jihad with Islamist terrorism, but have become conventional wisdom.  
 
Finally, there is a need to contextualise Islamist violence; comparisons need to be made by 
reference to historical military conflicts. Islamist violence is not sui generis; the 
motivations for involvement in defensive jihad are not unique to Islamists or to Muslims in 
general. This may be seen in the reflections of Sir Philip Gibbs (1929: 52), which for 
completeness, are quoted in full:  
 
‘Some instinct of a primitive savage kind for open-air life, fighting, killing, the 
comradeship of hunters, violent emotions, the chance of death, surged up into the 
brains of quiet boys, clerks, mechanics, miners, factory hands. The shock of anger at 
frightful tales … women foully outraged; civilians shot in cold blood – sent many 
men at a quick pace to the recruiting agents.’   
 
It his book, Realities of War, Gibbs was portraying the motivations and justifications 
behind the British people’s willingness to enlist in the First World War, yet arguably they 
could have been written about how Arab foreign fighters justified their involvement in the 
defensive jihads in 1980s Afghanistan, Iraq (post 2003), and Syria (post 2011). This 
suggests a degree of synergy (however unpalatable) between the rationales of WW1 
                                                 
312 It is important to note that those who participate in terrorism do not label themselves irhaabiyeen, but as 
mujahhideen, within the rubric of political Islam.  
313 The thesis dataset (noted in Chapter 6) identified three Arab foreign fighters who fought against the 
Gaddafi regime in Libya: two Egyptians (Ahmad al-Barra and Walid Badr) and a Palestinian (Osama Kishta). 
The Libyan jihad was also supported by NATO, and labelled ‘a model intervention’ (Rasmussen, 2016). 
314 The thesis dataset identified 126 Arab foreign fighters within the US backed Free Syrian Army (FSA), of 
which 10 conducted self-sacrificial attacks against Syrian Arab Army (SAA) units. 
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volunteer British soldiers, and that of Arab foreign fighters who mobilised to defend their 
co-religionists. In order to support such an argument and help differentiate between Arab 
foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists, this section will discuss the targeting and 
radicalisation of both transnational mobilisations.  
 
Targeting and Collateral Damage 
 
At the most basic level, the intentional targeting of either military forces, or civilians and 
non-combatants, helps to distinguish Arab foreign fighters participating in defensive jihad 
from Islamist terrorists. Although ideology may not be the sole driver of targeting, it does 
provide Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists with ‘an initial range of legitimate 
targets … as a means by which … to justify attacks’ (Drake, 1998: 53). Put into historical 
context, ideologically during ‘the Second World War, the civilian became the legitimate 
target’ (Ambrose, 1998: 116). In the three case study chapters the research found that the 
targeting by Arab foreign fighters was predominantly directed against Soviet troops, the US 
led military coalition, and Syrian regime forces, respectively. In 1980s Afghanistan and 
Iraq (post 2003), Arab foreign fighters were participating in defensive jihad targeting 
foreign occupation forces – occupations that lacked full international support.315 Perhaps 
this lack of full international support underpinning the invasions made resistance to them 
all the more legitimate in the eyes of Arab foreign fighters. Arguably the same logic could 
apply to the Syrian insurgency vis-à-vis the perceived lack of support for the Syrian regime 
in the eyes of the international community.316 The philosophy of targeting predominantly 
military forces within the crucible of defensive jihad, contrasts sharply with Islamist 
terrorist related activities. 
 
                                                 
315 As noted in Chapter 5, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2004) believed that the invasion of Iraq ‘was 
not in conformity with the UN Charter … it was illegal.’ Later UK former Lord Chief Justice Lord Bingham 
(2008) described the war as ‘a serious violation of international law.’ 
316 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2015: 2) Resolution 2254 called on the Syrian government 
and all parties to ‘engage in formal negotiations on a political transition process on an urgent basis.’ Implicit 
in the resolution was a transition without President Bashar al-Assad. The governments of the US, UK, 
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have publically denounced the legitimacy of the al-Assad regime. 
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Islamist terrorism that involves the intentional targeting of civilians and non-combatants 
appears altogether different. After the 1980s Afghan jihad some of the veteran Afghan 
Arabs switched from targeting Soviet troops, to involvement in Islamist terrorist attacks 
that targeted civilians and non-combatants. As noted in Chapter 4, these included the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the WTC attacks in 1993 and 2001. In Iraq, the 
point of inflection that signalled the move from defensive jihad to Islamist terrorism was 
the targeting switch, away from US led coalition troops and onto Iraqi civilians and non-
combatants, as shown in Figure 5.3. Unlike the clear delineation between defensive jihad in 
1980s Afghanistan and the subsequent Islamist terrorism in the 1990s, the Iraqi insurgency 
blurred the distinctions317 somewhat in that Iraqi police and army units (because they were 
mainly Shia) were also targeted. The sectarian overlay within the Iraqi insurgency certainly 
complicated the overall picture, however relying on Schmid’s (2013a: 86) ‘revised 
academic consensus definition of terrorism,’318 Ganor (2010),319and the US Department of 
State (2015: 388),320 attacks on trained Iraqi police and army units321 remain more akin to 
defensive jihad. Finally in Syria, those attacks that did intentionally target civilians and 
non-combatants could reasonably be considered terroristic in nature, and part of a wider 
strategy of genocide.322 
 
In Syria, there were numerous attacks against the military apparatus of the Syrian regime 
that also caused civilian casualties (collateral damage), but as noted in Chapter 6 (and 
Appendix F) they often appeared to be misdiagnosed in the CPOST database as attacks 
                                                 
317 From Chapter 4, an insurgency was understood to mean ‘a hybrid form of conflict that combines 
subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism … [in] an internal struggle in which a disaffected group seeks to 
gain control of a nation’ (Mockaitis, 1990: 3). 
318 Schmid’s (2013a: 86) ‘revised academic consensus definition of terrorism’ includes ‘targeting mainly 
civilians and non-combatants’ – which Iraqi military units are not.  
319 As noted in Chapter 1, according to Ganor (2010) ‘the targets of terrorism are civilians’ thus excluding 
Iraqi military and police units. Attacks on these units appear more akin to defensive jihad as part of an 
insurgency. 
320 The US Department of State (2015: 388) label ‘military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who 
are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting’ as civilians. As Iraq is reasonably considered a war zone 
or a war-like setting’ – Iraqi military personnel would not qualify as civilians. 
321 The adjective ‘trained’ is used to differentiate between untrained recruits (who are more akin to civilians) 
and fully trained soldiers or policemen who are operationally active, in a ‘war zone.’   
322 As noted in Chapter 6, genocide is defined in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) and includes acts that are ‘committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’ UN confirmation of genocide occurring in 
Syria is outlined in UNHRC (2016: 1) and USCIRF (2016: 121).  
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against civilians. The view within political Islam on collateral damage was touched on in 
Chapter 3 but it is worth reiterating that there is ideological support based on a fatwa 
(Majmua al Fatawa 28/537) issued by Ibn Taymiyya. Within the context of human shields 
(‘when the kaffir takes Muslims as human shields’) according to Ibn Taymiyya, it becomes 
permissible to fire at civilians and non-combatants (Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 2003: 90). 
There is also further theological support for the inevitability of collateral damage, with 
Islamists drawing on the words of the Prophet Muhammad, who sanctioned the use of a 
rock throwing catapult during the 630 siege of Taif (in Saudi Arabia), where enemy fighters 
were mixed with a civilian population. Despite any cries of ‘no moral equivalence,’ 
collateral damage is an accepted and indeed planned for, consequence of combat, 
perpetrated by both state and non-state actors,323 the only real difference being the non-state 
actor is normally employing a less conventional method of attack. 
 
The notion of collateral damage comes down to assessing the intention behind the attack(s). 
Invariably, civilians that are killed unintentionally are labelled collateral damage. Collateral 
damage is addressed by conventional militaries using the Law of Armed Conflict that 
‘stipulates that anticipated civilian or non-combatant injury or loss of life … incidental to 
attacks must not be excessive in relation to the expected military advantage to be 
gained.’324 The incidence of civilian casualties as a result of Arab foreign fighters attacking 
a military target has manifested itself particularly in Iraq and Syria. As noted in Chapter 5, 
collateral damage in Iraq was addressed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (2005), who whilst 
acknowledging the prohibition of killing ‘those who are not intended as targets, such as 
women and children,’ justified collateral damage ‘under the principle of daroorah325 … in 
order to ward off a greater evil, namely, the evil of suspending jihad.’ A similar theological 
justification was also proffered by the late ISIS spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani 
(2014), who argued that ‘whether the disbeliever is civilian or military … both of them are 
                                                 
323 According to US Joint Fires and Targeting Handbook (2007) collateral damage is an ‘the unintentional or 
incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the 
circumstances ruling at the time (p. 1-22), and thus a Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) is conducted as part 
of the planning process.  
324 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation 
Methodology. 12 October 2012. (p. D-1). 
325 In Chapter 5, the Arabic word daroorah was defined as ‘necessity’ (Wehr, 1980: 538), and chimes with the 
‘doctrine of necessity’ (Cooper, 1977). 
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disbelievers … the only things that make blood illegal and legal to spill are Islam and an 
Islamic covenant.’ Yet these views are not universally supported, as other Arab foreign 
fighters and Islamist terrorists hold more philosophical views towards collateral damage. In 
Syria for example, as noted in Chapter 6, Iraqi bomb maker Ibrahim al-Khazali, argued that 
‘those who were caught up in the attacks will be accepted by God’ (Chulov, 2015); while 
Saudi foreign fighter Ayachi Abdul Rahman argued that ‘killing the innocent along with 
the enemy is not acceptable’ (Shelton, 2013). The point to be taken away is that by 
examining the targeting patterns of the two transnational mobilisations, despite the 
existence of collateral damage, it is possible to start distinguishing between Arab foreign 
fighters participating in defensive jihad, and those involved in Islamist terrorist related 
activities. 
 
Radicalisation 
 
The second method to help differentiate between Arab foreign fighters and Islamist 
terrorists was by using the notion of radicalisation. Accepting that radicalisation is ‘a 
contentious term vulnerable to subjective and retroactive application’ (Beevor, 2016: 3), it 
has been used in this thesis and understood to mean the ‘social and psychological process 
of incrementally experienced commitment to [an] extremist political or religious ideology’ 
(Horgan, 2009: 152), that may eventually cross a threshold that leads to violence. As noted 
in the three case study chapters, there was no compelling evidence to suggest that most 
Arab foreign fighters (with no known prior links to Islamist terrorism), who initially 
partook in defensive jihad in 1980s Afghanistan, or Iraq (post 2003), or Syria (post 2011), 
were necessarily radicalised. This finding is largely predicated on the theoretical framework 
variables that included geographical origin; age; faith; friendship and kinship ties; political 
and religious ideology; and by comparison with historical military parallels. Using the 
conceptualisations advanced by Neumann (2013: 873), this suggests that Arab foreign 
fighters did not necessarily hold extremist beliefs (cognitive radicalisation), or exhibit 
extremist behaviour (behavioural radicalisation) – a typology empirically supported by 
Bartlett and Miller (2012: 2). The last point, the apparent lack of behavioural radicalisation, 
is perhaps the most counter-intuitive finding, in that many Arab foreign fighters clearly 
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demonstrated violent (albeit not extremist involving terrorism) behaviour whilst 
participating in defensive jihad. However, national standing armies also demonstrate 
violent behaviour in war zones but are not considered radicalised, hence this warrants a 
greater discussion.  
 
The three case study chapters found that Arab foreign fighters were largely volunteers, who 
engaged in defensive jihad often employing unconventional tactics against a hostile and 
militarily superior force. The fact that the hostile military force is representing a 
government or governments (in the case study chapters the former Soviet Union, the US led 
coalition, and Syria respectively), to link the notion of radicalisation to Arab foreign 
fighters, suggests political expediency. According to Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010: 
901) the ‘conventional wisdom’ on radicalisation has been sapped of its ‘scientific value,’ a 
view supported by Neumann (2013: 878), who argued that the term radicalisation ‘is 
believed to serve political agendas [and] is inherently context-dependent, and its meaning 
will always be contested.’ In many ways governments, the media, and some scholars, have 
conflated Arab foreign fighters and Islamist terrorists by linking them together through the 
notion of radicalisation - yet perhaps it is the notion of radicalisation that separates the two 
mobilisations.    
 
It was instructive that Chapter 6 found a lack of radicalisation amongst both the Western 
(mainly American) foreign fighters, who were fighting against ISIS in Syria, and amongst 
Arab foreign fighters who were fighting against Syrian regime forces. Both cohorts were 
not necessarily radicalised in the sense of cognitive or behavioural radicalisation, but were 
fighting their respective combatant enemies whilst largely eschewing violence against 
civilians and non-combatants. They both had deeply held beliefs that innocent people were 
being killed on a large scale, and that something needed to be done. Arguably it may have 
been a sense of righteousness (despite the normative value attached to it), rather than 
radicalisation, which motivated both cohorts.    
 
The notion of extreme radicalisation appears to be more applicable to those Arab foreign 
fighters who became involved in Islamist terrorism that included atrocities amounting to 
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genocide. The three case study chapters found that over time, in some cases, there appeared 
to be a greater acceptance of both extremist beliefs (cognitive radicalisation) and extremist 
behaviour (behavioural radicalisation). Yet despite this perceived state of extreme 
radicalisation, are the perpetrators of Islamist terrorism actually radicalised? Are there 
historical military examples involving national standing armies perpetrating similar 
atrocities, and if so, were they considered radicalised? This conundrum is covered later in 
the chapter 
 
The Lack of Nuance between Suicide Attacks and Martyrdom Operations 
 
Introduction 
 
The second major finding of this research is that suicide attacks aimed at civilians and non-
combatants are not necessarily synonymous with martyrdom operations aimed at military 
targets, as such blanket labelling removes nuance and hinders conceptual understanding. As 
noted earlier in the chapter, just as Neumann (2013: 878) argued that the term radicalisation 
‘is inherently context-dependent, and its meaning will always be contested,’ so Fierke 
(2014: 205) also recognised that the term suicide bombing ‘isolates the action from a 
political context, and thereby depoliticizes and criminalizes it.’ The three case study 
chapters identified ‘clear cut’ suicide attacks – those intentionally targeting civilians and 
non-combatants, yet there were instances where due to military inferiority (a point also 
raised by M. Taylor, 1991: 191), Arab foreign fighters attacked military targets that often 
involved a self-sacrificial element. As noted in Chapter 6, the tactic of employing inghimasi 
attacks has (re)surfaced in Syria, despite clear ideological differences between the groups 
of what constitutes an inghimasi attack vis-à-vis the appropriate target.326 Based on the 
research undertaken for this study, that included 187 identified Arab foreign fighters who 
conducted self-sacrificial attacks,327 there is a tactical, conceptual, and ideological divide 
                                                 
326 As noted in Chapter 6, while ISIS employ inghimasi attacks as a military tactic (Dabiq Issue 2, p. 13); 
Jabhat al-Nusrah employs them against civilians and non-combatants (Inspire Issue 14, p. 42). 
327 The research conducted for this study identified 187 self-sacrificial attacks (both martyrdom operations 
and suicide attacks) - 110 in Iraq (post 2003) and 77 in Syria (post 2011). The actual identity of the 
individuals (Arab foreign fighter / Islamist terrorist) and their intended targets amounted to 33 in Iraq, and 77 
in Syria.    
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between those attacking a military target (within the context of an insurgency), and those 
attacking civilians and non-combatants (whether as part of an insurgency or within a 
peacetime environment). To lump all attacks that generally (but not always – see below) 
involve the death of the attacker as a suicide attack, is simplistic if not misleading, and 
lacks nuance as regards to the underlying motivations, intentions, and circumstances. In 
order to support such an argument, the next section will discuss the typology of ‘suicide 
attacks,’ the importance of targeting, and finally leverage historical military examples of 
martyrdom.    
 
The Typology of a Suicide Attack 
 
The research conducted for this study found that, based on conventional wisdom, the 
broadly agreed academic definition of a suicide attack appears to be unreliable, and is at 
best a platitude. Many notable academics seem to regurgitate uncritically the explicit theme 
that ‘the perpetrator’s death is a precondition of a successful attack,’328 while ignoring the 
physical targets of such attacks. This raises two aspects. First, the success of Japanese 
kamikaze pilots in WWII was measured by how ‘effective [they were] in hitting ships’ (US 
Department of the Navy, 1970: 80), and not on ‘the perpetrator’s death.’329 Second, the 
definitional focus on ‘the perpetrator’s death’ also does not take into account instances 
when perpetrators of self-sacrificial attacks do survive. 330  For example, Saudi foreign 
fighter Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya, introduced in Chapter 1, blew himself up in Iraq in 2004 
killing 12 Iraqi civilians, but although injured, he survived. Based on current academic 
definitions, al-Shaya’s attack would be deemed ‘unsuccessful’ and not labelled a suicide 
attack, despite killing 12 civilians. This is a recurring and constant theme within the 
literature on suicide terrorism, yet it is not necessarily an accurate typology and appears at 
odds with the thesis findings and the reality on the ground. The only known scholar 
                                                 
328 The authors include Schweitzer (2000), Ganor (2000: 6), Cook (2004: 135); Pedahzur and Perlinger (2006: 
151), Pape (2005: 10), Dolnik (2006: 153), Hafez (2007b: 6), Moghadam (2011: 6), Singh (2011: 3), and De 
La Corte (2014: 4).  
329 According to the US Department of Navy (1970: 80), ‘14.7 percent of kamikaze sorties … were effective 
in hitting ships.’ 
330 Examples include Saudi Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya in December 2004 in Iraq; Muhammad Jarrallah in 
February 2014 in Syria (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Information Centre, 2014: 19); and Abu Alaa’ al-
Muhajir in August 2014 in Syria ((@JihadNews2. (2014, August 03)). 
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identified during this study who disputed the academic definition was Merari (2010: 9), 
who argued that ‘the assertion that the attacker’s death is essential for the success of the 
operation is not always true.’  
 
One of the definitions of ‘suicide’ is ‘a self-destructive action,’331 therefore a suicide attack 
may be considered ‘an attack that involves a self-destructive action.’ However, it is notable 
that the 1981 Irish Republican Army (IRA) hunger strikes, that resulted in ten deaths, were 
never labelled (for example) ‘suicide starvation’ – despite it being a self-destructive action 
involving starvation, albeit with a wider political objective (against the UK government). It 
is therefore important to identify the actual intent of a ‘self-sacrificial attack’ which is 
normally to attack a target (within an offensive or defensive setting), populated by military 
personnel, or civilians and non-combatants, or a combination of the two, accepting that the 
result will likely include the attacker’s own demise. Whilst suggesting the disaggregation of 
non-state actor self-sacrificial attacks (martyrdom operations and suicide attacks), even 
these two terms fail to really capture the essence and intent of their missions, when 
compared with historical military examples. For instance, as Koch (2000) noted, ‘the 
demand for unselfish self-sacrifice’ (p. 228) placed upon the Hitler Youth, found that 
‘when cornered they frequently fought to the last child’ (p. 249). This leads to the 
suggestion for the possible need for an overarching category of ‘self-sacrificial action’ or 
‘self-destructive action’ – that could then be subsequently categorised to include non-state 
actions involving a variety of intended targets (including oneself as a hunger striker).   
 
As a result of the three case studies, a suicide attack would arguably be more accurately 
defined as ‘an attack where an individual initiates an explosive device that is being driven 
or carried, intentionally targeting civilians and non-combatants, even if the individual 
survived.’ 332  This definition overlaps correctly with the ‘revised academic consensus 
definition of terrorism’ (Schmid, 2013a: 86), while satisfying the requirement to distinguish 
between attacks that target military forces and those that target civilians and non-
combatants (Moghadam, 2011: 5). Whilst it may perhaps appear contrived, distinguishing 
                                                 
331 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1995: 1393). The other definition is ‘the intentional killing of oneself,’ 
which within the context of a ‘suicide attack’ does not accurately reflect the action. 
332 This proposed thesis definition draws on that of Merari (2010: 27).  
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between targets (civilian or military) underpin much of the Law of Armed Conflict and 
International Humanitarian Law (as outlined in Chapter 2), adopted by most Western 
national standing armies. This suggested definition of a suicide attack also more accurately 
represents the predicted demise of the attacker as a means to an end (to harm civilians), 
rather than an end in itself. Conversely, it is suggested that self-sacrificial attacks should 
not be labelled suicide attacks, if they are targeting military forces (foreign or otherwise) 
that are engaged in a military occupation against the majority will of the people of that 
country (the USSR in 1980s Afghanistan; the US led coalition in Iraq; or the Syrian Arab 
Army in Syria), for reasons that are set out below.  
  
Targeting 
 
Despite the limitations of some databases in accurately identifying the intended target of 
self-sacrificial attacks (for example the CPOST highlighted in Chapter 6 and Appendix F), 
careful analysis of supporting documents has revealed that the intended targets appeared to 
relate broadly to group ideology, identity, and strategy. Whilst this is in harmony with 
Drake (1998), their employment in Iraq is instructive. In Iraq, Figure 5.3 demonstrated that 
out of the 512 identified self-sacrificial attacks, 17 percent (86) targeted US led coalition 
troops; 39 percent (200) targeted Iraqi police and army units; and 44 percent (226) targeted 
Iraqi civilians and non-combatants. These figures correlate well with the changing ideology 
and strategy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and draw out three points. 
 
First, al-Zarqawi initially sought to resist the US led invasion, by targeting coalition forces 
employing self-sacrificial attacks (namely martyrdom operations). Although the US led 
coalition labelled them ‘suicide attacks’ – a pejorative term - such tactics are often 
employed by the weaker party (Hoffman, 2006: 155; Fierke, 2014: 199), when combating a 
numerically superior military force. Despite the US led coalition’s armoured vehicles, it 
was an effective tactic (killing 118 coalition troops), and arguably well within the arsenal of 
Arab foreign fighters participating in defensive jihad. As noted earlier, the Arab foreign 
fighters in Iraq were resisting a hugely contentious invasion of Arab territory, which did not 
enjoy the full support of the UN Security Council. Such resistance, including the use of 
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self-sacrificial attacks, appeared to be viewed by Arab foreign fighters as a legitimate 
defence of Arab land. As Chapter 5 found, the evidence from the biographies of those Arab 
foreign fighters who conducted self-sacrificial attacks against US led coalition troops, 
suggested that they were not necessarily radicalised. Devout, incensed, humiliated, and 
revengeful appeared to be a more accurate portrayal of their motivational circumstances. 
 
Second, the switch in targeting of self-sacrificial attacks from US led coalition forces to 
Iraqi police and army personnel, continued to remain under the rubric of defensive jihad – 
due to their military and para-military nature. Despite the Iraqi military personnel being 
predominantly Shia and thus drawing on the (often terroristic) notion of takfir, the 
employment of self-sacrificial attacks in the form of martyrdom operations, suggests 
military necessity, tactical efficiency, sacrifice and a life hereafter. The pejorative labelling 
of such attacks as ‘suicide attacks’ is potentially misleading and problematic, in that by 
conceptualising all self-sacrificial attacks as ‘suicide attacks,’ it ignores the ideology and 
context of the violence. 
 
Third, the switch in self-sacrificial attacks targeting Iraqi civilians and non-combatants, 
whilst reflecting the prevailing ideology of al-Zarqawi,333 are more clearly conceptualised 
as suicide attacks that sit under the rubric of Islamist terrorism. It is interesting from 
Chapter 5, that those Arab foreign fighters who targeted US led coalition troops had an 
average age of 25, had no specific trait, nationality, or known previous terrorist links. In 
comparison, assuming that the dataset is representative in both instances, those Arab 
foreign fighters who targeted Iraqi civilians and non-combatants had a lower average of 21, 
with 46 percent of them originating from Saudi Arabia. This suggests perhaps that the 
suicide bombers who targeted Iraqi civilians and non-combatants may have had ‘a greater 
openness to increased engagement’ (Horgan, 2005: 101) due to their age, and who also 
originated from a country where ‘children are exposed to the most extreme cases of 
intolerance and calls to violence during their education’ (USCIRF, 2011: 141; ICRD, 2013: 
v).  
                                                 
333 Al-Zarqawi (2004a) made no distinction between Iraqi military targets and Iraqi civilians/non-combatants. 
This was based on the view that ‘the Shia’ had taken ‘control of the institutions of the state and their security, 
military, and economic branches’ making them ‘the real enemy.’ 
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In Syria, relying on the assumption that the majority of self-sacrificial attacks were 
conducted by Arab foreign fighters (Weiss and Hassan, 2015: 168; Dodwell et al., 2016a: 
31; Gerges, 2016: 67), out of the 168 self-sacrificial attacks (from Figure 6.4), 82 percent 
targeted Syrian military targets (effectively martyrdom operations), while only 18 percent 
targeted civilians and non-combatants (effectively suicide attacks). This is a reliable finding 
(corroborated also by Winter, 2017b: 17), in that out of the known 77 attacks that identified 
both the Arab foreign fighter and their intended target, 84 percent (65) targeted Syrian 
military targets. This suggests that self-sacrificial attacks were primarily a military tactic in 
order to provide what Hafez (2006a) referred to as, ‘strategic advantages in the context of 
asymmetrical warfare.’ At the individual level, it appears that the label ‘martyrdom 
operation’ is entirely appropriate within the realm of a defensive jihad where fighting a 
military foe is considered fee sabeel Allah (in the path of God).   
 
As noted in Chapter 6, whilst ISIS was proscribed correctly as a terrorist organisation, the 
terroristic nature of the group appeared less apparent through its use of suicide attacks 
(against civilians and non-combatants), which were infrequent. It appears that ISIS 
involvement in Islamist terrorist related activities was more visible in Western countries, 
whilst in Syria it was arguably more visible off the battlefield (in the form of genocide 
including ethnic cleansing). The call for terrorist acts targeting Western countries was first 
promoted by the now deceased ISIS spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (2014), who 
issued a fatwa to ‘kill a disbelieving American or European … including the citizens of the 
countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State.’ It is arguably this targeting 
rationale that gives ISIS its terrorist designation, whereas in Syria its modus operandi 
appears more genocidal.  
 
Historical Military Examples Involving Self-Sacrificial Attacks 
 
According to Merari (2010: 24), ‘suicide attacks by individuals or small groups of soldiers 
of many nations have been carried out before and after World War II.’ Reasonably 
assuming that the soldiers’ targets were opposing military forces, this observation supports 
the thesis argument that there needs to be a broad disaggregation of self-sacrificial attacks, 
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broken down into martyrdom, suicide, and inghimasi attacks. Chapter 6 noted the incidence 
of Japanese Kamikaze pilots who specifically forfeited their lives within ‘the framework of 
a conventional war as part of an organized, large-scale military activity’ (Merari, 2010: 22). 
Chapter 6 also noted the instances of self-sacrificial attacks adopted by those other than 
Arab foreign fighters or Islamist terrorists, for example the Viet Minh during the battle of 
Dien Bien Phu against the French. As far as can be ascertained, the actions by these small 
groups of soldiers (or airmen) at the time, were never labelled suicide attacks, although in 
the post 9/11 era, such a politically convenient label is more likely to be applied (Fierke, 
2014: 205). From an Arab foreign fighter perspective, such historical military examples 
could reasonably be labelled martyrdom operations. 
 
At the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh fighters were attempting to defeat a foreign 
militarily superior occupation force, and gain independence. The parallels with 1980s 
Afghanistan and Iraq are instructive – indeed Pape (2005) argued that suicide attacks are a 
direct consequence of foreign military occupation. What Pape does not do is to differentiate 
between targets, and therefore arguably conflates suicide attacks and martyrdom operations. 
The point to be made here is that there are many historical military examples of soldiers 
carrying out self-sacrificial actions, be they defensive (example the Hitler Youth), or 
offensive (the Viet Minh) in nature, that are tantamount to Arab foreign fighters carrying 
out martyrdom operations against a military target. As Cook (2007: 151) succinctly noted - 
‘the line between bravery in battle and suicide is blurred.’ 
 
The Research Question: How and Why do some Arab Foreign Fighters Cross a 
Threshold to Subsequently Become Involved in Islamist Terrorists Related Activities? 
 
Introduction 
 
Having tentatively established from the three case study chapters that most Arab foreign 
fighters were not necessarily radicalised prior to their involvement in defensive jihad, the 
next logical question would be whether those who subsequently participated in Islamist 
terrorist related activities were themselves actually radicalised. As the thesis employed a 
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radicalisation framework, such a question is pertinent. Also, does it depend on how and 
why they joined a terrorist group? This question is teased out, buttressed in part by the 
question proposed by Beevor (2016: 3), on whether ‘a fighter who … was coerced into 
joining ISIS, [could] be said to have been radicalized.’ As the case study chapters’ findings 
also suggested, not all Arab foreign fighters who subsequently became members of 
proscribed Islamist terrorist groups, appeared to exhibit signs of being radicalised, although 
the thesis findings varied across the three case study defensive jihads. For instance, many of 
the Afghan Arabs who later morphed into Islamist terrorists, clearly demonstrated an 
increasing commitment to an extremist political or religious ideology, by exporting their 
Islamist terrorism to the far enemy.  
 
Yet it is not so clear-cut concerning the Arab foreign fighters in Iraq (post 2003) and Syria 
(post 2011). Here, they were engaged in defensive jihad that was tantamount to an 
insurgency, where according to Merari (1993: 213), the ‘mode of struggle … is dictated by 
circumstances rather than choice’ resulting in the adoption of terrorism, ‘which is the 
easiest form of insurgency.’ This suggests that the ‘mode of struggle,’ in this case Islamist 
terrorism, may be better understood by examination of the dictating circumstances and 
environment of the insurgency, and how they may have contributed to the notion of 
radicalisation. As noted earlier, Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) questioned the 
‘conventional wisdom on radicalisation’ within a Western context, and perhaps the thesis 
findings also challenge the ‘conventional wisdom on radicalisation’ within the context of a 
defensive jihad, as part of an insurgency.334  
 
The trajectory for those Arab foreign fighters who transited through initial involvement in 
defensive jihad to subsequent participation in Islamist terrorist related activities appeared to 
involve situational factors, underpinned by facets of the Lucifer Effect – the situational 
factors encountered whilst participating in defensive jihad, including but not limited to (1) 
the personal experience of close combat in a war zone; (2) being subjected to ideological 
indoctrination (as part of group training and socialisation); and (3) being exposed to 
                                                 
334 This ‘conventional wisdom’ would include the conflation of defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism, and the 
labelling of all self-sacrificial attacks as ‘suicide attacks.’ 
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charismatic authority and obedience to it. These factors are not necessarily autonomous, 
heterogeneous, or discreet, but overlap and intersect with one another, each contributing to 
an overall Lucifer Effect. 
 
The Lucifer Effect 
 
The overarching factor that appears to help explain the trajectory of some Arab foreign 
fighters to subsequently participate in Islamist terrorist related activities is the influence of 
the Lucifer Effect – understood as ‘processes of transformation at work when good or 
ordinary people do bad or evil things’ (Zimbardo, 2007: 5). The notion of the Lucifer Effect 
is based on psychological research conducted by Philip Zimbardo at Stanford University in 
1971, whereby students acted out the roles of either prison guards or prisoners within a 
prison setting. Zimbardo (2007) concluded that individuals’ actions can be ‘traced to 
factors outside the actor, to situational variables and environmental processes unique to a 
given setting’ (p. 8), rather than dispositional qualities of ‘genetic makeup, personality 
traits, character, free will and other dispositions’ (p. 7). It is important to recognise that 
Zimbardo is not alone in his thesis, others scholars have drawn similar conclusions whilst 
studying terrorism and/or genocide, including Crenshaw (1981: 381); Staub (1989: 22); M. 
Taylor (1991: 257); Arendt (1994); and Browning (1998: 209).335 
 
It is worth briefly discussing the notion of ‘ordinary people’ - a term used by both Milgram 
(1974) and Zimbardo (2007) – insofar that it is a relational concept with normative 
connotations. The adjective ‘ordinary’ is understood to mean ‘regular, normal, customary, 
usual, commonplace’ (Oxford Concise Dictionary, 1995: 960), and in the context of 
political contestation may be considered as being ‘far removed from extremism’ 
(Vermeulen and Bovenkerk, 2012: 48). As noted in Chapter 4, in the context of the Arab 
world, Bayat (2010: ix) defines ‘ordinary people’ as ‘the globalizing youth and other urban 
grass roots.’ Additionally, again as noted in Chapter 4, the label ‘ordinary’ when referring 
                                                 
335 Max Taylor (1991: 257) argued that the ‘origins of fanatical violence … seem to lie in situational … 
factors;’ whilst Browning (1998) posited that ‘situational factors were very strong indeed’ (p. 209) turning 
‘ordinary men into willing executioners’ (p. 216). 
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to ‘people’ and ‘men’ has academic ballast, being used effectively by scholars such as F. E. 
Katz (1993) and Browning (1998) respectively. 
 
Returning to the Lucifer Effect, in essence it may be understood as the overarching factor 
that incorporates the three situational variables of combat experience in a war zone, 
ideological indoctrination, and charismatic leadership and obedience to it. The notion of the 
Lucifer Effect (although not the label) was identified earlier by Hannah Arendt who 
followed the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. According to Arendt (1994), Eichmann was 
‘neither perverted nor sadistic … [just] terribly and terrifyingly normal’ (p. 276), who 
demonstrated ‘the banality of evil’ (p. 287), having simply been swept up in the situational 
environment of 1930s National Socialism in Germany (p. 31). According to Milgram 
(1974: 6), Arendt’s findings come ‘closer to the truth than one might dare to imagine.’ 
Although psychological assessments are rare, it is instructive that the now de-classified 
CIA (2003) ‘psychological assessment of Abu Zubaydah’336 found that his ‘background did 
not indicate … a history of disturbance or other psychiatric pathology’ (p. 546). This 
chimes with the view of forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman (2013) who also concluded 
that Abu Zubaydah was ‘frighteningly normal.’ The notion of being ‘terrifyingly’ or 
‘frighteningly’ normal, is of course a normative argument, thus may be better 
conceptualised as being ‘ordinary’ – as defined earlier in this chapter. The thesis dataset 
reveals the ordinariness (or normality) of the majority of Arab foreign fighters – the 
overwhelming majority had not been imprisoned, or been involved in prior Islamist 
activism including terrorism.  
 
The findings from Chapter 4 established that the majority of Afghan Arabs possessed an 
idealised notion of defending co-religionists in the defensive jihad in 1980s Afghanistan, 
and (again the majority) had no known prior links to Islamist terrorism. Yet it was found 
that the environment that evolved in Afghanistan after (and not necessarily during) the 
defensive jihad, nurtured an ideology that was terroristic in nature (Strick van Linschoten 
and Kuehn, 2012: 69). Perhaps it is no surprise that much of the later ideological influence 
                                                 
336 Introduced in Chapter 4, Abu Zubaydah was a Palestinian expatriate living in Saudi Arabia, who became 
an Afghan Arab and maintained a diary of his experiences. He was later ‘wrongly’ considered (Sageman, 
2013) to be ‘the third or fourth man in Al-Qaeda’ (US Central Intelligence Agency, 2003). 
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originated from Egyptian Islamist terrorists (EIG and EIJ) who effectively hijacked the 
original notion of defensive jihad. This resulted in some ‘terrifyingly or frighteningly 
normal’ men becoming involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. The overarching 
notion of the Lucifer Effect – involving ‘situational variables … unique to a given setting’ 
(Zimbardo, 2007: 8),337 appears to help explain why some veteran Afghan Arabs from the 
thesis dataset (who had no known pre-existing terrorist links) eventually became involved 
in Islamist terrorist related activities. 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, the defensive jihad in Iraq (post 2003) soon developed into ‘a civil 
war’ (Fearon, 2007) that resulted in an insurgency involving Islamist terrorist activity, that 
was broadly based on the ideology of takfir against Shia Muslims who were dehumanised 
as ‘crafty and malicious scorpion[s]’ (al-Zarqawi, 2004a). This explicit identification and 
dehumanisation of the enemy again chimes with the findings of Zimbardo (2007: 17), who 
suggested that ‘war engenders cruelty and barbaric behaviour against anyone considered 
the Enemy, as the dehumanized, demonic Other.’ The notion of dehumanisation (and other 
‘situational factors’) was recognised by Browning (1998: 216), who found it “was 
sufficient to turn ‘ordinary men’ into ‘willing executioners’” in Poland in the Second World 
War. Returning to Iraq, the Lucifer Effect acting on Arab foreign fighters included combat 
in a (civil) war zone; a takfiri ideology that dehumanised Shia Muslims; being constantly 
targeted by Western and Iraqi troops; and the requirement of swearing allegiance to al-
Zarqawi (resulting in obedience to authority). These factors, which were ‘outside the actor’ 
(Zimbardo, 2007: 8) offer a persuasive explanation as to why some Arab foreign fighters in 
Iraq subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities, involving suicide 
attacks against civilians and non-combatants.  
 
The ‘situational variables and environmental processes’ (Zimbardo, 2007: 11) in the 
insurgency in Syria (post 2011) had many similarities with those in Iraq (post 2003), indeed 
ISIS, their leadership, and their ideology, spawned from Iraq after the US withdrawal of 
                                                 
337 Chapter 4 found these factors and situational variables included, but were not limited to, terrorist training 
and ideological indoctrination (often by those with known previous terrorist links); obedience to authority (in 
this case Osama bin Laden); the inability of many Afghan Arabs to reintegrate back into their societies; and 
‘comradeship’ ties. 
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troops (Gerges, 2016: 50), and expanded into parts of Syria. As Chapter 6 established, most 
of the Arab foreign fighters had no known previous links to terrorism or defensive jihad, 
yet some were subsequently involved in Islamist terrorist related activities including 
genocide, primarily against Shia (Alawite) Muslims and Yazidi Christians. The 
identification of a dehumanised ‘out-group’ within inter- and intra-group hostilities, helps 
shape the Lucifer Effect, creating “a hostile imagination … embedded deeply in their minds 
by propaganda that transforms those others into ‘The Enemy’” (Zimbardo, 2007: 11).  
 
Combat Experience in a War Zone 
 
Unlike a nation’s standing army that operates under the auspices of the Geneva Convention 
and Law of Armed Conflict (LoAC), Arab foreign fighters participating in defensive jihad 
within a war zone (that involves insurgency, guerrilla tactics, and terrorism in a civil war 
setting), arguably operate in a less humane, legal framework. They do not necessarily enjoy 
the privileges afforded to prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention, particularly 
during inter- and intra-group conflict (such as in 1980s Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria), where 
torture and death appear possible outcomes. 338  Additionally there is the existence of 
‘combat stress, with its real fear of death, [which] is quite different from other kinds of 
stress’ (Watson, 1978 as cited in Grossman, 2009: 51). It is instructive therefore that a 
British foreign fighter in Syria, Abu Salman al-Britani, reflected that ‘no one can feel the 
reality of a battle regardless of how many movies … one watches until he has actually been 
there,’ recalling that in his ‘first battle … lay a brother with the majority of his head 
missing and the whole of his brain exposed’ (Van Ostaeyen, 2016). This is arguably the 
crucible of defensive jihad, in which ‘98% of fighters in Syria had some direct exposure to’ 
(Perliger and Milton, 2016: 39). 
 
Such combat experience in a war zone appeared to push some Arab foreign fighters further 
along a trajectory to more extreme violent behaviour, including atrocities and acts of 
Islamist terrorism. Broader research on armed conflict however suggests that such 
                                                 
338 The thesis dataset identifies 22 cases of internecine deaths, most generally as a result of kidnapping, torture, 
and eventual execution.   
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behaviour is often more the norm than the exception: Bilton and Sim (1993: 370) posited 
that ‘war is hell … atrocities are inevitable;’ while Browning (1998: 160) was more 
specific, arguing that ‘war, and especially a race war, leads to brutalization, which leads to 
atrocity.’ Therefore, according to Ambrose (1998: 108), ‘atrocity is part of war that needs 
to be faced and discussed.’ There are many instances of nations’ standing armies 
committing atrocities against civilians and non-combatants (in effect war crimes). A 
particular infamous example would be the My Lai massacres in the Vietnam War 
(discussed in Chapter 6), which according to American psychiatrist Robert Lifton, was ‘an 
atrocity-producing situation’ (Oliver, 2006: 111).  
 
The massacre at My Lai appeared deceptively normal; Oliver (2006: 109-110) argued that 
‘the crimes of war … committed by US servicemen in Vietnam were primarily a product of 
the conflict itself.’ Specifically, Richard Holmes (2004: 391) identified that the ‘road to My 
Lai was paved, first and foremost, by the dehumanisation of the Vietnamese.’ Together at 
My Lai, these situational factors led to ‘a culture of violence, of brutality, with people 
around you doing the same thing … there came a point when nothing mattered anymore’ 
(Bilton and Sim, 1993: 368). This ‘culture of violence’ in Vietnam appeared be occur as a 
result the ‘action-reaction syndrome’ (Crenshaw, 1981: 385), whereby ‘violence becomes 
cyclical, ratcheted by corresponding strike and counter-strike’ (Mumford, 2012: 11). It 
appears that the situation in Vietnam, or in the words of Mumford (2012: 12), ‘the 
permissive structural environment,’ that the US soldiers found themselves in, generated a 
certain psychology - perhaps a culture - of violence where even the Geneva Conventions 
and the LoAC were sometimes flouted. Since the 9/11 attacks, Western armies in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan have been accused of serious atrocities, including British forces, resulting 
in the establishment of the (now discredited in 2017) Iraq Historic Allegations Team 
(IHAT), who had been investigating 1351 ‘allegations of abuse of Iraqi civilians by UK 
armed forces personnel’ (IHAT, 2016).  
 
With this in mind, perhaps Western society should not be surprised that non-state actors 
including Arab (and Western) foreign fighters also commit atrocities in war zones. All 
nations’ standing armies draw from the same pool of young citizens within society, some 
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enlist to become regular combatants, whilst a small minority may become non-state actors. 
Weiss and Hassan (2015: 129) made the same point about Arab foreign fighters in Syria: 
‘these are the same guys that militaries around the world have been counting on forever to 
be privates or infantrymen. They are knucklehead nineteen-year-olds looking to do 
something in their life.’ This thesis is not suggesting conflating state and non-state 
combatants, however both cohorts experience the violence of close combat, except that 
Arab foreign fighters generally operate in a less regulated environment, with less oversight, 
and less accountability. It is suggested that the longer Arab foreign fighters remained in 
such a war zone, the more predisposed they may become to committing increasingly violent 
atrocities (as recognised in Chapter 6 by Sajer, 1971: 234), including acts of Islamist 
terrorism. This suggestion does need qualifying however insofar that some Arab foreign 
fighters had a very short incubation period in defensive jihad, before executing acts of 
terrorism. Research suggests that these cases invariably involved some form of training and 
ideological indoctrination.   
 
Ideological Indoctrination 
 
The second situational factor that appeared to influence the trajectory of some Arab foreign 
fighters to subsequently participate in Islamist terrorist related activities is the notion of 
ideological indoctrination, often within a training environment. In Chapter 5, it was agreed 
that indoctrination entailed ‘the teaching of a person or group systematically … to accept 
ideas uncritically’ (Oxford Concise Dictionary, 1995: 693). This suggestion is not without 
its detractors including Silke (2009: 96), who argued that ‘you don’t have to teach, you 
don’t have to brainwash, you don’t have to push, you don’t have to pressure, it goes around 
by osmosis’. The notion of osmosis, perhaps compliments the overall thesis findings – the 
two factors are not mutually exclusive; perhaps the notion of ideological indoctrination 
simply reinforces the process of osmosis.    
 
One interesting empirical study conducted by William Sargant, demonstrated ‘how beliefs, 
whether good or bad, false or true, can be forcibly implanted in the human brain; and how 
people can be switched to arbitrary beliefs altogether opposed to those previously held’ 
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(Sargant, 1976: xxii). He concluded that ‘it is quite possible to indoctrinate people with 
ideas … or even deliberate lies; and keep them fixed in these beliefs’ (Sargant, 1976: 234). 
Across the three case study chapters, the incidence of indoctrination appeared to vary, 
particularly concerning the employment of suicide bombers, and the targeting of civilians 
and non-combatants. As Chapter 4 established, many Afghan Arabs remained in 
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal,339 and became exposed to a ‘range of political 
beliefs along the Islamist spectrum’ (Hafez, 2009: 78) - the spectrum of political Islam – 
particularly involving ‘the Jalalabad School of jihad’ (Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 165). This 
created the conditions for the ideological indoctrination of many Afghan Arabs,340 who 
subsequently returned to their countries to attack the near enemy (for example Algeria and 
Libya), or became involved in terrorist attacks that were undergirded by a new ideological 
emphasis that targeted the far enemy (for example the 9/11 attacks). In many cases, training 
camps were established based on nationalities (for example Algerians and Jordanians),341 
where the ideological indoctrination involved either a religious nationalist agenda (Brisard 
and Martinez, 2005: 68; Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 140), or the more transnational global 
terrorist agenda (Gerges, 2005: 119).  
 
The subsequent Islamist terrorism witnessed in Iraq (post 2003) occurring as it did in 
parallel with insurgent violence, was in part due to the presence of ideological 
indoctrination propagated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The Islamist terrorism in Iraq was 
largely sign-posted by suicide attacks against Iraqi civilians and non-combatants, yet the 
ideological indoctrination was underpinned by takfir against all Shia Muslims in Iraq, 
which included the country’s military and police forces. This ideology blurred the targeting 
distinctions (between military and civilians) and consequently blurred the distinctions 
between defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. That said, the results of the analysis 
conducted for Chapter 5 suggested that the ideological indoctrination was primarily aimed 
at two groups of Arab foreign fighters: those newly arrived in Iraq and arguably quite 
                                                 
339 As Chapter 4 discovered, this was in large part due to their respective regimes’ refusal to reintegrate them 
back into society. 
340 As Chapter 4 found, only 14 per cent of the Afghan Arab cohort had documented pre-existing terrorist 
links. 
341 The Algerians attended the Abdul Majid al-Jazairi Camp (Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 167), while the 
Jordanians attended the Tawhid wal-Jihad camp in Herat (Brisard and Martinez, 2005:72). 
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impressionable and ‘more open to influence’ (Horgan, 2005: 101); and those who may have 
had ‘age-related vulnerabilities’ (UNSC CTC, 2015b). It should be noted that the notion of 
vulnerability does not necessarily supplant the agency held by youth, however there is a 
growing body of evidence to suggest that ‘terrorist groups prey upon the vulnerabilities of 
young persons … and in some cases, youth have been … tricked into participating in 
terrorist activities, including suicide bombings’ (US Homeland Security Institute, 2009: 2). 
To buttress this argument, Horgan (2005: 102) also recognised ‘the emotional 
responsiveness of people at a younger age and the increased susceptibility towards greater 
involvement this might bring’ – a position reinforced by Browning (1998: 182) and 
Zimbardo (2007: 21).342 
 
Finally, the ideological indoctrination supporting Islamist terrorism in Syria (post 2011) 
occurred within the context of insurgent violence. As Chapter 6 suggested, much of the 
Islamist terrorism perpetrated by ISIS was more representative of genocide, than specific 
terrorist attacks employing suicide bombers. The ideological current of ISIS, with its 
particular emphasis on the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, the promotion of takfir, 
and the staunchly anti-Shia rhetoric, seems to have been embraced as much by osmosis as 
by indoctrination. What appears apparent in the case of Arab foreign fighters arriving in 
Syria, was the presence of a process of formal ideological indoctrination (al-Tamimi, 2014; 
Mironova et al., 2014: 16; H. Hassan, 2015; Waldeck, 2015: 66; Olidort, 2016; Todenhöfer, 
2015; Gerges, 2016). The key question is, how influential was this ideological 
indoctrination in encouraging acts of terrorism in Syria? The answer appears that it was a 
necessary but not sufficient cause for such acts, and that ‘the phenomenon is far more 
complex than the superficial appeal of jihadist ideology’ (Joffe, 2016: 800). This is 
supported by veteran Egyptian Afghan Arab, Mustafa Hamid, who argued that ‘Arabs 
follow a leader not an idea; they find a person they trust and then they follow him – not the 
idea’ (Hamid as cited in Hamid and Farrall, 2015: 61). Hamid’s argument thus warrants an 
examination of charismatic authority and obedience to it.  
 
                                                 
342 According to Browning (1998: 182), during the occupation of Poland in the Second World War ‘the age of 
men affected their susceptibility to indoctrination’ leading some to become ‘willing executioners’ of the 
Jewish population. 
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Charismatic Authority and Obedience to Authority 
 
The third situational factor that appeared to influence the trajectory of some Arab foreign 
fighters to subsequently participate in Islamist terrorist related activities is the notion of 
charismatic authority and obedience to it. According to Max Weber (as cited in Gerth and 
Wright Mills, 2009: 78), charismatic authority involves a leader who “is personally 
recognized as the innerly ‘called’ leader of men. Men do not obey him by virtue of tradition 
or statute, but because they believe in him.” This understanding is further advanced by 
Hofmann and Dawson (2014), who opined that ‘charismatic authority is a form of 
legitimate domination exercised by an individual who is perceived to possess divinely 
given or inspired abilities’ (p. 340), and ‘is something that is attributed to a leader, and not 
something the leader possesses’ (p. 351). There is broad academic consensus as to the 
centrality and importance of charismatic authority in the birth of Islamist movements, both 
violent and non-violent (Crenshaw, 1994: 264; Dekmejian, 1995: 63; Wiktorowicz, 2005b: 
135; Bjorgo, 2005: 260; Gerges, 2005: 36; Ingram, 2016: 4). In particular, Wiktorowicz 
(2005b) stressed the centrality of ‘reputation and sacred authority’ (p. 24) of Islamic 
scholars, but ‘also other characteristics, like charisma’ (p. 26). It appears that much of their 
role is ‘to transform widespread grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for 
violent struggle’ (Bjorgo, 2005: 260). It should be emphasised however that these scholars 
were examining a rather different cohort – a home-grown Western ‘bunch of guys 
(Sageman, 2004), and not Arab foreign fighters who have already mobilised and 
demonstrated martial fervour in the crucible of defensive jihad. 
  
As noted in Chapter 6, according to Hofmann and Dawson (2014: 358), the notion of 
charismatic authority is ‘a potentially critical element of the process of radicalization.’ In 
particular, according to Bartlett and Miller (2012: 15), this is engendered by “previous 
conflict experience abroad, or the perception of ‘battle hardiness,’ including the charisma 
and gravitas derived from such experiences.” Particular examples of charismatic authority 
from the case study chapters, include Abdullah Azzam (Emerson, 1998; McGregor, 2003; 
Stanley, 2005; Hegghammer, 2008b); Osama bin Laden (Reeve, 1999; Bodansky, 2001; 
Landau, 2002; Bergen, 2002 and 2006; Saghi, 2008); Shaykh Omar Abdul Rahman (Wright, 
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2006; Euben and Zaman, 2009); Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Brisard and Martinez, 2005; 
Napoleoni, 2005; al-Shishani, 2005a, Milelli, 2008); and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (McCants, 
2015; Beevor, 2016; Hofmann, 2016). Concerning ISIS, Beevor (2016: 1) also argued 
persuasively that the group practises ‘coercive radicalisation’ through ‘charismatic 
authority’ once they capture territory, noting that some may be ‘initially unwilling subjects.’ 
This thesis extends Beevor’s (2016) finding by suggesting that some Arab foreign fighters, 
who having mobilised to participate in defensive jihad, appeared to become ‘swept up’ by 
ISIS on their arrival in Syria, regardless of which group they had originally intended to join. 
This appeared to result in some Arab foreign fighters passing through a point of inflection, 
and getting involved (some, somewhat involuntarily) in Islamist terrorist related activities, 
and subsequently defecting from ISIS, as established by Neumann (2015). 
 
In tandem with the notion of charismatic leadership, is the notion of obedience to authority, 
understood to mean ‘a situation in which a person gives himself over to authority and … no 
longer regards himself as responsible for his actions’ (Milgram, 1974: xii). It is clear from 
the evidence presented in the case study chapters, that Islamist terrorist groups demand 
unquestioning obedience, and in many cases require the pledging of allegiance (baya) to a 
charismatic leader. As noted in Chapter 6, the ISIS magazine Dabiq 12 (p. 10) reminds its 
readership that it ‘is obligatory to yield to the opinion [Allah] has chosen and submit to his 
order.’ The impact of obedience to authority was tested by psychologist, Stanley Milgram, 
at Yale University in 1961, whereby ‘a person … is told to carry out a series of acts that 
become increasingly into conflict with conscience’ (Milgram, 1974: 3). He established that: 
 
‘ordinary people … can become agents in a terrible destructive process. Moreover, 
even when the destructive effects of their work become blatantly clear, and they are 
asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality, 
relatively few people have the resources needed to resist authority’ (Milgram, 1974: 
6). 
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It is instructive that the findings of Milgram’s study343 were validated 35 years later by 
Burger (2009), providing perhaps more reason to draw on his findings on the influence of 
authority. Milgram (1974: 189) also makes an important point concerning ‘legitimate 
authority’ and concluded that a ‘substantial number of people do what they are told to do, 
irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they 
perceive that command comes from a legitimate authority.’ The content of the act is 
important, and could reasonably include terrorism and/or genocide, which according to 
Staub (1989: 19), requires a ‘strong respect for authority and strong inclination to 
obedience.’ Historically, according to Bilton and Sim (1993: 362), the US Marines 
involved in the My Lai massacre ‘were following orders in a context in which they had be 
trained to follow orders.’ Scientifically, this chimes with the research of Milgram (1974: 7), 
who established that ‘orders from a man with epaulets, and men are led to kill with little 
difficulty,’ thus arguably the results of his research go some way to explain why some Arab 
foreign fighters subsequently became involved in Islamist related terrorism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis conducted for this thesis established three major findings. First, Arab foreign 
fighters who participate in defensive jihad should not be conflated with Islamist terrorists – 
overlaps notwithstanding, they tend to have different intentions, objectives and targeting 
rationales. Second, suicide attacks aimed at civilians and non-combatants are not 
necessarily synonymous with martyrdom operations aimed at military targets – again the 
intentions, objectives and targeting rationales tend to be different. Third, those Arab foreign 
fighters that subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities were 
influenced by key situational factors that contributed to the Lucifer Effect, including but not 
limited to, the personal experience of close combat in a war zone; being subjected to 
ideological indoctrination (as part of group training and socialisation); and being exposed to 
charismatic authority and obedience to it.   
                                                 
343 All 40 subjects obeyed the experimental commands to administer Shock Level 20 (a fake 300 volts) to 
their victims. Subsequently 26 (65 percent) continued to obey the experimenter’s orders to the end, 
administering a fake 450 volts (Milgram, 1963).  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter draws on the analysis and findings offered in Chapter 7, in order to address the 
‘so what?’ questions and suggest some implications relevant to these findings for policy 
makers and academia. Finally, this chapter reminds the reader of the limitations of the 
study, before offering an overall conclusion. 
 
Implications – Answering the ‘So What?’ Questions 
 
First, Arab foreign fighters who participate(d) in defensive jihad should not be conflated 
with Islamist terrorists – overlaps notwithstanding, they tend(ed) to have different 
intentions, objectives and targeting rationales. So what? From a policy perspective, the 
implications are far reaching, but are perhaps most relevant to Arab governments assuming 
the eventual return of Arab foreign fighters. The assumption is that Arab foreign fighters 
‘who gain combat experience in Iraq and Syria … come back as hardened veterans, steady 
in the face of danger and skilled in the use of weapons and explosives - ideal terrorist 
recruiting material’ (Byman, 2015: 582). Arguably therefore, Arab (and indeed Western) 
governments need to develop individualised reintegration programmes (de-radicalisation 
programmes) that recognise that not all foreign fighters are automatically terrorists. This 
would entail a recalibration in the targeting and reintegration of those who partake in 
defensive jihad, and in particular the content of CT/CVE/PVE messaging – which arguably 
should be crafted with respected and qualified Islamic scholars. This could assist in shaping 
the ‘post-conflict behaviour’ of veteran Arab foreign fighters (and terrorists) and in 
preventing Islamist terrorist attacks in both the Arab world and Europe. 
 
According to Hafez (2012b), the historical ‘post-return behaviour’ of Arab foreign fighters 
includes peacefully reintegrating into society; being co-opted by existing regimes; 
remaining involved in defensive jihad; or becoming (more) involved in religious nationalist 
or transnational terrorism. Aware that half of the above ‘post-return behaviours’ are violent 
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in nature, some Arab foreign fighters returning from Syria are likely to pose a threat to their 
autocratic regimes. The threat is real – already some Arab foreign fighters have returned 
from Syria and inspired or personally conducted terrorist attacks in their home countries 
including Saudi Arabia, 344  Tunisia, 345  Egypt, 346  Libya, 347  Kuwait, 348  and Yemen. 349 
However, what this study has established is the idea that not all Arab foreign fighters are 
necessarily terrorists, and that not all members of ISIS (for example) are necessarily 
terrorists. Treating all Arab foreign fighters returning from Syria as terrorists does not 
correlate with the thesis findings, and lacks a nuanced understanding about the nature of the 
phenomenon, and the threat they may, or may not, represent.    
 
It is clear therefore that if Arab governments and regimes do not (or are unwilling to) 
prevent their citizens from getting involved in a foreign defensive jihad, they would benefit 
from establishing post hoc rehabilitation strategies. Whilst some Arab countries do have de-
radicalisation programmes for example Saudi Arabia (Al-Ansary, 2008; Al-Saud, 2009) 
and the UAE (Al-Sayegh, 2004), many including Morocco (Sakthivel, 2013), Egypt 
(Hussain, 2015), Jordan (Pizzi, 2015), Saudi Arabia (Murphy, 2015), Tunisia (Byman, 
2015: 587), and the UAE (Al-Arabiya, 2016), are also appearing to adopt particularly harsh 
models (some - the UAE - in parallel), including the death penalty.350 This approach is 
again problematic, in that ‘returnees are likely to take up arms ... if the[y] are not being 
integrated into society’ (Byman, 2015: 591). As Chapter 4 found, some veteran Afghan 
                                                 
344 Mosques in Saudi Arabia were bombed on 22 May 2015 (Qatif); 29 May 2015 (Dammam); 6 August 2015 
(Abha); 4 July 2016 (Medina and Qatif).  
345 ISIS inspired attacks in Tunisia include the 18 March 2015 Bardo Museum attack; the 6 June 2015 Port El 
Kantaoui beach resort attack; and the 24 November 2015 bombing in Tunis (against the Presidential Guard).  
346 ISIS inspired attacks in Egypt include the 11 July 2015 attack on the Italian Consulate in Cairo; the 8 
January 2016 attack on the Red Sea city of Hurghada; and the 22 October 2016 assassin of an Egyptian 
general (Adil Rageea).  
347 In addition to ISIS expansion in Benghazi, Sirte, and Tripoli (A. Engel, 2015), ISIS inspired attacks within 
the country include the 27 January 2015 Corinthia Hotel (Tripoli) attack, and the 7 January 2016 Zliten truck 
bombing (killing 60 policemen and wounding 200).  
348 ISIS inspired attacks in Kuwait include the 26 June 2015 bombing of a Shia mosque in Kuwait City 
(killing 27 and wounding 227). 
349 ISIS inspired attacks in Yemen include the 20 March 2015 Sanaa mosque quadruple suicide bombing 
(killing 142 and wounding 351); the 25 March 2016 triple suicide bombing in Aden; the 26 May 2016 
bombing of army recruits in Aden. 
350 For example, the United Arab Emirates ‘sentenced four Emiratis (whose ages ranged from 18 to 29) to 
death in absentia for joining the militant ISIS group and fighting alongside the militant group’s members in 
Syria’ (Al-Arabiya, 2016). Interestingly in the early 1990s, the United Arab Emirates ‘instigated a particularly 
generous package of rewards’ for Emirati Afghan Arabs (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn, 2012: 109).  
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Arabs subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorism due in part to their inability to 
return home without being arrested and imprisoned. Perhaps this was a regime strategic 
decision, as it resulted in Islamist terrorism being perpetrated beyond regime borders and 
thus beyond regime jurisdiction and responsibility - in effect implicitly exporting terrorism 
overseas.  
 
Second, suicide attacks aimed at civilians and non-combatants are not necessarily 
synonymous with martyrdom operations aimed at military targets. So what? This finding is 
probably the most politically unpalatable, due in part to the monopoly states have on the 
application and use of violence. It appears that the state is always right, despite any 
autocratic or totalitarian tendencies of regimes and governments, particularly in the Arab 
world. Such a position makes any resistance to regime and government power illegitimate, 
creating the need to use pejorative terms for those who resist. It is also important to 
recognise the nature and intent supporting martyrdom operations – they are primarily aimed 
at enemy combatants (whether state or non-state actors). It somewhat begs the question 
whether there is any moral, ethical, or legitimate difference between a UK special forces 
attack on an ISIS position (that results in UK casualties), or an Arab foreign fighter’s 
martyrdom operation on an ISIS position (where the fighter also dies). ISIS is a recognised 
terrorist organisation, thus attacking a common enemy by whatever available military 
means, has a degree of legitimacy. The converse is a suicide attack aimed at civilians and 
non-combatants, which has no legitimacy. 
 
Third, those Arab foreign fighters that subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist 
related activities were influenced by key situational factors contributing to the Lucifer 
Effect, including but not limited to, the personal experience of close combat in a war zone; 
being subjected to ideological indoctrination (as part of group training and socialisation); 
and being exposed to charismatic authority and obedience to it. Again, so what? Looking 
first at the influence and impact of personal experience of close combat in a war zone 
within an insurgency, suggests that the challenge is to recognise how this may have 
affected them, on their return to their home country. Arguably, some returning individuals 
are likely to be suffering from mental illness, including PTSD (Briggs and Silverman, 2014: 
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37), and would most likely benefit from some form of decompression and rehabilitation, 
rather than simply being incarcerated in prison. Some Western countries have recognised 
the presence of PTSD in foreign fighters, such as Denmark (Hooper, 2014), and offered 
suitably tailored rehabilitation programmes. If the intent is that of preventing future terrorist 
attacks, recognising and managing the impact of combat experience in an individual, post 
conflict, could have tangible and long term positive effects.    
 
Next the influence and impact of being subjected to ideological indoctrination (as part of 
group training and socialisation) is similar to the personal experience of close combat in a 
war zone. Again, foreign fighters’ minds are likely to need time readjusting to a peacetime 
existence, and absorbing more moderate ideological messaging, for instance at their local 
mosque. The Saudi rehabilitation model perhaps recognises this, and spends many months 
on three programmes that include rehabilitation, counselling, and aftercare (Gardiner, 2017). 
In his edited book, Trauma Rehabilitation After War and Conflict, Erin Martz (2010: 4) 
stressed the importance of the ‘psychological component of … post-conflict rehabilitation.’ 
 
Finally, the influence and impact of being exposed to charismatic authority and obedience 
to it. So what? First, as noted in Chapter 7, a ‘substantial number of people do what they 
are told to do, irrespective of the content of the act’ (Milgram, 1974), thus it appears to be a 
psychological weakness inherent in all humans. This leads to the conclusion that any post-
conflict rehabilitation programme must acknowledge the notion of ‘obedience to authority’ 
and, as highlighted in Chapter 7, how ‘ordinary people … can become agents in a terribly 
destructive process’ (Milgram, 1974: 6). Second, the result of exposure to charismatic 
authority may be addressed by the use of individuals with suitable credentials such as 
fellow reformed foreign fighters (for example Abdullah Anas and/or Musa al-Qarni)), or 
highly respected (although arguably controversial) religious authorities (for example Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi) who are not perceived to be government officials.  
 
The implications of this thesis for academia involve thoughts about future theory building 
and future research. Future theory building includes developing a framework to better 
explain the processes involved that influence foreign fighters (particularly Arabs as they are 
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the predominant ethnic grouping) becoming involved in Islamist terrorism. As discussed 
earlier the thesis radicalisation model struggled to explain this trajectory, resulting in a need 
to draw upon the psychological theories of Arendt, Milgram, Zimbardo, Staub, and F. E. 
Katz - hence a greater reliance on psychology may be more appropriate. This resonates 
with Horgan (2015), who argued that ‘psychology has tremendous potential both to shape 
our understanding of terrorism as well as offering us the basis for a strategic framework … 
whenever there is a crisis, the questions that are at the top of the list relate to psychology.’  
Thus, despite leveraging a large dataset, the theoretical framework whilst helpful, did not 
the advance academic understanding of radicalisation per se, perhaps again leading to 
credence to the argument that ‘the conventional wisdom on radicalisation [is] a failed 
discourse’ (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010).    
 
The implications for future research includes conducting a comparative study that examines 
how Western foreign fighters, who initially participate in defensive jihad subsequently 
become involved in Islamist terrorist related activities. Do the situational variables 
(inherent within a civil war context) affect Western and Arab foreign fighters in the same 
way? Are Western foreign fighters who often lack knowledge of the Arabic language, 
persuaded more easily to commit atrocities including terrorism and genocide? There is 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that this is true (Atteridge, 2016: 23; Neumann, 2016: 104). 
Are there cultural dissimilarities – do Arabs have a greater propensity for obedience to 
authority? Can both the Western and the Arab world learn from each other about 
rehabilitation programmes? Second, this study raises the prospect of investigating the 
influence of family and social ties between Arab foreign fighters, employing Social 
Network Analysis. The existence and importance of such relationships and networks in the 
socialisation process leading to the recruitment, possible radicalisation, and involvement 
with Islamist violence are widely documented (Sageman, 2004; Bakker, 2006; Helfstein, 
2012). The thesis data is of sufficient granularity to be re-analysed using Social Network 
Analysis software, in order to empirically validate the role of social networks in facilitating 
the transition from involvement in defensive jihad, to subsequent involvement in Islamist 
terrorist related activities.  
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Limitations of the Study 
 
It was recognised in Chapter 2 that there would be limitations of practical concern as well 
as theoretical matters concerning ‘threats to validity’ (Robson, 2002: 171) of the research, 
particularly the data, the theoretical framework, and the absence of a control group.  First, 
the threats to validity of the thesis data may include issues of how representative the Arab 
foreign fighters are of the overall phenomenon, and the reliability of the data sources. The 
database, although leveraging information on 3,010 Arab foreign fighters, may still not be 
representative of the overall Arab foreign fighter phenomenon. That said, there are no 
agreed totals of Arab foreign fighter participation, and only in Chapter 6 is there an 
approximation that the dataset collected represents about 11 percent of the overall Arab 
foreign fighter contingent in Syria, based on figures provided by Malet (2015). As the 
research net was cast far and wide (including English and Arabic sources), the dataset 
represents the best ‘open source’ resource on Arab foreign fighters covering the period 
1979 to 2016 (available and known to the author). Second, the reliability of the data was a 
concern, insofar as the research relied largely on information from ‘jihadi’ sources, which 
are inherently propagandistic, possibly unreliable, and constructed more for group 
recruitment than for research. That said, where possible, the data were triangulated using 
other independent sources, and when this was not possible, the researcher’s judgement was 
applied. 
 
The next threat to the thesis validity was the theoretical framework based on the notion of 
radicalisation. As Robson (2002: 171) cautioned, the ‘main threat to providing a valid 
interpretation is that of imposing a framework or meaning on what is happening rather than 
this occurring or emerging from what you learn.’ Although the theoretical framework was 
useful in explaining the future trajectory to Islamist terrorism of many veteran Afghan 
Arabs, it appeared to struggle to accurately explain why some Arab foreign fighters in Iraq 
(post 2003) and Syria (post 2011), subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist 
related activities. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise, as the notion of radicalisation 
is highly contested, leading some scholars to challenge the basis on which it is used, in 
particular Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) in a Western context; Neumann (2013) in a 
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conceptual sense; and Beevor (2016) in the context of ISIS in Syria. It will therefore be 
noticed that the radicalisation framework was not leveraged exclusively to explain the 
trajectories of Arab foreign fighters in Iraq (post 2003) and Syria (post 2011), but was 
inductively augmented by additional theories including those of Milgram (1963, 1974) and 
Zimbardo (1971, 2007), and by contextualisation offered by historical military examples. 
This resulted in a richer account, rendering greater explanatory value. 
 
Finally, less perhaps for veteran Afghan Arabs, there was no control group of those who 
initially participated in defensive jihad, but did not subsequently become involved in 
terrorist related activities. In the case of the Afghan Arabs, seven returned back to their 
country of origin, but they all continued to demonstrate strong Islamist sympathies, thus 
questioning whether they were actually a credible and representative control group. Perhaps 
the absence of a control group for the defensive jihads in Iraq (post 2003) and Syria (post 
2011), demonstrates the interconnectedness between civil war, insurgency, and terrorism. It 
could be argued perhaps that defectors (particularly from ISIS) could constitute a control 
group in that some never embraced terrorism, 351  but having already been members of 
proscribed terrorist organisations, precludes them somewhat as a credible control group. 
This absence of a control group therefore represents a threat to the validity of the study, 
thus the thesis findings and arguments are more suggestive, rather than definitive or 
conclusive.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This study has attempted to explain why and how some Arab foreign fighters, who having 
participated in a defensive jihad against a combatant enemy, subsequently became involved 
in Islamist terrorist related activities that targeted civilians and non-combatants. In the 
attempt, this study has also challenged some basic academic assumptions. Specifically, 
Arab foreign fighters who participate in defensive jihad should not be conflated with 
Islamist terrorists; overlaps notwithstanding, they appeared as different cohorts. This study 
                                                 
351 As noted earlier, many Arab foreign fighters adopted insurgency tactics in both Iraq and Syria, targeting 
only ‘enemy’ military forces. In Syria with the acknowledged overlaps between civil war, insurgency, and 
terrorism, it ‘raises a conceptual question: Is ISIS best described as a terrorist group?’ (Moghadam, 2014).  
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also established the need to disaggregate self-sacrificial attacks that target civilians and 
non-combatants (suicide attacks), and those that target military forces (martyrdom attacks). 
In addition, it also found that the widely accepted definition of a suicide attack appeared 
misleading, focussing more on the demise of the perpetrator, rather than on the intended 
target.  
 
Concerning theory, this study found that the notion of radicalisation appeared to struggle to 
explain the trajectory from involvement in defensive jihad to subsequent participation in 
Islamist terrorism, perhaps due to different points of departure. Radicalisation, being a 
Western conceptualisation, may be more suitable in explaining why Westerners living in 
the West become involved in Islamist terrorism. This however is different to explaining 
why Arabs, who had already mobilised to participate in defensive jihad, subsequently 
became involved in Islamist terrorism. The study suggested that Arab foreign fighters (who 
had no known prior terrorist links) were not necessarily radicalised, and that even those 
who subsequently became involved in Islamist terrorist related activities, were often more 
‘ordinary’ than ‘radicalised.’ This was predicated by the use of comparative historical 
military examples (of atrocities), and the research findings of Stanley Milgram and Philip 
Zimbardo.  
 
The answer to the research question, whilst complex and often involving profoundly 
individual trajectories, appears to be broadly underpinned by facets of the Lucifer Effect – 
the situational factors encountered whilst participating in defensive jihad, including but not 
limited to, the experience of close combat in a war zone; being subjected to ideological 
indoctrination; and being exposed to charismatic authority and obedience to it. This 
suggests, although not definitively, that subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism by 
Arab foreign fighters, is primarily forged in the crucible of defensive jihad.  
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Appendix A 
Quranic Verses Covering Martyrdom and Suicide 
Quranic Reference Narrative 
Al-Baqarah (2:154) And do not say about those who are killed in the way of Allah, 
‘They are dead.’ Rather, they are alive, but you perceive [it] not. 
Al-Baqarah (2.194) And the one who attacks you, attack him in like manner. 
Al-Baqarah (2:195) And do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into 
destruction. 
Al-‘Imran (3:157) And if you are killed in the cause of Allah or die - then forgiveness 
from Allah and mercy are better than whatever they accumulate [in 
this world]. 
Al-‘Imran (3:169) And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah 
as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision. 
Al-‘Imran (3:170) Rejoicing in what Allah has bestowed upon them of His bounty, and 
they receive good tidings about those [to be martyred] after them 
who have not yet joined them - that there will be no fear concerning 
them, nor will they grieve.’ 
An-Nisaa’ (4:29) And do not kill yourselves. Indeed, Allah is to you ever Merciful. 
An-Nisaa’ (4:93) Whosoever intentionally kills a believer, hell is his eternal 
recompense, and the wrath and curse of Allah are upon him, and a 
great punishment is in store for him. 
Al-Ma’idah (5:32) If anyone killed a person not in retaliation of murder … it would 
be as if he killed all mankind. 
Al-An’am (6:51) Do not slay the soul sanctified by God, except for just cause. 
Al-Isra’ (17:33 Do not take a life that Allah has made inviolable without 
justification. 
Ash-Shuraa (42:40) And the retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it.’ 
Muhammad (47:4) And those who are killed in the cause of Allah - never will He waste 
their deeds. 
Muhammad (47:5) He will guide them and amend their condition. 
Muhammad (47:6) And admit them to Paradise, which He has made known to them. 
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Appendix B 
Content Analysis – Coding Matrix 
Categories Codes Remarks 
Geographic origin Nationality Sageman, 2004;  
Silke, 2008 
Migrant Status  
Town of birth  
Age Age of initial involvement in 
jihad 
 
Age of involvement in terrorism  
Education   
Previous jihad experience Country (ies)  
Previous terrorism experience Country (ies)  
Triggering event ‘Significantly provocative 
event’ 
Horgan (2005: 84) 
‘Catalyst events’ Silke (2008: 114) 
‘Cognitive openings’ Wiktorowicz (2005b) 
‘Precipitants’ Crenshaw (2003) 
‘Sense of moral outrage’ Sageman (2008: 75) 
Grievances  
Kinship & social Family ties  
Friendship ties  
Faith Fatwa  
Mosque  
Reformist  
Religious education  
Hajj / Ramadan  
Political Islam Ideologue Charismatic authority 
Defensive jihad  
Offensive jihad  
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Categories Codes Remarks 
Sunni / Shia ‘identity conflicts’ King and Taylor (2011) 
Takfir  
Tawheed (oneness of God)  
Istishhaad (martyrdom)  
Intihaar (suicide)  
Inghimasi (raider)  
Justification for targeting 
Civilians and non-combatants 
 
Establishing an Islamic state.  
Indoctrination ‘Culturing’ Wiktorowicz (2005b) 
‘Influenced by ideas’ Sageman (2008) 
Diagnostic, prognostic frames  
Motivational frames  
Charismatic authority Ibn Taymiyya  
Hassan al-Banna  
Sayyid Qutb  
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab  
Muhammad Abdul Salam Faraj  
Abdullah Azzam  
Osama bin Laden  
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi  
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi  
Comradeship ties   
Obedience to authority   
The Lucifer Effect   
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Appendix C 
Afghan Arab Subsequent Involvement in Global Islamist Terrorism 
 
Ser Name Short Biography 
1 Abu Ali al-
Maliki al-
Jazairi 
Former Algerian Afghan-Arab veteran, who stayed in 
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, and until the fall of the 
Taliban post 9/11. He escaped to eastern Afghanistan where he 
trained foreign fighters on explosives and prepared suicide 
bombers. Killed in US air raid in 2001. 
2 Adil Hadi al-
Jaziri Hamlili 
Algerian. Involved from the age of 11. Father and brother all 
involved. He claims he was involved with transferring illegal 
nuclear material to al-Qaeda (and governments of Iraq & Sudan) 
in 1995. Committed extremist; acknowledged takfiri. 
3 Lakhdar 
Boumediene 
Algerian Afghan Arab. Both a global and religious nationalist 
terrorist. Encouraged by a friend (Abu Mustafa Ahmad) to go to 
Afghanistan. Later involved with GIA and also fought in Bosnia 
with Mujahhid Brigade. Arrested and jailed in Algeria in 1999 
(as member of FIS/GIA). Arrested in Bosnia in October 2001 as 
part of the Algerian Six Cell, plotting an attack against the US 
Embassy in Sarajevo. GTMO detainee, released in 2009. 
4 Mukhtar 
Muhammad 
Belmukhtar 
Former Algerian Afghan Arab, going to Afghanistan in 1991. 
Both a global and religious nationalist terrorist. Head of Katibat 
al Mulathamoon AQIM 4th region in the Sahel. Led attack on 
Algerian oil facility in 2012, and was the suspected planner 
behind hotel attack in Mali (in November 2015).  
5 Mustafa 
Ahmad 
Hamlili 
Former Algerian Afghan-Arab who fled Algeria in 1986 due to 
his political views (although no evidence of terrorism). Both a 
global and religious nationalist terrorist He went to Saudi Arabia 
and was recruited by the IIRO to go to Afghanistan, going in 
1987. Later he was a member of GIA/GSPC. Linked with senior 
Al-Qaeda individuals. Knowledge of AQ Anthrax programme? 
GTMO detainee. 
6 Juma 
Mohammed 
Abdul Latif Al 
Dosari  
Bahraini member of al-Qaeda. Global jihadist. Visited the USA. 
Influenced by a radical shaykh at a mosque. First went to 
Afghanistan in 1989 and Bosnia in 1995. Returned to 
Afghanistan again after 9/11, to fight US. Member of Lakawanna 
Six Cell in US. 
7 Mahmood Abu 
Halima 
Egyptian. Adolescence spent within terrorist group EIG 
(although not personally involved with terrorism). Later moved 
to Germany as an immigrant in 1981 (aged 22). Became an 
Afghan-Arab (in 1988). Met and befriended Ramzi Yusuf and 
planned the 1993 WTC attack in New York. Jailed in 1994.  
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Ser Name Short Biography 
8 Muhsin bin 
Musa  
(Ibrahim 
al−Muhajir) 
Egyptian engineering graduate; 1980s Afghan Arab veteran. 
Moved to Sudan and later involved in 1998 Kenya/Tanzania 
bombings. Explosives expert, who was ‘engineering martyrdom 
operations’ and ‘preparing martyrs’. Killed by US in Afghanistan 
in April 2006. 
9 Omar Abdul 
Rahman 
Egyptian. Known as the 'Blind Shaykh'. Imprisoned in Egypt as a 
member of the Islamic Group (not EIJ - but maintained close ties 
with Zawahiri). On his release from jail, he moved to 
Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he 
moved to New York City, and was involved in the 1993 WTC 
attack in New York. Sentenced to life in a US federal prison for 
his role in the attack; died in February 2017. He has at least three 
sons involved in terrorism (Assad, Muhammad and Ahmad).  
10 Mustafa 
Mahmood  
(Abdul Wakil 
al-Masri) 
Veteran Egyptian jihadi. He was a veteran Afghan Arab and later 
a trainer in al-Furooq Camp. He moved to Sudan and organised 
Somalis against the US, and was directly involved with the 1998 
Kenya/Tanzania US embassy bombings. Returned to 
Afghanistan once under Taliban control, and was killed fighting 
alongside AQ/Taliban forces against the US in 2001. 
11 Mustafa 
Kamel Ibrahim 
(Abu Hamza 
al-Misri) 
Former Egyptian Afghan Arab and later radical cleric who was 
living in London, as the Imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque. 
Inspired many Islamist terrorists. He was imprisoned in the UK 
for 7 years, and then extradited to the US on terrorism charges in 
2012. Sentenced to life in prison on 9 January 2015. 
12 Awf 
Muhammad 
Abdul Rahman 
Egyptian Afghan Arab. Once Afghan civil war broke out, he 
moved to Tajikistan but later returned to Afghanistan and joined 
Bin Laden in Kandahar. Fought the US (post 9/11), and was 
killed by US forces near Jalalabad.  
13 Ahmad Saeed 
Khudr  
Egyptian immigrant to Canada. First went to Afghanistan in 
1984 to fight the Soviets. Returned to Canada, but after 9/11, he 
went back to Afghanistan to support the Taliban and fight the 
US. He escaped but was killed (in 2003). His two sons were 
captured in Afghanistan and sent to GTMO prison. 
14 Sami 
Muhammad 
Tufunkashi 
Key Egyptian Afghan Arab veteran who had fought the Soviets. 
One of the twelve founders of al-Qaeda.  Lived in Afghanistan 
after Taliban took power. Escaped to the FATA after the US 
invasion but later died using a BM rocket. 
15 Abdullah Sami 
Muhammad 
Tufankashi 
Egyptian immigrant living in Saudi Arabia. He moved to 
Afghanistan with his father, who became an Afghan Arab. 
Following in his father's footsteps, Abdullah trained in Kandahar, 
during Taliban rule. Killed in eastern Afghanistan by US forces. 
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16 Zakariya 
(Abu Yahya 
al-Hawn) 
Former Egyptian Afghan Arab veteran, who remained in 
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Became a trainer, and 
escaped after the US invasion to FATA, where he continued to 
train mujahhideen. He later died of cancer. 
17 Mustafa 
Hamid 
(Abu Walid al-
Misri) 
Egyptian. Author of The Story of the Afghan-Arabs: From Entry 
to Afghanistan to the Final Exodus with Taliban. Considered by 
al-Sharq al-Awsat as "a leading ideologue of al-Qaeda, and one 
of the first batch of Afghan-Arabs". Related by marriage to many 
prominent leaders of al-Qaeda. Fugitive al-Qaeda operative, Saif 
Adil, married his daughter. 
18 Ramzi Mowafi Former Egyptian doctor for Bin Ladin. Went to Afghanistan in 
1990. Explosives expert. Did chemical weapons (WMD) work 
for AQ. Mawafi escaped from an Egyptian prison in 2011, and in 
December 2011, he became the Emir of the new al-Qaeda in the 
Sinai Peninsula. He was designated a terrorist by US State 
Department on 21 October 2014, for ‘helping to arrange money 
and weapons to support violent extremist activity.’ 
19 Sayyid Imam 
Abdul Aziz al-
Sharif 
(Dr Fadl) 
Egyptian plastic surgeon specializing in burn injuries. Played a 
senior management role in EIJ. Went to Afghanistan in 1984/85 
and worked for Kuwaiti al-Hilal Hospital in Peshawar - and in 
1986, secured a job for Ayman al-Zawahiri. Became an 
ideologue and authored 'The Compendium of the Pursuit of 
Divine Knowledge' - later a core jihadi reference. Later moved to 
Yemen (1994) and after 9/11 was arrested and imprisoned for 3 
years. In 2004, he was returned to Egypt where he denounced al-
Qaeda and terrorism.  
20 Ahmad Omar 
Abdul Rahman 
(Saif) 
Egyptian. Son of Omar Abdul Rahman. Former Afghan Arab and 
member of EIG, and later member of al-Qaeda. Killed by a US 
drone strike in Afghanistan in October 2011.   
21 Ahmad Hasan 
Jamil 
Sulaiman 
Jordanian Afghan Arab from 1989, and has been associated with 
IIRO (NGO) and senior al-Qaeda operatives ever since. Arrested 
in Pakistan in 2002 and sent to GTMO. 
22 Khalid 
Mahmood 
Abdul Wahhab 
Jordanian. In 1985, he moved to PAK to work with JT. In 1986, 
he worked for Maktab al-Khidmat under Abdullah Azzam. 
Ostensibly worked for HIF (NGO) while continuing his 
relationship with al-Qaeda from 1988 – 2002. Sent to GTMO. 
23 Abdul Latif al 
Banna 
Jordanian. Recruited by Dr Samih Zidan in 1990, to travel to 
Afghanistan to fight jihad against the Soviets, working for the 
IIRO (NGO). Later went to the UK (1991) and worked with 
radical cleric Abu Qatada. Arrested in Gambia in November 
2002. Associated with al-Qaeda. 
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24 Muhammad 
Sadiq Odeh 
Jordanian of Palestinian origin.  Involved in 1998 US embassy 
bombing in Nairobi. Born in Saudi, raised in Jordan. Holds a 
Bachelor’s degree in engineering from Manila University. 
'Radicalised' in Philippines. Went to Afghanistan in 1990. Joined 
AQ in 1992, served as 'technical advisor' to Nairobi cell. Swore 
bayah to Bin Laden. Implicated in Somalia killing of US 
soldiers. Sentenced to life imprisonment in October 2001.  
25 Iyad Adil al-
Qunnah 
(Abu Bakr 
al−Falastini) 
Jordanian of Palestinian origin. Went to Afghanistan in 1980s to 
fight the Soviets. Once Afghan civil war broke out, he left but 
returned after the Taliban took control (1994/5). He fought the 
US (post 9/11) and was later killed by US forces.  
26 Khalid Shaykh 
Muhammad 
(KSM) 
Kuwaiti (Pakistani decent). A veteran Afghan Arab (from 1987) 
and involved in 1993 WTC bombing. Veteran of Bosnian jihad. 
Member of AQ. The principal architect of the 9/11 attacks. Head 
of AQ Mil committee. Family involved in extremism, including 
3 x brothers, 6 x cousins, and 1 x nephew (Ramzi Yusuf). High 
Value Detainee in GTMO 
27 Ramzi Ahmad 
Yusuf 
(Abdul Basit 
Mahmoud 
Abdul Karim) 
Kuwaiti (of Baluchi decent). Born in Kuwait. Nephew of KSM. 
Studied in Swansea, UK. Became an Afghan Arab in 1988, by 
attending training. Met and befriended Mahmood Abu Halima. 
Later together, they planned the 1993 WTC attack in New York 
(and Bojinka plot). Was never a member of AQ. Jailed for life in 
America in 1998.  
28 Wadih al-Hajj 
(Abdul Sabur) 
Lebanese. El Hage was born in 1960 into a Catholic family in 
Lebanon, but grew up in Kuwait, where he converted to Islam. In 
1978, he moved to the US and studied at a university in 
Louisiana. In (1984?) he left the US and went to Afghanistan - 
acting as an educator. He returned to the US in 1985, but in early 
1992, he moved his family to the Sudan and began working as a 
secretary for Osama bin Laden. He was involved (as an engineer) 
in the 1998 AQ bombings of the US embassies in Kenya & 
Tanzania, and later jailed in the US. 
29 Abu Faraj al-
Libi 
Libyan. In 1989, he travelled to Afghanistan. Later he was the 
operational chief of al-Qaeda. He managed al-Qaeda operations 
in Iraq (after KSM’s capture). Involved with the 1998 East 
Africa attacks and 9/11 planning. Arrested in Pakistan in 2005. 
Sent to GTMO. 
30 Ziyad Faraj 
al−Bah 
(Assad Allah 
al−Libi) 
Libyan. Went to Afghanistan in 1990, and later moving to 
Tajikistan (with Khattab). Lived in Sudan (with Bin Laden) and 
later returned to Afghanistan. Fought the US, later escaping into 
the FATA, and joined Abu Layth al-Libi. Killed in Afghanistan.    
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31 Ali Ammar al-
Rufayi 
(Abu Layth al-
Libi) 
Libyan Afghan Arab who returned to Libya to fight the Gaddafi 
regime (religious nationalist - LIFG). Escaped Libya and was 
later imprisoned in Saudi Arabia. Moved to Afghanistan in 1997, 
and joined al-Qaeda. He was killed on 29 January 2008, as AQ's 
No.3 operator. 
32 Ahmad 
Muhammad 
Ajaj 
Palestinian asylum seeker to the US. In 1992, he went to Khaldan 
training camp for military training. Involved in the 1993 WTC 
bombing, although he was in prison at the time. Convicted and 
sentenced to life in prison in the US.  
33 Omar Yusuf 
Juma 
(Abu Anas al-
Shami) 
Palestinian expatriate raised in Kuwait. Trained in Afghanistan 
for three months in 1990 (Afghan Arab), learning to use weapons 
and explosives. In 1991, he was forced to depart Kuwait and 
return to Jordan, where he was Imam at the Murad Mosque. He 
went to Bosnia in 1995, and became a radical cleric. He was 
imprisoned in Jordan in 2003, and ‘believed that the Americans 
came to Iraq to kill Muslims, and they had a right to defend 
themselves.’ He went to the umra in Saudi Arabia before 
disappearing to Iraq. Served on Shura of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 
He was killed in Baghdad on 17 September 2004 by US forces.  
34 Zayn al-Abidin 
Muhammad 
Husayn 
(Abu 
Zubaydah) 
Palestinian. Received militant training in Afghanistan in late 
1980s. He arrived in Afghanistan in January 1991. He was 
inspired by the Palestinian cause. Following the first Afghan 
jihad he decided to dedicate his life to jihad. He was recruited by 
al-Qaeda in 1997 and later was on the Shura Council. Helped 
facilitate al-Qaeda attacks outside Afghanistan.  Former Director 
of Khaldan Training Camp in Afghanistan. Now a High Value 
(GTMO) Detainee. 
35 Omar 
Mahmood 
Uthman  
(Abu Qatada) 
Palestinian. Abu Qatada lived in Jordan until 1989 when he fled 
to Afghanistan. There he served as a professor of Sharia law 
sciences. He arrived in the UK and became a radical preacher in 
London, and had connections with the GIA in Algeria. Both a 
global and religious nationalist terrorist. Extradited to Jordan in 
2013, and later was found not guilty of terrorism charges. 
36 Osama 
Azmarai 
According to Hamid and Farrall (2015), Osama Azmarai was a 
Saudi Afghan Arab, with an Uzbek background (p. 181), who 
later established his own camp near Jalalabad. He worked closely 
with KSM and Ramzi Yusuf, including the 1993 WTC attack. He 
was anti-US before al-Qaeda, and planned with KSM the failed 
‘Bojinka’ hijackings in SE Asia. He no tangible link al-Qaeda. 
He was firmly rooted in the ‘Jalalabad School’ that ‘pioneered 
attacking America and planted the idea of 9/11 with Bin Laden’ 
(p. 322). Arrested in Malaysia in 1995 by the US. 
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37 Abdullah al-
Hudhayf  
Saudi Afghan Arab and former university student in the US in 
early 1980s (and held very anti American views). Went to 
Afghanistan in late 1980s. Later involved in an attack on a Saudi 
prison interrogator, in revenge of the alleged torture of his father, 
brother, and friends. He was subsequently arrested and allegedly 
tortured to death (on 12 August 1995). His action prompted a 
revenge attack in the form of the 1995 Riyadh bombing. 
38 Khalid al-Sa'id Saudi Afghan Arab and later part of a group that carried out a 
terrorist attack in Riyadh, 13 November 1995. Killed seven & 
injured 37 Americans. Arrested in Saudi Arabia, and beheaded.   
39 Riyad 
Sulaiman 
Ishak al-Hajiri 
Saudi Afghan Arab and later part of a group that carried out a 
terrorist attack in Riyadh, 13 November 1995. Killed seven and 
injured 37 Americans. Arrested in Saudi Arabia, and beheaded.   
40 Muslih Ali 
Ayad al-
Shamrani 
Saudi Afghan Arab and possibly a veteran of Bosnian War. 
Leader of a group that carried out a terrorist attack in Riyadh, 13 
November 1995. Killed seven and injured 37 Americans. 
Arrested in Saudi Arabia and beheaded. 
41 Musa bin 
Muhammad 
bin Yahya al-
Qarni  
Saudi. Former Muslim Brother and Afghan Arab. Travelled to 
Afghanistan ‘in the early days of the Afghan jihad’ (1985) in 
order ‘to attend an academic course in Peshawar.’ He later 
became an Islamic scholar for Bin Ladin. Supported the jihad in 
Iraq. Now living as an academic in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  
42 Fahd Mahdi 
Ahmad 
Hamdan al-
Hassan al-
Shehri 
Saudi foreign fighter with a long career fighting alongside al-
Qaeda in Tajikistan, Afghanistan (Afghan Arab), Bosnia, and 
Iraq. In 1999, he was with Bin Laden and Abu Zubaydah in 
Khaldan Guest House in Afghanistan. As of late August 2006, 
US forces had arrested, detained, and debriefed him.  
43 Yusuf al-
Uyayri 
Veteran Saudi Afghan Arab from 1991. Both a global and 
religious nationalist terrorist. Briefly a bodyguard to Bin Laden. 
After the 1996 Khobar bombings he was imprisoned (and 
tortured?) for two years. Later became a committed AQAP cleric 
who wrote the Crusade in Iraq Series. Killed by Saudi forces in 
Saudi Arabia in Turba/Hail in late May 2003. 
44 Abu Khalil al-
Madani 
Former Saudi Arab Afghan, Fought with Bin Laden in Jaji. Part 
of al-Qaeda shura council. A fugative, he reappeared in al-Qaeda 
video in 2013 and 2014, discussing Jabhat al-Nusrah and ISIL.  
45 Wa'il Hamza 
Abdul Fatih 
Julaidan 
Saudi. Worked in US at Tuscon (Arizona) Islamic Centre. 
Helped establish Maktab al-Khidmat. Worked for Saudi NGOs, 
including the Saudi Joint Relief Committee (SJRC). Served as 
part of the Arab and Islamic Shura Council in Afghanistan, and 
later helped to establish al-Qaeda. 
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46 Abu Sulaiman 
al-Makki 
(Khalid al-
Harbi) 
Former Saudi teacher at Holy Mosque in Mecca. Former Afghan-
Arab and friend of Abdullah Azzam. Wounded by Serb forces in 
June 1992 (Battle of Tishin). Was permanently paralysed from 
waist down. Later involved with al-Qaeda and featured in post 
9/11 video (in December 2001), praising the 9/11 attacks with 
Bin Laden. Surrendered to Saudi authorities in 2004.352  
47 Osama 
Muhammad 
bin Laden 
Saudi (of Yemeni decent). Financier for Afghan-Arabs and 
Maktab al-Khidamat. Later leader of al-Qaeda. Issued famous 
1996 and 1998 fatwas. Involved in the 1998 bombings of US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the 2000 USS Cole bombing 
in Yemen; and the 9/11 attacks. Killed in 2011 in Abbottabad 
(Pakistan) by US Seals. 
48 Muhammad 
Haydar 
Zammar 
A Syrian who moved to Germany with his family aged 10. Later 
involved in the Afghan jihad in 1991. Went to Bosnia in 1995, 
and later recruited some of the 9/11 pilots of the hijacked planes. 
Captured in Morocco in late 2001, he was sent to Syria (not 
GTMO) for interrogation. Was freed in exchange for Syrian 
army officers, in late 2013 during the Syrian civil war (co-
ordinated by Ahrar al-Sham),  
49 Raswan 
Namoos 
(Abu Firas al-
Suri) 
Syria, born in Damascus in 1949. Joined anti-regime militants in 
1980. In mid-1980s, he moved in Afghanistan and acted as a 
trainer with mujahhideen. Later became a member of the al-
Qaeda Military Shura Council. Moved to Yemen in 2003, and 
returned to Syria (as al-Qaeda representative in Syria) in order to 
mediate between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS (now IS). He failed, 
and officially joined Jabhat al-Nusra as their spokesman. Killed 
in an airstrike in Syria in April 2016. 
50 Muhammad 
Ayman Aboul-
Tout 
(Abul-Abbas 
al-Shami) 
Syrian, involved in the 1980s Islamist uprising in Syria, within 
the ranks of the Fighting Vanguard, a now-defunct 1970s 
Muslim Brotherhood splinter faction that was influenced by the 
militant ideologue Sayyid Qutb. Escaped to Afghanistan in the 
1980s as an Afghan Arab, and later became involved with al-
Qaeda. In Syrian civil war, he became a member of Ahrar ash-
Shaam and the Islamic Front's top Sharia ideologue. Narrowly 
survived a suicide attack (9 September 2014) that killed majority 
of the leadership of Ahraar ash-Shaam. 
51 Baha Mustafa 
al-Jughl 
Former Syrian Afghan Arab, who was later arrested as a terrorist 
suspect in Pakistan in the early 2000s. In the Syrian civil war, he 
held a leadership position within Ahrar ash-Shaam. 
                                                 
352 Not to be confused with Kuwaiti Sulaiman al-Ghayth who appeared in a post 9/11 al-Qaeda video (on 10 
October 2001). 
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52 Mustafa Abdul 
Qadir Nassir 
(Abu Musab 
al-Suri) 
Syrian. According to Lia (2008b) Abu Musab al-Suri, author of a 
1600 page treatise, Call to Global Islamic Resistance, ‘advocated 
mass casualty terrorism in the West’ (p. 3) and that 
‘confrontation with America is fundamental’ (p. 412). It is 
understood he is currently (2016) in a Syrian prison. 
53 Muhammad 
Loay Bayazid 
(Abu Rida al-
Suri) 
Former Syrian Afghan Arab. Born in Syria in 1964, and moved 
to US as teenager. Started university (engineer undergraduate) in 
1982, and in 1985 went to Afghanistan. Allegedly later involved 
with al-Qaeda plot to obtain uranium, and membership of BIF. 
Never indicted in the US, last seen in Sudan in 2006. 
54 Mustafa 
Setmariam 
Nassir 
(Abu Musab 
al-Suri) 
Syrian Afghan Arab from 1987-92. In 1991, he wrote a book, 
Global Islamic Resistance, advocating global terrorism against 
the West. Despite his emphasis on ‘global jihad’ - according to 
Wagemakers (2012: 80), al-Suri ‘contends that the rulers of the 
Muslim world are apostate infidels.’  
55 Abdullah 
Omar 
Tunisian Afghan Arab who left Tunisia in 1990 following the 
Tunisian government's crackdown on opposition groups. Both a 
global and religious nationalist terrorist (Tunisian Combat 
Group). Familial ties to terrorism, including his son (who is 
GTMO detainee). In 1997, he was a Koran instructor in 
Afghanistan. Linked with al-Qaeda. GTMO detainee. 
56 Abdul Rahim 
Husayn 
Mohammed Al 
Nashiri 
Yemeni. Long time member of al-Qaeda. Pledged oath of 
allegiance (bayat) to Bin Laden. Afghan-Arab. Veteran of 
Tajikistan, Chechnya, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. Involved in 
the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 in Aden, Yemen. His cousin 
(Jihad Muhammad Ali al-Harazi) was a suicide bomber in the 
attack on the US embassy in Kenya in 1998. Involved with 
planning of 9/11 attacks. GTMO High Value Detainee. 
57 Ayman Saeed 
Abdullah 
Batarfi  
Yemeni Afghan Arab and medical doctor. He first went to 
Afghanistan in 1988 and fought the Soviets (as an Afghan Arab). 
He later became the chief medical advisor for the al-Wafa, an al-
Qaeda linked NGO. He also assisted Yazid Sufaat, one of AQ’s 
anthrax researchers in Afghanistan. GTMO detainee. 
58 Abdul Majid 
Aziz al-
Zindani 
Yemeni. Al-Zindani was a 'radical' cleric that recruited Yemenis 
for the 1980s Afghan jihad. He was present in Peshawar and 
Afghanistan (Musa Qarni, 2006). He continued to support 
militant activities, including terrorism. 
59 Ibrahim 
Muhammad 
Balawi 
Yemeni Arab Afghan in late 1980s; Bosnia in 1992; Afghanistan 
under the Taliban (with al-Qaeda) in 2000. Became a prolific 
jihadi recruiter in Yemen). Killed on 5 December 2001. 
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60 Ali Hamza 
Ahmad 
Sulaiman al 
Bahlul  
Veteran Yemeni Afghan Arab. First went to Afghanistan from 
1990-1993, and returned to AF in 1999. He swore bayat to UBL, 
served as Bin Laden’s personal secretary, operated the al-Qaeda 
media center, and was leader of the Dirty 30 group of Arabs. 
Convicted in a US court in 2008, which was overturned in 2013. 
GTMO detainee. 
61 Marwan 
Qasim Jawan 
(Abu Ali al-
Yafi) 
Yemeni Afghan Arab and veteran Chechen jihad. Recruited and 
facilitated at least 10 Yemeni jihadis for al-Qaeda. He was once a 
Bin Laden bodyguard. Al-Yafi was reportedly killed during a 
coalition raid in Kandahar, in 2001. 
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Appendix D 
Afghan Arab Subsequent Involvement in Religious Nationalist Terrorism 
 
Ser Name Short Biography 
1 Ahmad Fadhil 
Nazir al-
Khalalah 
(aka Abu 
Musab al-
Zarqawi) 
Jordanian. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi went to Afghanistan in 1989 
(Afghan Arab). In 1992 he was jailed in Jordan with Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi (on terrorism charges). Released 1999. 
Recidivist. Returned to AF & established his own training camp 
(near Harat). Later led Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and was killed in June 
2006.  
2 Khalid 
Mustafa al-
Aruri 
(aka Abu 
Qassam,  Abu 
Ashraf) 
Jordanian. Brother-in-law of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, whom he 
worked with in Afghanistan from 1989-1993, in the Herat camp. 
Returned to Jordan, and was subsequently imprisoned (with al-
Zarqawi) from 1993-1999. On his release, he returned to Herat 
camp in Afghanistan, and later was a key liaison with Ansar al-
Islam in northern Iraq. Worked in Iraq after 2003 invasion, and 
later fled to Iran. Was imprisoned, but later absconded (as at 28 
July 2005). 
3 Abu Khabab 
al-Filistini 
Palestinian/Jordanian. Close friend of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 
First went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, but stayed on to 
fight the communists, including at the battle of Jalalabad. He aslo 
worked with al-Zarqawi in the Herat camp. Returned to Jordan, 
but fled to avoid arrest. Went to Chechnya to fight, but arrested 
in Azerbaijan. He returned to Herat camp in Afghanistan, and 
later was among the first to join the jihad in Iraq. He was later 
killed by US forces.  
4 Yusuf al-
Uyayri 
See Appendix C, Serial 43. 
5 Asim 
Muhammad 
Tahir al-
Barqawi 
(aka Abu 
Muhammad al-
Maqdisi) 
Jordanian. Famous influential Jordanian Palestinian ideologue. 
Early years spent in Kuwait (expatriate). Later moved to Saudi 
Arabia to study salafi writings. Wrote important book: Millat 
Ibrahim. Participated in military training in Afghanistan during 
Afghan jihad. He was not a fighter, but spent his time teaching 
and writing (ideologue). Evicted (with all other Palestinians) by 
Kuwait after the Gulf war (for Palestinian support to Iraq) and 
moved back to Jordan, where he met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
again, and due to their political agitation, in 1994 both were 
imprisoned until 1999. Maqdisi continues to be a salafist 
ideologue, living in Jordan, intermittently in and out of jail.  
6 Kamal 
Algerian 
Algerian. Arab Afghan who returned to Algeria, and continued 
jihad in his home country. Was killed by Algerian security forces 
in 1993.   
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7 Abdul Hadi 
(aka Abu 
Sumayya) 
Algerian. His home town was centre of Islamic Front & other 
militant groups. A sermon of Shaikh Ali bin Haj tilted him 
towards religion and jihad. He went to Afghanistan & later 
returned to Algeria i10n 1992. Was killed by Algerian security 
forces in May 1993.  
8 Nasim Islam Algerian. Arab Afghan who returned to Algeria in 1992, and 
continued jihad in his home country. Was killed by Algerian 
security forces in 1993.   
9 Al-Qaqaa Algerian. Arab Afghan who returned to Algeria, and continued 
jihad in his home country. Was killed by Algerian security forces 
in 1993.   
10 Abu Sariya Algerian. Known as the 'Lion of Khost.’ Arab Afghan who 
returned to Algeria in 1992, and continued jihad in his home 
country. Was killed by Algerian security forces on 11 December 
1992.   
11 Salih ad-Deen Algerian. Arab Afghan who returned to Algeria, and continued 
jihad in his home country. Was killed by Algerian security forces 
in 1993.   
12 Abdul 
Muqtadir Abu 
Sayyaf 
Arab Afghan who started his jihadi activities in Algeria. Went to 
AF in 1991 & then returned to Algeria, and continued jihad in his 
home country. Was killed by Algerian security forces in 1993.   
13 Muhammad 
Yusuf 
Algerian. Arab Afghan who started his jihadi activities in 
Algeria. Went to AF for 'a few months' & then returned to 
Algeria, and continued jihad in his home country. Was killed by 
Algerian security forces in 1993.   
14 Lakhdar 
Boumediene 
See Appendix C, Serial 3. 
15 Tayyib al-
Afghani 
Algerian. Former Afghan-Arab who returned to Algeria in early 
1990s. Early GIA leader, who was captured in SE Algeria in 
1992. 
16 Sid Ahmad 
Murad  
Algerian. Former Afghan-Arab who returned to Algeria in early 
1990s. Joined GIA & was killed in March 1994. 
17 Sharif Ghusmi 
(aka Abu 
Abdullah 
Ahmad) 
Algerian. Former Afghan-Arab who returned to Algeria in early 
1990s. Became leader of Katiba al Mawt death squads, and later 
leader within GIA. He was killed in September 1994 (aged 26).  
18 Karmar 
Khaban 
Algerian. Former Afghan-Arab commander who returned to 
Algeria in early 1990s. Former Algerian Army officer and key 
FIS leader. Involved in Bosnian jihad (role unknown). 
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19 Boudjemaa 
Bounoua  
(aka Abdullah 
Anas) 
An Algerian, who was an Afghan-Arab from 1983 until 1992. He 
was a founder of the Maktab al-Khidmat in Peshawar. He 
became a principle military commander to Ahmad Massoud 
(Northern Alliance). He married the daughter of Sheikh Abdullah 
Azzam. He is on the council in exile of the FIS, the Algerian 
Islamist Party, and lives in London, having gained political 
asylum. 
20 Abdul Hamid 
al Ghazzawi 
Libyan. AQ associate. At the Tariq Bin Ziyad mosque in Tripoli, 
he met extremists (Najib al-Akhdar, Yusif al-Bukhari, Iz al-Din 
Balkhayr, & Ammar al- Qut) who distributed tapes that preached 
jihad. In 1988, he went to AF as an Afghan-Arab. He went to 
Sudan (1994) and then to Afghanistan again to the LIFG 
guesthouse in Jalalabad. More LIFG than AQ.  
21 Abdul Rauf 
Umar al Qusin 
Libyan. In 1990, the detainee deserted the Libyan military and 
fled to Tunisia where he met Abu Idriss (aka Abu Anas). Idriss 
convinced al-Qusin to go to Afghanistan for jihad against the 
Soviets (1990?). At the end of 1990, detainee remained with the 
Taliban to fight other groups in Afghanistan. He admitted he was 
a member of the LIFG while in AF. More LIFG than AQ.  
22 Mustafa 
Setmariam 
Nassir 
Also known as Abu Musab al-Suri. See Appendix C, Serial 54. 
23 Abdullah 
Umar 
See Appendix C, Serial 55. 
24 Mukhtar 
Muhammad 
Belmukhtar 
See Appendix C, Serial 4. 
25 Mustafa 
Ahmad 
Hamlili 
See Appendix C, Serial 5. 
26 Tayyib 
Masoudi 
(aka Tayyib al-
Afghani) 
Algerian. Former Afghan Arab. In November 1991, he attacked 
an Algerian army post, killed 15 conscripts & stole weapons. 
Killed in Biska (Algeria) in December 1991.   
27 Abdul Rahman 
Dahane  
(aka Dahane 
al-Afghani) 
Algerian. Former Afghan Arab. Became the most prominent 
Algerian Afghan Arab. Involved in a November 1991 attack on 
an Algerian army post, that killed 15 conscripts & stole weapons. 
He was captured in 1992 in Magrane, El-Oued, and executed in 
1993.  
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28 Abu Abdullah 
al-Sadiq 
Former Libyan Islamist before going to Afghanistan in 1988. 
One of the founders of the LIFG after 1990 (not al-Qaeda).   
29 Abu Mundhir 
al-Sa'idi 
Former Libyan Islamist before going to Afghanistan in 1988. 
One of the founders of the LIFG after 1990 (not al-Qaeda).   
30 Abdul Ghaffar 
al-Duwadi  
Former Libyan Islamist before going to Afghanistan in 1988. 
One of the founders of the LIFG after 1990 (not al-Qaeda).   
31 Salah Fathi bin 
Sulaiman 
Former Libyan Islamist before going to Afghanistan in 1988. 
One of the founders of the LIFG after 1990 (not al-Qaeda).   
32 Abdul Wahhab 
(Abu Idris) 
Former Libyan Islamist before going to Afghanistan in 1988. 
One of the founders of the LIFG after 1990 (not al-Qaeda).   
33 Iwad al-
Zawawi 
Libyan. Student of Islamic Law, and graduate from Tripoli 
University. Former Afghan Arab, went to Afghanistan in 1986. 
One of the founders of the LIFG after 1990.   
34 Ali Ammar al-
Rufayi 
Also known as Abu Layth al-Libi. See Appendix C, Serial 31. 
35 Omar 
Mahmood 
Uthman  
 Also known as Abu Qatada. See Appendix C, Serial 35. 
36 Muhammad 
bin Isa bin 
Musa al-Rifa’i 
(aka Abu 
Hammam al-
Filistini) 
Jordanian doctor of Palestinian origin, who was an Afghan Arab 
from the mid-1980s, practicing medicine & da`wa (missionary) 
activities to support the Afghan jihad. In the early 1990s, he 
returned to Jordan and helped created a religious nationalist 
group - al-Da`wa wa-al-Jihad. He was jailed for four months, 
and on his release he returned to Peshawar (1992). On 3 April 
1993, his Peshawar-based associates swore loyalty to him as the 
caliph. In 1996 he fled to London, and in 2006, he was detained, 
before being released on health grounds, dying in March 2014. 
37 Abdul Aziz al-
Muqrin 
Saudi. Al-Muqrin went to Afghanistan in 1990 and subsequently 
fought in Bosnia, and Algeria in 1994;  In 1995 he was arrested 
in Ethiopia and accused of taking part in a failed assassination of 
Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak. He was extradited to Saudi 
Arabia where he served a two-year prison term. He was released 
in summer 2001, and returned to Afghanistan after 9/11 and 
fought against the US-led coalition. Became head of AQAP in 
March 2004, and was killed in Saudi Arabia in June 2004. 
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Appendix E 
Veteran Arab Foreign Fighter Further Involvement in Defensive Jihads 
 
Table 1 
Veteran Afghan Arab Involvement in Iraq (post 2003)* 
 
Ser Name Kunya Nationality 
1 Muhammad Hardan  Iraqi 
2 Ahmad Fadhil Nazir al-Khalalah Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Jordanian 
3 Khalid Mustafa al-Aruri Abu Qassam  Jordanian 
4 Mustafa Ramadan Darwish Abu Muhammad Lebanon 
5 Abu Faraj al-Libi 
 
Libyan 
6 Abu Khabab al-Filistini 
 
Palestinian 
7 Omar Yusuf Juma Abu Anas al-Shami Palestinian 
8 Musa Muhammad Yahya al-Qarni  
 
Saudi 
9 Fahd Mahdi al-Hassan al-Shehri 
 
Saudi 
10 Yusuf al-Uyayri 
 
Saudi 
11 Abu Raghd al-Jazrawi Abu Raghd al-Utaybi Saudi 
12 Osama Muhammad bin Ladin 
 
Saudi (Y) 
 
* Involvement includes physical and/or ideological support. 
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Table 2 
Veteran Afghan Arab Involvement in Syria (post 2011)* 
 
Ser Name Kunya Nationality 
1 Saif Areef Abdullah al-Jazari Algerian 
2 Muhammad Shawqi al Islambouli 
 
Egyptian 
3 Abu Hafs al-Misri 
 
Egyptian 
4 Ayman al-Zawahiri 
 
Egyptian 
5 Ahmad Salama Mabrook Abu Faraj al-Misri Egyptian 
6 Abu Abdullah al-Muhajjir 
 
Egyptian 
7 Abu Hani al-Masri Abdul Rahman al-Misri Egyptian 
8 Muhammad Ibrahim al-Saghir Abu Abdullah Egyptian 
9 Abdul Aziz al-Qatari 
 
Iraqi**  
10 Asim Muhammad Tahir al-
Barqawi 
Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi 
Jordanian 
11 Abdul Hakim Belhaj  Libyan 
12 Abu Khalil al-Madani 
 
Saudi Arabian 
13 Ibrahim al-Bawadi Saqr al-Izz al-Jihad Saudi Arabian 
14 Abdul Malik al-Ihsai Abu Leen Saudi Arabian 
15 Zaid al-Badawi Abu Ammar al-Makki Saudi Arabian 
16 Abu Muhammad al-Halabi 
 
Saudi Arabian 
17 Abu Khalid al-Suri 
 
Syrian 
18 Raswan Namoos Abu Firas al-Suri Syrian 
19 Muhammad Ayman Aboul-Tout Abul-Abbas al-Shami Syrian 
20 Baha Mustafa al-Jughl Abu Hamza al-Jughl Syrian 
21 Muhammad Haydar Zammar 
 
Syrian 
22 Abu Basir al-Tartusi  Syrian 
 
* Involvement includes physical and/or ideological support. 
** Iraqi national despite kunya of al-Qatari.  
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Table 3 
Veteran Arab Foreign Fighters from Iraqi Jihad Involvement in Syria (post 2011)* 
 
Ser Name Kunya Nationality 
1 Abu Omar al-Shami 
 
Foreign Arab 
2 Omar Abu Qatam 
 
Jordanian 
3 Riyadh Hudayb Abu Hamza al-Urduni Jordanian 
4 Iyad al-Tubaysi Abu Julaybib Jordanian 
5 Mohammed al-Dosari Abu Talha al-Kuwait Kuwaiti 
6 Abdul Ghani Jawhar Abu Ali Lebanese 
7 Ibrahim Bakhaytan al-Hamzi  Moroccan 
8 Khalid al-Suwayd Abu Hamaam Saudi Arabian 
9 Ahmad Abdullah al-Shaya 
 
Saudi Arabian 
10 Abu Khalid al-Suri 
 
Syrian 
11 Hashim al-Shaykh Abu Jabir Syrian 
12 Abu Muhammad al-Gholani 
 
Syrian 
13 Abu Muhammad al-Ayaat 
 
Syrian 
14 Hassan Abood 
 
Syrian 
15 Abu Hammam al-Suri 
 
Syrian 
16 Hamdi Thawadi Hamdi al-Tunisi Tunisian 
17 Boubakr al-Hakim Abu Muqaatil al-Tunisi Tunisian 
 
* Involvement includes physical and/or ideological support. 
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Appendix F 
Analysis of CPOST Suicide Attacks in Syria (2012-2015) 
 
Chapter 6 highlighted the 46 ‘suicide attacks’ listed, on the Chicago Project on Security and 
Threats (CPOST) Suicide Attack Database, as attacks against ‘civilian’ targets, occurring in 
Syria between 2012 and 2015. Having removed three duplicate entries and three with no 
clearly identifiable target, out of the remaining 40 attacks, only 28 could reasonably be 
considered as suicide attacks targeting civilians and non-combatants, with the remaining 12 
attacks being more consistent with defensive jihad, against combatant targets. This 
appendix is included to demonstrate the difficulty in interpreting self-sacrificial attacks 
(despite the best intentions of those who compile the data), and the care needed before 
drawing findings and conclusions based on such data. Below are the results of the analysis 
of the 46 CPOST ‘suicide attacks,’ where the ‘target type’ was classified by CPOST as 
‘civilian.’  
 
Table 1 
Self-sacrificial attacks consistent with defensive jihad 
Ser Attack ID Attack Date Supporting Media Depiction of Target 
1 -170414947 2012-03-05 Car bomb in Deraa that wounded 20 'including 
security force personnel.' 
2 -2120898580 2012-06-14 ‘A security complex overlooking the garage was 
damaged. The bomb went off near security 
offices, damaging the apparent target as well as 
the shrine. It was not immediately clear whether 
the shrine was the intended target.’ 
3 -2143985988 2012-10-03 ‘The officers' club and the hotel were almost 
completely destroyed. The Britain-based Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights … said …most of 
them members of the regime forces.’ 
4 1393729660 2012-11-28 ‘Attacks took place in Jaramana, where pro-
regime militiamen have set up armed groups to 
defend the town against rebels.’ 
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Ser Attack ID Attack Date Supporting Media Depiction of Target 
5 1428079662 2013-10-21 ‘Suicide bombers detonated at the gas line and a 
regime base outside Sadad and then entered the 
town.’ 
6 -976959534 2013-11-20 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said 
opposition forces had entered Bassel Hospital to 
capture a (Hizibullah) wounded officer but were 
unsuccessful. 
7 -147281505 2013-12-20 Al-Kindi Hospital. ‘The Al-Kindi Hospital is 
located in a valuable strategic point in Aleppo 
countryside and … under the Syrian Army control 
and clashes continue.’ 2 x Iraqi foreign fighters 
(Khattab al-Iraqi & Abu Turab al-Iraqi). 
8 1405965104 2014-03-11 Hadaya Hotel (Qamishly). ‘Hotel in the city 
which was being used as a local Kurdish 
administration office.’ Saudi bomber (Abu 
Hamam al-Najdi). 
9 1427906664 2014-10-10 Attacked the Grand mosque in Kobani. Suicide 
bomb - no casualties. Part of "heavy clashes 
between Kurdish forces and Islamic State 
fighters." Tunisian bomber (Abu Mahmood al-
Tunisi). 
10 1443114679 2014-10-13 Abu Noor al-Jazai'ri (Saudi Arabia) attacked a bus 
station in Kobani as part of "heavy clashes 
between Kurdish forces and Islamic State 
fighters." 
11 220425044 2014-12-29 ‘Five employees and four regime troops guarding 
the Firqlos gas plant were killed in a car bomb 
blast near the facility in the east of Homs 
province’ said the Syrian Observatory for Human 
Rights. Two Moroccan bombers (Abu Abdullah 
al-Maghrabi & Abu Ayoob al-Maghrabi) involved 
in attack. 
12 1439321480 2015-07-05 Al-Hasakah thermal power plant - strategic target.  
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Table 2 
Self-sacrificial attacks consistent with Islamist terrorism 
Ser Attack ID Attack Date Supporting Media Depiction of Target 
1 1286459136 2012-10-21 French run hospital 
2 1428346952 2013-01-18 Mosque 
3 366163269 2013-03-21 Mosque 
4 419829513 2013-04-08 Central bank in Damascus 
5 -178029777 2013-06-08 Bank in Damascus 
6 -958440792 2013-06-27 Greek Orthodox church 
7 433590465 2013-07-08 Regime controlled area of Homs 
8 1772105982 2013-08-22 Pro government journalist 
9 -1867325880 2013-11-04 A Shiite school 
10 36219496 2013-11-11 Residential area in Kobani, although unknown 
target. Saudi suicide bomber was Dr Mashara al-
Qasami. 
11 478816730 2013-11-26 Bus station in Sumariyah 
12 -26866722 2013-12-03 ‘The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights … 
said that the target appeared to be a government 
building.’ 
13 1428337179 2013-12-22 Shiite school children. 
14 -169017205 2014-01-02 Residential area Al Kafat Hamaa. 
15 -2097645099 2014-02-20 Syrian refugee camp. 
16 1405624820 2014-05-02 Alawite residential area in Jibrin 
17 1707119703 2014-05-02 Alawite residential area in Humairi 
18 -1060000123 2014-06-02 Non-Arab FF (French) 
19 -326953823 2014-08-09 Suicide car bomb in Ghranij (Deir Azzoor). Saudi 
foreign fighter (Abu Mujahhid al-Jazrawi).  
20 677680545 2014-09-30 Ekrimah primary school - Alawite children 
21 1128660167 2015-03-20 Kurdish New Year - suicide attack 
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Ser Attack ID Attack Date Supporting Media Depiction of Target 
22 -752085471 2015-06-25 Al Jazeera's Nisreen El Shamayleh, reporting 
from Amman, said several ISIL fighters "carried 
out suicide attacks; decimated themselves and 
caused a lot of casualties" after entering the city.  
23 -1236149507 2015-08-29 Suicide attack in Alawite neighbourhood of Homs 
24 1447968890 2015-10-08 Suicide bombing of Aleppo market 
25 342352671 2015-12-11 Suicide attack on a hospital, market and 
residential area in Kurdish controlled territory 
(Hasakah) 
26 -622581575 2015-12-12 Syrian suicide bomber - attacks Alawite area in 
Homs 
27 596139371 2015-12-28 Alawite neighbourhood of Homs 
28 -1911637284 2015-12-30 Suicide attacks in three restaurants in Qamishli 
 
 
Table 3 
Unknown intended target 
Ser Attack ID Attack Date Supporting Media Depiction of Target 
1 1431361176 2014-01-03 National Hospital in Jasmin City. ‘Army managed 
to explode the vehicle with RPG rockets before it 
reaches its goal.’ Saudi bomber (Ibrahim al-Arifi) 
2 -1932641626 2014-04-09 Attack on Alawite neighbourhood. ‘Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights, January 3, 2015 - 
still not confirmed whether if they were fighters 
allied to regime forces or civilians.’ Libyan 
bomber (Abu Abdullah as-Salmiya). 
3 1820843504 2015-02-21 According to the Syrian Observatory for Human 
Rights ‘the explosion that hit the town of 
Qardaha … two women and two soldiers were 
killed in the attack.’ 
 
 
 
 295 
Table 4 
Duplicate entries 
Ser Attack ID Attack Date Supporting Media Depiction of Target 
1 1405541428 2013-03-22 Duplicate of attack ID 366163269 
2 1416424873 2014-10-01 Duplicate of attack ID 677680545 
3 1667842542 2015-12-11 Duplicate of attack ID 342352671 
 
 
